The Wackenhut Corporation d/b/a G4S

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 16, 2012

12-CA-026644 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 16, 2012)

JD(ATL)–31–12
Miami-Dade County, FL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
G4S REGULATED SECURITY
SOLUTIONS, A DIVISION OF
G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC.,
f/k/a THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION
and
THOMAS FRAZIER, an Individual
and
CECIL MACK, an Individual
Cases 12–CA–26644
12–CA–26811
Shelley B. Plass, Esq.,
for the Acting General Counsel.1
Fred Seleman, Esq., for the Respondent.2
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. These are two discharge cases I
heard in Miami, Florida, commencing on April 4, 2011, pursuant to a complaint that issued on
December 29, 2010. The discharged employees were Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack. On
June 27, 2011, I issued a Decision and Recommended Order in which I found that Frazier and
Mack were supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and that the complaint
be dismissed. On September 28, 2012, the Board issued a Decision and Order remanding in
which it found that Frazier and Mack were not supervisors. G4S Regulated Security Solutions,
358 NLRB No. 160 (2012).

1 I shall refer to counsel for the Acting General Counsel as counsel for the Government and to the Acting
General Counsel as the Government.
2 I shall refer to counsel for the Respondent as counsel for the Company and I shall refer to the
Respondent as the Company.
JD(ATL)−31−12
2
In my initial decision I specifically noted that, in view of my finding that Frazier and
Mack were supervisors, “the remaining issues need not be addressed, namely, whether Frazier
and Mack engaged in concerted activities protected by the Act and whether they were
discharged for doing so,” nor did I need to address “the Company’s affirmative defense that
Frazier and Mack were discharged for valid considerations not based on unlawful motives or 5
considerations.”
The Order remanding the case to me directs that, “based on the existing record, the
judge shall prepare a supplemental decision setting forth credibility resolutions, findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order regarding solely the Section 8(a)(1) 10
discharge allegations.” Following receipt of the foregoing Order, I conducted a conference
call with the parties who stated their desire to file briefs. The briefs filed by the parties have
been received and considered.
Findings of Fact15
A. Facts
As set out in my initial decision, Frazier was hired as a security officer in 1989, and
Mack in 2002. Both were promoted to lieutenant in 2003. Both Frazier and Mack were 20
suspended from work a few days before they were terminated. Mack was suspended on
February 2, 2010, and informed that he was terminated on February 22. Frazier was
suspended on February 12, 2010, and informed that he was terminated on February 15.
Frazier’s termination notice states: “Failure to meet satisfactory leadership expectations.”
Mack’s termination notice states: “Cecil was involved in an incident with the client that 25
involved undesired behavior. As a part of the process management completed a review of
Cecil’s personnel file. As a result of the review it is management’s perspective that Cecil’s
performance does not meet satisfactory job performance or behavior standards.”
Project Manager Michael Mareth explained that the Company had not “hit the mark 30
in our performance of supervisors … because we didn't have the right oversight of the
officers in the field.” The Company’s senior executives at headquarters and Florida
Power & Light, the client and operator of the Turkey Point facility, agreed to initiate a
leadership effectiveness program pursuant to which reviews of all supervisors were
undertaken. The directive to perform those reviews came from Tim Kendall, president of 35
the Company. Mareth confirmed that, as a result of the reviews there were “a number of
individuals that were terminated because they didn't meet the expectations.” Five
lieutenants, including Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack, were discharged.
It is undisputed that Frazier raised various concerns on behalf of the security 40
officers including inadequate bathroom facilities, a requirement relating to having
lanyards on weapons, a requirement from Florida Power & Light requiring the wearing
of vests that was not required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, uncomfortable
chairs, and insufficient water. Mack raised issues relating to security officers including
being posted in the sun for 6 hours without any shelter, an inadequate supply of water, 45
the vests being too hot, and complaints of “not being treated fairly.” Their testimony
was not contradicted. Counsel for the Company acknowledged that “the Company does not
JD(ATL)−31−12
3
dispute, as a basis matter, that the two individuals [Frazier and Mack] brought issues to
the attention of management.”
Project Manager Mareth confirmed that he expected lieutenants to “give me
feedback,” whether it be issues relating to Florida Power & Light or “my supervision.” 5
The leadership effectiveness reviews reflect that he also expected them to deal with the
issues they raised as supervisors, not as rank-and-file employees. The leadership
effectiveness reviews rated lieutenants and captains in three areas, supervisor effectiveness,
communication, and setting high standards for team performance. The Company considered
lieutenants to be supervisors in making its evaluations.10
The leadership effectiveness review of Frazier rated him as unsatisfactory in all three
categories. Comments relating to his supervisory effectiveness included the following
statements: “He doesn’t see himself a part of management and therefore is not leading us into
the future,” and, at team briefing, “[O]penly criticizes management decisions.” In the area of 15
communication, the comments note that Frazier “fails to balance the need of the organization
with his sensitivity to individuals.” Regarding setting high standards, the review notes that
Frazier’s “sensitivity to individuals is an overused strength with negative impact.”
Frazier was suspended on February 12, 2010, and discharged on February 15. At the 20
discharge meeting, Mareth informed Frazier that he did “not effectively support
management” and “would not effect change going forward.” Frazier responded that, even
though he did not agree with all the policies and procedures, he always followed them, and
that “he was a voice for the security officers and the other lieutenants and it was not right for
him to be terminated.” Mareth did not state any specific dereliction on the part of Frazier.25
Mack was also rated unsatisfactory in all three categories. Comments relating to his
supervisory effectiveness included the following statement: “He doesn’t see himself a part of
management and as viewed by one direct report [i.e. a security officer], ‘Is on the security
officer’s side.’” In the area of communication, the comments state that Mack had an “over 30
alignment with security officer concerns,” and that he is “more of ‘a team member’ than a
team leader.” He is criticized with regard to setting high standards because he “does not seek
different opinions from all levels of management to gain a balanced approach to team
performance.”
35
Mareth claimed that an additional basis for the discharge of Mack was an
incident that occurred on January 25, 2010, 3 weeks before he was discharged. On that date
Mack had dealt with an incident in which access to the plant had been delayed for about 10
employees due to issues with one of the security entry machines. Brett Rittmer, site security
manager for Florida Power & Light, was present when the incident occurred. When the 40
situation was resolved, Mack and Rittmer entered the plant and went into the final access
control (FAC) office where two security officers, Anthony McKay and Johnnie Davis,
were present. In the office they “were joking about it because I mean it was just a big
misunderstanding.” Mack could not recall what, if anything Rittmer said, but “it was in
a laid back setting.”45
Three days after the incident, Mack was called to the office of his supervisor,
JD(ATL)−31−12
4
Captain Quintin Ferrer. Ferrer and Operations Coordinator Juan Rodriguez were present.
Mack was asked what had happened on January 25. Mack explained what happened.
They asked whether he used the word “cluster fuck” in front of Rittmer. Mack denied
using those words. They asked him to write a “statement saying so.” Mack did so and, a
couple of hours later, gave his statement to Juan Rodriguez to give to Project Manager 5
Mareth. He gave a copy of the statement to Captain Ferrer who “read it and he tore it
up.” Ferrer told Mack that it “sounds good,” and Mack reported back to his shift.
On January 31, Captain Ferrer had Mack report to shift because the shift was low
on manning levels and told him not to report to training. The next day Ferrer called 10
Mack and told him “not to report to the shift or training,” that he was being suspended
for the “bullshit incident that happened in the hallway.” Mack was directed to wait for a
call from Project Director Mareth the next day. Mareth did not call, and so, on February
3, 2010, Mack called him. Mareth told Mack that it was alleged that he had used foul
language in front of Florida Power & Light security and that he was “on suspension 15
pending investigation.”
Mareth called Mack and requested him to come in on February 22 “so we could
speak.” Mack requested that Rittmer be present at the meeting. The meeting was at noon
on February 22, and Rittmer was present initially as were Mareth, Rodriguez, and Mack. 20
Mack asked Rittmer why “he waited a couple of days” to bring up the issue of him using
foul language or acting in an unprofessional manner at that time.” Rittmer answered that
he “had his vacation on his mind.” Mareth told Rittmer that he could leave.
Mack asked Rodriguez why he did not speak up when he knew that “I didn't 25
curse.” Rodriguez said that he “couldn't say that I did or didn't” because he was located
in the FAC office and Mack “was outside in the hallway … addressing the situation, but
he did say I did seem calm.”
Mareth stated that the investigation was concluded and that he was terminating 30
Mack because a witness had said that he had “used foul language.” Mack responded that
“there were witnesses that said that I didn't use foul language.” Mareth said that
“because of the conflicting stories that he was terminating my employment.” As pointed
out in the brief of the General Counsel, the leadership effectiveness review was not
mentioned. So far as Mack knew, the January 25, 2010 situation was the reason for his 35
discharge.
Although the Company’s brief asserts that “Mack was loud and aggressive and used
profanity during a discussion with the security manager” there is no credible evidence in that
regard. Mack’s discharge document, cites “undesired behavior” and failure to meet 40
“expectations for Supervision,” and that he is being issued a “Level I violation.” The
undesirable behavior is not described. Mareth mentioned only “foul language” when
discharging Mack. Rodriguez “couldn't say” whether Mack “did or didn't” use foul
language because he was in the FAC office. He said that Mack “did seem calm.”
45
Rittmer, in a statement dated February 1, wrote that, when dealing with the
situation, Mack referred to it as a “cluster fuck.” He does not report that Mack was “loud
JD(ATL)−31−12
5
and aggressive.” Although Florida Power & Light Security Shift Coordinator Charles
Sengenberger claimed that Mack said “cluster fuck” in a voice “loud enough for
everyone to hear,” no one other than Rittmer reports hearing those words. Florida Power
& Light Security Analyst Ted Ostenson, although stating that Mack “appear[ed] to be
making his point in an overly ‘assertive’ manner,” did not claim that Mack used the 5
words “cluster fuck.” Three Company security officers who were present, Antoine
Giffried, Edward Daniels, and Nikki Napier gave statements that do not mention Mack
saying “cluster fuck.”
Neither Rittmer nor Sengenberger, the only individuals claiming that Mack said 10
“cluster fuck,” testified. Rittmer took no immediate action and claimed that he did not
do so because he “had his vacation on his mind.” I conclude, Rittmer, notwithstanding
his vacation, would not have tolerated “loud and aggressive” conduct and use of profanity
by Mack. He would have taken immediate action. Even if the alleged comment had been
made, it was descriptive of the situation. There is no claim or evidence that the alleged 15
comment was directed to Rittmer. Mack denied using that language, and I credit Mack.
The Company has a progressive discipline policy. Level I offenses include serious
offensives such as abandoning a security post, fighting, and inattention to duty. Less serious
Level II offenses include failure to follow procedures that affect security effectiveness and 20
unexcused absences. Level III offenses include various offenses including smoking in
unauthorized areas and using abusive or offensive language. A first offense for a Level III
violation under the disciplinary policy is an oral counseling. There is no evidence that any
employee has been terminated for using offensive language when describing a situation.
25
The security officers below the grade of lieutenant are in a bargaining unit represented
by Local Union 610 of the Security Police and Fire Professionals of America. Timothy
Lambert, president of Local 610, testified without contradiction, that it is “fairly
prevalent to hear profanity throughout your working day.” He acknowledged that
abusive or offensive language towards another person would not be tolerated, but when 30
directed to a situation “there's not much response to it,” that “occasionally someone
[who is offended] will say something.”
B. Analysis and Concluding Findings
35
The complaint alleges that Frazier and Mack were discharged for engaging in
protected concerted activity.
My decision herein is predicated upon the determination by the Board that lieutenants
are not supervisors. Board precedent establishes that an employer’s good-faith belief that 40
individuals whom the employer considers to be supervisors but who are found to be
employees does not deprive those employees of the protections of the Act. In Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 221 NLRB 1026, 1028 (1975), the Board held: “[W]e find it immaterial that
Respondent had … a good-faith belief that its dispatchers were already supervisors within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.”45
JD(ATL)−31−12
6
More recently, in Shelby Memorial Home, 305 NLRB 919, 919 fn. 2 (1991), enfd. 1
F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1993), the Board held that “[a]n employer acts at its peril when it takes
steps calculated to chill the exercise of Sec. 7 rights by individuals who may later be found to
be under the protection of the Act. See Sav-On Drugs, 253 NLRB 816, 820–821 (1980), enfd.
728 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1984).”5
The Company, in its brief, citing Pillows of California, 207 NLRB 369, 372 (1973),
argues that the Company’s good-faith belief about the lieutenants’ supervisory status is a
factor in determining whether it violated the Act. That case is inapposite. In that case, decided
in 1973, before Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., an attorney had interrogated a purported 10
supervisor who was found to be an employee. The judge determined that the attorney made
prefatory remarks relating to voluntariness and assured the individual of the absence of any
reprisals. The judge found that, in view of the prefatory remarks and the employer’s good-
faith belief that the individual was a supervisor, it would not serve the purposes of the Act to
find that by such interrogation the Company violated the Act.15
The brief of the Company asserts that “it is unclear in what manner each (or any) of
the issues [raised by Frazier and Mack] was raised in a concerted manner or related to a
protected subject.” I disagree. The Company was aware that the complaints reported by
Frazier and Mack including having lanyards on weapons, the wearing of vests, 20
uncomfortable chairs, insufficient water, and being posted in the sun for 6 hours without
any shelter were complaints raised by security officers relating to their working conditions.
Insofar as the Board has found lieutenants to be employees, their raising of complaints on
behalf of the security officers constituted protected concerted activity.
25
The Company expected Frazier and Mack to deal with those complaints as if they
were supervisors. As stated in the Company’s brief, “the alleged discriminatees were required
to be part of solving and addressing issues and presenting the management side of an issue,
not just raising complaints.” Because of that requirement, the leadership effectiveness review,
found the performance of Frazier and Mack to be unsatisfactory. Neither Frazier nor Mack 30
saw “himself a part of management.” Frazier criticized management decisions and failed “to
balance the need of the organization with his sensitivity to individuals.” Mack was “on the
security officer’s side” and had an “over alignment with security officer concerns.”
The Company, in its brief, argues that, although “other security officers and 35
lieutenants regularly and consistently raised issues and concerns on behalf of themselves and
other employees, there is no allegation that Respondent terminated or otherwise took any
detrimental employment action relative to any of those other individuals for engaging in such
conduct.” Employees whom the Company did not consider to be supervisors were not subject
to the leadership effectiveness review. There is evidence that three other lieutenants were 40
discharged, but there is no evidence that any charge was filed with the Board relating to those
discharges, thus there was no investigation or determination that the Company violated the
Act with regard to those individuals.
The Company argues that its “good faith belief about the alleged discriminatees’ 45
supervisory status … demonstrates that Respondent did not harbor animus towards the alleged
discriminatees, … and Respondent’s good faith belief belies any finding of retaliatory intent.”
JD(ATL)−31−12
7
I disagree. Frazier and Mack were discharged pursuant to unsatisfactory evaluations based
upon the Company’s mistaken belief that they were supervisors.
The evaluations reflect that the performance of Frazier and Mack was found to be
unsatisfactory because, rather than giving full allegiance to management, they did not see 5
themselves as “a part of management” but instead were “on the security officer’s side.” In
view of the Board’s finding that lieutenants were not supervisors, their bringing complaints to
management on behalf of the security officers and being on the side of the security officers
constituted protected concerted activity. “The existence or lack of unlawful animus” is not
material when “the very conduct for which employees are disciplined is itself protected 10
concerted activity.” Burnup & Sims, Inc., 256 NLRB 965, 976 (1981); see also CGLM, Inc.,
350 NLRB 974, 974 fn. 2 (2007).
Even if an analysis pursuant to Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), were applicable, the comments 15
that Frazier and Mack did not see themselves as part of management, that Frazier criticized
management decisions and failed “to balance the need of the organization with his sensitivity
to individuals” and that Mack was “on the security officer’s side” and had an “over alignment
with security officer concerns” establish animus towards Frazier and Mack because of their
identification with and advocacy on behalf of rank-and-file employees. Pursuant to Wright 20
Line, I find that Frazier and Mack engaged in protected concerted activity and the Company
was aware of that activity. The Company bore animus towards individuals whom it deemed to
be supervisors engaging in the protected concerted activity of raising complaints on behalf of
security officers and thereafter being “on the security officers’s side.” No basis for the
discharge of Frazier was cited other than the unsatisfactory evaluation that was predicated 25
upon the Company’s erroneous belief that he was a supervisor. Although the Company
contends that there was a further basis for the discharge of Mack, as hereinafter discussed, I
find that basis did not exist. Even if it did, discipline for the alleged offense would, at worst,
have been a documented oral counseling. The Company acted “at its peril” in treating
individuals who were “later … found” to be employees as supervisors. The Company has not 30
established that Frazier and Mack would have been discharged in the absence of their
protected concerted activity.
The Company contends that there was an additional basis for Mack’s discharge, an
alleged comment that I have found he did not make. Insofar as Mack’s alleged comment 35
relating to a “cluster fuck” is asserted to have been a basis for his discharge, that action was
an adverse action that directly affected his employment. Thus, the burden of going forward to
establish that the same action would have been taken against him is upon the Company.
Mareth could not have held a good-faith honest belief that Mack had made the 40
statement attributed to him by Rittmer and Sengenberger. Although Sengenberger claimed
that Mack said “cluster fuck” in a voice “loud enough for everyone to hear,” no other
individual present at the access incident reported hearing that description of the situation
except Rittmer. Rittmer made no contemporaneous comment to Mack, nor did he speak with
him regarding his alleged offensive language when he, Mack, and security officers Anthony 45
McKay and Johnnie Davis were in the FAC office “joking about” the access incident. At
Mack’s discharge interview, Rittmer claimed that he had not mentioned the offensive
JD(ATL)−31−12
8
language because he “had his vacation on his mind.” He did not state how he could have
been so distracted by thoughts of his vacation that he would ignore conduct that
warranted discipline, and he did not testify. The Company did not present either Rittmer
or Sengenberger as witnesses. Mack credibly denied using that language. When the
reason given for a respondent's action is either false, or does not exist, the respondent has not 5
rebutted the General Counsel's prima facie case. Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722
(1981).
The Company, upon the mistaken belief that Frazier and Mack were supervisors, gave
them unsatisfactory evaluations and discharged them for engaging in protected concerted 10
activities by presenting complaints on behalf of the security guards and advocating their
positions regarding those complaints so much so that they were deemed not to be “a part of
management” and were on “on the security officer’s side.” “An employer acts at its peril
when it takes steps calculated to chill the exercise of Sec. 7 rights by individuals who may
later be found to be under the protection of the Act.” Shelby Memorial Home, supra at fn. 2.15
That is what happened in this case. The Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
discharging Frazier and Mack because of their protected concerted activity.
Conclusion of Law
The Company, by discharging employees Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack because of 20
their protected concerted activity, violated Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Company has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to 25
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Company, having unlawfully discharged Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack, it
must offer them reinstatement. The Company must also make them whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits. Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis from February 30
12, 2010, in the case of Thomas Frazier, and from February 2, 2010, in the case of Cecil
Mack, to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate prescribed in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010), enf. denied on other grounds sub.35
nom. Jackson Hospital Corp. v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The Company will also be ordered to post and email an appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the 40
following recommended:3

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(ATL)−31−12
9
ORDER
The Company, G4S Regulated Security Solutions, A Division of G4S Secure
Solutions (USA) Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:5
(a) Discharging employees because of their protected concerted activity.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.10
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Thomas Frazier and Cecil
Mack full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially 15
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
(b) Make whole Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack for any loss of earnings and other
benefits they suffered as a result of their discharges, in the manner set forth in the remedy 20
section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any
reference to the discharges of Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack and, within 3 days thereafter,
notify them in writing that this has been done and that the discharges will not be used against 25
them in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel 30
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if
stored in electronic form, necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Miami-Dade 35
County, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 12 after being signed by the Company’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Company and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed 40
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Company customarily communicates with its employees by such

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading
“Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(ATL)−31−12
10
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Company has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Company shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by Company at any time 5
since February 2, 2010.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps
that the Company has taken to comply.10
Dated, Washington, D.C., November 16, 2012.
________________________________
William N. Cates15
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered
us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge you because of your protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits they suffered as a result of their discharges, with interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful discharges of Thomas Frazier and Cecil Mack, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify each of them in writing that this has been done and that the discharges will
not be used against them in any way.
G4S REGULATED SECURITY SOLUTIONS, A
DIVISION OF G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS
(USA) INC., f/k/a THE WACKENHUT
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions.
To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you
may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also
obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., South Trust Plaza, Suite 530, Tampa, FL 33602–5824, (813) 228–2641,
Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (813) 228-2455.