Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 19, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 1061 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

TRATFRSI CITY~ OS ii )PATHIC HOSPIT li
Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital and United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC.
Cases 7-CA- 18003, 7-CA-18080, and 7-CA-
18947
March 19, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY Ml MBERS JENKINS, ZIMMERMAN, AND
HUNTER
On November 4, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Marion C. Ladwig issued the attached Deci-
sion in this prioceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found, inter alia,
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by discriminatorily discharging employees
Elbridge Aldridge and Rita Craven. With respect
to Aldridge, the Administrative Law Judge found
that Respondent seized on a profane outburst ut-
tered by Aldridge at the hospital cafeteria on Janu-
ary 28, 1981, as a pretext for ridding itself of an
active supporter of unionization. While we agree
with the Administrative Law Judge's findings in
this regard,2 we also note that Aldridge's outburst
occurred in the context of Aldridge's exercise of
union and protected concerted activities, thereby
warranting the application of the principles set
forth in Thor Power Company, 148 NLRB 1379,
1380 (1964), enfd. 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965).
Responldent has excepted to certain credibilits findilngs mlade bh the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's estabhished polios Ilc tot
overrule an administratise lax judge's resolutions with respect to credi.
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the rele .ant es idence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc.. 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd 188 F2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We hae
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
Respondent also asserts that the Administrative lIaus Judge was biased
against Respondent in his interpretatiort of testimonytl at Ihe hearing
Upon our full consideration of the recovrd, we perceise no esidelce that
the Administrative law Judge prejudged the case or demonsirleated a bias
against Respondent in his analysis or di'scussion of the elidence Accord
ingly, we find totally without merit Respondenl's allegation of bias on
the part of the Administrative L aw Judge
2 We. however. unlike the Administratise I ass Judge, place ino reli-
ance upon Respondent's Written reports to the Michigan [-mplosrIIeni
Security Commission. wsherein Respondent noted that Aidridge was dis-
cussing unionlation on the date in question in I our sieu, Respondent's
reference to this topic simpls indicates that it reported the uhbstanlce f
the conversation Io the Conlmnlssiol for utrenpll Inlltell COnmperlstlutll
purposes and does not necessarils reseal "concern" about Aldrldge's con
tinued union actrisit
The credited testimony establishes that, during
the discussion which gave rise to Aldridge's pro-
fane outburst, Aldridge was seated among a group
of employees at the cafeteria and was discussing
with these employees the formation of a union, was
urging employees to commence union campaigning
as soon as possible, and was expressing to employ-
ees how, in his view, unionization would give em-
ployees greater job security. During the course of
these remarks, employee Jean Jessup, who was
seated among this group of employees, reacted to
Aldridge's comments by making negative refer-
ence, in a loud voice, to "the goddamned union"
and by impliedly warning Aldridge that, in her
view, Aldridge might be discharged if he continued
to support unionization. Angered by Jessup's re-
marks, Aldridge loudly stated to Jessup, "If you
want to be a brown-nosing suck-ass, you can, but
I'm not going to be and I never will be one." 3
Even assuming, arguendo, that Aldridge's dis-
charge was attributable solely to the January 28 in-
cident, as contended by Respondent, it is clear that
his discharge was directly attributable to conduct
which was part of the res gestae of Aldridge's
union and protected concerted activities; i.e., his
discussion with fellow employees urging support
for unionization. In such circumstances, we have
long held that, in order for discipline arising there-
from to be privileged, the misconduct at issue must
be so flagrant or egregious as to warrant the re-
moval of the Act's protection from the employee's
otherwise integrally related protected union and
concerted activities. United States Postal Service,
250 NLRB 4 (1980); Thor Power Tool Company,
supra. We find, under the circumstances herein,
that Aldridge's outburst was not so flagrant or
egregious as to remove him from the protection of
the Act. We note particularly the credited testimo-
ny that the use of profanity by hospital personnel
was not uncommon, including its use in the cafete-
ria, and had been tolerated in the past, that Al-
dridge's profane outburst was, to some degree, pro-
voked by employee Jessup's intemperate and pro-
fane comments to Aldridge regarding unionization
and Aldridge's future job status, that Jessup herself
frequently used profanity in conversations with
other employees, that the outburst was made
during nonworking time outside of a patient care
area, and that there were apparently few nonem-
ployee visitors in the cafeteria at the time in ques-
Jessup
'
s uri ttcin satemnt it Reepondcnt coimplaining about Al-
dridge', retnlurk.,s silmlitted shortls after the incident, clearly indicates
that Aidridge s ins dls.uillsiig Utllio)niatioll and loh security at the time of
lhe outburst s I hu. it i, Iunispued that Aldridge .,is seeking support for
uritlral llt ilnlo llg tclloe, ermplosees during the Januars 28 discussiuonl
1I11d h.ill Responlldtlel \.ls i, ; i\;are Iat all perllnenlt times
260 NLRB No. 147
0()61
I)ECISI(ONS OF NAFI()NAL LABO()R RELATIONS BOARD
tion and no evidence that any complaints, other
than by Jessup, were made to management regard-
ing Aldridge's conduct. Therefore, in these circum-
stances, and for this additional reason, we agree
with the Administrative Law Judge that Respond-
ent's discharge of Aldridge violated the Act.
With respect to the discharge of Rita Craven, we
agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the
evidence as a whole warrants a finding that Re-
spondent discharged Craven because of her support
and activities on behalf of the Union. In adopting
the Administrative Law Judge's findings and con-
clusions in this regard, and in addition to those fac-
tors set forth more fully by the Administrative
Law Judge at section II,C,5, of his Decision, we
note the credited testimony that Craven was the
leading employee organizer at the hospital; that
Craven's union activities were, on occasion, con-
ducted in the presence of supervisors; that Supervi-
sor Lucille Cowles informed Craven on July 1,
1980, that she was aware of Craven's union activi-
ties; that Craven's discharge was effectuated in a
particularly summary manner; and that no credible
basis existed to support Respondent's contention
that Craven, in fact, insubordinately refused a
direct work order. Accordingly, in agreement with
the Administrative Law Judge, we find that Re-
spondent's discharge of Craven violated Section
8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Traverse City
Osteopathic Hospital, Traverse City, Michigan, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order. 4
' In accordance with his dissent in Oyvmphi Medical Corporaurtion, 20
NLRB 146 (1980), Member Jenkins would award interest on the backray
due based on the formula set forth therein
DECISION
STATEMENT OI rTHE CASE
MARION C. LAI)WiG, Administrative Law Judge:
These cases were heard before me in Traverse City,
Michigan, June 23-25, 1981.' The charges were filed by
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, on July 15, August 1, and February 20;
the first complaint issued on August 28; and the consoli-
dated complaint issued on April 1.
m All dates are from July 1980 until June 1981, unless otherwise indica.-
ed
The primary issues are whether Traverse City Osteo-
pathic Hospital. the Company or the Respondent, (a) un-
lawfully promulgated, maintained, and enforced an
overly restrictive no-solicitation rule, (b) discriminatorily
discharged the leading employee organizer during the
Union's organizational campaign, and (c) after the
narrow defeat of the Union in the election, discriminator-
ily discharged another union organizer for discussing a
renewal of the organizational drive, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. as amended.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due considera-
tion of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the
Company, I make the following:
FINDINGS or FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, a Michigan corporation, operates a
hospital in Traverse City, Michigan, where it annually
receives gross revenues in excess of $1 million and re-
ceives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
outside the State. The Company admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. AL .l E;EI) UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
On June 23, 1980, after the latest union organizing
began, Bruce Krider came to the hospital as its adminis-
trator and executive director. He began leading the Com-
pany's campaign to defeat the Union, notifying the em-
ployees of the no-solicitation rule, writing personal let-
ters to the employees, and conducting employee meet-
ings.
On July 28, Krider approved the discharge of employ-
ee organizer Rita Craven for engaging in "gross insubor-
dination" by purportedly refusing an assignment, without
talking to her or making any investigation to verify that
there had been such a refusal. Six months later, when
union organizer Elbridge Aldridge got into a brief,
heated argument with an antiunion employee about the
need for the Union and about beginning another union
organizational drive, Krider approved his discharge 2
days later without getting his version of what happened.
At the hearing, Krider pointed out that Craven and
Aldridge would not have been discharged without his
concurrence. He took the position that "If what is being
questioned are my notives for discharging anybody,"
past practice and records are superfluous for determining
"how I should be evaluated in this matter as it relates to
the union .... I can't let somebody commit whatever
kind of indiscretion because . . . others in past years
have gotten away with it. I've got to start with practic-
ing appropriate management and common sense and use
what reasonable judgment I have in operating that facili-
1062
TRAVERSE CITY OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAI0
ty. And I can't excuse everything because it was handled
less than adequately or differently in the past."
The principal question is whether Krider was unlaw-
fully motivated when deciding that these good emplo>-
ees were to be discharged.
B. No-Soliciuation Rule
About July 1, at 2:30 p.m., employee organizer Pauline
Rosa was standing about 20 feet from the back door of
the hospital, preparing to pass out union authorization
cards. Administrator Krider told her that she did not
have permission to be there, that it was against hospital
policy to solicit on hospital premises without authoriza-
tion from the administrator, and that she should leave.
He pointed out the policy in the employees personnel
handbook which provided that "Solicitation by hospital
employees is . . . prohibited unless such solicitation has
been approved by the administrator." (G.C. Exh. 2.)
Rosa asked, "Are you sure, because I think you're break-
ing the law," and Krider answered, "Well, that's the
policy."
Later, in employee meetings, Administrator Krider in-
formed employees about the no-solicitation rule, told
them that employee Rosa was handing out authorization
cards for the Union, and said that she "was asked to
leave the premises because she was in violation of the
hospital policy regarding solicitation and specifically be-
cause she had not gotten the proper authorization per
that policy to solicit."
The Company did not change the no-solicitation rule
until about 3 months later when it issued a new hand-
book. Meanwhile, Krider decided not to enforce the old
rule and permitted those who were willing to ignore the
rule to solicit without his permission. He did not retract
what he had told the employees in the meetings.
The first complaint alleged that since about January
15, 1980, the Company unlawfully coerced the employ-
ees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights by promulgat-
ing and maintaining an overly restrictive no-solicitation
rule in the employee handbook, and that about June 30,
1980, the Company promulgated and discriminatorily en-
forced the rule by asking an employee who was solicit-
ing for the Union to cease and leave the premises. The
Company stated in its September 16 answer that these al-
legations "are each and every one denied for the reason
that said allegations are not true." (G.C. Exh. Ig.) To the
contrary, the Company finally admitted these allegations
at the hearing.
It is well established that "The mere existence of an
overly broad rule tends to restrain and interfere with em-
ployees' rights under the Act even if not enforced,"
Staco, Inc., 244 NLRB 461, 469 (1979), and that the
rule's mere existence tends to "inhibit the union activities
of conscientious minded employees," Custom Trim Prod-
ucts, 255 NLRB 787 (1981).
1 find that during the organizing and election cam-
paign the Company unlawfully maintained the overly re-
strictive no-solicitation provision in the employee hand-
book prohibiting employees from soliciting for the Union
without approval by the hospital administrator, and that
about the first of July it unlawfully promulgated and en-
forced the rule in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
C. Discharge of Rita Craven
1. Her union activity
Rita Craven, a transcriber in the medical records
department, had previously worked about 3 years in ad-
mitting and medical records before resigning and moving
from the city. In September 1979, after Craven returned
to the city, Medical Records Director Lucille Cowles
telephoned her and asked her to come back to work and
she did. Admittedly she did "very good" work.
In the spring of 1980, Craven contacted the Union and
became its "key organizer" at the hospital. She sched-
uled the union meetings, prepared the notices, and
openly-in the presence of supervisors-passed out no-
tices, literature, and union cards, and collected the signed
cards. On July I when Supervisor Cowles gave her the
personal letter from Administrator Krider (who presum-
ably addressed such a letter to each of the other employ-
ees), Cowles told her, "Rita, I know you are active in
the union."
2. Her discharge
The transcribing work in medical records did not in-
clude the typing of pathologists' dictation which, as cre-
dibly testified by Pathologist Leo Stein, was a "totally
different language" not used by other doctors in their
general work. When pathology secretary Karen Gray
was absent, Supervisor Cowles would assign transcriber
Eleanor Myers to go to the lab to type the reports.
Sometime earlier, when Gray was sick, Craven complied
with Stein's request that she come in on Saturday to do
some work for him. She explained that she did not know
anything about the pathology work, but he promised to
help all he could. "I picked up the earphones and started
typing and I left a lot of blanks, a lot of misspelled
words, but he was very patient" and made corrections.
Then she retyped the material on the regular pathology
report form. (Secretary Gray recalled that although
Craven "had a lot of problems with the pathology
words," Stein said that Craven did a "very good" job.
She added, "He says that about everybody." Stein's im-
pression was that the associate pathologist, Dr. Subra-
manya, had merely a "slight accent" but Gray, who did
Subramanya's work, credibly testified that Subramanya
"has a very strong accent," that he "is hard to under-
stand even when he is talking regular English," and that
someone unfamiliar with pathology terminology would
have even more difficulty working for him.)
On July 28, the day of Craven's discharge, she and
medical records employees Eleanor Myers and Pauline
Rosa went to lunch from 11:45 to 12:15. About noon, in
their absence, health record analyst Mary Ann Smith re-
ceived a telephone call from laboratory aide Ruth Ealy
and referred the call to Supervisor Cowles. The aide said
that secretary Karen Gray was not there and someone
was needed. When Craven, Myers, and Rosa returned
from lunch, Cowles called Craven into her office, told
her about the call, and in effect asked her if she would
go to the lab. As credibly testified by Craven (who im-
pressed me on the stand as being an honest, forthright
witness), Cowles said, "Rita, they need someone down in
1063
D)ECISI()NS OF NATIIONA LAt ()R RELATIONS BOARD)
the .laboratory. Karen isn't here today. They need some-
one down there to do transcribing." (Cowles did not spe-
cifically ask or instruct her to go.) Craven protested,
"Lucy, I am not capable of doing that type of work
down there. I tried it before and couldn't do it."
In the discussion which followed, Craven asked about
sending employee Sue Parent, who had been assigned in
early July to work as a "floater" in various departments,
including the lab. Cowles attempted to telephone the
personnel department but no one answered. She then
told Craven, "Rita, I'll go down to Personnel and check
for you." Transcriber Myers (who also impressed me fa-
vorably as a witness) recalled that after Cowles left,
Myers asked Craven what was going on, and Craven
said that Cowles had asked her to go to pathology to do
transcription and that she told Cowles she felt she was
not capable of doing it. Myers asked her where Cowles
was then and Craven said she thought Cowles had gone
to personnel.
When Supervisor Cowles returned about 15 or 20 min-
utes later, she went to Craven's desk and told her there
was no one in personnel. Myers, who was seated directly
behind Craven, was typing and did not overhear this
part of the conversation. "But I came to a place where I
had to stop and look up a word. And at that point I did
hear the conversation.... I heard Mrs. Cowles say to
Rita that she wondered what they were going to do be-
cause they needed somebody in Pathology to do the
typing.... At that point, I said, 'Lucy, I would be
happy to go down to Pathology and do the typing.' And
she said, 'That would be fine. I would appreciate it."'
Myers then went immediately to pathology (where she
had worked 3 days the week before) and completed the
transcribing before Associate Pathologist Subramanya
left at 2 o'clock.
Supervisor Cowles left the department and returned
about 3:20 p.m. She stopped by Craven's desk, invited
her into the office, handed her a termination letter which
read, "This is to inform you of your termination . . . for
gross insubordination by failing to comply with a direct,
reasonable order to report to the laboratory to perform
medical transcription work" (G.C. Exh. 5), and said,
"You're fired." As Craven credibly testified, "I couldn't
believe it. I just sort of was dumbfounded." Craven left
the office and handed the letter to Pauline Rosa. Cowles
followed and told her, "Rita, go clean out your desk and
get out." (Craven had to pick up her 5-year-old son and
could not pursue the matter that day.)
The next morning she returned and complained to Ad-
ministrator Krider, "I did not refuse to do the work. We
had discussed Sue Parent. [Cowles] was going to go to
Personnel and check on Sue." Krider promised to "dig a
little deeper into it" and "get back with me that after-
noon." She went home and waited but he did not call.
On July 30, Krider's assistant confirmed the discharge,
informing her "that there has been no change in the deci-
sion of the Hospital." (G.C. Exh. 6.)
3. The Company's defenses
In justification for the discharge, Supervisor Cowles
gave conflicting, implausible testimony about what hap-
pened, and the Company presented a corroborating wit-
ness who gave a completely fabricated account, not
having been present at the time.
At one point Crowles gave testimony which tends to
support Craven's version of what happened, that there
,,as no refusal to go to the lab. Cowles testified that
after Myers volunteered to go to pathology she reported
to Associate Executive Director Kenneth Dextrom "I
thought [Craven] refused to do the work and that I felt
that she should be discharged." (Emphasis supplied.) Un-
doubtedly, if her testimony were true that Craven had
flatly refused to go, Cowles would not have been report-
ing to Dextrom that she "thought" Craven refused to do
the work.
Cowles testified that when Craven came into her
office after lunch, she told Craven "I'd like her to go" to
the lab and Craven said "No, I won't go. No way. I'm not
going. I'm not going to do that." (Emphasis supplied.)
Cowles claimed she told Craven, "Well, you can't refuse
to do the work." Later Cowles claimed that Craven said,
"Well, then go do it yourself," and went out to her desk
and sat down. Cowles testified that after she called back
Ruth Ealy in the lab, "I went right directly out to Rita's
desk, and I asked-or I didn't ask her; I told her . . .
'The work cannot wait till 5:00. It needs to be done now.
Dr. Subramanya will be leaving this afternoon and he
wants it done while he's here.' And she said, 'That's ri-
diculous.' And she would not look up at me. She kept
right on typing like I had disappeared." She testified that
it was then that Eleanor Myers asked, "Lucy, do you
need someone to go down to Pathology?" and she an-
swered that she did.
I note that in giving this version of what happened,
Cowles was evidently giving a fabricated account of
how an aide was talking to her over the telephone.
Cowles claimed that when she asked if the work could
wait until 5 o'clock, Ruth Ealy-a laboratory aide, not a
pathologist or a person in charge-said, "No if you can't
send someone down, I'll just have to wait till tomorrow
. . .but you better come up with a better solution the
next time." (The aide had difficulty recalling on the
stand what happened that day. However, in a memoran-
dum which the aide had secretary Gray type for her the
next day (G.C. Exh. 7), the aide recalled that she told
Cowles that if someone could be sent, it would be nice,
but if not, it could be handled another way.)
In an effort to bolster Supervisor Cowles' claim that
Craven had refused to comply with a direct order, the
Company produced a witness who was not even present
at the time. She was analyst Mary Ann Smith who re-
ceived the call from the lab about noon and who did not
arrive in the cafeteria for lunch until shortly before
12:15, when Craven, Myers, and Rosa returned to work.
She had not returned to medical records when Myers
volunteered to go to pathology. She therefore had no
personal knowledge of the conversations between
Cowles and Craven.
By the time Smith was called to the stand, she was
prepared to change her earlier versions to conform with
that given by Supervisor Cowles. In her pretrial affidavit
(G.C. Exh. 15, given August 12, about 2 weeks after
Craven's discharge), Smith had claimed that the only
h1064
TRAVERSE CITY OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL
conversation she overheard between Cowles and Craven
about going to the lab was after lunch when she received
a call from the lab and Cowles took the call, checked on
the dictating tanks, and talked to Craven, standing on the
side of Craven's desk. (Thus, according to this version,
in order for Smith to place herself in medical records at
the time of the incident, Smith claimed that she received
the call after lunch, not during Craven's lunch and
before Smith went to lunch, as actually happened. She
claimed that the entire conversation between Cowles and
Craven occurred at Craven's desk.) Later, in October
when testifying before the Michigan Employment
Security Commission (G.C. Exh. 16), Smith claimed that
"[i]t was right after she came back from lunch" that she
answered the telephone from the lab, and that the only
part of the conversation she overheard was when
Cowles was at Craven's desk, where the conversation
lasted at least 5 minutes. (Not actually having overheard
any of the conversations between Cowles and Craven,
Smith testified before the Commission that she overheard
Cowles telling Craven that she had to go and type for
Dr. Stein, whereas in fact the work was to be done for
Dr. Subramanya.)
In the absence of any other employee who would sup-
port Supervisor Cowles' version of the incident at the
hearing, the Company called employee Smith. This time
she truthfully testified that she answered the telephone
call from the lab about noon (not after lunch as she
twice claimed before). This testimony conforms with the
accounts given by Cowles and employees Craven,
Myers, and Rosa; however, it would place her lunch
period afterwards, taking her from the department when
Cowles talked to Craven about going to the lab. She had
a solution though for this dilemma, testifying:
Q. Do you recall what happened . . . after you
transferred the call to Mrs. Cowles?
A. Rita Craven and Pauline Rosa and Eleanor
Myers came back from lunch.
Q. Did you go to lunch that day?
A. No, sir, I didn't.
Like Cowles, she appeared on the stand to be willing to
give whatever testimony would help the Company's
cause.
Contrary to her earlier testimony that the only conver-
sation she overheard was at Craven's desk, Smith testi-
fied this time that she overheard Craven, upon being
called into Cowles' office, declare in a raised voice, "I
will not" and "Then you go do it yourself." She next
went further than Cowles' testimony, claiming that she
overheard Cowles state at Craven's desk, "I'm not asking
you; I'm telling you. You have to go"; that Craven an-
swered, "That's ridiculous I will not go"; that Cowles
said, "But someone has to go and I'm telling you"; to
which Craven responded, "No," and "then Mrs. Myers
stood up and went back to the Lab." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
The General Counsel contends that Smith's testimony
should be totally discredited. The Company contends
that Smith's testimony strongly supports the testimony of
Lucille Cowles, that it is sincerely submitted that nobody
listening to Mary Ann Smith's testimony could properly
conclude that she fabricated hearing the portions of the
conversations to which she testified, and that it is only
the more irrelevant details concerning which her
memory may be somewhat inconsistent. I disagree and
find that Smith, not being present, fabricated hearing the
portions of the conversations to which she testified.
Thus, I agree with the General Counsel that both Su-
pervisor Cowles and analyst Smith gave contrived testi-
mony. Having credited the testimony of transcribers
Craven and Myers, I find that Craven did not refuse an
order to do the pathology transcription work.
4. Administrator Krider's approval of the discharge
Although both Administrator Krider and Medical Re-
cords Director Cowles positively testified that nothing
was said about Craven's union activities at the time he
approved Craven's discharge, I find that Krider's actions
belie the denials.
Krider readily approved Craven's discharge upon
Cowles' recommendation without giving Craven an op-
portunity to be heard, without getting her side of the
story, and without talking to any of the employees who
were present. He did not look at her personnel file. He
did not ask if Craven had ever been disciplined and he
testified that he could not say to this day whether she
had ever been. He admitted that he did not ask what ex-
perience she had in making pathology transcriptions or
how many times she had done it, testifying, "I was satis-
fied that she had been asked and had performed the
work satisfactorily before." He took the position that she
was trained and qualified to do an assigned job and that
she refused to do it. That was it.
Krider demonstrated that he was not interested in veri-
fying what actually happened. As Krider testified,
Craven came in the morning after the discharge and re-
lated her side of the story, which said that she really did
not refuse to do it, and Cowles never said that she was
going to fire her if she did not, and related some dia-
logue between Cowles and some other individuals in
medical records (evidently referring to the discussion
about Sue Parent being hired to do this relief work and
transcriber Myers volunteering to do it). He merely
called in Cowles again and questioned her about "the
specific dialogue" between her and Craven. When
Cowles told him that Craven in essence had refused, he
still did not talk to any of the witnesses. He claimed that
Cowles' position was supported by some witnesses in
that department. When later asked who those witnesses
were, Krider named Mary Ann Smith (who Cowles un-
doubtedly knew was not present) and testified that he
could not draw back the other name, but there was more
than one individual. This purported witness was never
identified or called to testify. From his demeanor on the
stand, Krider impressed me most unfavorably as a vwit-
ness. He appeared unwilling to give a candid account of
what actually happened.
5. Concluding findings
Medical records transcriber Craven was a valuable
employee whom Medical Records Director Cowles had
1065
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
called back to the job when Craven returned to the city.
Cowles admitted that she did very good work.
On one occasion Craven had volunteered to come in
on Saturday and work for Dr. Stein transcribing some
pathology reports, and had found that she was not quali-
fied to perform that work which involved a totally
different language from work she was trained to do in
medical records. Since then Cowles assigned transcriber
Myers to do the relief work in pathology. In early July,
the Company made transcriber Sue Parent (who was
trained to do pathology transcriptions) a "floater" to
work in various departments as needed, but she was not
assigned to do relief work in the lab until after Craven's
discharge.
On July 28, after Craven had become the key union
organizer, openly campaigning for the Union in the pres-
ence of supervisors, the Company decided to assign
Craven instead of Myers to do some transcribing for Dr.
Subramanya who has a "very strong accent," making the
pathology terminology even more difficult to under-
stand. Cowles in effect asked Craven if she would go,
telling her that they needed someone down in the labora-
tory, without specifically asking her if she would go or
telling her to. Craven protested that she was not capable
of performing the work and suggested that Parent be as-
signed. When Cowles went to the personnel office to
check on Parent's availability and reported back that
nobody was there during the lunch hour, she again made
another implied request that Craven go to the lab by
saying to Craven that she wondered what they were
going to do because they needed somebody in pathology
to do the typing, whereupon Myers (who had worked in
the lab 3 days the week before) volunteered to go.
It was under these circumstances that Administrator
Krider decided that Craven should be summarily dis-
charged for "gross insubordination," without making any
investigation and without giving Craven an opportunity
to be heard. He did not review her personnel file, check
on her work record, or learn that she had never been
disciplined. When Craven complained to Krider the next
day that she did not refuse to do the work, he talked
only to Cowles and made no investigation. Then at the
hearing, in the absence of any actual witness who would
support Cowles' claim that Craven had been insubordi-
nate, the Company called health record analyst Mary
Ann Smith who falsely claimed that she was present and
that she overheard the conversations between Cowles
and Craven.
I discredit Administrator Krider's and Supervisor
Cowles' denials and find that they did discuss Craven's
union activity when deciding to discharge her. After
weighing all the evidence and circumstances, I infer that
Krider, as well as Cowles, was aware that Craven did
not refuse an assignment and that she was not insubordi-
nate. I agree with the General Counsel that the Compa-
ny seized upon the reluctance of this key union organizer
to perform work for which she was not trained as a pre-
text for discharging her. I therefore find that the Compa-
ny discriminatorily discharged Rita Craven in an effort
to undercut the union organizational drive and to dis-
courage union support. in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act.
D. Discharge of Elbridge Aldridge
1. His continued union activities
Aldridge, employed in April 1975, was a highly rated
maintenance man who sometimes served as an acting su-
pervisor. In his last evaluation dated April 1980 (G.C.
Exh. 17), he was given a favorable rating on all 10 fac-
tors. Administrator Krider, who approved his discharge,
conceded, "I am not saying Mr. Aldridge can't fix any-
thing. He is probably very good. My frank recollection
from a comment, I think it was from Mr. Laukhart [the
plant engineer], is that Mr. Aldridge is a good mainte-
nance man. I am not going to dispute that with you or
'pick' that with you; I'd agree."
Before the election, Aldridge actively campaigned for
the Union, talking to the employees and passing out
union authorization cards, union literature, and meeting
notices. In June 1980 (before employee organizer Rita
Craven was discharged), Aldridge was sitting in the cafe-
teria with Plant Engineer Laukhart and Maintenance Su-
pervisor Eugene Zoulek when Craven handed him some
union meeting notices to be passed out to the other em-
ployees. He passed out authorization cards in the pres-
ence of Laukhart and Zoulek an estimated 10 or 15
times.
Sometime in September, as Aldridge credibly testified:
Mr. Laukhart called me in his office and told me
that there was a lot of people . . . around the hospi-
tal . . . following me, on the union deal. They were
listening to me, and . . . he wanted to make sure I
knew which way I was going, if I knew what I was
doing. He didn't want me leading a bunch of people
around for the wrong thing. I told Mr. Laukhart I
had been a union man since I was 19 years old. I'm
now 49. I'm still a union man and always will be a
union man. And he told me that we didn't need a
union .
I discredit Laukhart's claim that he did not have any
"direct" knowledge of Aldridge's union activities. Lauk-
hart, when testifying, appeared less than candid. Both
Laukhart and Administrator Krider admitted knowledge
that Aldridge was outspoken in favor of the Union at an
employee meeting in the hospital. Personnel Director
Norma Pellikka (the third management representative in-
volved in Aldridge's subsequent discharge) was also
present at that September meeting where, as Aldridge
credibly testified, "I set up there and argued with
consultants . . . the hospital hired to break the union
I had to take three pills before I got out of there."
Aldridge continued to engage in union activities after
the October 17 election, in which the Company narrow-
ly defeated the Union. As he testified, "[W]e held three
or four [union] meetings after that. Most of us never
stopped talking about it, because we knew April I we
could start it again. We thought we [came] so close the
last time, that one more time we would get it in, so we
kept talking." Aldridge discussed the Union in the cafe-
teria almost every day until January 28, when his men-
tion of the Union and the renewed campaign in the pres-
1066
TRAVERSE CITY OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL
ence of an antiunion employee led to an argument which
resulted in his discharge 2 days later.
2. His discharge
Aldridge's argument in the hospital cafeteria on Janu-
ary 28 was with employee Jean Jessup, who was known
for her "filthy mouth." It is undisputed, as various em-
ployees testified, that she used profane and abusive lan-
guage in her regular speech both at work and in the
cafeteria. She often used such language when loudly tell-
ing "dirty" stories in the cafeteria in the presence of
management. On one occasion, in front of Dr. Borenitch
and several medical records employees, she told employ-
ee Pauline Rosa, "You're a bitch. You're just nothing but
a bitch." (As defined in the standard Webster, Random
House, and American Heritage desk dictionaries, "bitch"
has a meaning of "lewd or immoral woman," "lewd
woman," and "spiteful or lewd woman.") Rosa com-
plained orally to Medical Records Director Lucille
Cowles and complained in writing to Associate Execu-
tive Director Kenneth Dextrom (G.C. Exh. 3), but
Jessup was not disciplined. The Company's rules listed
"Mental and/or physical abuse of patients, employees,
and visitors" as cause for immediate discharge, and "use
of profane or abusive language as cause for disciplinary
action [which] could include discharge (Resp. Exh. 7),"
but the Company did nothing to discourage Jessup's foul
language.
It is also undisputed that members of management used
rough language in the cafeteria, with Maintenance Super-
visor Zoulek using about the same kind of words that
Jessup did when telling off-colored stories; Plant Engi-
neer Laukhart saying "son of a bitch"; and Administrator
Krider saying "goddamned" and "son of a bitch."
On January 28, Aldridge and employee Marilyn Ruth-
erford were seated with others at a long table in the hos-
pital cafeteria, eating their evening meal. Aldridge and
Rutherford were discussing the Union, and Aldridge was
complaining about being assigned to the evening shift, in-
terfering with taking insulin for his diabetes and playing
in his jazz band. When Jean Jessup and employees Sue
Parent and Rose Orth joined them sometime between
5:15 and 5:30 p.m., Aldridge and Rutherford were still
discussing the Union. Aldridge was telling Rutherford
that they could start passing out union cards April I to
start a new organizing drive. Jessup was looking at Al-
dridge when she said in a loud voice to one of the
women, "we have to get this done before the god-
damned union gets in here" (without explaining what she
meant). Becoming incensed, Aldridge told her, "Hey,
let's just knock it off about the union ... if we had one
in here, I wouldn't be sitting here eating my supper right
now; I'd be home where I belong." Jessup then loudly
goaded him further, "Well, if you don't watch it, you'll
be playing in your dance band all the time." (Both Ruth-
erford and Orth recalled the reference to Adlridge's
band. Rutherford recalled Jessup snapping at him about
the "goddamned union, I'm tired of hearing of it,"
whereas Orth recalled Jessup saying, "Would you just
shut up about it. I'm sick of hearing of it." Parent, who
was talking to another employee, noticed that Aldridge
and Jessup were "getting louder" about Aldridge's feel-
ing on the union, and remembers that Jessup asked him
to change the subject because the union was not some-
thing that she wished to discuss.) Angered by Jessup's
running down the union and warning him about being
discharged for supporting it, Ajdridge began standing up
and loudly stated, "If you want to be a brown-nosing
suck-ass, you can, but I'm not going to be and I never
will be one."
That ended the conversation. Aldridge sat down and
the employees finished their meal. Aldridge's remark was
embarrassing to several of the women at the table.
Jessup, who regularly used much obscene and vulgar
language, testified that she had heard the words "suck,"
"ass," and "brown nose," but claimed, "I have never
heard those four words put together and called some-
thing like that in a vile manner." Parent testified that she
had heard them several times before but not together,
and that she uses profanity herself, such as "damn" and
"shit." Rutherford recalled that Aldridge and Jessup
were equally angry, and that the employees at the table
tried to ignore the situation as best they could and drop
it, because it was embarrassing. Regarding the use of
swearing words, Rutherford commented, "Oh, I guess
we all do . . . when we are pissed off. You hear it on
TV. You see it in the movies." Orth testified, "I think
most people felt embarrassed at the table." Two of them,
Ralph Jones and Mary Wabegijik, resumed their conver-
sation as if nothing had happened. Jones recalled only
that Aldridge and Jessup were loud; he did not remem-
ber any of the obscene language.
Sue Parent, a defense witness who impressed me as
being both honest and forthright, was in a good position
to observe whether other people in the cafeteria over-
heard any of Aldridge's statement. She was sitting at the
opposite end of the table from him, with her back to the
wall in a position to see everybody in the room. She re-
membered that Jessup was speaking louder in order to be
heard because it was noisy. Aldridge sounded disgusted
and mad and said it in a very loud voice. That is what
made Parent hear it. She looked out over the room to
see if anybody else had heard it, and saw three or four
employees at the next table, and one or two persons in
street clothes three or four tables away, turn around.
Thus, Aldridge's voice was loud enough in the noisy
cafeteria for her to hear at the other end of the table,
and it attracted the attention of a few persons at two
other tables. The evidence does not disclose whether
they discerned the words Aldridge used. (Although this
was before the visitors' eating time, the persons in street
clothes were probably visitors.)
Jessup was the only one who complained about Al-
dridge's language. The following day when she asked
Mary Wabegijik (who sat next to her) to join her in
complaining, Wabegijik responded that she did not hear
a thing because she was reading the paper.
While testifying about what had happened, Jessup im-
pressed me as deliberately putting on an act, feigning an-
guish and humiliation, even to the point of crying. De-
spite the foul, obscene language that she herself frequent-
ly used, she claimed:
1067
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I was so embarrassed I wanted to crawl underneath
my chair I was so embarrassed my face was red. I
just put my head down so nobody could see me and
I picked at my plate and waited for Rose [Orth] to
get up and leave so I could leave with her because I
wasn't going to leave alone. I didn't look around. I
was very embarrassed. I just wanted to crawl un-
derneath the table so nobody could see me. I was
very humiliated because I know other people had
heard him. I didn't want them to know he was talk-
ing to me like that.
Two days later, without anyone in management
having said anything to Aldridge about the incident,
Plant Engineer Laukhart, in his office (as Aldridge credi-
bly testified) "asked me if I was talking about the Union
and using foul language in the cafeteria Wednesday
night. And I told him exactly what I said and what
Jeanie Jessup said," frankly admitting the words he had
used. (From his demeanor on the stand, Aldridge im-
pressed me as being a sincere, honest witness.) Laukhart
then handed Aldridge a statement which Jessup had
written with Sue Parent's assistance. The statement,
which bore only Jessup's signature, quoted Aldridge's
objectionable language and stated that he had used it
when he was talking about how the union would give
him job security and how union campaigning should be
started as soon as possible and "I asked that the conver-
sation be changed." (G.C. Exh. 8.) After Aldridge read
the statement, Laukhart gave him his final paycheck and
termination sheet which read:
As verified by the attached statement, by one hospi-
tal employee and witnessed by another employee,
used abusive language, directed toward one employ-
ee and witnessed by another, in the cafeteria on
January 28, 1981. That language caused the embar-
rassment of those employees in the presence of
other employees and visitors. These offenses are
grounds for immediate dismissal from the hospital.
Therefore, your employment is immediately termi-
nated on these grounds.
Thus, 2 days had elapsed since the incident, and the
Company had decided to discharge the union organizer
and had prepared his final paycheck and termination
sheet before giving him an opportunity to be heard.
3. The Company's defense
The Company contends in its brief that the discharge
arose from Aldridge's loud use of profanity and abuse of
a fellow employee in the public cafeteria on the hospital
premises and that it was totally unrelated to the employ-
ee's union activities.
In support of this defense, Personnel Director Norma
Pellikka studiously omitted any reference to the Union in
her testimony about her conversations with employees
Jessup and Sue Parent concerning the incident. Accord-
ing to Pellikka, Jessup mentioned only Aldridge's com-
plaining about his shift assignment, and when Parent de-
livered to her Jessup's statement, Parent also mentioned
only the shift problem-despite the fact that Jessup
wrote in the statement (G.C. Exh. 8) that Aldridge was
talking about how union campaigning should be started
as soon as possible, and Parent testified that both Al-
dridge and Jessup referred to the Union. Pellikka posi-
tively denied that in her conversations on January 29 and
30 with Administrator Krider and Plant Engineer Lauk-
hart, there was any mention made by anyone from man-
agement at the hospital regarding Aldridge's union activ-
ities.
When Laukhart was asked a similar question, concern-
ing any mention of Aldridge's union activities at any
time during his conversations with Krider, Pellikka,
Maintenance Supervisor Zoulek, or Jessup, he at first
equivocated, claiming "Not that I can recall. I don't
recall any 'union' mentioned whatsoever." However, on
cross-examination he positively testified that there was
no conversation about any union activities in the series of
conversations he had with Krider, Pellikka, and Jessup.
Similarly, Administrator Krider positively testified
"No," that in the course of his review of the recom-
mended discharge there was not any discussion of Al-
dridge's union activity or leanings. However, on cross-
examination Krider did admit that in the "discourse"
with Pellikka and Laukhart about what had occurred,
"yes, that came out of it," that Aldridge was discussing
the Union at the time of the Jessup incident.
Despite these denials, the Company revealed its con-
cern about the Union renewing its organizational drive in
its reports to the Michigan Employment Security Com-
mission. The Company's February 11 report began with
the sentence: "During his lunch hour on 1/29/81, claim-
ant [Aldridge] was discussing the possibility of unioniz-
ing the hospital's employees." (G.C. Exh. 19.) In its
March 13 report to the Commission (G.C. Exh. 18), the
Company stated in the opening paragraphs:
Upon further investigation of the incident which led
to claimant's discharge the hospital has determined
the following are the events which led to claimant's
discharge.
During the lunch period claimant was discussing
the formation of a union in an extremely loud
voice.
Thus at the hearing, the Company was endeavoring to
conceal its concern about Aldridge's advocating a re-
newal of the union organizational drive. I discredit the
denials by Pellikka, Laukhart, and Krider that they had
any discussion of Aldridge's union activity when the de-
cision was being made to discharge him.
4. Administrator Krider's approval of discharge
Apart from the union context, the incident which
Krider discussed with Personnel Director Pellikka and
Plant Engineer Laukhart involved a very brief exchange,
in which Aldridge used four objectionable words in one
sentence. (The first two words are considered slang by
Webster and Random House and vulgar slang by Ameri-
can Heritage.) Only a few persons at two other tables
looked in that direction. None of them, and none of the
employees sitting at Aldridge's table-except Jessup, the
1068
TRAVERSI CITY O)STEIt)'PATHIC H()SPII'AI
antiunion employee-made a complaint about the lan-
guage used. Insofar as Krider knew, it %was merely a
passing event which attracted no particular attention
among the others, and caused only momentary embar-
rassment to some nonparticipants sitting at Aldridge's
table. From the facts that Jessup had frequently used ohb-
scene and vulgar language in the cafeteria. Maintenance
Supervisor Zoulek had used similar language there, and
both Krider and Laukhart had used some coarse lan-
guage there as well, Krider undoubtedly realized that the
employees were not eating in a pristine atmosphere, shel-
tered from present day vulgarity.
Krider denied that Aldridge's prounion status was dis-
cussed as it related to anything associated with the case
that they were considering, and Laukhart denied that Al-
dridge's union activities had anything to do with his rec-
ommendation that Aldridge be discharged. However, the
evidence is clear that Krider's only concern was to find
justification for discharging this union organizer.
Finding nothing in Aldridge's personnel file which
would provide a justification, Krider asserted that he
considered this incident on its individual merits. He ad-
mitted that he did not ask anyone what Jessup said that
might have led to the incident. He took the position, "I
relied on the fact . . . that Mr. Aldridge rose with an
outburst of profane and vulgar language in a public
place" and "the fact that everybody is responsible for
what they do, and regardless of what the situation was, if
he wants to act like that, he is going to accept responsi-
bility and the consequences"
Despite Administrator Krider's position that Al-
dridge's discharge was based solely on the four objec-
tionable words used on this one occasion, the Company
took shifting positions at the hearing in an apparent
effort to bolster its defense. Personnel Manager Pellikka
(who impressed me most unfavorably as a witness)
claimed that "this incident in the cafeteria was the last
straw." The Company, in offering evidence that from
time to time Aldridge went to the linen department
where linen clerk Kay Wagner worked, argued that the
evidence would indicate the tendencies and abusive
nature and character that Aldridge had, and the charac-
ter of Aldridge is in issue here-his character and his
abuse of other individuals being the overriding reasons
for his discharge. (As the evidence developed, there was
no abuse on Aldridge's part. Wagner complained about
the frequency of Aldridge's visits to her department after
they decided not to be married.) Also at the hearing, the
company counsel asked Aldridge if Plant Engineer Lauk-
hart had previously warned Aldridge about his language
problem in abusing other employees. Aldridge agreed
that Laukhart had talked to him, explaining that this was
when he was serving as an acting supervisor in charge of
the maintenance department while Zoulek was off with a
broken foot. Two other employees, not Aldridge, were
doing the swearing in the maintenance room. Laukhart
called Aldridge into the office and told him he would
have to stop their swearing because it could be heard
"clear up the hallway."
5. Concluding findings
In September, before the election, Aldridge had re-
buffed Plant Engineer Laukhart's efforts to persuade him
to turn against the Union and not lead a bunch of people
around for the wrong thing. Aldridge told Laukhart, "I
had been a union man since I was 19 years old and
alwsays ,will be a union man." Aldridge continued to talk
ill favor of the Union, and was talking in the cafeteria on
January 28 about renewing the organizational campaign
when he got into the heated argument with the antiunion
employee. Jean Jessup. She loudly commented about the
"goddamned union" and goaded him further by warning
that he would be discharged for supporting it. In anger
he loudly responded, "If you want to be a brown-nosing
suck-ass, you can, but I'm not going to be and I never
will be one." He thus redundantly combined two
common vulgar, slang words with two well-known,
more explicit obscene words-a combination she claimed
she had never heard, despite her frequent use in the cafe-
teria and at work of such vulgarity and obscenities as
"crap," "shit," "mother fucker," "fuck you," and "fuck-
ing dummy" (without the Company doing anything to
discourage the vulgarity).
Aldridge's choice of words was embarrassing to some
of the women at his table, and a few persons at two
other tables looked in his direction, but the Company re-
ceived no complaint from anybody except the antiunion
employee.
Before discharging Aldridge 2 days later, the Compa-
ny did not talk to Aldridge or concern itself with any-
thing except seeking justification for discharging him.
Then at the hearing it falsely claimed that his union ac-
tivities were never discussed during the intervening 2
days, despite the fact that it notified the Michigan Em-
ployment Security Commission first that Aldridge was
discussing the possibility of unionizing the hospital's em-
ployees, and later that he was discussing the formation of
a union in an extremely loud voice.
The Company argues in its brief, and I agree, that the
employer has the right to exercise its judgment as to
what conduct in a specific case warrants discipline, and
the extent of that discipline, so long as the reason for the
disciplinary action was not the employee's union activity.
I do not agree that the causal relationship between Al-
dridge's union activities and his discharge is highly spec-
ulative, and that the discharge was totally unrelated to
these activities.
Particularly based on the Company's concern about
Aldridge's continued union activity, its conduct in seek-
ing only to justify his discharge instead of giving him an
opportunity to be heard or to investigate the circum-
stances of his outburst, its falsification of testimony to
conceal its discussions of his union activities, and its
shifting positions at the hearing indicating its endeavor to
establish anything plausible to bolster its defense, I find
that the Company seized on his outburst as a pretext for
ridding the plant of the dedicated union supporter before
he could go further in encouraging the renewal of the
Union's organizational campaign. I further find that in
view of the fact that there was no complaint from
anyone except the antiunion employee and in view of the
1069
D[CISIO()NS ()F NATI'ONAL. I ABOR RE LAIONS B()ARD
previous tolerance of obscene and vulgar language in the
cafeteria, the incident would have been considered of
little consequence in the absence of the union context. I
therefore find that the Company discharged union orga-
nizer Aldridge not because of his language on this occa-
sion but because of his union activity in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and ( I) of the Act.
CONCIUSIONS OF LAW
1. By discriminatorily discharging Rita Craven on July
28, 1980, and Elbridge Aldridge on January 30, 1981, be-
cause of their support of the Union, the Company en-
gaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By promulgating, maintaining, and enforcing an
overly restrictive no-solicitation rule prohibiting employ-
ees from soliciting for the Union without approval of the
hospital administrator, the Company violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
THE Ri M-DiYw
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged
two employees, I find it necessary to order it to offer
them reinstatement and make them whole for lost earn-
ings and other benefits, to be computed on a quarterly
basis from date of discharge to date of proper offer of
reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, in accord-
ance with F: W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950), plus interest as computed in Florida Steel Corpora-
tion, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See, generally, Isis Plumbing
& Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recomended:
ORDER 2
The Respondent, Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital,
Traverse City, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
any employee for supporting United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other union.
(b) Promulgating, maintaining, or enforcing an overly
restrictive no-solicitation rule prohibiting employees
from soliciting for a union without approval of the hospi-
tal administrator.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2 In the esent no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the flid-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Rita Craven and Elbridge Aldridge immedi-
ate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits they may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, in
the manner set forth in the section of this Decision enti-
tled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its facility in Traverse City, Michigan,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 3
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by the Re-
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon their receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereaf-
ter, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herein.
:' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National L.abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
alit to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National t abor Relations Board
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAI. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection
1070
TRA\'FRSF CI( Y OSTE()P'ATHIC IO()SPI' AL
To refrain from the exercise of any or all such
activities.
Wi WIl.I NOI discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any of you for supporting United Steel-
workers of America. A I. CI) CLC, or any other
union.
WI: WIII NOT prohibit you from soliciting for a
union without approxval of the hospital administra-
tor.
W'I- Wll NOI in any like or related manner in-
terefere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed you in Section 7 of the
Act.
Wit wit11 offer Rita Craven and Elbridge Al-
dridge immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exists, to sub-
slantially equivalent positions, .Without prejudice to
their seniority or any other rights or privileges pre-
viously enjoyed, and wi viil make them wshole
for an 5y loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from their discharge, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
TRAVI!RSF CI IY OSIEOP, [ lHIC HoSPIIAl
1071