Thierry Huque et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 27, 2020

13583148 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/583,148 11/19/2012 Thierry Huque 10ZV2050US01/852563.403US 2081
38106 7590 04/27/2020
Seed IP Law Group LLP/ST (EP ORIGINATING)
701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 5400
SEATTLE, WA 98104-7092
EXAMINER
DU, HUNG K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2647
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte THIERRY HUQUE and
OLIVIER VAN NIEUWENHUYZE
____________________

Appeal 2018-006050
Application 13/583,148
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–8 and 13–27, which are all of the claims pending
in the application. Claims 9–12 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Proton
World International N.V. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant generally describes the disclosed and claimed invention as
protecting information contained in a security module of a
telecommunication device provided with a near-field communication router,
“wherein the modification of a routing table between ports of said router is
subject to the checking of an authentication code inputted by a user.”
Abstract.2
Independent claim 1, which is reproduced below, is illustrative of the
subject matter on appeal:
1. A method, comprising:
protecting data stored in a security module of a
telecommunication device having a near field communication
(NFC) router, the NFC router having a plurality of individually
assignable gates, at least one of the plurality of individually
assignable gates concurrently coupleable to a first node via a first
communication pipe and to a second node via a second
communication pipe, wherein each communication pipe is
formed as a non-shared, point-to-point communication path
between its respective gate and its corresponding node, wherein
assignments of the individually assignable gates are defined in a
routing table, the protecting including the acts of:
receiving an authentication code keyed in by a user;
verifying the authentication code; and
preventing in the routing table a modification of an
assignment of at least one of the individually assignable gates of

2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed Jan. 3, 2017 (“Final
Act.”), Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed Aug. 8, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”) and
Reply Brief filed May 22, 2018 (“Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer
mailed Mar. 22, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Substitute Specification filed Sept. 6,
2012 (“Spec.”), which is referred to as the “Specification.”
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said NFC router based on a failure to verify the authentication
code keyed in by the user.
Appeal Br. 41 (Claims App.).
Rejections on Appeal3
Claims 13, 21, and 26 are provisionally rejected on the ground of non-
statutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 7, 15, and 20,
respectively, of co-pending Application No. 13/583,157. Final Act. 8–11.
Claims 19–234 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Id. at 12.
Claims 1–4, 14, 19, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Charrat et al. (US 2009/0206984 A1; published

3 The Examiner withdrew the rejections of claims 1–8 and 13–27 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for indefiniteness. Ans. 10.
4 The Final Action states that claims 1–8 and 13–18 are rejected for failure
to comply with the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph, but provides no supporting findings or reasoning. Final Act.
12. The Examiner also states that claim 19, and dependent claims 20–23,
are rejected because there is no written description support in the
Specification for the “physical gates” limitation. Id. The Examiner further
rejects claims 1, 19, and 24, and dependent claims 2–8, 13–18, 20–23, and
25–27, because the written description does not disclose the “non-shared”
communication pipe limitation. Id. In addition, the Examiner rejects claim
3 for lack of support for the limitation “verify the password using the
security module.” Id. at 12–13. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant made
arguments with respect to each of these rejections. Appeal Br. 20–27. In the
Answer, the Examiner addresses only the “physical gate” limitation of claim
19, and claims 21–23. See Ans. 2–10. Moreover, the Examiner specifically
withdrew the rejections of claims 1, 3, 19 (relating to the “non-shared”
limitation), and 24 for failing to comply with the written description
requirement. Id. at 10. Thus, we understand the Examiner’s rejection under
§ 112, first paragraph, for lack of written description as applicable to only
claims 19–23 with respect to the “physical gates” limitation.
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Aug. 20, 2009) (“Charrat”) and Kelley et al. (US 2006/0213972 A1;
published Sept. 28, 2006) (“Kelley”). Id. at 14–21.
Claims 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20–22, 25, and 26 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Charrat, Kelley, and Banker
et al. (US 2005/0013310 A1; published Jan. 20, 2005) (“Banker”). Id. at
21–29.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Charrat, Kelley, and Arditti et al. (US 2007/0186097 A1;
published Aug. 9, 2007) (“Arditti”). Id. at 29–30.
Claims 17, 23, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Charrat, Kelley, Banker, and Shimbo et al. (US
6,092,191 A1; issued July 18, 2000) (“Shimbo”). Id. at 30–32.

ANALYSIS
Double Patenting Rejection
The Examiner provisionally rejects claims 13, 21, and 26 on the
ground of non-statutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims
7, 15, and 20, respectively, of co-pending Application No. 13/583,157 (“the
’157 application”). Final Act. 8–11. The Examiner finds that “[a]lthough
the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from
each other.” Id. at 8.
Appellant notes that at the time of filing of the Appeal Brief, the ’157
application was under appeal and had not been allowed. Appeal Br. 13.
Appellant argues that the double patenting rejection should be reversed
because the Examiner did not consider all of the features of the independent
claims, 1, 19, and 24, from which rejected claims 13, 21, and 26 depend,
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respectively. Id. According to Appellant, upon consideration of each
relevant feature of the claims, “the respective claims are patentably distinct
and [] the double patenting rejection is in error.” Id. Appellant provides
three tables (each having two columns) in which the limitations of each of
the rejected claims, together with the limitations of the independent claim
from which it depends, are set forth in the column on the left, and the
corresponding limitations of each of the claims of the ’157 application relied
on by the Examiner, together with the limitations of its independent claim,
are set forth in the column on the right. Id. at 14–20. In each table,
Appellant identifies (in bold and with underlining) certain limitations of the
rejected claims, and the claims relied on by the Examiner from the ’157
application, that Appellant contends are “non-obvious features,” and argues
that the double patenting rejection should be reversed. Id.
In the Answer, under the heading titled “Ripeness of the Non-
Statutory Double Patenting Rejections,” the Examiner states that “Appellant
waits for decision before filing terminal disclaimer.” Ans. 2.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the Examiner implies that no
substantive arguments for reversing the double patenting rejection were
asserted, but this is incorrect based on the arguments presented in the Appeal
Brief at pages 13–20, and requests reversal of the rejection. Reply Br. 2.
Upon review of the prosecution history of the ’157 application, we
note that, after the filing of Appellant’s briefs, and mailing of the
Examiner’s Answer, in this application, Appellant filed on October 15,
2018, a Request for Continued Examination in the ’157 application and
amended the claims, including amendments to independent claims 1, 12, and
17, and dependent claims 7, 15, and 20. Subsequently, on December 17,
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2018, a Notice of Allowance for claims 1–7 and 12–21 was issued. On
February 15, 2019, a Supplemental Notice of Allowance for claims 1–7 and
12–21 was issued. On March 15, 2019, Appellant filed an Amendment after
Notice of Allowance resulting in the amendment of claims 12–16. On April
30, 2019, the ’157 application issued as U.S. Patent No. 10,278,077 B2.
Panels have the flexibility to reach or not reach provisional
obviousness-type double-patenting rejections. Ex parte Jerg, No. 2011-
000044, 2012 WL 1375142, at *3 (BPAI Apr. 13, 2012) (expanded panel)
(informative); see also Ex parte Moncla, 95 USPQ2d 1884, 1885 (BPAI
2010) (precedential). Although claims 13, 21, and 26 were provisionally
rejected for obviousness-type double patenting (OTDP) over claims 7, 15,
and 20 of the co-pending ’157 application, the ’157 application has now
issued as U.S. Patent No. 10,278,077 B2. Consequently, the double-
patenting rejection is no longer a provisional rejection.
Although Appellant presents substantive arguments regarding the
double patenting rejection, the allegedly conflicting claims, and their
respective base claims, in the ’157 application were amended in a request for
continued examination filed on Oct. 15, 2018, and an amendment after
notice of allowance filed on March 15, 2019. Because of the subsequent
claim amendments, the Examiner’s original basis for the non-statutory
double patenting rejection is now moot, and we do not consider it on its
merits, but leave it to the further consideration of the Examiner in light of
the newly amended and issued claims of the ’157 application that has issued
as U.S. Patent No. 10,278,077 B2.5 Accordingly, we pro forma dismiss the

5 Appellant states in the Appeal Brief that “if the copending ’157
Application should be allowed while the present case is under appeal, a
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OTDP rejection as moot, pending additional review by the Examiner in the
event of further prosecution, including any review prior to allowance.
Written Description Rejection
The Examiner rejects claim 19–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 12. Independent claim 19 recites “each individually assignable
gate being a physical gate,” and claims 20–23 depend directly or indirectly
from claim 19. Appeal Br. 43–44 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that the Specification does not “specifically
disclose” that the assignable gates of claim 19 are “physical gates.” Final
Act. 12. In the Answer, the Examiner finds that “[n]either the written
description nor drawings specifically discloses the claimed logic gates are
physical gates.” Ans. 4, 6, 8.
Figure 2 of the application is reproduced below.

terminal disclaimer will be considered to expedite allowance of the present
application.” Appeal Br. 1 (emphasis omitted). Because the ’157
application has been allowed, Appellant now has the option of filing a
terminal disclaimer with respect to this application.
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Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating, in the form of blocks, the routing
function of a near field transmission module or NFC router of a
telecommunication device of the type recited in claim 1. Spec. 3–4, 6.
Figure 2 depicts NFC router 18, subscriber identification module (SIM) card
14 and microprocessor (CPU/TH) 12.
The Specification explains that router 18 comprises “physical
terminals” (labeled TERMINALS) of connection to links 1218, 1418, and
2418, and manages “logic gates” (labeled GATES) for assigning these
terminals to the different functions associated with near field
communications. Spec. 5:26–28. Each of the router TERMINALS is
assigned one or several GATES. Id. at 6:8–9. The Specification also
explains that routing table 18 assigns some GATES to internal functions,
“but also creates pipes (PIPE) between some gates assigned to the SIM card
or to the RF microcontroller, and gates (RFGATES) comprised in module
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18. Id. at 6:13–16. This corresponds to the creation of pipes between the
circuits external to router 18 and its RF transmission circuits for
implementation of the different applications requiring a near field
communication. Id. at 6:16–18. Router 18 also manages a pipe (ATPIPE),
as shown in Figure 2, of communication between SIM card 14 and any other
security module, and microcontroller 12. Id. at 7:1–3.
Referring to Figure 2, the Examiner finds that the connectors labeled
as TERMINALS are physical, but there is no specific disclosure that the
logic gates, i.e., GATES, “are hardware or what the lines between the
TERMINALS and GATES represent.” Id. at 6–9. The Examiner also finds
that “any electrical engineering student would know that a ‘physical’ logic
gate is the building block of a digital circuit,” but Figure 2 does not use any
of the “symbols” for the basic logic gates and, therefore, the GATES of
Figure 2 “cannot be assumed to be physical.” Id. at 7–10.
The test for compliance with the written description requirement
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is “whether the disclosure of the
application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the
inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc). “[T]he disclosure as originally filed does not have to
provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.”
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Nevertheless, the disclosure must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in
the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Ariad, 598
F.3d at 1351 (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred.
First, Appellant argues that the Examiner incorrectly asserts that the written
description requirement of § 112, first paragraph, mandates a “specific
disclosure” in the Specification of the claim limitation at issue. Appeal Br.
22; Reply Br. 3. We agree with Appellant’s argument because the
Examiner’s insistence on a “specific disclosure” in the Specification or
drawings that the logic gates, i.e., GATES, “are hardware” is not consistent
with applicable law. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1323 (“In order to
satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed
does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject
matter at issue.”).
Second, Appellant argues there is no support for the Examiner’s
apparent finding that fulfilling the written description requirement of § 112,
first paragraph, with respect to the “physical gates” limitation “would
require the illustration of specific schematic symbols in the figures” for the
logic gates. Reply Br. 3. We agree with Appellant’s argument because the
Examiner cites no case law or other authority that would require illustrating
the logic gates, i.e., GATES, shown in Figure 2 with the schematic symbols
for particular types of logic gates. Although logic gates could be depicted in
the drawings in that manner, there is no legal requirement that the general
class of logic gates, i.e., GATES, shown in Figure 2 be depicted with any
particular symbols to satisfy the written description requirement of § 112,
first paragraph.
Third, Appellant argues that based on the Specification’s disclosure at
page 5, lines 26–31, a person of ordinary skill in the art would clearly
understand that the logic gates shown in Figure 2 are “comprised of a
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plurality of electronic circuits . . . [that] are unquestionably physical
structures.” Appeal Br. 24. The cited portion of the Specification states:
Router 18 comprises physical terminals of connection to
links 1218, 1418, and 2418 and manages logic gates for assigning
these terminals to the different functions associated with near
field communications. Router 18 thus comprises a processor and
volatile and non-volatile memories for storing, among others, a
routing table for the different logic gates. Some gates are
reserved for router administration functions while others can be
freely assigned by the router.

The Specification also discloses that the lines shown in Figure 2
between the TERMINALS and GATES are communication paths or pipes.
For example, the Specification states that router 18 makes available and
manages different “pipes of communication” with the other circuits 12, 14,
24 (security module (SSE)), etc. of the mobile device to provide these
circuits access to the near field communication functions, “that is, to gates
connected to radio frequency transmission circuits, called RF gates.” Spec.
5:32–6:3. As mentioned supra, the Specification also discloses that each of
the router terminals is assigned one or several gates and that routing table 18
assigns some gates to internal functions, “but also creates pipes (PIPE)
between some gates assigned to the SIM card or to the RF microcontroller,
and gates (RFGATES) comprised in module 18.” Id. at 6:8–21. Thus, we
find that, in view of the Specification, a person of ordinary skill would
understand that router 18 has internal physical structures, including
terminals, logic gates, and electronic circuitry in the form of communication
paths, that can be used to pass data to CPU/TH 12, SIM card 14, and
security module 24. See Appeal Br. 5–6.
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Accordingly, we find that the disclosure of Appellant’s Specification
reasonably conveys to those of ordinary skill in the art, as of the filing date,
that the inventor had possession of the claimed “physical gate.” See Ariad,
598 F.3d at 135. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim
19, and dependent claims 20–23, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for
failure to comply with the written description requirement.
Section 103(a) Rejections
The dispositive issue raised by the arguments in Appellant’s briefs is
whether the combination of Charrat and Kelley teaches or suggests the NFC
router having a plurality of “individually assignable gates,” as recited in
claim 1, and as similarly recited in independent claims 19 and 24.6
The Examiner rejects claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for
obviousness over the combination of Charrat and Kelley. Final Act. 14–21.
In particular, the Examiner finds that Charrat teaches an NFC router having
a plurality of individually assignable gates because Charrat “shows the NFC
router (NFCC) assigns data paths with endpoints to host processors HP1,
HP2 and NFC circuit. The endpoints are the assignable gates.” Id. at 14–15
(citing Charrat Figure 3B; Tables 1–2; ¶¶ 10, 12–13).
Appellant contends that Charrat does not teach “individually
assignable gates” as claimed. Appeal Br. 33–35. Appellant argues that
instead of assignable gates, Charrat’s system has a dedicated bus interface to
each of its circuits. Id. at 33. According to Appellant, Figures 3A and 3B
(as well as Figures 8 and 9), for example, illustrate two dedicated bus

6 Appellant argues the claims as a group focusing on claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 6–11. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as representative, and the
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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interfaces, INT1 and INT2, which can be adapted to different protocols and
modes of operation, but are “expressly dedicated to particular circuits via a
shared address and data bus ADB ; DTB.” Id. Appellant also argues that
the asserted endpoints of Figure 3B relied on by the Examiner are also
shown in more detail in Figure 8 “in buffers (BUF1, BUF2), which are
internal source and destination buffers,” and there is no teaching in Charrat
“where ‘buffers’ are understood by one of skill in the art to teach
individually assignable gates.” Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). Appellant
further argues that a person of ordinary skill would understand that Charrat’s
BUF1 and BUF2 are coupled to these buses (ADB and DTB) to provide and
receive data, and reading or writing to a buffer does not provide any
evidence of any individual gate assignments. Id. at 34–35. Moreover,
Appellant argues that, instead, a person of ordinary skill would understand
that
bus lines are formed as fixed electrical paths between nodes, and
buffers have data paths coupled to the bus lines. Each device and
each buffer is presumably coupled to every line of an ADB or
DTB bus, and nothing in such coupling teaches any individually
assignable structures.
Id. at 35.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds that in this application, “a gate is
an endpoint of a communication path.” Ans. 12. The Examiner also finds
that Charrat teaches formation of a new data path using the route creation
command and, upon successful execution of the command, the new data
path is added to Table 1 or Table 2 of Annex 2. Ans. 12–13 (citing Charrat
Figure 6, ¶¶ 72–76, 87–91, 95, 126). The Examiner further finds that in
Table 1 or Table 2, “each data path entry comprises the identifier of the data
path (CHANi), the source point (IDsp), the protocol of the data path (PTi),
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the mode of the data path (Mi) and the destination point (Send).” Id. at 13.
Moreover, the Examiner finds that the endpoints of each data path are HP1,
HP2, or CLINT, which are identifiable by P1, P2, Pc, and therefore “the
routing includes the gate assignment, i.e. P1, P2, Pc, etc.” Id. (citing Charrat
¶ 60, Figures 8–9).
“After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response
[to the Examiner’s presentation of a prima facie case of unpatentability],
patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance
of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument.” In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also In re Sullivan,
498 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Whether the composition would
have been obvious cannot be determined without considering evidence
attempting to rebut the prima facie case.”); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048,
1052 (CCPA 1976) (“When prima facie obviousness is established and
evidence is submitted in rebuttal, the decision-maker must start over.”).
On the record before us, Appellant’s contention that Charrat does not
teach or suggest “individually assignable gates” is persuasive of reversible
error by the Examiner for three reasons. First, as Appellant argues, the
Examiner did not address Appellant’s arguments and evidence of Charrat’s
bus-based architecture. Reply Br. 4–5. In particular, the Examiner did not
address, much less rebut, Appellant’s showing that by virtue of Charrat’s
“bus features, Charrat does not need any gate assignments and there are no
gate assignments taught in Charrat’s routing tables.” Id. at 4; see also
Appeal Br. 33–35.
Second, we have reviewed Charrat’s Figures, Tables, and paragraphs
of the Specification cited by the Examiner, and we fail to discern any
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teaching or suggestion of “assignable gates.” In that regard, we note that the
Examiner relies on different portions of Charrat in the Answer than in the
Final Action. Regardless, we determine that none of the disclosures of
Charrat cited in the Final Action or the Answer teach or suggest the claimed
“assignable gates.”
Third, in the Reply Brief, Appellant addresses the portions of Charrat
newly cited in the Answer, based on which the Examiner finds that “in the
instant application a gate is an endpoint of a communication path” and that
Charrat teaches creation of a routing table that names certain endpoints.
Reply Br. 5 (citing Ans. 12–14 (citing Charrat Figure 6; ¶¶ 87–91, 95, 126;
Tables 1–2 of Annex 2)). Appellant argues that the Examiner asserts “an
unsupported and incorrect conclusion that ‘a gate is an endpoint.’” Id. We
agree with Appellant’s argument because the Examiner fails to provide any
explanation or technical reasoning why an endpoint of a data path, such as
P1 located on HP1 or P2 located on HP2, constitutes a “gate” or why the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the “assignable gate” limitation, in
view of Appellant’s Specification, is an endpoint of a data path. Appellant
also argues that “there is no teaching found in Charrat’s routing table of any
assignable gates.” Id. We are persuaded by this argument because, as
Appellant argues, and we agree, the portions of Charrat cited by the
Examiner in the Answer “refer to data path parameters, but there is no
teaching of any gate assignments.” Id. at 4.
On this record, we find the preponderance of the evidence establishes
that Charrat does not teach or suggest “individually assignable gates.” The
Examiner does not rely on Kelley to teach this limitation. Thus, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. For the same reasons, we do not
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sustain the Examiner’s rejections of independent claims 19 and 24, and
dependent claims 2–8, 13–18, 20–23, and 25–27, which are not argued
separately and fall together with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
We dismiss as moot the Examiner’s provisional rejection of claims
13, 21, and 26 on the ground of non-statutory double patenting as being
unpatentable over claims 7, 15, and 20, respectively, of co-pending
Application No. 13/583,157.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19–23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4, 14, 19, and 24
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Charrat and Kelley.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 18,
20–22, 25, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Charrat, Kelley, and Banker.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Charrat, Kelley, and Arditti.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 17, 23, and 27 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Charrat, Kelley, Banker, and
Shimbo.
DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
19–23 112, first
paragraph
19–23
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1–4, 14, 19,
24
103(a) Charrat, Kelley 1–4, 14, 19,
24
5, 7, 8, 13,
15, 16, 18,
20–22, 25–
26
103(a) Charrat, Kelley,
Banker
5, 7, 8, 13,
15, 16, 18,
20–22, 25–
26
6 103(a) Charrat, Kelley,
Arditti
6
17, 23, 27 103(a) Charrat, Kelley,
Shimbo
17, 23, 27
Overall
Outcome
1–8, 13–27

REVERSED