Tower Automotive Operations

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Mar 31, 2009

13-CA-044668 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 31, 2009)

JD–13–09
Chicago, IL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
TOWER AUTOMOTIVE OPERATIONS
USA I, LLC
and Cases 13–CA–44668
13–CA–44894
JUAN RUVALCABA, AN INDIVIDUAL
and
STEVE RAMOS, AN INDIVIDUAL
DECISION
Statement of the Case
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Chicago, Illinois,
on January 26–29, 2009. The charge in Case 13–CA–44668 was filed by Juan Ruvalcaba on
April 23, 2008,1 and amended on April 30. The charge in case 13–CA–44894 was filed by
Steven Ramos on August 26, and amended on October 17. The complaint issued October 30,
alleging that the Respondent, Tower Automotive Operations USA I, LLC, violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by suspending Ramos and
Ruvalcaba on or about April 4, discharging Ruvalcaba on or about April 8, and discharging
Ramos on or about June 1, because they assisted and supported the United Auto Workers
Local 3212, AFL–CIO (the Union) and engaged in union activities. The Respondent admits the
jurisdictional allegations, but denies the material allegations and asserts that Ramos’ charge
that he was unlawfully suspended on April 4 is time-barred pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, an Illinois corporation, is engaged in the business of manufacturing
automobile parts at its facility in Chicago, Illinois, where it annually purchases and receives
goods, products, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the
State of Illinois. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

1 All dates are in 2008 unless otherwise indicated.
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II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
The Respondent’s Operations
The Respondent’s Chicago facility (the facility) produces automobile parts for sale to
automobile manufacturers. The Ford Motor Company is the Respondent’s largest customer.
Prior to March, the facility, which is approximately the size of a football field, operated two
production shifts. The first shift begins in the morning; the second shift begins in the afternoon.
Production personnel are supported by maintenance technicians, who are responsible for
ensuring that assembly lines are running, repairing broken machinery and equipment, and
performing routine maintenance work.2
From March 21, 2008, to April 3, 2008, there was a production shutdown. During the
shutdown, the facility did not produce parts and production employees were furloughed.
Approximately 32 maintenance technicians and utility technicians, however, performed
maintenance and preventive maintenance work during the shutdown on two shifts—a day shift
from 6 a.m. to approximately 2:30 p.m., and an afternoon shift from approximately 3:30 p.m. to
1 a.m. Maintenance employees were assigned to perform either preventive maintenance or
repair work on the production machinery and equipment. Their work was recorded on preventive
maintenance worksheets, commonly referred to as PM sheets. Each PM sheet contained a
check-off list of categories of work specific to a piece of equipment or machinery.3
The Parties
The Respondent’s supervisors involved in this controversy include: Matt Pollick, the
plant manager; Greg Watts, the facility’s human resources manager; Eric Tuley, an
engineering/maintenance manager; William Noojin, a maintenance superintendent; and Don
Plomann, a maintenance supervisor. 4 The discriminatees, Ruvulcaba and Ramos, were
employed by the Respondent as maintenance technicians on the 3:30 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. shift at
the north end of the facility. Plomann was their immediate supervisor. Ruvalcaba was hired in
May 2004; Ramos was hired in January 2005. Ramos and Ruvalcaba were also members of
United Auto Workers Local 3212, AFL–CIO (Union), which represented the hourly employees,
including the maintenance technicians, at the Respondent’s facility. Prior to March, Ruvalcaba
was an alternate member to the skilled trades and bargaining committees. However, neither
Ruvalcaba nor Ramos had any interaction with the Respondent on behalf of the Union prior to
March.5
Prior to March, neither Ruvalcaba nor Ramos was ever disciplined, audited, or given a
negative evaluation regarding their work performance. Nor was any supervisor concerned about
their work performance.6 Ruvalcaba was, however, previously disciplined on two occasions.

2 Tr. 21, 196–197, 305.
3 As witness estimates varied widely as to the number of maintenance technicians employed
by the Respondent, I relied on the Respondent’s internet usage report for the period of March
17 to April 2. It lists 31 names, but omitted any mention of Ruvalcaba, so I determined there was
a total of at least 32 maintenance technicians and utility technicians. (GC Exh. 11.)
4 The Respondent, in its answer, concedes that these individuals were statutory supervisors
and agents within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) and 2(13) of the Act, respectively. (GC Exh. 1(p).)
5 It is undisputed that neither Ramos nor Ruvalcaba played an active role on behalf of the
Union prior to March. (Tr. 23–24, 198–201.)
6 Pollick, Plomann, Noojin, and Watts conceded that, prior to March, none had concerns
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The first occurred in June 2007, when he left the facility during a shift without punching out and,
upon returning, refused a requested drug and alcohol test. The second occurred in September
2007, when Ruvalcaba engaged in a physical altercation with several other employees. As a
result of union intervention, Ruvalcaba avoided the maximum number of disciplinary points, but
still ended up with nine points—one short of mandatory termination--as of March 1. These
disciplinary events were preceded, however, by incidents involving Ruvalcaba that caused
Pollick additional consternation. Sometime in 2006, Ruvalcaba’s car was vandalized in the
parking lot. Upon seeing police arrive in the parking lot, Pollick said, “there goes Ruvalcaba
again.” Subsequently, Ruvalcaba filed a claim with the Respondent for compensation.7
The Respondent’s Policies and Practices
The Respondent’s policies and procedures at issue involve those relating to discipline,
internet usage, evaluating or auditing employees and training. The Respondent’s written
disciplinary policy, effective February 1, 2006, lists 37 types of infractions that will result in the
issuance of disciplinary points, including 3 for infractions involving the “[f]ailure to meet
established performance expectations” or “[m]isuse or abuse of Company provided technology.”
The policy further accords 10 points both for “[f]alsifying employment records, including time
cards, training sheets, maintenance records, quality documents, etc.” and “[i]ntentional
disregard or bypass of safety rules, requirements or equipment.” An accumulation of 10
disciplinary points over a 12-month period subjects an employee to termination.8
All employees, upon their hire, including maintenance technicians, acknowledge in
writing that they will comply with the Respondent’s internet usage policy by using company
computers only for business-related purposes.9 Prior to March, maintenance technicians were
logged on to the internet on a regular basis. While internet access for some maintenance
technicians was blocked because of excessive use in accessing nonwork-related websites,
none was ever told by a supervisor to refrain from such activity. Nor did the Respondent ever
discipline any employee for excessive or nonbusiness-related use of company computers while
working.10
Beyond its disciplinary and internet usage policies, the Respondent’s operations were
not governed by written policies and procedures. Prior to March, the Respondent had a practice
of writing up employees, including maintenance technicians, for poor work performance. It did
not, however, have a policy or practice, written or otherwise, of auditing the work of
employees.11 Nor did the Respondent have any written training policies and procedures.12
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with the previous work performance of either Ramos or Ruvalcaba. (Tr. 467–470, 534–535, 572,
706–708.)
7 The accuracy of Ruvalcaba’s disciplinary history prior to March is not disputed. (Tr. 281,
394–396, 402–405.)
8 R. Exh. 6.
9 There is no question that Ramos and Ruvalcaba agreed to, and were aware of, this policy.
(R. Exhs. 2, 7.)
10 Pollick and Watts acknowledged that there was no practice of disciplining employees for
excessive or nonbusiness related use of the internet until action was taken against Ramos and
Ruvalcaba in March and April. (Tr. 453–455, 463–464, 699, 706.)
11 Watts conceded the absence of such a policy or practice prior to March. (Tr. 707–708.)
12 It was not disputed by Pollick, Ramos and Ruvalcaba that the Respondent lacked a
written training policy or schedule and that any training was provided on an ad hoc basis without
regard to seniority. The culprit for this void appeared to be the lack of a collective-bargaining
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The Skilled Trades Committee
The Respondent and the Union have been without a collective-bargaining agreement
since the expiration of the last one on October 10, 2006. As a result, the provisions for
grievances, arbitration procedures, and training programs also expired at that time.
Notwithstanding the absence of an agreement, after arriving at the facility in or around April
2007, Pollick periodically discussed with employees and union representatives the need to
establish a training program for employees in the skilled trades, including the maintenance
technicians. The most recent series of discussions began in February when Pollick and Tuley
spoke with Edward Kendall, an assembler and the Union’s bargaining unit chairman, about
filling labor vacancies on the skilled trades committee. At that time, Pollick asked Kendall if he
was going to appoint Ruvalcaba to the committee. Kendall responded that he did not know yet
who he would appoint. Pollick urged Kendall to appoint Ron Spencer, a maintenance technician
with no disciplinary history, to be the Union’s designee on the committee.13
Kendall did not take Pollick’s advice and appoint Spencer to the committee. Instead, in a
letter faxed to Watts on March 5, he appointed Ruvalcaba to the committee and designated him
chairman of the skilled trades safety subcommittee. Kendall also took the opportunity to name
Ruvalcaba to the Union’s bargaining team. Kendall also faxed another letter to Watts on March
20 appointing Ruvalcaba and Ramos as union representatives to the skilled trades committee.14
This was the first instance in which Ramos and Ruvalcaba became actively involved in union
activity.15
Ruvalcaba convened the first meeting of the newly-constituted skilled trades committee
on March 18. The others in attendance included Pollick, Ramos, Spencer, O. Jamison, Frank
Angel, Leo Williams, Tuley, and Noojin. During the meeting, Ramos raised the issues of
training, apprenticeship programs, and electrical safety for maintenance technicians. Ruvalcaba
raised the issue of seniority with respect to training opportunities for maintenance
technicians. Pollick was receptive to the suggestions raised, including training development.
However, while the meeting was mostly civil, there was an undercurrent of discord as the
result of several grievances filed between January and March by maintenance technicians
who were upset that newly hired technicians were being selected for training first. Consistent
_________________________
agreement and the inability of the Respondent and the Union to engage in any meaningful
discussions on training since the agreement expired. (Tr. 25–27, 202, 423–425, 444–447, 494–
495.)
13 There is no dispute that Pollick preferred Spencer, a person he deemed of higher
character than Ruvalcaba, for the committee. (Tr. 308–309, 401–405, 427–428, 446–447, 493.)
14 The Respondent sought to show at trial that Kendall did not notify the Respondent of his
decision appointing Ruvalcaba and Ramos until May 27, the date indicated on the fax
transmission stamp of a copy of the letter. However, that fax transmission was sent to the office
of the Board’s General Counsel, not the Respondent. As such, Kendall’s testimony that he
faxed both letters to Watts on those dates was credible and corroborated by the printout
generated by his office’s fax machine confirming those fax transmissions. (GC Exhs. 6–8; Tr.
24–26, 200–201, 309–319.)
15 I did not credit Kendall’s testimony that Ruvalcaba and Ramos attended grievance or
negotiating meetings prior to being appointed by Kendall in March and that harsh words were
exchanged at some of those meetings. First, it was inconsistent with Ruvalcaba’s account of his
union involvement. Second, he had a poor recollection of dates and qualified his answer by
saying that the meetings occurred “approximately” during that time. Tr. 343–351.)
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with the Respondent’s position at those earlier grievance meetings, Pollick disagreed with the
notion that training should be offered on the basis of seniority. He felt that the newer and, thus,
more inexperienced technicians should be afforded training.16
Employee Use of the Internet
Since 2004, when the facility began operating, until May 2008, maintenance technicians,
including Ramos and Ruvalcaba, regularly used the computer terminals near their work areas to
access and search the internet—a process commonly referred to as “surfing” the internet. Since
January 1, 2007, at the earliest, and continuing regularly through May 2008, several other of the
Respondent’s maintenance technicians regularly used the internet during worktime as much or
more—even much more—that Ramos or Ruvalcaba, and throughout this time period other
technicians regularly accessed websites that were not business-related, such as sites providing
information on the weather forecast, automobiles for sale, news developments, retail specials
and real estate offerings.
Prior to April 4, the Respondent would occasionally block certain employees from
internet access due to excessive use. No maintenance technicians, however, including Ramos
and Ruvalcaba, were ever informed by a supervisor of their excessive use of the internet for
nonwork reasons. Nor were they ever disciplined or warned to refrain from surfing the internet
on the Respondent’s computers for nonwork-related reasons.17
On a few occasions during the March shutdown, Ramos, accompanied by Ruvalcaba,
accessed the Respondent’s computers for the purpose of obtaining information from the
Respondent’s intranet website regarding the Respondent’s Programmable Logistics Control
(PLC) software.18 However, most of the time, Ramos was surfing the worldwide website for
nonwork-related reasons.19 They also did this with Plomann during their lunch or break periods
on two or three occasions. Plomann’s interests included a custom-manufactured Corvette
automobile and real estate listings.20 In any event, the Respondent’s internet usage reports for

16 Pollick conceded that he disagreed at this meeting with Ruvalcaba and Ramos regarding
the order of training opportunities for maintenance and utility technicians. Pollick wanted the
newer employees to receive the training first. Ramos and Ruvalcaba wanted training offered on
the basis of seniority. Given the nature of the meeting, the conversations that ensued, and
Kendall’s notifications on March 5 and 20 that he was appointing Ruvalcaba and Ramos to the
committee, Pollick’s initial testimony that he was unaware that Ruvalcaba and Ramos were
members of the skilled trades committee until later in April was not credible. (Tr. 27–30, 37, 99–
100, 202–205, 241–243, 344, 425–427, 447–451, 494, 502.)
17 This finding incorporates Sec. 2 of the stipulation entered into between the parties at trial
regarding internet usage by Ramos, Ruvalcaba and all other technicians and the unrefuted
testimony of Ramos and Ruvalcaba as to the extent of their internet usage. (Tr. 52–59, 217–
220, 454; GC Exh. 14.)
18 Although the Respondent produced an internet usage report for the particular period in
March and April, it is suspicious that there is no data regarding Ruvalcaba’s internet usage
during that time. This corroborates Ruvalcaba’s testimony that he did not, after being informed
he was going to be audited, actually access the internet himself. (GC Exh. 11; Tr. 262.)
19 I concur with the Respondent’s witnesses that Ramos and Ruvalcaba would have had
little reason to spend much time on the repair of the PLC software, since they were assigned
mainly to perform preventive maintenance work during the shutdown period. (Tr. 299–300, 510,
532–533.)
20 I did not credit testimony by Ramos and Ruvalcaba that they needed to access the
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the maintenance department during March and April indicated that several other maintenance
technicians viewed significantly more nonwork-related internet sites than Ramos and
Ruvalcaba.21
Ramos and Ruvalcaba Are Audited
During the February production shutdown, Plomann assigned Ramos and Ruvalcaba to
work on the front body pillar in Section 18 of the facility. After production resumed, the
Respondent experienced several problems with the front body pillar.22 Those problems resulted
in a production shutdown at Ford, the Respondent’s most important customer. Plomann and
Noojin knew that Ruvalcaba and Ramos had performed maintenance work on the front body
pillar during the first shutdown in February. They encountered some problems with that task, but
Plomann did not evaluate their work or discuss it with them at or around that period of time.23
Nor was there an issue with the work performance of Ruvalcaba and Ramos in March prior to
the March 21 shutdown, as they completed all of their assignments, in comparison to most
technicians, who completed far less of their assigned tasks that month.24 Nevertheless, at some
point between March 18 and March 20, Pollick and Noojin discussed the union involvement of
Ramos and Ruvalcaba. As a result, Noojin directed Plomann to inform Ramos and Ruvalcaba
that their work would be audited. Plomann informed them of the audit on March 21.25
On or around the same day he requested the audit, Pollick asked Plomann about the
activities of Ramos and Ruvalcaba. Plomann informed Pollick that he believed Ramos and
Ruvalcaba to be spending some of their worktime surfing the internet, although he knew that
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internet as often as on a daily basis in order to search for technical information’s testimony
relating to the PLC machinery. In fact, of the 3 days that later became issue, only the PM sheet
for March 27 reflects work on the PLC issue. (Tr. 164, 170–171, 263, 299–300; GC Exh. 2(a).)
The plant was on shutdown and I credited testimony by Plomann and Noojin that PLC-related
issues would not have arisen as often during a production shutdown. (Tr. 532–534, 562–563.)
However, Plomann confirmed their testimony regarding their collaborative surfing of the
worldwide web and that he never warned them about their internet usage or told them to refrain
from such activity. (Tr. 537–538.)
21 GC Exh. 11.
22 Noojin conceded that the front body pillar machinery frequently encountered problems
and malfunctioned. (Tr. 560.)
23 Plomann’s testimony regarding his concern about their performance on the front body
pillar in February was not credible. He could not articulate exactly what, if anything, they did
wrong during the February shutdown and confirmed their testimony that he never had
discussions with them about their work or took disciplinary or evaluative action as a result. (Tr.
96–97, 513–515, 534, 547; R. Exh. 12.)
24 Noojin conceded that the Respondent’s records showed their March completion rate at
100 percent, which was higher than nearly two-thirds of the other maintenance technicians. (Tr.
575–576; GC Exh. 12.)
25 Noojin’s explanation as to why he asked Plomann about work by Ramos and Ruvalcaba
on the front body pillar, as well as what Plomann told him, was not credible. Plomann, who was
their supervisor, took no issue with their work at or around the time it was completed and did not
believe in writing up his employees. In other words, Noojin put pressure on Plomann to come up
with any negative information as to their work performance. While there is insufficient credible
evidence establishing that Plomann was aware of the March 18 union activity by Ramos and
Ruvalcaba, it is clear that the audit was not his idea. (Tr. 47–48, 124, 212–213, 517–518, 529,
546–547; R. Exh. 11–12.)
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other technicians used the internet more, and some substantially more, than Ramos and
Ruvalcaba.26 Venturing into an area that he had never been concerned about before, or later,
for that matter, Pollick then asked Watts to obtain copies of the internet usage records of
Ruvalcaba and Ramos. 27 The records produced indicated that Ruvalcaba and Ramos used the
Respondent’s computers to access personal e-mail accounts and surf several nonwork-related
worldwide websites. The records contained data indicating the websites visited, but none as to
the amount of time spent on them. Nor was there data produced regarding the internet usage of
other employees and against which the produced information could be compared.28
Nevertheless, a review of the Respondent’s internet usage records going back to at least
January 1, 2007, and continuing regularly through mid-March 2008, would have indicated that
Ramos and Ruvalcaba regularly used the internet during worktime as much or more than they
did during the period of March 17 to April 2, including regularly accessing worksites that were
not business-related.29
Ramos and Ruvalcaba performed their preventive maintenance work during that period
of time without incident. There was a minor problem with paperwork—several of the PM sheets
for particular machines were not available. As a result, they improvised and marked-up the
forms used for other machinery in order to use them for the machines in question. As a result,
the PM documentation on March 26 for one machine that they serviced and later became an
issue—the weld gun—was reflected on the PM sheet for the smart electrode.30
Knowing that their work would be audited, Ruvalcaba and Ramos attempted to contact
Plomann every night to come and review their work. He never responded, so Ruvalcaba and
Ramos contacted Salgado, another shift manager who was not their supervisor, to review their
work at the end of each shift. Salgado responded when requested, reviewed their work, and
provided them with a verbal approval. At no point did Salgado, Plomann, or any other supervisor
inform Ramos or Ruvalcaba during the second shutdown that there was a problem with their
work. In fact, Buddell and Salgado did not actually inspect any of the machinery serviced by
Ramos and Ruvalcaba until they were asked to do so on March 28.31 By that time, machinery

26 I credited Plomann’s testimony that Ramos and Ruvalcaba would walk away from the
computer terminal if he was approaching, as they did not credibly deny such activity. However,
he did not know what they were doing on the computer and how long they had been there on
any occasion. (Tr. 263, 510, 534.) In any event, given the nature and extent of Plomann’s
internet collaboration with Ramos and Ruvalcaba, and his testimony conceding that others used
the internet substantially more than they did, I find it incredible that he would have, in the
ordinary course of his activities, expressed concern to Pollick about their furtive movements
around the computer station and its impact on their productivity. (Tr. 453–455, 522, 525.)
27 Significantly, even in July, about 4 months after this incident, Pollick was still unaware that
employees’ internet access was being blocked, much less the entire maintenance department.
(Tr. 462.)
28 Unlike the internet usage reports produced at trial, these reports did not show the amount
of time spent by Ramos and Ruvalcaba on each site or a total amount of time spent on all of
them. (R. Exh. 17–18; Tr. 407, 418–419, 451–454, 509–510, 699–701.)
29 This finding is based on Sec. 3 of the stipulation entered into between the parties at trial.
(GC 14.)
30 The Respondent failed to provide any credible testimony or evidence to refute the
assertion of Ramos and Ruvalcaba that the PM sheets for the weld gun and other machinery
were unavailable. (Tr. 41–46, 210–211; GC Exh. 2(c).)
31 The General Counsel, citing Torbitt & Castleman, Inc. 320 NLRB 907 (1996), and
International Automated Machines, 285 NLRB 1122 (1987), requests that I draw an adverse
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previously serviced by Ramos and Salgado would have been operated prior to the end of the
second shutdown period and resumption of production. As such, it would not have been unusual
to find grease, dirt, and slag on machinery that had already been serviced during a production
shutdown. Nevertheless, there was a significant amount of buildup on some of the machinery
assigned to Ramos and Ruvalcaba for service, indicating that the substance had been on the
machinery for weeks. 32
Buddell’s written report was hurriedly incorporated the same day into an e-mail by Noojin
to Plomann, which was forwarded the next business day, March 31, to Watts.33 Noojin,
responding to an e-mail request by Watts on April 2, accompanied Buddell and Salgado on
April 3, the last day of the shutdown, to photograph the various pieces of machinery referenced
in Buddell’s report. The 15 photographs depicted a broken air regulator, pneumatic valves that
were not replaced, and grease, dirt, and slag on or around some of the machines serviced by
Ramos and Ruvalcaba during the second shutdown.34
Ramos and Ruvulcaba Are Suspended
On April 3, Ruvalcaba and Ramos learned from other maintenance technicians that the
Respondent scheduled utility technicians, not the more senior maintenance technicians, for
robotic training. This training development became a cause of concern among many of the
maintenance technicians. As a result, Ruvalcaba called Pollick later that day. He told Pollick that
maintenance technicians were upset at being bypassed for the training and asked to meet the
next day at around 3:30 p.m. to discuss how training opportunities were being implemented.35
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inference from the Respondent’s failure to call Salgado as a witness. Such an inference should
be drawn only where the requesting party provides a sufficient notice at trial to the party against
whom it requests such action. However, since Salgado was not called and Plomann did not
deny the contentions of Ramos and Ruvalcaba that they had difficulty trying to reach him, I rely
on their credible testimony that Salgado approved their work during each shift. In another twist
that casts doubt as to the integrity of the purported audit, the Respondent did not ask Salgado
and Buddell to actually perform the audit until March 28. It is reasonable to assume that, had
Pollick and Noojin been serious about conducting a meaningful audit, they would have taken
steps throughout the period of March 21 to March 28 to monitor the work performance of Ramos
and Ruvalcaba. Such scrutiny would have revealed that Salgado was checking their work each
night and that Noojin would have directed him to check their PM sheets as well. As a result,
Salgado was not aware of the audit and did not check the PM sheets. (Tr. 48–52, 214–217,
604.)
32 Buddell conceded that the machines that Ramos and Ruvalcaba worked would have gone
through start-up procedures before production workers returned and that they would have
accumulated grease, dirt, and slag. (Tr. 628, 632.) He later clarified, however, that the buildup
depicted on one of the machines at issue would have accumulated over the period of 2 to 3
weeks. His opinion in that regard was corroborated by the amount of buildup shown in the
photograph and was not rebutted by either Ramos or Ruvalcaba. (Tr. 639; R. Exh. 1N.)
33 It appears from Noojin’s e-mail to Plomann that he asked Buddell and Salgado to do the
audit on March 28 and incorporated their report the same day. (R. Exh. 13; Tr. 549, 595.)
34 Yet another factor detracting from the integrity of the alleged audit was that the
photographs relied on as evidence were not taken by Buddell and Salgado during their alleged
audit, but rather by Noojin at Watts’ direction as part of his process for further action. (R. Exhs.
14 and 1A–1O; GC Exh. 2(a)–(c); Tr. 596–611, 613, 615, 617, 622, 660–662.)
35 Pollick, Ramos, and Ruvalcaba provided consistent testimony regarding this
conversation. (Tr. 59–61, 220–223, 470–471.)
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On April 4, instead of planning to meet with Ruvalcaba and other union representatives
later that day, Pollick, Noojin, and Watts decided to take disciplinary action against Ruvalcaba
and Ramos based upon the information contained in the audit. At the time of their conversation
or conversations, Pollick, Noojin, and Watts were all aware of the involvement of Ruvalcaba and
Ramos with the Union and the skilled trades committee, and the Union’s concerns about the
availability of training opportunities for maintenance technicians.36 As a result, the meeting
between representatives of the Respondent and the Union never occurred.
At or around 3:30 p.m., as Ruvalcaba and Ramos arrived for their shift, they
encountered Noojin standing at the entrance. He stopped them, directed Ramos to wait outside,
and took Ruvalcaba inside the facility. They proceeded to the conference room, where Watts
told Ruvalcaba that he was suspended for falsifying documents and excessive internet usage.
Ruvalcaba asked what documents he supposedly falsified. Watts then showed him three PM
sheets for March 26, 27, and 28, and asked if Ruvalcaba’s signature was on the May 28 sheet.
Ruvalcaba denied that it was his signature and demanded to have his shop steward present.
He later retracted that statement. Noojin added that Salgado and Goodell, the night shift
supervisors, checked the work. The meeting concluded.
Noojin then called Ramos into the facility. Ramos proclaimed at the outset that, if the
meeting was disciplinary in nature, he wanted union representation present. Noojin insisted,
however, that the meeting go forward and then Watts informed Ramos that he was suspended
for falsifying documents and excessive internet use. He also explained that Ramos and
Ruvalcaba filled out PM sheets for 3 days showing work completed which, in fact, was
incomplete or not performed at all. Ramos asserted that other maintenance technicians also use
the internet, including some whose access has been blocked due to excessive internet use.
This meeting also concluded with Watts explaining that Ramos was suspended pending
further investigation.37
The April 8 Grievance Meeting38
Ruvalcaba and Ramos grieved their suspensions and a grievance meeting was held on
April 8. Pollick, Watts, and Noojin attended on behalf of the Respondent. Ramos and Ruvalcaba
were accompanied by bargaining unit chairman Kendall, a shop steward, Leo Williams, and two
other union officials, Frank Angel and O. Jamison.
Pollick presented the Respondent’s position, explaining that the suspensions were
premised on their excessive use of the internet for personal reasons and their work performance
on March 26, 27, and 28. He produced the PM sheets for those days and the 15 photographs

36 I did not find credible testimony by either Pollick or Watts that the latter decided, based
solely on the results of the audit and independent of any other considerations, to suspend both
employees pending an investigation. In addition to the suspicious timing of the disciplinary
action taken, I was particularly taken aback by Pollick’s conduct in frequently looking at Watts at
counsel’s table while he testified. On several occasions that I observed, he held up exhibits
facing Watts as if to be looking for subtle messages from the latter. (Tr. 667–672.)
37 There is not much dispute as to what transpired at their suspension meetings on April 4.
(Tr. 61–65, 223–229, 553, 556–557, 669–672; GC Exh. 2(a)–(c).)
38 I relied on the testimony of Watts, who seemed sure of the date, that the meeting
occurred on April 8. Ramos and Ruvalcaba, on the other hand, testified that it occurred around
April 7.
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and gave Ruvalcaba and Ramos the opportunity to explain. While Kendall precluded them from
addressing the photographs, Ruvalcaba and Ramos addressed each of the allegations in
Buddell’s report. Ramos insisted there had been miscommunication. Ruvalcaba initially insisted
that he signed only one of the PM sheets, but relented after consulting with his union
representative and conceded he signed two of them, while Ramos signed one of the sheets.
Ruvalcaba also conceded that he had been in a hurry, forgot to replace certain pneumatic
valves, and incorrectly listed them as completed work. Ruvalcaba also explained that he needed
to improvise by adapting the form for a weld gun in order to service the smart electrode. As a
result of their response, Pollick agreed to reduce the charge of intentionally falsifying documents
to poor workmanship.39
Pollick then raised the issue of excessive internet usage by Ruvalcaba and Ramos.
Ruvalcaba and Ramos insisted they had been provided with access to the internet and
asserted, further, that most employees, including Plomann and other supervisors, used the
Respondent’s computers to access personal websites and accounts. Curiously, Pollick then
acknowledged that the Respondent possessed a list of the top 10 internet users, but conceded
that neither Ramos nor Ruvalcaba was on it. Kendall then inquired if other employees had been
blocked from Internet access, an action that would be appropriate in this instance. The meeting
ended without resolution, and Ruvalcaba and Ramos remained on unpaid suspension. Angel
suggested that the Respondent compromise and Pollick agreed to consider it.40
Ramos is Reinstated and the Disciplinary Points Are Reduced
Watts reinstated Ramos with backpay on April 10. Upon returning, he was told that his
discipline would be reduced to a total of six points—three for excessive internet use and three
for work performance and paperwork issues. Although he filed a charge regarding the initial
discipline of April 4, Ramos returned to work and did not take issue with this determination until
he filed an amended charge with the Board on October 16.41
Ruvalcaba is Terminated
On or about April 16, Pollick, Watts, and Noojin met again with Ruvalcaba, Kendall, and
Angel. Ruvalcaba reiterated his position that he completed his assigned tasks and did not abuse
his internet access any more than anyone else at the facility. Angel asked that the Respondent
mitigate the charges in such a manner as to reinstate Ruvalcaba, but Pollick insisted that the
Respondent could not completely overlook Ruvalcaba’s third serious transgression within 10
months. As of April 1, Ruvalcaba already had nine disciplinary points in his personnel record
from earlier incidents. Although Pollick agreed to reduce Ruvalcaba’s discipline to 6 points—the
same amount assessed against Ramos—the sanction resulted in a new total of 15 disciplinary

39 Noojin and Pollick could not readily distinguish many of the machines depicted in the
photographs from similar or identical machines elsewhere throughout the facility. Accordingly, I
relied on the explanations of Ramos of Ruvalcaba, coupled with their offer to go and show
Pollick what they worked on, that many of the 15 photographs did not accurately depict
machinery that they were assigned to service. (Tr. 42, 46, 63–64, 66–73, 122–123, 209–211,
227–233, 258–259, 407–413, 475–476, 565–566; R. Exh. 1A.)
40 There is no disagreement about this part of the meeting. (Tr. 71–73, 232–233.)
41 The Respondent correctly notes that Ramos did not take issue with that determination at
that time. (GC Exh. 1(l); R. Exh. 6; Tr. 73–74, 674–678.)
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points in Ruvalcaba’s personnel file. Accordingly, on or about April 22, Ruvalcaba received a
letter of termination, effective April 4.42
Ramos Is Never Considered for a Promotion
On April 23, Ramos applied for a promotion to the position of maintenance team leader.
However, he was never interviewed for it. The promotion would have resulted in increased pay.
The Respondent neither considered nor interviewed him for the position.43 Instead, he inherited
a new supervisor, Frank Pena. There were no problems initially, but Pena started yelling at him
in May because he was working slowly. Ramos was not used to such treatment from his
previous supervisors.44 On May 30, while he was still out on suspension for a safety violation
committed 2 days earlier, the Respondent rejected Ramos’ April promotion application due to
that “disciplinary issue.”45
Ramos Is Terminated for a Lock-Out/Tag-Out Violation
On May 28, Ramos had been working on his shift for about 3 hours when another
maintenance technician requested assistance in another location known as the lower back area.
As he approached the lower back area, Ramos encountered Pena. Pena began cursing about
the fact that the lower back area was not running, and insisted that Ramos resolve the problem
and “get the cell going.” After a brief discussion as to how long the repair might take, Pena left
the area. Before entering the cell, Ramos attempted to “lock-out/tag-out”—a procedure required
whenever a maintenance technician enters a production cell—by attempting to remove the key
before entering the cell. Although the key was given to Ramos by Plomann for use on that lock,
Ramos could not remove the key from the lock. Pursuant to Occupational Safety and Health
Administration safety requirements, a notice was posted on the cell door stating, “STOP! LOCK
CELL DOOR WHEN ENTERING.” Thus, Ramos knew, and was trained to the effect, that he
was not permitted to enter the production cell unless and until he could lock the cell door behind
him. Nevertheless, after attempting unsuccessfully for several minutes to remove the key from
the lock, Ramos entered the production cell in an attempt to quickly resolve the problem, leaving
the door open in the process.46

42 The Respondent’s witnesses did not shed much light on this discussion, but there is no
disagreement as to what transpired at this meeting and the termination letter that issued. (Tr.
235–237, 273–274, 405, 419–420, 423; GC Exh. 5; R. Exh. 20.)
43 The Respondent does not dispute that Ramos applied for the position, but was neither
interviewed nor considered for the position. (Tr. 75–76; GC Exh. 3.)
44 Again, I refuse to draw the requested adverse inference against Pena, who was not called
by the Respondent as a witness. The General Counsel did not provide notice at trial of its intent
to request such an inference. Moreover, there is simply insufficient connection between Pena’s
alleged tirades and Ramos’ previous activities with the Union and at the facility. (Tr. 73–75.)
45 Although there is an issue as to the nature and extent of the Respondent’s disciplinary
action resulting from the May 28 “tag-out/lock-out” safety violation, discussed infra, there is no
question that Ramos committed a safety violation on May 28 and that his promotional
application was rejected on May 30. (GC Exh. 3.)
46 It was not disputed that the lock given to Ramos, designated as lock number 258, was the
correct one for the gate to that cell. (Tr. 80–81.) Nor is it disputed that the OSHA notice was
posted on the cell door. (R. Exh. 3; Tr. 649–650.) Furthermore, in evaluating the propriety of the
Respondent’s response to this incident, it is irrelevant as to whether Ramos’ conduct was
attributable to pressure by Pena or simple disregard for the applicable OSHA requirement. See
29 C.F.R. §1910.147(a) et seq.
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Ramos remained in the production cell, which contained a robotic arm and weld parts,
for approximately 90 seconds in order to diagnose the problem. While he was in the cell, Ramos
received a radio call from David Roe, the production superintendent, requesting his location.
Ramos told Roe that he was in the lower back area, but did not mention his problem with the
key and violation of the lock-out/tag-out procedure. Roe and Tuley arrived at the cell a short
while later and observed Ramos inside the cell with the door open and the key in the lock. Tuley
noticed the key inside the lock and asked Ramos what happened. Ramos explained that he was
unable to remove the key from the lock. Tuley responded that there was no excuse for violating
the lock-out/tag-out requirement and directed Roe to issue Ramos a disciplinary violation.
Ramos simply replied to Tuley that it had been a pleasure working with him.47
Shortly thereafter, Tuley and Roe informed Watts about Ramos’ safety violation. Watts
then contacted Israel Pierson, a materials handler who also served as a union shop steward, to
inform him that the Respondent was suspending Ramos. Shortly thereafter, Pierson spoke with
Ramos. Ramos provided an explanation and asked Pierson to try to remove the key from the
lock. Pierson was unable to do so. Pierson then went to meet with Watts, Tuley, and Roe, taking
the lock and key with him. Tuley responded that Ramos could have suffered a fatal injury.
During their conversation, Pierson asked Watts to try to remove the key from the lock. Watts
complied and attempted to remove the key from the lock several times. He, too, was
unsuccessful.48
Ramos was then called to a meeting with Watts, Roe, and Pierson. Tuley had already
left. Watts informed Ramos that he was suspended for a lock-out/tag-out violation, pending a
further investigation. Watts informed Ramos that he was suspended pending a further
investigation for a lock-out/tag-out violation. Ramos conceded that he was in the production cell
while the key was still in the lock and the door open, but asserted that he could not remove the
key from the lock. Watts simply responded that Ramos needed to leave the premises.49
During his investigation of the Ramos lock-out/tag-out violation, Watts attempted to
ascertain whether the Respondent had ever disciplined an employee for a lock-out/tag-out
violation. After speaking with supervisors and reviewing employee personnel files, he uncovered
only one similar violation—by Plomann. In that instance, however, Plomann was verbally
counseled and issued no disciplinary points. Here, rather than take the same route and have

47 Tuley testified that, when Ramos saw him approaching, Ramos “immediately grabbed it,
opened it up, took the key in and out three or four times in front of Mr. Roe and myself.” He also
allegedly reported his observations immediately to Watts. (Tr. 644–648.) His version, however,
contrasted with Watts’ recollection that Tuley told him that he, not Ramos, was able to remove
the key from the lock two or three times and insert it again each time. Moreover, Watts’
corroborated Ramos’ contention by conceding that, he too, was unable to remove the key from
the lock. (Tr. 710–711.) Lastly, I find it ludicrous that Ramos, having left the door open, would
have gone to the lock and removed the key several times. Accordingly, I found Ramos’ version
of this incident more credible than the testimony and e-mail report provided by Tuley, as well as
the identical version contained in the e-mail provided by Roe, who was not called as witness.
(Tr. 77–84, 149–151, 157–158, 163, 678–681; R. Exh. 16, 21)
48 As previously noted, Watts, Pierson, and Ramos provided consistent testimony confirming
there was a problem removing the key from the lock. (Tr. 84–85, 379–381, 710.)
49 It is evident that Watts moved quickly to issue the suspension based on verbal reports
from Tuley and Roe, as they e-mailed their reports later that day. (R. Exh. 2127; Tr. 85–86; 383,
710–712.)
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Ramos receive a verbal counseling, Watts issued Ramos 10 disciplinary points for intentionally
disregarding safety rules. As those 10 points alone mandated termination, he did not even
consider Ramos’ disciplinary history, which consisted of 6 points for excessive internet use.
Accordingly, on June 4, the Respondent issued Ramos’ termination letter.50
The Respondent Issues a New Internet Policy
On May 1, the Respondent issued a new internet use policy, entitled, “Information
Systems Acceptable Use.” The new policy stated, in pertinent part, at item 2:
Colleagues will use Tower information resources for valid business purposes, except
that very limited or incidental use for personal nonbusiness purposes is acceptable.
Such use must be infrequent, not incur charges against Tower Automotive, not affect job
performance, and not deplete system resources needed for business purposes.
Personal non-business use by any colleague may be terminated at any time at the
discretion of Tower Automotive. These activities include but are not limited to chat
rooms, email, telephones, and Internet surfing. Tower IT will monitor colleague Internet
usage, and provide usage reports to Human Resources.51
Sometime in July, after unfair labor practice charges were filed, a Board investigator
requested, in pertinent part, internet usage records for the employees in the maintenance
department. In response, on July 21, Watts sent an e-mail to the information technology
department directing him to remove internet access for the remaining 33 maintenance and utility
technicians because “[n]ot only has there been abuse but none need Internet use for business
use.”52
III. Discussion and Analysis
The Respondent’s Section 10(b) Defense of Untimeliness
Section 10(b) of the Act precludes the filing of a complaint if the alleged unfair labor
practice occurred more than 6 months prior to the filing of a charge. There is an exception,
however, where the otherwise time-barred allegations are both legally and factually related to
the allegations of a prior timely-filed charge. Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115, 116–118 (1988). To
meet that threshold, the untimely allegations must be found to have arisen from the same
factual situation or sequence of events as those found in the timely-filed charge. Carney
Hospital, 350 NLRB 627, 629 (2007).
Ramos was informed of his suspension on April 4 for falsification of documents and
internet abuse. On April 10, he was notified of the Respondent’s final determination, which

50 I based the finding as to how the Respondent treated others for a similar violation on
Watts’ testimony and, thus, reject Pollick’s suggestion that Plomann might have been disciplined
for a lock-out/tag-out violation. (Tr. 86–87, 492–493, 681–682, 687–688, 712–713: GC Exh. 4.).
In fact, given the fact the Respondent failed to produce any records in response to the General
Counsel’s subpoena requesting such disciplinary records, the only inference that can be drawn
is that Plomann’s verbal counseling was not even recorded in his personnel file. (ALJ Exh. 1.)
51 GC Exh. 9.
52 Watts conceded that he directed that maintenance and utility technicians be precluded
from internet access after the Board investigator requested that department’s internet usage
records. (Tr. 702–705; GC Exh. 10.)
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reduced the violations to poor workmanship and internet abuse. He was suspended again on
May 28 and terminated for the lock-out/tag-out violation on June 4. On August 26, he timely filed
a charge alleging illegal termination due to his union-related activities. On October 16, Ramos
amended the original charge to incorporate the April 10 discipline. As the October 16 charge
was filed more than 6 months after it occurred and, in the absence of an exception, it is time-
barred.
The Respondent contends that the “closely-related” exception does not apply, as there is
no factual overlap between Ramos’ April discipline and June termination, and that any alleged
overall antiunion animus is insufficient to connect the two incidents. The General Counsel
disagrees and asserts that there is a common inquiry for both the April suspension and the June
4 discharge—the Respondent’s motivation to treat Ramos adversely due to his activities on the
skilled trades committee in March and April. I disagree. The Board, in Carney Hospital, rejected
such an approach, holding that it would not find the “closely-related” test satisfied merely
because the untimely events occurred during or in response to the same union activities. Id.,
350 NLRB at 630. Accordingly, Ramos’ charge arising from his April 4 suspension, or April 10
discipline for that matter, is time-barred.
The 8(a)(3) and (1) Allegations
The surviving portion of the complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by suspending Ruvalcaba on or about April 4, discharging Ruvalcaba
on or about April 8, and discharging Ramos on or about June 1, because they assisted and
supported the Union and engaged in union activities. The Respondent denied the material
allegations and asserts that Ruvalcaba and Ramos were dismissed for safety violations that
warranted points exceeding its threshold for termination.
Section 8(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that it is “an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” Under Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982), the General Counsel must establish that an employee engaged in protected concerted
activity, the employer was aware of that activity, and the activity was a substantial or motivating
reason for the employer’s action. See also Naomi Knitting Plant, 328 NLRB 1279, 1281 (1999).
If the General Counsel establishes its prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to “demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of
the protected conduct.” Septix Waste, Inc., 346 NLRB 494 (2006). Simply presenting a
legitimate reason for its actions is not enough. Donaldson Bros. Ready Mix, Inc., 341 NLRB
958, 966 (2004); T&J Trucking Co., 316 NLRB 771, 771 (1995); GSX Corp. v. NLRB, 918 F.2d
1351 (8th Cir. 1990).
Pollick’s animosity toward Ruvalcaba was previously expressed in February when,
suggesting that Ruvalcaba had serious character flaws, he urged Kendall not to appoint him as
a union representative on the skilled trades committee. Kendall, the Union’s chairman,
disregarded Pollick’s request and, on March 5, notified Watts in writing that he was appointing
Ruvalcaba to two union committees. On March 18, Ruvalcaba and Ramos met with Pollick,
Tuley, and Noojin as new members of the Union’s skilled trades committee and advocated for
safety training on behalf of maintenance technicians. Pollick disagreed that safety training be
offered on the basis of seniority. On March 20, Kendall notified Watts in writing that he was
appointing Ruvalcaba and Ramos to the Union’s skilled trades committee.
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The Respondent did not take long to react. On May 21, 3 days after Ruvalcaba and
Ramos met with Pollick to insist on seniority-based safety training, the Respondent notified
them that their work would be audited. Almost simultaneously, the Respondent allegedly looked
into their internet usage at the worksite’s computer kiosks. Both actions were unprecedented
and unrelated to any periodic evaluation or legitimate complaints by supervisors. In any event,
there was no record of Ruvalcaba’s internet usage during the audit period. Subsequently, on
April 4, 1 day after Ruvalcaba and Ramos called Pollick to complain about the latter’s decision
to roll out safety training for the newer technicians and without regard to seniority, Pollick had
Watts suspend Ruvalcaba and Ramos based upon poor work performance and excessive
internet use. In Ruvalcaba’s instance, it was tantamount to termination.
The Respondent’s reasons for disciplining Ruvalcaba and Ramos53 were all pretextual.
With respect to the audit, it is clear that their work on some of the machinery was unsatisfactory.
The Respondent, however, did not ask Buddell and Salgado to perform the audit until 1 of the 2
weeks of the audit period had elapsed. By that time, Plomann had abdicated his supervisory
role by failing to respond to daily radio calls by Ramos and Ruvalcaba to check their work. This
caused Ramos and Ruvalcaba to call Salgado, one of their eventual auditors, to review their
work each night. Salgado approved their work on each occasion. The Respondent’s failure to
call Salgado as a witness to counter such testimony strongly suggests that Plomann’s
disappearance was part of a scheme to “set-up” Ruvalcaba and Ramos for adverse action.

With respect to the charge that Ramos and Ruvalcaba abused their internet access,
there is no doubt that they were treated in a disparate manner. The Respondent knew or had
reason to know that internet abuse was rampant in the maintenance department. In fact, several
employees in that department were previously blocked from internet access due to excessive or
inappropriate use. However, instead of examining the internet access of all employees in the
maintenance department, the Respondent pulled only those internet use records pertaining to
Ramos and Ruvalcaba. Upon receipt of that information, the Respondent took the
unprecedented action of strictly construing its internet usage policy and disciplined them for
using the Respondent’s computer to access nonbusiness websites.
Lastly, the Respondent’s response to Ramos’ violation of the lock-out/tag-out policy was
also unprecedented. While I doubt the Respondent’s assertion that Ramos and Tuley were able
to remove the key from the lock, it is not disputed that Ramos violated the Respondent’s OSHA-
mandated safety policy by entering the production cell in contravention of the OSHA notice
posted on the door. As such, I reject Ramos’ assertion that his conduct was excusable because
he had a mean supervisor that was stressing him out. However, it was not the first time that an
employee had violated that policy. In fact, Ramos’ supervisor, Plomann, also violated the policy.
In that instance, Plomann received a verbal counseling that did not result in disciplinary points in
his personnel file.
While Ramos’ treatment for violating the lock-out/tag-out safety policy was attributable to
discriminatory motivation, the same cannot be said about the Respondent’s decision to deny his
promotion. In the absence of any information as to the Respondent’s promotional policies and
practices, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the Respondent was unreasonable in rejecting
his application and refusing to consider him for promotion to team leader.

53 Although Ramos’ charge of discipline on April 4 is time-barred, such facts are relevant
background to show bias leading to subsequent discipline on May 28.
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The suspicious timing of the Respondent’s actions, coupled with its assertion of
pretextual reasons for terminating Ruvalcaba and Ramos, strongly supports an inference of
discriminatory motivation. State Plaza, Inc., supra at 757. Accord: In re Campbell Electric Co.,
Inc., 340 NLRB 825, 841–842 (2003).
Since the General Counsel established a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion
shifted to the Respondent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have
suspended and then terminated Ramos and Ruvalcaba even in the absence of their union
activity. Monroe Mfg., 323 NLRB 24 (1997). To meet its burden of persuasion, the Respondent
was required to do more than show that it had a legitimate reason for its actions. Hicks Oils &
Hicksgas, 293 NLRB 84, 85 (1989), enfd. 942 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1991). It did not do so. The
evidence demonstrated that the Respondent had never performed a scheduled audit of any
employee, much less one that resulted in discipline. Internet use by maintenance employees
was rampant and, prior to April 4, no employee was ever disciplined on that basis. Lastly, the
Respondent’s only precedent for disciplining an employee for violating the lock-out/tag-out
safety policy was to verbally counsel the employee who, in that instance, was Plomann, the
Charging Parties’ supervisor.
Based on the foregoing, I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by
suspending Ruvalcaba on April 4, terminating Ruvalcaba effective that date, and suspending
Ramos on May 28 and terminating him on June 4, all because they advocated for seniority-
based training for maintenance technicians.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent, Tower Automotive Operations USA I, LLC, is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The United Auto Workers Local 3212, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By suspending Ruvalcaba on April 4, terminating Ruvalcaba on April 4, suspending
Ramos on May 28 and terminating him on June 4, all because they advocated for seniority-
based training for maintenance technicians, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged employees, it must offer them
reinstatement and make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a
quarterly basis from date of discharge to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net
interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as
computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
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On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended54
ORDER
The Respondent, Tower Automotive Operations USA I, LLC, Chicago, Illinois, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee for supporting the
United Auto Workers Local 3212, AFL–CIO, or any other union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Juan Ruvalcaba and
Steven Ramos full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Juan Ruvalcaba and Steven Ramos whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in
the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any
reference to the unlawful discharges, and within 3 days thereafter notify the employees in
writing that this has been done and that the discharges will not be used against them in any
way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Chicago, Illinois,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”55 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 13, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized

54 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
55 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
April 4, 2008.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 31, 2009
____________________
Michael A. Rosas
Administrative Law Judge
JD–13–09
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting the United
Auto Workers Local 3212, AFL–CIO or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Juan Ruvalcaba and Steven Ramos
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exists, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Juan Ruvalcaba and Steven Ramos whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits resulting from their discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to the
unlawful discharges of Juan Ruvalcaba and Steven Ramos, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify each of them in writing that this has been done and that the discharges will not
be used against them in any way.
TOWER AUTOMOTIVE OPERATIONS USA I, LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
JD–13–09
The Rookery Building
209 South LaSalle Street, Suite 900
Chicago, IL 60604
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
312-353-7570
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 943-645-3598.