Theodore W. Makse, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 14, 2004
01a42773_r (E.E.O.C. Jul. 14, 2004)

01a42773_r

07-14-2004

Theodore W. Makse, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Theodore W. Makse v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A42773

July 14, 2004

.

Theodore W. Makse,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A42773

Agency No. 200J-0541-2003100899

DECISION

Complainant filed this appeal from the March 1, 2004 agency decision

finding no discrimination.

Complainant alleged that he was discriminated against on the bases of

disability (back) when on or around November 25, 2002: (1) complainant

was informed that he was not selected for the position of Maintenance

Operations General Foreman, MPA 02-117; and (2) complainant was informed

that he was not selected for the position of Utilities Systems Repairer

Operator Supervisor, MPA 03-018.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge but

complainant requested that the agency issue a decision.

In its decision, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The agency further

concluded that even if complainant established a prima facie case,

complainant failed to show that the agency's reason for making the

selection was pretextual.

The record discloses that complainant injured his back while working as

a Utilities Systems Repairer Operator in 1981 when he fell off a ladder.

Complainant continued to work until 1984. He was determined to be totally

disabled by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) in 1985.

In 1997, OWCP determined that complainant was able to work part-time

in a light duty position. By May 2003, complainant had been working a

20-hour workweek for six years as a Pharmacy Aid with the agency.

The record reveals further that complainant applied for the agency

positions of Maintenance and Operations General Foreman and Utilities

Systems Repairer Operator Supervisor. Complainant was deemed qualified

for both positions but he was not selected for either of the positions.

The record reveals that none of the candidates deemed qualified were

interviewed.

The record contains complainant's sworn statement, wherein he stated

that his application for the Foreman position indicated that he was a

disabled veteran. Complainant also stated that the fact that he did

not work for years would have the selecting official wonder about the

reason why complainant had not worked. While complainant also stated

that he did not know if he were more qualified than the selectee for

the Foreman position, and his resume did not reflect the dates of his

employment, it was clear that he had 36 years as a licensed engineer.

Regarding his nonselection for the Supervisor position, complainant stated

that when he applied for the Supervisor position, he made sure that the

agency knew that he had a disability by informing the agency that he

should be able to come back to the agency under rehabilitation rights.

Complainant stated that he had worked for the agency as a Utilities

Systems Repairer Operator; he used to work with the selectee and trained

him; he was more qualified than the selectee; he had acted in the position

as a supervisor in 1984; and the selectee had not supervised before.

The record contains the sworn statement of the Chief of Engineering

(COE) who was the selecting official for the position of Maintenance

Operations General Foreman, stating that the selectee was chosen for

his leadership skills. The COE stated that he knew the selectee when he

worked as an Electric Shop Supervisor and that the selectee had excellent

communications skills and was very technically competent. The COE stated

that the recent nature of a candidate's experience might be considered,

noting that engineering was a dynamic field with constant changes in

procedures and in codes which had to be met. The COE also stated that

he did not know complainant.

Regarding the selection for the position of Utilities Systems Repairer

Operator Supervisor, the COE stated in his sworn statement that he

forwarded the certificate of qualified applicants to the Facilities

Manager (FM) who was to supervise the selectee. The COE also stated

that he reviewed the file of the selectee and felt that the FM had done

a satisfactory job in making a recommendation. The COE stated that

the selectee had current experience because he was a boiler operator at

the time of the selection in the same plant where he was to supervise,

whereas complainant had a lapse in time with regard to his experience

in operating a plant.

In his sworn statement, the FM stated that the selectee had supervisory

skills. The FM also stated that he knew complainant and was aware that

he had a disability. The FM stated that he doubted that any physical

disability would have any bearing on filling the position since the

supervisory position consisted mostly of desk work. The FM stated that

the selection was made by the selectee of the other position for which

complainant applied and he (FM) reviewed the selection and concurred.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part

analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail, the complainant

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in

the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;

Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden

then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden,

the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact

finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the

basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

actions were motivated by discrimination. See United States Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990).

Assuming arguendo that complainant has established a prima facie case

of discrimination, the Commission finds that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Commission

further finds that complainant failed to present evidence that more

likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a

pretext for discrimination. The Commission notes that an employer has

the discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates provided

that the employment decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.

Moreover, it is not the function of the Commission to substitute its

judgment for that of the selecting official familiar with the needs of

the agency. Although the Commission notes that in nonselection cases,

pretext may be found where the complainant's qualifications are plainly

superior to the qualifications of the selectee, the Commission is not

persuaded that complainant's qualifications were so plainly superior

to the qualifications and experience of the persons selected so as to

warrant a finding of pretext. See Wasser v. Department of Labor, EEOC

Request No. 05940058 (November 2, 1995).

The agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 14, 2004

__________________

Date