Thomas P. Bezelik, Complainant,v.Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Director, National Security Agency, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 18, 2002
01A10441 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 18, 2002)

01A10441

04-18-2002

Thomas P. Bezelik, Complainant, v. Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Director, National Security Agency, Agency.


Thomas P. Bezelik v. National Security Agency

01A10441

April 18, 2002

.

Thomas P. Bezelik,

Complainant,

v.

Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden,

Director,

National Security Agency,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A10441

Agency No. 99-029

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq., and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

Complainant alleged that he was discriminated against on the bases of

age (date of birth: January 23, 1947 ), disability (degenerative disk

and rheumatory arthritis), and reprisal (filed prior EEO complaints),

when the Chief of Y29 did not support him for promotion to GGD-14 in the

first half of FY-99 and he was subsequently not promoted in December 1998.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Senior Engineering Specialist in the Fielded Systems Support Branch

(Y271) of the Field Support Division (Y27) in Ft. Meade, Maryland.

Complainant applied for the promotion at issue, and in December 1998,

was nonselected. Two younger employees (dates of birth: June 11,

1957, and June 19, 1960) were selected. Believing he was a victim

of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on April 28, 1999. At the conclusion of the

investigation, complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final

decision by the agency. Complainant requested that the agency issue a

final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant established a prima

facie case of age discrimination. The FAD then concluded that the

agency articulated the following legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the nonselection: complainant was not the most qualified person for

promotion to GG-14 in December 1998. Specifically, one comparator has a

B.S. and a B.A. and the other has a B.S. and a M.S., while complainant

has an A.A. Complainant was an engineering specialist at the time

of selection, while the comparators were both cryptologic engineers.

Additionally, while complainant had one special performance cash award

between 1993-1996, one of complainant's named comparators received four

such awards, and the other received five. The selectees were selected

according to the agency's promotion criteria, which placed great value on

job performance, and while complainant attended an abundance of training

courses, he did not transfer his training into on-the-job performance.

In addition, according to Deputy Chief Y29 (D1), complainant did not

have solid accomplishments and was not a team player. In contrast,

complainant's younger comparator had stellar performance. The FAD went

on to conclude that complainant failed to present any evidence to rebut

the agency's explanation, and therefore did not establish pretext.

The FAD also found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination, because he did not establish that he

is disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. It further

concluded that there is no evidence whatsoever to link complainant's

alleged disability with his non-promotion. The members of the Y, DDI,

and agency boards indicated that they were unaware of any disability

that complainant alleged to have. Additionally, the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the nonselection, which

complainant has not demonstrated to be pretextual.

The FAD additionally concluded that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of reprisal. Specifically, although complainant

filed prior EEO complaints, which is protected activity, and he was not

promoted, there is no evidence linking the two. Complainant's reprisal

claim is based on nothing more than speculation. In any event, the

FAD concluded that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for the nonselection, which complainant failed to demonstrate

as pretextual.

On appeal, complainant, through his attorney, restates arguments

previously made, and makes the following additional principal arguments:

There have been alleged illegalities by the agency concerning promotions

awarded on the basis of race and sex, and complainant has suffered from

similar illegalities based on age, disability and reprisal;

Complainant has provided sufficient evidence to establish that the

agency's act is motivated by a discriminatory animus toward complainant.

The EEO investigation is incomplete and biased because it lacks

objectivity and professional acumen.

The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

As an initial matter we note that, as this is an appeal from a FAD

issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the

agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse

to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's

age." 29 U.S.C. � 623(a)(1). When a complainant alleges that he or

she has been disparately treated by the employing agency as a result

of unlawful age discrimination, "liability depends on whether the

protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's

decision." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141

(2000) (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).

"That is, [complainant's] age must have actually played a role in the

employer's decisionmaking process and had a determinative influence on

the outcome." Id.

In disparate treatment cases, where there is an absence of direct

evidence of discrimination, the allocation of burdens and order of

presentation of proof is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see also Reeves, 530

U.S. at 142 (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to ADEA claim). Under

this analytic framework, complainant must first establish a prima

facie case of unlawful age discrimination. We note that it is not

necessary for complainant to rely strictly on comparative evidence in

order to establish an inference of discriminatory motivation necessary

to support a prima facie case. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers

Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on O'Connor

v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at n.4

(Sept. 18, 1996). However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the agency intentionally discriminated against complainant

remains at all times with complainant. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie

case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions, the

factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell

Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by

a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated

by discrimination. U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC

Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health

and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Assuming, arguendo, that complainant established his prima facie case

of discrimination on the bases of age, disability and reprisal, the

Commission turns to the agency to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. D1 stated that he and C1 initially discussed the

list of eligibles given to them by personnel, Y091. Then a zero-based

review of all of the GG-13's in the organization was conducted by

the Promotion Board (PB). See Record of Investigation (ROI), Exhibit

4-31. Complainant's application was reviewed by the PB. The PB scored

all of the candidates based on the following criteria: performance,

job experience, personal attributes, training and self-development,

and potential. Id. Job performance was weighted the most heavily. Id.

The PB then compiled a list for C1 of recommended promotees, and C1 made

the ultimate selection decision. See ROI, Exhibit 4, p. 2. The Board

did not rank complainant high for job performance and future potential

contributions at the GG14 level, and his name was not on the list of

recommended promotees. See ROI, Exhibit 7, p. 3. D1 additionally

explained that the selectees both had significantly more accomplishments

since their last promotions than complainant did. See ROI, Exhibit 4,

at p. 3. D1 also noted that, although complainant took an extremely

high number of agency training courses while he was in Y29, no more

than 10% weight can be given to training/self-development according to

the applicable guidelines. Id., at p. 5. All individuals involved in

the selection process for the position at issue denied that age was a

factor in the selection process. See ROI, Exhibits 4-31.

The burden returns to complainant to show that the agency's reasons were

pretext for discrimination. Complainant asserts, in his affidavit,

his belief that C1 does not support personnel over 40 or 50 years old

for promotion. He stated �[C1] doesn't support people who have age,

longevity, don't have much time until retirement. That's the key here.

If you don't have much time left, he will not nominate you unless you

have enough time to be able to put in for your 15.� Id., at p. 5-6.

Complainant states that, to his knowledge, management has never

supported anyone over the age of 40 or 50 for promotion to grade 14

who was not in a management position. Id., at p. 6. Additionally,

according to complainant's affidavit, he believes he was qualified

for the promotion. In regards to education and training, he feels

he was as, or more, qualified than the selectees. As to experience,

he notes that he had been a program manager on a number of programs,

worked on nine contracts totaling $80 million, and asked for a higher

dollar projects, but was never afforded the opportunity. See ROI,

Exhibit 1, p. 4-5. Complainant also notes that he received a number

of letters of appreciation from his customers and contractors. Id.,

at p. 5. Complainant also contends that the promotion write-ups for the

selectees were �padded� by C1, and this constituted fraud. Specifically,

complainant contends that C1 used the responsibilities and accomplishments

of subordinate division personnel to fluff up the promotion write-ups.

See Affidavit of complainant (December 18, 2000), p. 2. Complainant does

not substantiate this allegation of fraud. Complainant may be able to

establish pretext with a showing that his qualifications were plainly

superior to those of the selectee(s). Wasser v. Department of Labor,

EEOC Request No. 05940058 (November 2, 1995); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d

1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981). However, complainant has not persuaded the

Commission that, his qualifications, when measured against the weighted

promotion criteria, were plainly superior to the qualifications of

the selectees. The Commission finds that complainant failed to show,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's articulated reasons

for its actions were a pretext for age-based discrimination.

With respect to complainant's argument expressing complainant's

dissatisfaction with the processing of his instant complaint, we note

that such dissatisfaction is not sufficient reason for us to vacate

the agency decision and remand his case for the issuance of a new

decision. In the Commission's Management Directive, it is stated that

if a complainant is dissatisfied with the processing of his complaint,

he must bring his allegation regarding the processing of his complaint

to the appropriate agency officials. See EEO Management Directive 110,

(MD-110) p. 5-25 (November 9, 1999); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107 (a) (8)

(the agency shall dismiss an entire complaint that alleges dissatisfaction

with the processing of a previously filed complaint).

Therefore, based on a complete examination of the evidence of record,

we conclude that complainant has not presented sufficient evidence to

prove that the agency's articulated reasons were pretext for reprisal or

disability discrimination, or that his age actually played a role in the

agency's actions and had a determinative influence on the outcomes. See

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.

In so finding, we note complainant's suggestion that individuals at the

agency often receive promotions for a nondiscriminatory reason, namely

favoritism. See Affidavit of complainant, (December 18, 2000), p. 4.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 18, 2002

__________________

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992

to apply the standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

to complaints of discrimination by federal employees or applicants

for employment.