Time Warner Cable Enterprises LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 6, 2022

2020000947 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/417,783 01/27/2017 James S. Manchester TWC12-08(12-13C2)CON2 7953 156874 7590 01/06/2022 Armis Intellectual Property Law, LLC P.O. Box 1564 Westborough, MA 01581 EXAMINER ALATA, YASSIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2426 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/06/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chris.lutz@armisiplaw.com docket@armisiplaw.com eofficeaction@appcoll.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES S. MANCHESTER, MICHAEL ANGUS, and WILFRED JAIME MILES Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,7831 Technology Center 2400 Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from a Final Action rejecting claims 1-32, which constitute all pending claims. Final Act. 1; Appeal Br. 2, 6, 22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. SPECIFICATION The Specification of the ’783 application is directed to “[a] content delivery resource in a cable network” that “initiates transmission of . . . 1 This application was filed on January 27, 2017. 2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Time Warner Cable Enterprises LLC of Saint Louis, Missouri. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 2 versions of . . . specified content in . . . multiple playback formats.” Spec. 34. CLAIMS Claims 1, 13, and 21 are the pending, independent claims. Claim 1 is reproduced below: 1. A method comprising: via computer processor hardware, executing operations of: receiving a request for content, the request originated from a first playback device operated in a subscriber domain; identifying multiple different playback formats from profile information assigned to the subscriber domain, the profile information indicating the multiple different playback formats supported by multiple playback devices operated in the subscriber domain, the multiple playback devices including the first playback device from which the request originated; and to satisfy the request, transmitting multiple versions of the content encoded in accordance with the multiple different playback formats over a shared communication link to the subscriber domain. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following prior art: Name Reference Date Friedman US 2009/0113481 A1 Apr. 30, 2009 Schlack US 2011/0173304 A1 July 14, 2011 Trimper US 2012/0079523 A1 Mar. 29, 2012 Jana US 2013/0125185 A1 May 16, 2013 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4-7, 13, 14, 16-18, 21-23, 25, 26, and 28-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Trimper. Final Act. 4-9. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 3 Claims 3, 8-10, 15, 19, 20, 24, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Trimper and Schlack. Final Act. 9. Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Trimper, Friedman, and Jana. Final Act. 11. Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Trimper, Friedman, Jana, and Schlack. Final Act. 13. OPINION A. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 1. Claim 1 Appellant argues that Trimper does not disclose the limitations of “receiving a request for content, the request originated in the subscriber domain” (“receiving limitation”) and “to satisfy the request, transmitting multiple versions of the content encoded in accordance with the multiple different playback formats over a shared communication link to the subscriber domain” (“transmitting limitation”). Appeal Br. 12-22. The Examiner finds that Trimper teaches the receiving limitation by describing that application server 315 receives a selection of a video asset from a user via one of a plurality of user devices 210. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds that user devices 210 are in the subscriber domain of Trimper. Id. Further, the Examiner finds that Trimper teaches the transmitting limitation by disclosing that CDN server transmits a copy of the selected asset to user device 210 based on the corresponding video profile. Id. at 5. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 4 Appellant disagrees with these findings, arguing that “claim 1 recites receiving a request for content and, to satisfy the request for content, transmitting multiple versions of the content encoded in accordance with the multiple different playback formats to the subscriber domain.” Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis original). Appellant further argues that “there is no indication that Trimper (or any other cited reference) delivers content in multiple different encoding formats to a respective subscriber domain based on a single request for the content.” Id. at 14. Appellant further asserts that “paragraph 47 of Trimper indicates that CDN server 330 responds to each of multiple requests (not a single request, i.e., the claimed invention recites ‘a request’) for selected video assets.” Id. at 15 (emphasis original). Further, Appellant argues that CDN server 330 does not reside in the subscriber domain. Id. In the Answer, the Examiner indicates that the claim does not require that multiple versions of the content be sent to the user in response to a single request. Ans. 4. In the Reply, Appellant appears to reiterate its argument that multiple versions of the content must be transmitted in response to a single request. Reply Br. 2-7. We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not require that multiple versions of the content be transmitted in response to a single request. The receiving limitation recites “receiving a request for content.” The indefinite article “a” means “one or more” in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase “comprising,” like claim 1. KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The transmitting limitation recites “to satisfy the request, transmitting multiple versions of the content.” As a rule, the subsequent use of the term “the” Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 5 reinvokes the non-singular meaning of “a.” Baldwin-Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). An exception to this rule only arises when the language of the claims, the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule: That “a” or “an” can mean “one or more” is best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention. The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must “evince[ ] a clear intent” to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” Id. The subsequent use of definite articles “the” or “said” in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular meaning. An exception to the general rule that “a” or “an” means more than one only arises where the language of the claims themselves, the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule. See, e.g., Abtox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Id. at 1342-1343 (alteration original, emphases added). Here, Appellant has not cited anything from the language of the claims, the specification, or the prosecution history that would warrant a departure from the general rule, and we see none. The Specification, in fact, teaches that the transmission of content in multiple formats can be in response to one or more requests, which is consistent interpreting the recited request to be one or more requests: Thus, embodiments herein can include receiving the request to stream specified content to the subscriber domain 160-1. In response to the request(s), the content delivery resource 140 initiates delivery of the requested content in multiple formats over multiple types of channels including a first channel supporting broadcast type communications and a channel and a second channel supporting IP type communications. Spec. 17:18-22 (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 6 Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not require that multiple versions of the content be transmitted in response to a single request. As for Appellant’s argument that CDN Server 330 does not reside in the subscriber domain of Trimper, CDN Server 330 does not have to reside in the subscriber domain of Trimper to satisfy claim 1. Claim 1 merely requires receiving a request for content that originated from a first playback device operated in a subscriber domain. It does not require that the recipient of the request reside in the subscriber domain. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. 2. Claims 2, 4, 13, 14, 16-18, 21, 25, 28-30 and 32 Appellant does not separately argue claims 2, 4, 13, 14, 16-18, 21, 25, 28-30 and 32 from claim 1. Appeal Br. 22. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 2, 4, 13, 14, 16-18, 21, 25, 28-30 and 32. 3. Claim 5 Claim 5 recites: The method as in claim 1, wherein identifying the multiple different playback formats includes: mapping the first playback device to a first playback format; identifying a second playback format assigned to a second playback device operated in the subscriber domain. Appellant argues that claim 5 requires identifying multiple different playback formats in response to a single request and that Trimper identifies multiple encoding formats in response to multiple requests. Appeal Br. 23. As discussed above in Section A.1, claim 1’s recitation of “a request” encompasses one or more request. Thus, we do not agree with Appellant’s argument for claim 5, and we sustain the rejection of that claim. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 7 4. Claim 6 Claim 6 recites: The method as in claim 1 further comprising: providing a notification to a user of the first playback device, the notification querying the user whether to transmit the requested content in a format supported by a second playback device in the subscriber domain. Appellant argues that Trimper does not provide a notification that queries a user whether to transmit the requested content in a format supported by a second playback device. Appeal Br. 25. The Examiner finds that paragraphs 38 and 105 of Trimper disclose the recited notification. Ans. 8-9. The Examiner finds that these paragraphs discloses sending an indication to the profile server that a transaction is executed that enables other user devices to obtain a copy of the selected video in another video format supported by the another device. Id. The Examiner further finds that enabling the user to obtain a copy requires asking the user whether to transmit the requested content. Id. Further, the Examiner finds that sending a URL or bookmark associated with the video content is querying the user whether to transmit the content. Id. Appellant argues that communication of a notification of a transaction of making selected video content available to multiple user devices does not teach or suggest providing a notification to a user of the first playback device, the notification querying the user whether to transmit the requested content in a format supported by a second playback device in the subscriber domain. Reply Br. 11-12. Appellant further argues that there is not any querying in Trimper. Id. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 8 We sustain the rejection of claim 6. Trimper discloses that it enables a device to obtain a copy of a video asset by sending a URL or Bookmark associated with the video asset. Trimper, ¶¶ 97, 105, Fig. 8 (block 835). Trimper teaches that the user’s response to the URL is a request for the content to which content is provided. Id. ¶ 99. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that by enabling a user to obtain a copy of the selected video in another video format, Trimper discloses providing a notification to a user of the first playback device, the notification (e.g., the URL) querying the user whether to transmit the requested content in a format supported by a second playback device in the subscriber domain. Id. ¶¶ 38, 97, 99, 105. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 6. 5. Claim 7 Claim 7 depends on claim 1 and further defines the step of transmitting multiple versions of the content recited in claim 1. Appellant argues that Trimper does not transmit content in multiple different formats in response to a single request. Appeal Br. 28. As set forth in Section A.1, claim 1 does not require the transmission of content in multiple different formats in response to a single request, and claim 7 adds no such requirement. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 7. 6. Claim 22 Claim 22 depends on claim 4, which depends on claim 2, which depends on claim 1. Appellant argues that Trimper does not teach transmitting video in in multiple formats to satisfy a request. Appeal Br. 29- 31. This argument depends on Appellant’s proposed construction of “a” request as a single request. Id. As set forth in Section A.1, we do not agree with that proposed construction. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 22. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 9 7. Claim 23 In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that Trimper does not disclose the subscriber domain recited in claim 23. Appeal Br. 32. In the Answer, the Examiner sets forth how paragraph 24 of Trimper teaches such a subscriber domain. Ans. 12. In the Reply Brief, Appellant “agree[s] with the Examiner that that the server resource in Trimper may provide multiple subscriber domains access to content.” Reply Br. 17. Appellant argues, however, that “Trimper does not provide service in a manner as recited by the combination of claims 1 and 23.” Id. The Examiner fully answered the argument Petitioner made in the Appeal Brief, and the argument in the Reply Brief that Trimper does not provide service in a manner as recited by the combination of claims 1 and 23 is too unspecific to identify any reversible error by the Examiner. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 23. 8. Claim 26 Claim 26 depends from claim 25, which depends from claim 24, which depends from claim 2, which depends from claim 1. Claim 26 recites, inter alia, “obtaining the profile information assigned to the subscriber domain in response to receiving the request.” The antecedent basis for “the request” in claim 26 is the recitation of “a request for content” in claim 1. Appellant argues that Trimper does not provide multiple playback formats in response to a request for content. Appeal Br. 33-35. As set forth in Section A.1, we do not agree with that argument. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 26. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 10 9. Claim 31 Appellant raises the same arguments for claim 31 as for claim 6. Appeal Br. 37-38. As set forth above, we disagree with Appellant’s arguments for claim 6. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 31. B. Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 1. Claims 3, 8, 9, 15, 19, 20, 24, and 27 Appellant does not challenge the rejection of claims 3, 8, 9, 15, 19, 20, 24, and 27. Appeal Br. 6-7; see also id. at 12-42. Thus, we sustain this rejection. 2. Claim 10 Claim 10 recites: The method as in claim 3, wherein the subscriber domain is a first subscriber domain of multiple subscriber domains; wherein the first channel supports a predetermined bandwidth; and wherein the second channel supports a varying amount of bandwidth. The antecedent bases for the terms “first channel” and “second channel” are the “first channel of the shared communication link” and “second channel of the shared communication link,” recited in claim 3. The Examiner finds that Schlack teaches the limitations that claims 3 and 10 add to claim 1. Final Act. 10-11. Appellant disagrees, arguing that, in Schlack, different devices receive content over different communication links, not a shared communication link as recited by the claim. Appeal Br. 39. Appellant notes that, for claim 10, the Examiner cites paragraph 137 of Schlack, which discloses: “client device 740-2 can be configured to receive content such as video over a RF (Radio Frequency) network or QAM transport network 735-2. The client device 740-1 can be configured Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 11 to receive video over an Internet Protocol (IP) transport network 735-1.” Appellant argues that the disclosed devices do not receive data on channels of the same communication link. Reply Br. 25-26. The Examiner does not explain how the channels that are being mapped as the first and second channels for claim 10 are channels on a shared communication link. Final Act. 10-11; Ans. 16-17. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 10. 3. Claim 11 Claim 11 depends from claim 1 and further defines the transmitting limitation of claim 1. For claim 11, Appellant repeats the argument it made for claim 1 that the recited transmission must be responsive to a single request. Appeal Br. 41-42; Reply Br. 27-28. As set forth in Section A.1, we do not agree with that argument. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 11. Appeal 2020-000947 Application 15/417,783 12 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4-7, 13, 14, 16- 18, 21-23, 25, 26, 28- 32 102 Trimper 1, 2, 4-7, 13, 14, 16-18, 21-23, 25, 26, 28-32 3, 8-10, 15, 19, 20, 24, 27 103(a) Trimper, Schlack 3, 8, 9, 15, 19, 20, 24, 27 10 11 103(a) Trimper, Friedman, Jana 11 12 103(a) Trimper, Friedman, Jana, Schlack 12 Overall Outcome 1-9, 11- 32 10 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART