Traxo, Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 6, 20202020001721 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 6, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/822,498 08/10/2015 Andres Fabris TRAX01-00007 1074 23990 7590 07/06/2020 DOCKET CLERK P.O. DRAWER 800889 DALLAS, TX 75380 EXAMINER VETTER, DANIEL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3628 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/06/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): munckwilson@gmail.com patents@munckwilson.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte ANDRES FABRIS and RICHARD PENDERGAST ________________ Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JUSTIN BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judges. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection of claims 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, and 20–29. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. INVENTION The claimed invention relates to identifying, processing, and handling travel reservations that are made outside of a company travel policy. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below: 1. A method by at least one processor, the method 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Traxo, Inc. is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 2 comprising: receiving, by the at least one processor, an email from an email server, the email having a record of a hotel reservation made by an employee of a company, wherein the at least one processor receives the email from the email server after the email server executes a keyword based filter to identify that the email includes the record of the hotel reservation; determining, by the at least one processor, based on information extracted from the record of the hotel reservation, whether the hotel reservation is for leisure travel; determining, by the at least one processor, whether the hotel reservation complies with a travel policy of the company by determining whether the email having the record of the hotel reservation was sent from an email address or email domain that is predetermined to be in accordance with the travel policy; determining, by the at least one processor, whether the hotel reservation meets an exception to the travel policy; determining, by the at least one processor, whether the hotel reservation is fully cancelable without penalty, the determining comprising (i) executing computer instructions comprising a parsing algorithm to parse the record of the hotel reservation and determine whether the record includes one or more text strings or keywords associated with a cancellation policy, and (ii) interpreting the one or more text strings or keywords to determine the cancellation policy; and upon a determination that (i) the hotel reservation is not for leisure travel, (ii) the hotel reservation does not comply with the travel policy, (iii) the hotel reservation does not meet an exception to the travel policy, and (iv) the hotel reservation is fully cancelable, sending, by the at least one processor, a notification email to the employee so the employee may cancel the hotel reservation, and determining a list of recommended hotels that are within the travel policy for presentation to the employee. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 3 Appeal Br. 23–24 (Claims App.) (emphases added to indicate additional, i.e., non-abstract, elements). REJECTION Claims 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, and 20–29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–8. ANALYSIS We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually raised in the Briefs.2 Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). A. Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of 2 In the instant appeal, claims 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18–20, 25, 27, and 28 are not argued separately from claim 1 in either of Appellant’s briefs (Appeal Br. 10–22; Reply Br. 2–9) and will not be addressed separately. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 4 intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 5 B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 6 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. C. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments The Examiner determines that the claims recite certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes. Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner further determines that the abstract ideas are not integrated into a practical application because the additional elements, taken individually or as an ordered combination, provide a general technological environment in which to carry out the judicial exception and do not improve a technological field or the functioning of the computer components themselves. Id. 5–6. The Examiner determines that the additional elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Id. 6–7 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22, 27–30, 58–61; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–25; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). The Examiner additionally determines that the dependent claims similarly fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application and do not recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 7–8. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 7 Appellant disputes that the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Appeal Br. 12–16; Reply Br. 2– 5 (citing Example 40 of the Subject Matter Eligibility Examples5). Appellant additionally contends that the claims do not preempt the use of the abstract idea in all fields. Appeal Br. 18. Appellant argues that the Examiner does not provide evidence required by the Berkheimer Memorandum6 to support the finding that the additional elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Id. at 16–17; Reply Br. 6–7. Appellant argues that the lack of a prior art rejection indicates that the combination of elements in the claims is not well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 18; Reply Br. 7. Appellant further argues that the Examiner’s analysis is deficient, because it fails to consider all of the additional elements and the limitations 5 Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas (available at http://ptoweb.uspto.gov/patents/exTrain/documents/101-examples-37- 42.pdf) (“Subject Matter Eligibility Examples”) 6 In response to Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the USPTO published a Memorandum of Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (“Berkheimer Memorandum”) requiring at least one of four categories of information to support a finding that an additional element is well- understood, routine, or conventional: (1) A citation to an express statement in the specification or to a statement made by an applicant during prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s); (2) A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s); (3) A citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s); or (4) A statement that the examiner is taking official notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). Berkheimer Memorandum at 3–4. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 8 directed to sending a notification email upon four determinations being made. Appeal Br. 17–18; Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant argues that dependent claims 21–24, 26, and 29 integrate the abstract idea into a practical application and amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 18–20; Reply Br. 7–8. D. Step 2A, Prong One: The Judicial Exception Claim 1 requires receiving a record of a hotel reservation made by an employee of a company; determining whether the hotel reservation is for leisure travel; determining whether the hotel reservation complies with a travel policy of the company; determining whether the hotel reservation meets an exception to the travel policy; determining whether the hotel reservation is fully cancelable without penalty, the determining comprising parsing the record of the hotel reservation to determine whether the record includes one or more text strings or keywords associated with a cancellation policy, and interpreting the one or more text strings of keywords to determine the cancellation policy; and upon a determination that the hotel reservation is not for leisure travel, does not comply with the travel policy, does not meet an exception to the travel policy, and is fully cancelable, sending a notification to the employee. The present claims recite concepts relating to commercial or legal interactions, which fall into the category of certain methods of organizing human activity. See id. Moreover, those certain methods of organizing human activity are a type of abstract idea. See id. Namely, the claims recite features such as, “receiving . . . a record of a hotel reservation made by an employee of a company;” “determining . . . based on information extracted from the record of the hotel reservation, whether the hotel reservation is for leisure travel;” “determining. . . whether the hotel reservation complies with Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 9 a travel policy of the company by determining whether . . . the record of the hotel reservation was sent from an email address or email domain that is predetermined to be in accordance with the travel policy;” “determining . . . whether the hotel reservation meets an exception to the travel policy;” “determining . . . whether the hotel reservation is fully cancelable without penalty, the determining comprising (i) . . . pars[ing] the record of the hotel reservation and determin[ing] whether the record includes one or more text strings or keywords associated with a cancellation policy, and (ii) interpreting the one or more text strings of keywords to determine the cancellation policy;” and “upon a determination that (i) the hotel reservation is not for leisure travel, (ii) the hotel reservation does not comply with the travel policy, (iii) the hotel reservation does not meet an exception to the travel policy, and (iv) the hotel reservation is fully cancelable, sending . . . a notification . . . to the employee so the employee may cancel the hotel reservation, and determining a list of recommended hotels that are within the travel policy for presentation to the employee,” which are all features that recite business relations, and therefore fall under certain methods of organizing human activity. In particular, the limitations above recite identifying and handling a company’s out-of-policy hotel reservations made by an employee, and as such, constitute business relations, i.e., an abstract idea. Further, the present claims recite concepts that can be performed in the mind or with the assistance of pen and paper, which are concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion). Concepts performed in the human mind fall under the category of mental processes (i.e., an abstract idea). Namely, the claims require features such as, “receiving . . . a record of a hotel reservation made Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 10 by an employee of a company;” “determining . . . based on information extracted from the record of the hotel reservation, whether the hotel reservation is for leisure travel;” “determining . . . whether the hotel reservation complies with a travel policy of the company;” “determining . . . whether the hotel reservation meets an exception to the travel policy of the company by determining whether . . . the record of the hotel reservation was sent from an email address or email domain that is predetermined to be in accordance with the travel policy;” “determining . . . whether the hotel reservation is fully cancelable without penalty, the determining comprising (i) . . . pars[ing] the record of the hotel reservation and determin[ing] whether the record includes one or more text strings or keywords associated with a cancellation policy, and (ii) interpreting the one or more text strings or keywords to determine the cancellation policy; and “upon a determination that (i) the hotel reservation is not for leisure travel, (ii) the hotel reservation does not comply with the travel policy, (iii) the hotel reservation does not meet an exception to the travel policy, and (iv) the hotel reservation is fully cancelable, sending . . . a notification . . . to the employee so the employee may cancel the hotel reservation, and determining a list of recommended hotels that are within the travel policy for presentation to the employee,” which are all features that can be performed practically in the human mind or with the assistance of pen and paper, and therefore are abstract ideas. In particular, these claim features are similar to receiving a paper hotel reservation record; parsing, i.e., reading, the hotel reservation record to determine whether certain conditions are met; and upon determining that the conditions are met, sending a notification, which are tasks that humans routinely and for many years have performed mentally or with pen and paper to determine employee compliance with company policies. Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 11 However, we must still determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. We therefore (1) identify whether there are any additional recited elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements both individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. See id. Accordingly, we proceed to Prong 2. E. Step 2A, Prong 2: Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application Here, the only elements in the claims beyond the abstract idea are “at least one processor,” “an email,” “an email server,” “a keyword based filter,” “a parsing algorithm,” and “a notification email.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons. The additional elements, taken individually, do not serve to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Here, the “at least one processor,” “an email,” “an email server,” “a keyword based filter,” “a parsing algorithm,” and “a notification email” are disclosed simply as generic computer components for executing the mental processes or business relations, i.e., abstract ideas, described above. Appellant’s Specification discloses that these elements encompass generic components, such as a generic processor (Spec. ¶ 27, Fig. 2), generic emails (Spec. ¶¶ 32, 41, 58), a Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 12 generic server (Spec. ¶¶ 22, 32), a generic keyword based filter (Spec. ¶ 32), and a generic parsing algorithm (Spec. ¶¶ 32, 48, 54). Merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application). In addition, the additional elements “an email” and “an email server” do not themselves carry out any of the steps recited in the claims. See MPEP § 2106.05(g) (“The term ‘extra-solution activity’ can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim.”). Rather, we conclude that these additional elements merely act as data inputs for carrying out the abstract ideas recited in the claims, such that they constitute extra-solution activity. Id. (“Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post- solution activity. An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a claimed process.”). For example, courts have found data gathering steps to be insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity), aff’d sub nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). Considering the claims as a whole, the additional elements merely add generic computer activity to determine whether an employee’s hotel reservation is outside of company policy and to notify the employee, which is insufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 13 We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims are similar to Claim 1 of Example 40 of the Subject Matter Eligibility Examples. See Appeal Br. 14–16; Reply Br. 3–5. The invention in Example 40 relates to network visibility tools, specifically NetFlow protocol, which has a technical problem of large records, high traffic volume, and reduced network performance. See Subject Matter Eligibility Examples 10. Notably, in Example 40, the claimed invention reduces traffic volume by limiting collection of additional NetFlow protocol data to instances when initially collected data indicates an abnormal condition. Id. at 10–11. Claim 1 of Example 40 integrates the additional elements into a practical application, because “the claim as a whole is directed to a particular improvement in collecting traffic data,” whereby excess traffic volume on the network is avoided, and network performance and network monitoring are improved. Id. at 11. In contrast to Claim 1 of Example 40, the present invention is not directed to reducing either record flows or network traffic volume, or improving performance or monitoring of a network. For example, Appellant’s Specification does not disclose a technological problem with large flows or volumes of emails, nor are the claims directed to a solution to such problem. See, generally, Spec. In contrast, the present claims create more emails, because they require receiving an email, parsing the email, and sending another email if certain conditions are met. See claim 1. Instead, the present claims are more analogous to those considered by the Federal Circuit in FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The subject claim in FairWarning relates to a method for detecting fraud by an otherwise-authorized use of a patient’s protected health information (“PHI”), comprising generating a rule for Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 14 monitoring audit log data; applying the rule to audit log data to determine if an event has occurred, the event occurring if at least one criterion has been met; storing, in memory, a hit if the event has occurred; and providing notification if the event has occurred. FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1092. The court determined that the claims “merely implement an old practice in a new environment.” Id. at 1094 (citation omitted). In particular, the court determined: The claimed rules ask whether accesses of PHI, as reflected in audit log data, are 1) ‘by a specific user,’ 2) ‘during a predetermined time interval,’ or 3) ‘in excess of a specific volume.’ These are the same questions (though perhaps phrased with different words) that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centuries. Although FairWarning’s claims require the use of a computer, it is this incorporation of a computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly ‘improve[s] [the] existing technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks. Id. at 1094–95. Similarly, the rules recited in the present claims ask whether 1) a hotel reservation is not for leisure travel, 2) the hotel reservation does not comply with company travel policy, 3) the hotel reservation does not meet an exception to the company travel policy, and 4) the hotel reservation is fully cancelable. See claim 1. Like in FairWarning, these questions are the same that humans determining and responding to hotel reservations made outside of a company travel policy have asked for decades, and therefore, merely form part of the abstract ideas discussed above. Similarly, Appellant’s contention that the invention allows for “intelligently identifying and parsing cancellation information from a hotel reservation record” (Appeal Br. 14), is not persuasive to show a Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 15 technological improvement. This alleged improvement is an improvement in business relations, which falls within the category of an abstract idea, as discussed supra, not an improvement to technology. “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Appellant’s argument that the present claims do not preempt use of an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 18), do not persuade us that the claims are eligible. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098. For claims covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We are unpersuaded that any of dependent claims 21–24, 26, or 29 recite additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Appeal Br. 18–20; Reply Br. 7–8. Specifically, we disagree that claims 21, 26, and 29 recite additional elements. Instead, those claims merely further limit the abstract idea, discussed supra, of determining, based on information extracted from the record of the hotel reservation, whether the hotel reservation is for leisure travel. Although claims 22–24 recite “an email notification” (see Claims App.), Appellant’s Specification discloses that the emails of the present invention are generic emails. See Spec. ¶¶ 32, Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 16 41, 58. As discussed above, merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to Step 2A, Prong 2. Because the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B. F. Step 2B: The Inventive Concept We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner does not support the finding that the additional elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional, and does not include an analysis of all the additional elements. Appeal Br. 16–18 (citing Berkheimer Memorandum). As an initial matter, Appellant’s argument that the additional elements include the “four determining operations associated with four different conditions” (Appeal Br. 17–18; see, also, Reply Br. 6–7), namely those discussed supra in conjunction with FairWarning, appears misplaced because all of the claim limitations, with the exception of the additional elements identified above, are directed to the abstract idea, as discussed supra, in § D. An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic, 818 F.3d at 1376; see also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’” (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 17 significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, the Examiner has supplied the evidence required by the Berkheimer Memorandum at least by providing a citation to the Specification and to one or more court decisions. See Final Act. 6–7 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22, 27–30, 58–61; SAP Am., Inc., 890 F.3d at 1023; Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–25; Intellectual Ventures I, 838 F.3d at 1307; Versata., 793 F.3d at 1334). Appellant’s argument that “[w]hile the Examiner cites some court cases, the holdings in those cases do not demonstrate that all of the elements of Claim 1 are well-understood, routine, and conventional” (Reply Br. 7) does not, without more, persuade of error in the Examiner’s finding to the contrary. The Examiner also determines, and we agree, that the Specification at paragraphs 22, 27–30, and 58–61, describes the additional elements as known and conventional generic computing elements in a manner that indicates that they are sufficiently well-known. Final Act. 6–7. The Specification supports the Examiner’s determination in this regard, because it explains that “at least one processor,” “an email,” “an email server,” “a keyword based filter,” “a parsing algorithm,” and “a notification email,” are generic components and describes them at a high level of generality. ¶¶ 22, 27, 32, 41, 48, 54, 58, Fig. 2. With regard to Appellant’s argument that the claims are not well- understood, routine, or conventional because the prior art of record does not Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 18 disclose or suggest the claim limitations (Appeal Br. 18; Reply Br. 7), Appellant improperly conflates the requirements for eligible subject matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty (§ 102) and non- obviousness (§ 103). “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89; see also Genetic, 818 F.3d at 1376 (stating that, “under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility”). We disagree with Appellant’s additional argument that dependent claims 21–24, 26, and 29 recite significantly more and create an ordered combination that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 18–20; Reply Br. 7–8. As discussed above, claims 21, 26, and 29 do not recite any additional elements that could amount to significantly more. Claims 22–24 recite only the additional element of “a notification email,” which is discussed at a high degree of generality in Applicant’s Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 32, 41, 58), and is not purported to improve the functioning of the computer itself or any other technology or technical field. Therefore, on the record before us, Appellant has not shown that the claims on appeal add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional, when the claim limitations are considered both individually and as an ordered combination. See MPEP § 2106.05(d). For at least the above reasons, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, and 20– Appeal 2020-001721 Application 14/822,498 19 29, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, and 20–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, and 20–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more. DECISION SUMMARY FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, 20–29 101 Eligibility 1, 4, 6–8, 11, 13–15, 18, 20–29 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation