Tina M. Harris, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Capital Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 23, 2011
0120112098 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 23, 2011)

0120112098

08-23-2011

Tina M. Harris, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Capital Metro Area), Agency.




Tina M. Harris,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Capital Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120112098

Hearing No. 430-2008-00366X

Agency No. 4K-230-0012-08

DECISION

On March 2, 2011, Complainant timely appealed the Agency’s January

28, 2011, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Commission accepts the

appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether Complainant was discriminated against based on her race

(African-American), sex (female), religion (Christian-Baptist) and

disability (anxiety/panic attacks) when from October 11, 2007, onward

she was subjected to a hostile work environment and ongoing harassment

including but not limited to her request for administrative leave being

disapproved after her doctor took her off work from November 6 –

December 3, 2007.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a General Clerk, PS-5 at the Agency’s Charlottesville Main Post

Office facility in Charlottesville, VA.

She filed an EEO complaint dated January 22, 2008, alleging the above

claim. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided

Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her

right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

Complainant requested a hearing. The AJ issued a decision without a

hearing finding no discrimination, which the Agency implemented in its

final order.

Supervisor 1 is Complainant’s direct supervisor. The Postmaster

of Complainant’s post office (African-American male, Christian)

is Complainant’s second line supervisor. Supervisor 2 (White male)

is a Supervisor of Customer Services. Complainant has an office which

is separate from the work room floor.

The AJ made the following findings of undisputed facts, taking

Complainant’s version of events as true. On October 11, 2007,

Supervisor 2 called Complainant on the telephone and yelled at her for not

entering his hours in the Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS).

When Complainant responded that she was awaiting authorization from

the Postmaster to review and authorize the hours, Supervisor 2 replied

“Jesus fucking Christ, aren’t you supposed to do this daily.”

Earlier that day, when a customer called, Supervisor 2 told Complainant

he did not have time, was busy, and to take a message, and Complainant

replied “oh no you didn’t talk to me that way” and asked

the customer (holding the telephone) if she heard Supervisor 2’s

comment. Later that day, Supervisor 2 questioned Complainant about

her conversation, and Complainant told him he was unprofessional and

disrespectful. Supervisor 2 replied that was “bullshit.” Complainant

tried to end the conversation and Supervisor 2 came within three inches

of her face and said “I am the senior fucking supervisor and you will

have this conversation.” Complainant tried to leave the office but

Supervisor 2 blocked the entrance.1 He then left and as he walked away

yelled “bitch.”

On October 16, 2007, Complainant noticed Supervisor 2 following her, and

felt threatened and afraid. She reported the matter to the Postmaster,

who told Supervisor 2 to walk in the direction away from Complainant.2

Due to her feelings of unease, Complainant sought medical attention, and

was diagnosed with panic/anxiety attacks. She stayed out of work until

returning on October 29, 2007. The record reflects that on October 16,

2007, Complainant submitted a request for administrative leave, writing

she had too much distress to remain at work, and needed immediate medical

assistance. The Postmaster denied the request, writing her services were

needed. Report of Investigation (ROI), 279. Labor Relations conducted an

investigation on the October 11, 2007, on the conflict between Complainant

and Supervisor 2 which arose in connection with the customer.

On November 5, 2007, Supervisor 2, who was scheduled to meet with

Supervisor 1, walked by Complainant’s door, and she had a panic attack

and was taken to the hospital. She requested administrative leave or,

if disapproved, continuation of pay (COP). She remained out of work until

December 3, 2007. In denying Complainant’s request for administrative

leave which she submitted on January 8, 2008, the Postmaster wrote there

was no documented evidence to support it. ROI, 280. In response to a

question about administrative leave, the Postmaster stated he inquired

about it with his superior, and it was determined that Complainant was

not entitled to administrative leave. ROI, 241.3

Upon her return, Supervisor 1 threatened and continued to remind

Complainant that her position was being considered for abolishment.

The record reflects that soon prior to this, an audit revealed that

Complainant’s job had duties that should take no more than four hours

daily. It noted the job’s time and attendance function had diminished

because it no longer included plant employees, and the function should

be absorbed by management. Supervisor 1 shared the results of the audit

with Complainant.

The AJ found that based on the Labor Relations investigation, Complainant

received a letter of warning dated January 18, 2008, and Supervisor 2

received a proposed letter of warning on January 29, 2009.

The AJ found that Complainant did not establish an inference of religion

discrimination since there was no evidence, including Complainant’s

own statement, that management was aware of her religion. Supervisors 1

and 2, and the Postmaster denied knowing Complainant’s religion.

Complainant contended that she believed she was a victim of sex and

race discrimination because the term “bitch” was primarily used

against African-American women. The AJ found that in her affidavit,

Complainant included a list of other employees who were also subjected to

poor treatment by Supervisor 2, which contained male and female names.

After describing the incidents perpetrated against her by Supervisor 2,

Complainant wrote he often had these hostile approaches with employees

and supervisors alike, listing 12 of them, with male and female

names. Complainant provided statements from three of them, all men.

One described Supervisor 2 as having extreme mood swings, another wrote

he is extremely argumentative and abrasive, and a third wrote that he

angrily called him pussy over a three day period. The AJ found that

other than Complainant’s opinion that “bitch” is more readily

directed to African-American females, there was no evidence establishing

a connection between the alleged hostile treatment and her membership in

the protected groups. The AJ found that it was evident that Supervisor

2 had a reputation of ill-treatment toward Agency employees of varied

protected groups.

The AJ found that Complainant did not did not make out a prima facie

case of disability discrimination because she did not show she had

a disability. The AJ found that even assuming Complainant was an

individual with a disability, management stated they were not aware of

her health issues and there was no evidence she requested any reasonable

accommodation.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant argues that she established a prima facie case of sex

discrimination. She writes that she claimed Supervisor 2 made rude and

condescending remarks to women in general, and a prima facie case can be

made without comparative evidenced. She argues that the investigation

was inadequate because a witness to the October 11, 2007, incident did not

provide an affidavit, nor did a witness to the November 5, 2007, incident.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision

on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de

novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9,

1999) (providing that an administrative judge’s “decision to issue a

decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)] will

be reviewed de novo”). This essentially means that we should look at

this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if

accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual

conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of

whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue

of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.

See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A.

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal

and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

As an initial matter, we find that the record was sufficiently developed

for the AJ to make a decision without a hearing. Complainant writes that

statements were not provided by witnesses to the incidents of October

11, 2007, and November 5, 2007. The witness to the October 11, 2007,

incident, however, provided an email recounting what she witnessed, and

Labor Relations wrote an account of what she reported the investigation.

We also find that there is sufficient information in the record about

the November 5, 2007, incident, and Complainant does not indicate any

additional facts that the witness would have provided.

To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that:

(1) they belong to a statutorily protected class; (2) they were

subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained

of was based on their statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment

affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or

effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or

creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.

See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further,

the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of [complainant's] employment and create an abusive working

environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of

a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance

on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 6

(Mar. 8, 1994).

We agree with the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case of religion, sex and race discrimination. As found by

the AJ, there was no evidence that management was aware of Complainant’s

religion. Complainant argues that comparative evidence is not necessary

to establish a prima facie case. While this is true, the evidence in

this case shows that Supervisor 2 treated Complainant in the same manner

he treated others outside her protected groups.

For purposes of analysis only, we assume without finding that Complainant

is an individual with a disability. While Supervisor 2 denied being

aware that Complainant had a medical condition and there is no evidence to

the contrary, the same cannot be said of the Postmaster. The Postmaster

stated he was not aware Complainant had a medical condition. There is

some evidence, however, that he knew Complainant had anxiety and panic

attacks. When Complainant applied for administrative leave on October 16,

2007, she wrote that she was too distressed to remain at work and needed

immediate medical assistance. Also, Complainant sent the Postmaster

an email on December 21, 2007, that to avoid another panic attack she

needed to stay away from Supervisor 2. ROI, 135.

In denying Complainant’s requests for administrative leave, the

Postmaster wrote that Complainant’s services were needed and she

submitted insufficient documentation. The Postmaster stated he checked

with his superior, and was advised Complainant was not entitled to

administrative leave. Complainant does not contend she was denied other

types of leave, and there is no evidence she was so denied.

Complainant has not shown that the Postmaster’s reasons for denying

her administrative leave, which is paid leave without charge to annual

or sick leave, were pretext to mask discrimination. The record contains

the Agency’s policy on the provision of administrative leave, and

none of the reasons permitted for giving administrative leave fit

Complainant’s situation. ROI, Exh. 18.

Finally, the record shows that Supervisor 1’s alleged comments to

Complainant about the prospective abolishment of her job were consistent

with a prior written Agency audit, and there is no evidence Complainant

was treated disparately regarding this matter. The AJ found that in

June 2008, a Function 4 Review abolished Complainant’s job, and based

on her bid job, she was now working as a Training Technician, PS-6.

Complainant has failed to prove discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on

appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM

the Agency’s final order which implemented the AJ’s finding of no

discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 23, 2011

__________________

Date

1Complainant did not dispute Supervisor 2’s contention that there was

also a door behind Complainant she could have used.

2 The Postmaster wrote a letter dated October 16, 2007, to Supervisor

2 instructing him to avoid any contact with Complainant until further

notice, and if he saw her coming, to go in the other direction.

The letter advised that if he had information regarding timekeeping,

to give it to Supervisor 1 to confer with Complainant.

3 The information about denial of administrative leave in this decision

was obtained from uncontested information in the record.

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0120112098

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120112098