01a05917
11-15-2000
Traine D. Smith, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Mid-Atlantic Area), Agency.
Traine D. Smith v. United States Postal Service
01A05917
November 15, 2000
.
Traine D. Smith,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Mid-Atlantic Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A05917
Agency No. 1C-191-0042-99
Hearing No. 170-A0-8172X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The
appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges
she was discriminated against on the bases of race (Black), and sex
(female), when: (1) on December 3, 1998, she was required to perform all
the work associated with the loading and unloading of trucks at the dock
of the Airmail Section located in the Philadelphia Airmail Center and; (2)
on December 4, 1998, she was only given a fifteen minute break. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, a Casual employee at the agency's
Philadelphia Airmail Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania facility,
filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on February 19, 1999,
alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced
above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received
a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an
EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a
decision finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of race or sex discrimination when she was allegedly instructed to
load and unload all the trucks by herself. Specifically, the AJ found
complainant failed to present credible evidence that she was required to
perform all the work at the dock area on the day in question, and that the
male employees present were not required to assist her. In that regard,
the AJ found that complainant's witness was not credible in light of
prior problems, including an altercation, that existed between himself
and complainant's supervisor. The AJ found complainant failed to provide
any competent evidence that would prove that she was required to work
the docks alone. Although complainant alleged that the supervisor made
certain statements to complainant which were evidence of a discriminatory
notice, the AJ disagreed and found that the comments were taken out of
context and were not evidence of a discriminatory motive.
As for complainant's claim that she was denied a lunch break on December
3, 1998, the AJ found complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case on either bases. Specifically, the AJ found complainant failed
to establish that she was denied a lunch break on the day in question.
In that regard, the agency provided documentation that showed that
complainant clocked out for lunch at 1178 hours and returned at 1226
hours. The Supervisor of Distribution Operations testified that this
represents approximately 50 units which translates into roughly thirty
minutes. On December 4, 1998, complainant clocked out at 1177 hours
and returned at 1227 hours. The AJ found complainant failed to present
a scintilla of evidence to contradict the agency's documentation that
established complainant was not denied thirty minute lunch breaks on
the days in question.
The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely
than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask
unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found
that complainant failed to present sufficient evidence that the events
in question occurred as she alleged in her complaint.
On August 18, 2000, the agency issued a final action that implemented
the AJ's decision. On appeal, complainant requests a new hearing so
that she may recall her witnesses. In response, the agency restates the
position it took in its FAD, and requests that we affirm its final order.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the
appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant
failed to present sufficient credible evidence that any of the agency's
actions were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's race
and or sex. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision, which was
largely based on the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, after a careful
review of the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal,
the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically
addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 15, 2000
__________________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's
federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations
apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in
the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply
the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.