Thomson Reuters Global Resources

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 16, 2020

2020003974 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/195,648 03/03/2014 Thomas G. Melling TRCP.P0050US.CP1C1/197658 3297
29053 7590 12/16/2020
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
2200 ROSS AVENUE
SUITE 3600
DALLAS, TX 75201-7932
EXAMINER
NIQUETTE, ROBERT R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
doipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THOMAS G. MELLING, RONALD G. WENCEL,
GREGORY P. SHRIBER, RICHARD D. BOONE,
DONALD MURRAY, and ROBERT THOMAS
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648
Technology Center 3600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–56. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Thomson Reuters
Global Resources Unlimited Company. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention, according to Appellant, generally relates to a software
facility for ensuring the “accurateness and currentness” of information
provided by the submitter of an electronic invoice throughout the life of a
matter using tentative invoice submission. See Spec. ¶ 37. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method in a computing system having a processor and
memory for collecting specified information via a graphical user
interface in conjunction with the submission of an invoice on
behalf of a vendor for payment by an invoiced party, comprising:
providing, by the computing system, a first graphical user
interface component of the graphical user interface to users
associated with the invoiced party for specifying a condition
under which the specified information is required for processing
of the invoice;
providing, by the computing system, a second graphical
user interface component of the graphical user interface to users
associated with the vendor for providing the specified
information, wherein the specified information is separate from
the invoice;
receiving, by the computing system, the invoice from a
user associated with the vendor;
accepting, by the computing system, the received invoice
without imposing conditions on such acceptance;
after the invoice has been accepted, determining, by the
processor of the computing system, whether the specified
condition is satisfied;
in response to determining that the specified condition is
not satisfied, making, by the processor of the computing system,
the received invoice available for processing by the invoiced
party for payment; and
in response to determining that the specified condition is
satisfied:
determining, by the processor of the computing
system, whether the user associated with the vendor is
responsible for providing the specified information;
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

3
determining, by the processor of the computing
system, in response to determining that the user associated
with the vendor is responsible for providing the specified
information, whether the second graphical user interface
component of the graphical user interface has been used
by the user associated with the vendor to provide the
specified information;
in response to determining that the second graphical
user interface component of the graphical user interface
has been used by the user associated with the vendor to
provide the specified information, making, by the
processor of the computing system, the received invoice
available for processing by the invoiced party for
payment; and
in response to determining that the second graphical
user interface component of the graphical user interface
has not been used by a user associated with the vendor to
provide the specified information:
generating a notification data structure
relating to the received invoice, wherein the
generating the notification data structure includes:
populating at least one field with
information identifying one or more required
information items identifying the specified
information that must be provided before the
received invoice will be made available for
processing by the invoiced party for
payment; and
populating at least another field with
information indicating that the received
invoice will be held for processing until the
second graphical user interface component of
the graphical user interface has been used by
the user associated with the vendor to provide
the specified information;
providing the notification data structure to
the user via the graphical user interface;
holding the received invoice in the memory
until the second graphical user interface component
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

4
of the graphical user interface has been used by the
user associated with the vendor to provide the
specified information; and
only when the second graphical user interface
component of the graphical user interface has been
used by the user associated with the vendor to
provide the specified information, using the
processor to make the received invoice available for
processing by the invoiced party for payment.
Appeal Br. 20–21 (Claims App.).
REJECTION
Claims 1–56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-Final
Act. 3.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is in error. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate,
substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments
are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues claims 1–56 as a
group. Appeal Br. 11. Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the § 101 rejection of claims 1–56 based on
representative claim 1.
Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

5
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr,
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

6
450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101.2 The Manual of

2 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). In response to received public
comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019,
clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

7
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised
guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev.
June 2020).3
Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
MPEP § 2106.04(a)) and § 2106.04(d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application,5 do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:

personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to
follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1.
3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
4 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
5 This corresponds to Alice part one where it is determined whether the claim
is “directed to” an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. If a claim is “not
directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice framework, we do not
need to proceed to step two.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

8
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.6
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Prima Facie Case
Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to make a prima facie case
of subject matter ineligibility by not considering all of the claim features
individually and as an ordered combination. Appeal Br. 2–4. Appellant
further argues that the Examiner did not make a prima facie case of subject
matter ineligibility for the dependent claims because no separate rejections
for the dependent claims appear in the Non-Final Action. Id.
We disagree. The procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case
is carried when the rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132. In
re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Section 132 is violated
when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). That is, the Examiner must set
forth the rejection’s statutory basis “in a sufficiently articulate and

6 This corresponds to Alice part two where it is determined whether the
claim contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

9
informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132.” Jung, 637
F.3d at 1363.
This is not a case where the “rejection is so uninformative that it
prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds
for rejection.” Id. at 1362. Rather, the Examiner has provided a rationale that
identifies the abstract idea recited in the claims and why it is considered an
exception. See Non-Final Act. 7–12. And Appellant clearly identifies the
abstract idea identified by the Examiner. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 13.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner has failed to set
forth a prima facie case of patent ineligibility for representative claim 1.
Step 1
Claim 1, as a method claim, falls within the process category of
§ 101. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (citing MPEP
§§ 2106.03, 2106.06).
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity and mental processes. Non-Final Act. 7. The
Examiner determined that the practice of invoice management is a
commercial interaction, extensively used for many years, “with or without
the involvement of technological means.” Id. Thus, the Examiner
determined that claim 1 recites a certain method for organizing human
activity. Id. The Examiner also determined that “this is an example of
concepts performed in the human mind as mental processes because the
invention as drafted is a process that under it[s] broadest reasonable
interpretation covers a mental process.” Id. The Examiner determined that,
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

10
other than generic computer components, “nothing in the claim element
precludes the step from practically being performed as mental process.” Id.
Consistent with Appellant’s description of the claims (see, e.g., Spec.
¶ 37), we determine that the limitations of claim 1 describe a method for
managing invoices that is fairly characterized as a commercial interaction,
which falls into the “certain methods of organizing human activity” category
of abstract ideas. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appellant does not present any
persuasive argument that the Examiner erred in determining that all of the
recited steps are part of the recited abstract idea. See Ans. 5–6. With regard
to mental processes, we agree with the Examiner that at least the
“determining,” “making available,” “generating,” “populating,” and
“holding” steps, as recited in claim 1, recite abstract mental processes.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred by not providing an
individual analysis for each of claims 1–56. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant briefly
argues that the Examiner’s position regarding claims 1–56 “merely assert[s]
in conclusory fashion that an adequate rejection for claims 1–56 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 was made in the Office Action” but the Examiner “does not,
however, indicate where such an adequate showing was made in the Office
Action.” Reply Br. 2. For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant claims
to be “unable to submit arguments traversing each rejection of the dependent
claims separately because there are no separate rejections for the dependent
claims in the Office Action.” Id. at 3.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The Examiner
considered claims 1–56 in the Examiner’s analysis. Non-Final Act. 5–12.
Independent claims 1, 2, 33, 42, and 51 all relate to using a computing
system (or data transmission system) for collecting (or transmitting)
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

11
specified information in conjunction with the submission of an invoice by a
submitter for payment by an invoiced party. Here, Appellant does not
identify any independent claim limitations that are not commensurate in
scope with the limitations the Examiner identified in claim 1. The Examiner
also determined, and we agree, that no dependent claim contains any
additional limitation sufficient to give rise to patent-eligibility, in view of the
recitation of an abstract idea by the corresponding independent claims. Ans.
6–7.
Appellant further argues that the Examiner erred because the
“generating a notification data structure” and “providing the notification data
structure” limitations, as recited in claim 1, are not a mental process or part of
a method of organizing human activity. Appeal Br. 13−14.
We are not persuaded. The 2019 Revised Guidance explains that
“mental processes” include acts that people can perform in their minds or
using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic computer
component performs the acts. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under
its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but
for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the
mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed
in the mind. Here, under the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1,
“data structure” encompasses the table in Figure 5 of Appellant’s
Specification. See Spec. ¶ 57. Generating such a table (i.e., notification data
structure) by populating fields with information, as recited in claim 1, can be
performed by the human mind or with pen and paper.
Because we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract
idea, we proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea is
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

12
integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole
would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
We determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are
any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s);
and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination
to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical
application.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See
Revised Guidance at 55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements include the
“providing,” “receiving,” and “accepting” steps, as well as the recited
“computing system,” “processor,” “memory,” and “graphical user interface”
limitations. See Ans. 5–6.
To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional
claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or
any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the
judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See 2019 Revised Guidance.
The Examiner determined that none of the additional limitations is
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

13
because the additional elements “are no more than computer elements (i.e.
computing system, processor) to be used as a tool to perform an abstract
idea.” Ans. 6.
Appellant argues that the “generating,” “providing,” holding,” and
“using” limitations of claim 1 “provide features that represent a practical
application by providing mechanisms (e.g., graphical user interfaces) for
specifying conditions for required information, for providing the required
information, for accepting the invoice without conditions, and for
determining when the invoice will be processed based on the required
information,” which result in an improved system “that is more efficient,
more robust, and better than when the features are not implemented.” Appeal
Br. 16–18. Appellant points to drawbacks in previous systems described in
the Specification. Id. at 17.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The “generating,”
“holding,” and “using” limitations of claim 1 are not additional elements, but
rather are part of a recited abstract idea. Claim 1’s method of “collecting
specified information via a graphical user interface in conjunction with the
submission of an invoice on behalf of a vendor for payment by an invoiced
party” is not an improvement to a technical field but merely uses existing
computers as a tool to perform a particular task—managing invoices. In
other words, the claimed method of managing invoices in a business process
is not an improvement to a computer, other technology, or technical field,
but to a business process. Moreover, the recited “providing” steps amount to
insignificant extra-solution activity that is not sufficient to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP
Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

14
Electric Power Group LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
Appellant further argues that “[a] system implementing the features of
the present claims would include functionality not present in prior art
systems.” Appeal Br. 18.
Appellant’s “prior art” argument is unavailing because the novelty of
any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. Diehr, 450 U.S. at
188–89. “Eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media
Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2017); see also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253,
1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “[e]ven assuming” that a particular
claimed feature was novel does not “avoid the problem of abstractness”).
Considering claim 1 as a whole, then, Appellant’s invention lacks a
technical solution to a technical problem. Claim 1 as a whole merely uses
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively,
merely uses a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Here, the
additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to
the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field; (ii) a
“particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception; (iii) a particular
transformation of an article to a different thing or state; or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, claim 1 recites an
abstract ideas as identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations
integrates the judicial exception into a practical application.
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

15
Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). We look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the
claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims
eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573
U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
The Examiner determined that the functions performed by the
additional elements in claim 1 amount to conventional computer functions
that are “generic, routine, conventional computer activities that are
performed only for their conventional uses.” Non-Final Act. 11. The
Examiner found that paragraphs 43 and 44 of the Specification describe that
standard off-the-shelf computer technology may be used to implement the
claimed invention. Id.
Appellant presents no arguments with regard to the Examiner’s Step
2B analysis. Accordingly, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

16
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the computer components perform anything other than well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving data,
looking up data in a database, attempting to execute commands, and storing
data in a database. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over
a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive”);
In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(server that receives data, extracts classification information from the
received data, and stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive
concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225−26 (receiving, storing, sending information
over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept).
Because the Specification describes the additional elements in general
terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations
may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer
components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s
Specification, as cited above. See Berkheimer Memo7 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶¶ 43–
44. We conclude claim 1 does not have an inventive concept because the
claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along

7 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)” at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining that a specification that describes
additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements
are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe
the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional).
Appeal 2020-003974
Application 14/195,648

17
with no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea
using the computer-based elements.
Because the claims are directed to a judicial exception, without
significantly more, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 1 and grouped claims 2–56, not argued separately with particularity.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–56.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–56 101 Eligibility 1–56

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED