The United States Olympic Committeev.Tempting Brands Netherlands B.V.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 5, 2021

91233138 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2021)

This Opinion Is a
Precedent of the TTAB

Hearing: September 29, 2020 Mailed: February 5, 2021
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
The United States Olympic Committee
v.
Tempting Brands Netherlands B.V.
_____

Opposition No. 91233138
_____

Susan A. Smith of Ballard Spahr LLP for The United States Olympic Committee1

Christopher B. Lay and Dermot J. Horgan of IPHorgan Ltd. for Tempting Brands
Netherlands B.V.
_____
Before Wellington, Lynch, and Johnson, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judge:

1 William M. Merone of Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, who previously also represented The
United States Olympic Committee, appeared and argued on its behalf at the oral hearing in
this case.
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I. Procedural Background and Evidentiary Record
Tempting Brands Netherlands B.V. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the
Principal Register of the stylized word mark for the
following goods and services:2
Perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions;
dentifrices; cosmetic soaps, soaps for personal use;
douching preparations for personal sanitary or deodorant
purposes in the nature of toiletries in International Class
3;
Eyeglasses, sunglasses, protective eyewear, sports
eyewear, anti-glare glasses, 3D spectacles, binoculars,
contact lenses, containers for contact lenses, eyewear
cases, cases for spectacles and sunglasses, eyeglass chains,
eyeglass cords, frames for spectacles and sunglasses,
spectacle lenses, lenses for sunglasses, optical lenses,
pince-nez, pince-nez cases, goggles for sports, monocles,
magnifying glasses; protective helmets; bags adapted for
laptops; sleeves for laptops; protective covers and cases for
cell phones; decorative magnets; clothing for protection
against accidents; earphones; headphones; electronic
equipment in the nature of smartwatches and weighing
scales for displaying and or storing data obtained during
exercise in International Class 9;
Jewellery and precious stones; horological and
chronometric instruments; watches and bracelets also
incorporating functions for monitoring and reporting
fitness, training, and activity data, namely, time, distance,
pace, calories burned, and cumulative activity level;
watches and bracelets also communicating data to personal
digital assistants, smart phones, and personal computers
through internet websites and other computer and
electronic communication in International Class 14;

2 Application Serial No. 79185262 is a request for extension of protection under the Madrid
Protocol of International Registration No. 1293867, based on Section 66(a) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141f. The application record includes a statement that “[t]he name shown
in the mark does not identify a particular living individual.”
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Animal skins; trunks being luggage and travelling bags;
umbrellas; parasols and walking sticks; whips and
saddlery; bags, namely, handbags, travelling bags, bags for
sports, school bags, book bags, reusable shopping bags,
leather shopping bags, briefcases and rucksacks; collars for
animals; purses, credit card cases, wallets, and pocket
wallets; bags in the nature of envelopes of leather, for
packaging, and pouches, of leather, for packaging; vanity
cases, not fitted; clothing for pets in International 18;
Clothing for men, women and children, namely, socks,
stockings, jeans, trousers, breeches for wear, leggings
trousers, boxer shorts, combinations, suits, skirts,
petticoats, dresses, dressing gowns, blouses, shirts, tee-
shirts, sweaters, pullovers, vests, clothing jerseys,
cardigans, shawls, scarves, neckties, clothing gloves,
clothing belts, suspenders, panties, coats, waistcoats,
overcoats, raincoats, parkas, ponchos, pelerines, cloaks,
saris, clothing jackets, overalls, pockets for clothing,
clothing collars, nightwear, lingerie, underwear, bathing
suits, bath robes, masquerade costumes, fur stoles,
footwear, headwear in International 25; and
Tennis racquets, baseball bats, cricket bats, golf clubs and
hockey sticks; golf balls, golf gloves, golf club grips, golf
bags, golf tees, head covers for golf clubs, golf ball markers;
sports balls, bags specially adapted for carrying sports
equipment and sports balls; table tennis rackets;
badminton rackets; skis; skates, namely, hockey skates, ice
skates, roller skates; fitness machines and equipment,
namely, weights, treadmills, rowing machines, stair-
stepping machines, resistance machines, stationary cycles;
appliances for gymnastics; swimming jackets in
International Class 28.
By its Notice of Opposition, The United States Olympic Committee (“Opposer”)
opposes registration of the mark based on an alleged false suggestion of a connection
under Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), with Opposer and “the
Opposition No. 91233138

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Olympic Games as a whole.”3 In its Answer, Applicant denies the salient allegations
in the Notice of Opposition, and asserts what it titled as the “affirmative defenses” of
“Lack of Standing” and “Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted.”4 These are not true affirmative defenses,5 and because Applicant raised
them in the Answer but did not pursue them at trial, we consider them waived. See
Alcatraz Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1752 n.6
(TTAB 2013); see also In re Google Tech. Holdings, LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 2020 USPQ2d
11465 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
The record includes the pleadings and, pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the opposed application. Both parties submitted
testimony and documents under notices of reliance, including some confidential
material that we discuss only in general terms. Both parties also lodged evidentiary
objections, although Applicant helpfully notes that ultimately, it “requests that the
Board simply exercise its customary review of such evidence by assigning appropriate
weight.”6 Opposer objects to testimony on subjects for which the witness, Applicant’s

3 1 TTABVUE 4. Except where otherwise indicated, citations refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s
online docketing system.
4 4 TTABVUE.
5 Failure to state a claim upon which relief must be granted is not an affirmative defense.
John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1942, 1949 (TTAB 2010) (“The
asserted defense of failure to state a claim is not a true affirmative defense because it relates
to an assertion of the insufficiency of the pleading of opposer’s claim rather than a statement
of a defense to a properly pleaded claim.”). Lack of standing also is not an affirmative defense.
Opposer must prove its entitlement to the statutory cause of action at issue (here, an
opposition proceeding under 15 U.S.C. § 1063) as a part of its claim, see Empresa Cubana Del
Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014), so this
issue is addressed in that context.
6 70 TTABVUE 41.
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Director of Global Licensing, Mr. Van Dijk, allegedly lacks personal knowledge, and
Opposer objects to testimony and evidence on grounds of hearsay. With these types
of objections, the Board is capable of assessing the proper evidentiary weight to be
accorded the testimony and evidence, taking into account the concerns raised by the
objections. We have considered all of the testimony and evidence submitted for the
record. In doing so, we bear in mind both parties’ objections and accord whatever
probative value the evidence merits. See Pierce-Arrow Soc’y v. Spintek Filtration, Inc.,
2019 USPQ2d 471774, at *8-*9 (TTAB 2019); Luxco, Inc. v. Consejo Regulador del
Tequila, A.C., 121 USPQ2d 1477, 1479 (TTAB 2017); Poly-America, L.P. v. Ill. Tool
Works Inc., 124 USPQ2d 1508, 1510 (TTAB 2017).
We note that Opposer failed to cite to TTABVUE docket entries in its briefs.
Opposer instead generally cited to evidence by document title and page or paragraph
number, or transcript page number. This citation convention renders it more difficult
for the Board and other readers to find the cited evidence. We therefore reiterate the
guidance in TBMP § 801.01 (2020), “[t]o allow readers [of briefs] to easily locate
materials in the record, the parties should cite to the evidence in the trial record by
referencing the TTABVUE entry and page number,” and in Turdin v. Trilobite, Ltd.,
109 USPQ2d 1473, 1476 n.6 (TTAB 2014):
Because the Board primarily uses TTABVUE in reviewing
evidence, the Board prefers that citations to material or
testimony in the record that has not been designated
confidential include the TTABVUE docket entry number
and the TTABVUE page number. For material or
testimony that has been designated confidential and which
does not appear on TTABVUE, the TTABVUE docket entry
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number where such material or testimony is located should
be included in any citation.
II. Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration of the Board’s June 22,
2017 Order
Early in the proceeding, Opposer filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Notice of Opposition to add a claim of lack of bona fide intent to use the mark.
Applicant responded and pointed out that an applicable rule and Board precedent
applying it foreclose amending an opposition against an application such as this one,
filed under Section 66(a).7 See 37 C.F.R. § 2.107(b). Opposer subsequently withdrew
the motion to amend, but stated that it “reserve[d] the right to assert the withdrawn
claims in any further proceedings that may arise subsequent to the resolution of this
Opposition.”8 The Board issued an order on June 22, 2017 noting the motion to
amend, response, and withdrawal of the motion, and stating that in view of the
withdrawal, the motion would “be given no further consideration.”9
In its Brief filed May 13, 2020, Applicant concludes with a request that the Board
“exercise its inherent authority to first deny Opposer’s withdrawal of the motion to
amend and then dismiss it with prejudice.”10 Pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.127(b),
“[a]ny request for reconsideration or modification of an order or decision issued on a
motion must be filed within one month from the date thereof.” Trademark Rule
2.127(b), 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(b). Applicant’s request related to the June 22, 2017 order

7 7 TTABVUE 3-4.
8 8 TTABVUE 2.
9 9 TTABVUE.
10 69 TTABVUE 38.
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is untimely, and we decline to reconsider the June 22, 2017 order, or to take other
action regarding the withdrawn motion to amend.
III. Factual Background
A. Pierre de Coubertin
The parties agree that Pierre de Coubertin is the name of a French baron who
lived in Europe and died in 1937. Neither party has acquired rights to the name
“Pierre de Coubertin” from or through his estate.11
Pierre de Coubertin was instrumental in reviving the Olympic Games in the late
nineteenth century by co-founding the International Olympic Committee and later
becoming its president.12 He designed the Olympic Rings logo, “proposed the Olympic
motto Citius, Altius, Fortius (Faster, Higher, Stronger),” and created the Olympic
Creed that states in part, “[t]he most important thing in the Olympic Games is not to
win but to take part, just as the most important thing in life is not the triumph but
the struggle.”13 The Olympic Games feature a sportsmanship award given only
occasionally, named the Pierre de Coubertin medal,14 which Time Magazine reports
“is also known as the International Fair Play Committee Award,”15 and Wikipedia

11 69 TTABVUE 3 (Applicant’s Brief); 35 TTABVUE 3, 97 (Opposer’s admissions).
12 26 TTABVUE 5 (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
13 26 TTABVUE 6, 71 (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
14 26 TTABVUE 6 (Zeytoonjian Declaration); see also 29 TTABVUE Exhibit W.
15 26 TTABVUE 42.
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reports is “also known as the Coubertin medal or the True Spirit of Sportsmanship
medal.”16
Various articles about the Olympics in media, including some mainstream
publications, identify and discuss Pierre de Coubertin’s role in establishing the
modern Olympic Games,17 such as the following:
 A May 2008 article in USA Today quotes a sports historian from Purdue
University who states that “Even the 1896 revival of the modern-day
Olympics, thanks to Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, had a political
agenda.”18
 A July 28, 2016 Wall Street Journal mentions that the 1948 Olympic
“Austerity Games” Opening Ceremony at Wembley Stadium included the
display of “a quote from Pierre de Coubertin” of the Olympic Creed.19
 A July 22, 2012 Boston Globe review of some books about the Olympics
describes how readers would “learn the unlikely, remarkable story of how the
ancient games vanished for a couple thousand years, only to make their second
debut in 1896, thanks to Baron Pierre de Coubertin, father of the modern
Olympics.”20

16 28 TTABVUE 12.
17 See also, e.g., 30 TTABVUE 311-56, 362-72, 377-427, 432-46.
18 26 TTABVUE 15.
19 26 TTABVUE 17; see also 30 TTABVUE 310 (August 5, 2016 Wall Street Journal article
referring to “the founder of the modern [Olympic] Games, Pierre de Coubertin”).
20 26 TTABVUE 22.
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 A January 21, 2014 editorial in the Washington Post advocates “ending this
corrupt quadrennial exercise” that is the Olympic Games, noting as
background that “[t]he modern Olympics were founded by a French aristocrat,
Pierre de Coubertin, who believed in promoting international peace and
understanding by reviving the ancient Greek custom of periodic truces for
athletic competition.”21
 A March 18, 2017 article in The Economist about the business model for the
Olympic Games describes how “Pierre de Coubertin, the French aristocrat who
founded the modern Olympics, was seduced by the world’s fair.”22
 A January 26, 2014 article in the San Francisco Chronicle notes that “Baron
Pierre de Coubertin, who founded the modern Olympics in 1894, would hardly
recognize the sports fest coming in two weeks.”23
Opposer’s “Brand Book” of “brand guidelines [] for internal reference only by the
USOC and its partners” introduces the International Olympic Committee with, “In
order to develop the Modern Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) was created by Pierre de Coubertin at an International Congress in Paris on
June 23, 1894.”24
As reflected in a video submitted for the record, and according to Mr. Zeytoonjian,
Senior Vice President, Commerce & Events, for a joint venture that includes Opposer,

21 26 TTABVUE 34.
22 26 TTABVUE 36.
23 30 TTABVUE 315.
24 26 TTABVUE 67-68.
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“during the Atlanta 1996 Games, Pierre de Coubertin was discussed specifically and
his photograph was prominently displayed during the nationwide broadcast of the
opening ceremony of the Olympic Games.”25
B. Adoption of Applicant’s Mark
Applicant, a brand development and licensing company, selected the proposed
mark in connection with its development of a clothing brand.26 Applicant’s Director
of Global Licensing, Mr. Van Dijk, stated that while brainstorming for a “French-
sounding name,” they chose “Pierre” as the first name because it is “a quintessential
French-sounding first name for men.”27 In selecting the surname, Mr. Van Dijk
testified that they “liked the sound of a hard ‘k,’ following the ‘p’ sound in ‘Pierre,’
similar to the sequence of PIERRE CARDIN.”28 While Mr. Van Dijk stated that he
“had heard of Pierre de Coubertin and [he] suggested that name as a potential
candidate,” he and his business associate “did not discuss any potential association
of this mark to the Olympic Games or any related entity, and such a potential was
not part of our calculation into whether the name was the best choice for our brand.”29
He testified that they selected the name because they liked its sound and look.30

25 26 TTABVUE 6 (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
26 38 TTABVUE 4-5.
27 38 TTABVUE 4 (Van Dijk Declaration).
28 38 TTABVUE 4 (Van Dijk Declaration).
29 38 TTABVUE 5 (Van Dijk Declaration).
30 38 TTABVUE 4-5 (Van Dijk Declaration).
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On cross-examination, Mr. Van Dijk elaborated that “we were looking for good
name [sic] starting with Pierre, and I had heard of the saying, participating is more
important than winning. And I knew it was from Pierre de Coubertin. And that’s why
I brought up the name.”31 He further stated, “When I first suggested Pierre de
Coubertin’s brand name, I knew that he was one of the founders of the IOC, that’s
what I – basically what I knew in regards to that.”32
Mr. Van Dijk further testified by declaration that during the selection process, the
trademark search yielded no U.S. registrations, but showed three foreign
registrations (COUBERTIN) owned by the Fondation de Coubertin, and one
European Union (EU) registration (PIERRE DE COUBERTIN) owned by the
International Olympic Committee (IOC).33 He further testified that Applicant
searched for and found no evidence of use of these marks.34 Applicant was “hopeful
we could easily come to terms with both parties.”35 Elaborating on cross examination,
Mr. Van Dijk stated that because these registrations “would potentially stand in the
way” of Applicant’s pursuit of the proposed mark, “that’s why [Applicant] sent [the
IOC] a letter to withdraw their trademark because they were actually not using it,
which we also did to the Fondation de Coubertin.”36 Applicant submitted a trademark

31 66 TTABVUE 27 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
32 65 TTABVUE 30 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
33 38 TTABVUE 5 (Van Dijk Declaration).
34 38 TTABVUE 6 (Van Dijk Declaration).
35 66 TTABVUE 72-73 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
36 66 TTABVUE 47-48 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
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application for the mark PIERRE DE COUBERTIN in the Benelux on June 22, 2015,
and the application matured to registration on December 21, 2015.37 At the same
time, Applicant pursued an application to register the “acronym [sic] of PDC” shown
below, done by a designer who Mr. Van Dijk concedes “clearly was inspired by Pierre
de Coubertin”: .38 However, Applicant later “decided we wanted
something else,” and Mr. Van Dijk stated that it did not continue its plan to use the
initial mark.39 Opposer submitted a screenshot from Applicant’s Twitter feed dating
from 2018 that displayed the initials logo along with four other unrelated logos above
the text line, “5 brands waiting for your inspiration,” in conjunction with a “Design
Summer Internship” vacancy announcement.40
In October 2015, during the pendency of Applicant’s Benelux application,
Applicant pursued the revocation of the IOC’s and Fondation’s registrations for
PIERRE DE COUBERTIN and COUBERTIN.41

37 56 TTABVUE 18 (Benelux registration); 38 TTABVUE 6 (Van Dijk Declaration).
38 66 TTABVUE 76 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
39 Id.
40 56 TTABVUE 2, 10 (Kane Declaration).
41 38 TTABVUE 8 (Van Dijk Declaration); 66 TTABVUE 65 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
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Presumably after learning of the revocation proceedings, a March 4, 2016 joint
letter from the IOC42 and the Fondation Coubertin to Applicant included the
following assertions:43
On the one hand, Pierre de Coubertin is known worldwide
for being the creator of the IOC and for having created the
modern Olympic Games. As such, the IOC perpetuates his
memory and his legacy through the notorious event that
are [sic] the Olympic Games and the values thereof. His
name and his image undoubtedly refer, in the mind of the
public, to the Olympic Games, their universe and their
values. Any commercial exploitation of Pierre de
Coubertin’s name and/or image is likely to constitute an
undue commercial exploitation of Pierre de Coubertin’s
notoriety and reputation as well as the Olympic Game’s
[sic] notoriety, thus infringing the IOC’s rights, and such
practice is likely to engage the liability of whoever does so.
On the other hand, the Fondation and Pierre de
Coubertin’s heirs, represented by the AFC [Association
Familiale Coubertin] which specifically safeguards their
ancestor’s name and the values and rights attached to the
name and image of Pierre de Coubertin, ensure, together
with the IOC, that their ancestor’s patronym and his
memory are not prejudiced, notably by means of
uncontrolled commercial exploitation which can harm his
dignity and the family’s honor. Such commercial
exploitation of the name of Pierre de Coubertin would
constitute a willful violation of our clients’ prior rights to
the said name, as well as a blatant violation of the
personality rights linked with the name of Pierre de
Coubertin. Our clients have consistently preserved the
name of its founding ancestor from being commercially
exploited outside the scope of the Olympic values without
their permission, so as to ensure that the image of, and the

42 Opposer describes itself as “charged and empowered by the International Olympic
Committee (“IOC”) to promote and protect the Olympic Movement here [the United States].”
67 TTABVUE 13 (Opposer’s Brief).
43 38 TTABVUE 36-37.
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values linked with, Pierre de Coubertin would be respected
and kept unharmed.
Subsequently, however, Applicant and the Fondation de Coubertin entered into a
confidential Coexistence Agreement dated August 10, 2017, attested to by Mr. Van
Dijk, and a copy of which was attached to the confidential version of his declaration.44
He further testified that “we reached a coexistence agreement, so that was not a fight
at all,” and “no money was paid to the foundation at all.”45
However, Applicant did not resolve the dispute with the IOC or Opposer, and as a
result of the revocation proceeding pursued by Applicant, the IOC’s EU registration
subsequently was revoked in its entirety, based on non-use.46 In response to
questioning about why Applicant continued to pursue this mark despite the costs
associated with legal actions including the revocation proceedings and this
opposition, Mr. Van Dijk stated that they were “surprised” by the opposition and
“when you’re attacked and you don’t expect it and you think you’re attacked unfairly,
then also other motives start to kick in than just business reasons….”47

44 39 TTABVUE 5-9; 66 TTABVUE 67-69 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination); see also 65
TTABVUE 50 (Confidential Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
45 66 TTABVUE 68-69 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
46 38 TTABVUE 41-52 (concluding that the IOC “has not proven genuine use of the contested
EUTM for any of the goods and services for which it is registered”).
47 66 TTABVUE 71 (Van Dijk Cross-Examination).
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IV. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action48
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold issue in every inter partes
case. Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370,
2020 USPQ2d 10837, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26, 109 USPQ2d 2061, 2067 n.4 (2014)). A party
in the position of plaintiff may oppose registration of a mark when such opposition is
within the zone of interests protected by the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1063, and the
plaintiff has a reasonable belief in damage that is proximately caused by registration
of the mark. Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at * 6-
7 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Opposer relies on its status as “part of the ‘institution’ to which use of the PIERRE
DE COUBERTIN mark would falsely suggest a connection – i.e., the Olympic
Movement.”49 We find that the record in this case supports the finding previously
made by the Board in In re Urbano that “the entire organization which comprises the
Olympic Games, as a whole, qualifies as an ‘institution’ within the meaning of Section
2(a) of the Trademark Act.” 51 USPQ2d 1776, 1779 (TTAB 1999). Opposer established
that the IOC’s Olympic merchandise retail website features a “Pierre de Coubertin’s
Moustache T-Shirt” with a price shown in Swiss francs and a product description that

48 Board decisions have previously analyzed the requirements of Sections 13 and 14 of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64, under the rubric of “standing.” Despite the change in
nomenclature, the substance of our analysis of this issue in our prior decisions and those of
the Federal Circuit interpreting Sections 13 and 14 remain equally applicable. See
Spanishtown Enters., Inc. v. Transcend Resources, Inc., 2020 USPQ2d 11388, at *2 (TTAB
2020).
49 67 TTABVUE 28 (Opposer’s Brief).
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includes the explanation, “Pierre de Coubertin was the founder of the modern
Olympic Movement.”50 Presumably to establish that the IOC would sell the shirt to a
U.S. consumer, Opposer’s counsel purchased one such shirt and had it shipped to him
in the U.S.51 On the front, the shirt contains four drawings of moustaches with ranges
of years underneath, and on the back, the shirt bears an image of the late individual,
with “Coubertin” in cursive font underneath.52 Opposer and its licensees also sell
“most of the goods” in the opposed application, albeit under other marks.53 To further
establish the requisite interest and belief, Opposer relies on the evidence that the
IOC awards an occasional Olympic Games sportsmanship medal bearing Pierre de
Coubertin’s name,54 that the 1996 Olympic Games opening trailer includes mention
of Pierre de Coubertin,55 and that Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia
features a monument honoring Pierre de Coubertin.56
We find that the record, including evidence of IOC sales of a shirt bearing the
Coubertin name and image of Pierre de Coubertin, Opposer’s sale of competing goods
under other marks, and the commemoration of Pierre de Coubertin’s role in the
Olympics at Olympic events and venues, sufficiently shows that Opposer’s opposition

50 29 TTABVUE 267-73 (Olympic retail website offering the t-shirt, with the price shown in
Swiss francs).
51 28 TTABVUE 9, 274-75 (Kane Declaration).
52 Id. at 274-75.
53 26 TTABVUE 7-11 (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
54 26 TTABVUE 6 (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
55 26 TTABVUE 6 & Exhibit B (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
56 26 TTABVUE 6 (Zeytoonjian Declaration).
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to registration of the mark is within the zone of interests protected by the statute,
and Opposer has a reasonable belief of damage that is proximately caused by
registration of the mark. See, e.g., Australian Therapeutic Supplies, 2020 USPQ2d
10837, at *4 (An opposer may “demonstrate a real interest and reasonable belief of
damage by producing and selling merchandise bearing the [proposed] mark.”) (citing
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and Int’l Order
of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). We
therefore conclude that Opposer has proven its entitlement to this opposition
proceeding.
V. False Suggestion of a Connection
Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that consists of
or comprises matter that may falsely suggest a connection with an institution.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). This statutory provision “evolved from the rights of privacy and
publicity, and was intended to preclude registration of a mark that conflicts with
another’s rights in one’s persona or identity.” Pierce-Arrow Society, 2019 USPQ2d
471774, at *13 (citations omitted). The elements of a false suggestion of connection
claim are:
1. The mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the
name or identity previously used by another person or
institution;
2. The mark would be recognized as such, in that it points
uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
3. The person or institution named by the mark is not
connected with the activities performed by the applicant
under the mark; and
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4. The fame or reputation of the person or institution is
such that, when the mark is used with the applicant's
goods or services, a connection with the person or
institution would be presumed.
Id. at *14; see also Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703
F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505, 508-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (providing foundational principles
for the current four-part test used by the Board to determine the existence of a false
connection).
In Univ. of Notre Dame, 217 USPQ at 509, the Federal Circuit set out additional
background on this provision of Section 2(a) that provides helpful guidance in this
case:
Under concepts of the protection of one’s “identity,” in any
of the forms which have so far been recognized, the initial
and critical requirement is that the name (or an equivalent
thereof) claimed to be appropriated by another must be
unmistakably associated with a particular personality or
“persona.”
As stated by Professor Prosser:
It is in this sense that “appropriation” must be
understood. It is therefore not enough that a name
which is the same as the plaintiff’s is used in a novel,
or the title of a corporation, unless the context or the
circumstances indicate that the name is that of the
plaintiff. [Footnotes omitted.]
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS at
805-06 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, to show an invasion of one’s
“persona,” it is not sufficient to show merely prior
identification with the name adopted by another. Nor is it
sufficient, as urged by the University, that the fame of the
name of an institution provides the basis for protection in
itself. The mark NOTRE DAME, as used by Gourmet, must
point uniquely to the University.
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As the board noted, “Notre Dame” is not a name solely
associated with the University. It serves to identify a
famous and sacred religious figure and is used in the
names of churches dedicated to Notre Dame, such as the
Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, France. Thus, it cannot
be said that the only “person” which the name possibly
identifies is the University and that the mere use of
NOTRE DAME by another appropriates its identity. (See
FBI v. Societe M. Bril & Co., 187 USPQ 685, 687 (D.D.C.
1975), where the court indicates that § 2(a) may preclude
registration where “the mark by its very nature falsely
suggests a connection.”) This conclusion could be changed
if the evidence showed that Gourmet intended to identify
the University, as the University argues. Evidence of such
intent would be highly persuasive that the public will make
the intended false association.
C. Whether PIERRE DE COUBERTIN Is Opposer’s Name or Identity,
or a Close Approximation Thereof
“Opposer’s Section 2(a) claim requires proof … that consumers view [PIERRE DE
COUBERTIN] so closely with Opposer that they recognize it as Opposer’s name (or
nickname), identity or persona.” Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 USPQ2d
1492, 1497 (TTAB 2015). “[A]n opposer in a proceeding of this character may prevail
even if the name claimed to be appropriated has never been commercially exploited
by the opposer in a trademark or trademark analogous manner.” Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s,
Inc., 226 USPQ 428, 429 (TTAB 1985). However, the opposer must have publicly used
or promoted the name as a means of identifying itself. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala.
v. Pitts, 107 USPQ2d 2001, 2026 (TTAB 2013) (vacated pursuant to settlement on
appeal); Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 117 USPQ2d at 1497 (must be the “recognized name or
identity” of the opposer). “Applicant’s mark must do more than simply bring
Opposer’s name to mind.” Pierce-Arrow Soc’y, 2019 USPQ2d 471774, at *15 (citations
Opposition No. 91233138

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omitted). “[T]he similarity required for a ‘close approximation’ … is more than merely
‘intended to refer’ or ‘intended to evoke.’” Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 117 USPQ2d at 1497
(citation omitted).
In its Brief, Opposer glosses over this prong of the test by asserting that “[t]here
is no dispute here that the mark (PIERRE DE COUBERTIN) and asserted name are
identical. Thus, the only question is whether any of the entities that comprise the
‘institution’ behind the Olympics used the PIERRE DE COUBERTIN name before
Applicant’s filing date.”57 However, while the mark matches the name or identity
Opposer asserts in this proceeding, the crux of the dispute under this prong focuses
on whether the term in Applicant’s mark, “Pierre de Coubertin,” qualifies as
Opposer’s “name or identity,” or a close approximation thereof. The legislative history
of the Section 2(a) false suggestion claim, discussed above, and prior precedent make
clear that “[t]he statutory false suggestion of a connection refusal emerged from the
right to privacy and right of publicity.” In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1639,
1643 (TTAB 2015). If “Pierre de Coubertin” is not Opposer’s name or identity, or close
to it, Opposer has no claim to any associated right of privacy and right of publicity,
and has no meritorious Section 2(a) false suggestion claim.
Pierre de Coubertin is the name and identity of a historical person, and as
discussed in more detail below, the record shows that one or more organizations
(Fondation de Coubertin and Association Familiale Coubertin) hold themselves out
as existing to preserve and protect the publicity rights associated with his name.

57 67 TTABVUE 35.
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While Pierre de Coubertin certainly was associated with the Olympic Movement, this
record does not demonstrate that the public would perceive Applicant’s mark as a
name or identity of the Olympic Movement or Opposer, or a close approximation
thereof. Thus, this mark differs from the SYDNEY 2000 mark at issue in Urbano,
about which the Board stated, “we have no doubt that the general public in the United
States would recognize this phrase as referring unambiguously to the upcoming
Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia, in the year 2000.” Urbano, 113 USPQ2d at
1644.
Here, Opposer has admitted that it “does not use ‘Pierre de Coubertin’
interchangeably with ‘Olympic Games’ as a name for the Olympic Games.”58 Opposer
also admitted that the name was not mentioned in the 2016 USOC Annual report,
did not appear in the “‘U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Brand Usage Guidelines’ page
of the teamusa.org website as of the date of service of these Requests for Admission,”
and is not included as one of the specific designations listed in the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, which gives Opposer special statutory exclusive
rights to certain specified Olympic-related designations in the U.S.59
However, Opposer asserts that “the record contains numerous examples of how
the U.S. Olympic Committee and others in the Olympic Movement (including the
IOC) have used, honored, and publicized the PIERRE DE COUBERTIN name over

58 35 TTABVUE 103 (Opposer’s Response to Request for Admission No. 26).
59 35 TTABVUE 105 (Opposer’s Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 30-32); see also 36
U.S.C. § 220506(a) (giving Opposer the exclusive right to use, inter alia, “the words ‘Olympic’,
‘Olympiad’, ‘Citius Altius Fortius’, ‘Paralympic’, ‘Paralympiad’, ‘Pan-American’, ‘America
Espirito Sport Fraternite’, or any combination of those words”).
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the years.”60 However, mere use of a term does not equate to establishing the term as
Opposer’s name or identity. See In re Kayser-Roth Corp., 29 USPQ2d 1379, 1385
(TTAB 1993) (“It is our opinion that OLYMPIC CHAMPION is not a close
approximation of the name or identity of the United States Olympic Committee, but,
that they are in fact different.”). We find that the nature of Opposer’s use, honoring,
and publicizing does not rise to the level of establishing PIERRE DE COUBERTIN
as the name or identity of Opposer or the Olympic Movement, or a close
approximation of it. Rather, we find that Opposer’s activities reflect a more limited
interest in educating the public about the historical role of Pierre de Coubertin in
reviving the Olympic Games in the late 1800’s and in celebrating his legacy.61 Even
where the IOC has featured Pierre de Coubertin’s name or likeness on merchandise
such as the moustache-themed t-shirt purchased by Opposer’s counsel, such use
emphasizes him as a person and does not show that PIERRE DE COUBERTIN would
be recognized as the name or identity of Opposer or the Olympic Movement.
Opposer also contends that “the media have picked up on and acknowledged the
connection between the PIERRE DE COUBERTIN name and the Olympics, including
by bestowing on Pierre de Coubertin the title ‘father’ of the modern Olympic

60 67 TTABVUE 35 (Opposer’s Brief).
61 Opposer urges us to rely on “mentions of ‘Pierre de Coubertin’ at Olympic Games held
outside the United States” that are not televised in the U.S. and “foreign tributes to M. de
Coubertin … especially those which are located in tourist areas.” 67 TTABVUE 35 n.7
(Opposer’s Brief). However, this urging is notably devoid of citations to the record that
demonstrate the alleged U.S. consumer exposure to such mentions and foreign tributes.
Accordingly, we give them little weight.
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Games.”62 In the context of Section 2(a) false association, the Board has considered
online articles as evidence of public perception, noting that “[w]hile not considered
for the truth of any matters asserted therein, the on-line articles are competent to
show that the public has been exposed to the term [at issue] and the meaning the
public is likely to associate with the term.” Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 117 USPQ2d at 1498
(citations omitted). We find that media coverage on Pierre de Coubertin’s historical
role in the Olympics does not reflect public understanding or perception of PIERRE
DE COUBERTIN as the name or identity of Opposer or the Olympic Movement, or a
close approximation thereof. We note that much of the media coverage presumes the
reader’s familiarity with the Olympic Games, but unfamiliarity with Pierre de
Coubertin. The publicity refers to and describes Pierre de Coubertin’s involvement
with the Olympic Movement, holding him out as a historical figure who took the lead
in reviving the Olympics.63 However, the media coverage does not indicate or even
suggest that consumers would recognize the name PIERRE DE COUBERTIN as
synonymous with the Olympics or Opposer.
Opposer contends that the “matter need not have been used to identify the senior
user; it just has to be seen as pointing to the party.”64 First, we note that the
“pointing” language that appears in some Section 2(a) precedents generally addresses
the second prong of the false suggestion test – once it is established that the mark is

62 Id. (citations omitted).
63 See, e.g., 26 TTABVUE 15-36; 30 TTABVUE 311-56, 362-72, 377-427, 432-46.
64 72 TTABVUE 13 (Opposer’s Reply Brief).
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the plaintiff’s identity, whether the mark would be recognized as pointing uniquely
and unmistakably to the plaintiff. E.g., Hornby v. TJX Cos. Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1411,
1426 (TTAB 2008) (because TWIGGY has a dictionary meaning of resembling a twig
but was also the nickname of a celebrity, Board “must determine whether consumers
would view the mark as pointing only to petitioner, or whether they would perceive
it to have a different meaning”) (emphasis added). Under the first prong, Opposer
must establish that PIERRE DE COUBERTIN is its name or identity, or a close
approximation thereof.
Even assuming, arguendo, that merely “pointing” to Opposer were the standard,
the record indicates that the name points to the historical person Pierre de Coubertin,
and that entities other than Opposer lay claim to rights in the name. The joint letter
to Applicant from the IOC (part of the same institution as Opposer) and the Fondation
states that “the Fondation and Pierre de Coubertin’s heirs, represented by the AFC
[Association Familiale Coubertin] which specifically safeguards their ancestor’s name
and the values and rights attached to the name and image of Pierre de Coubertin,
ensure, together with the IOC, that their ancestor’s patronym and his memory are
not prejudiced, notably by means of uncontrolled commercial exploitation which can
harm his dignity and the family’s honor.”65
Opposer seeks to challenge the accuracy of this representation, arguing in its
Reply Brief that “[t]here is no admissible evidence establishing that the Fondation de

65 38 TTABVUE 36-37.
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Coubertin was actually Pierre de Coubertin’s successor.”66 However, the truth of the
representation in this joint letter from the IOC and the Fondation is not essential.
The letter was sent jointly by the Fondation and an arm of Opposer’s own
“institution,” and the letter acknowledged that PIERRE DE COUBERTIN refers to
the individual to whose name certain “values and rights [are] attached” that are
protected by his heirs, through the Fondation and another organization identified as
“Association Familiale Coubertin.”67 At the very least, the representations in the
letter, and the subsequent coexistence agreement between Applicant and the
Fondation, demonstrate that there is someone other than Opposer asserting rights in
the Pierre de Coubertin name and that Opposer was aware of this assertion of rights
because of the IOC’s participation in it. See In re MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d 1378, 1380-
81 (TTAB 2008) (reversing a Section 2(a) false association refusal to register MARIA
CALLAS where it was “unclear whether the rights that Maria Callas once possessed
in her name or persona devolved to anyone” after her death). That is, the Olympic
institution’s involvement in the letter reflects its acknowledgment that the Fondation
and the Association Familiale Coubertin possess protectable rights in the name at
issue.
Ultimately, “the concern in § 2(a) cases involving a false suggestion of a
connection, unlike cases under § 2(d) which are concerned with protection of the
public from confusion, is protection of persons and institutions from unauthorized

66 71 TTABVUE 16.
67 See 38 TTABVUE 36-37.
Opposition No. 91233138

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exploitation of their personas.” In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d 1185, 1196 (TTAB 2013),
citing Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Automobile Club De l’Ouest de la
France, 245 F.3d 1359, 58 USPQ2d 1460, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “A natural person’s
right to the use of a designation which points uniquely to his or her persona may not
be protected under Section 2(a) after his or her death unless heirs or other successors
are entitled to assert that right.” MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d at 1380. In this case, Opposer
is not the successor to rights in the name of Pierre de Coubertin, and PIERRE DE
COUBERTIN is not Opposer’s persona, meaning the mark is not the name or identity
of Opposer, or a close approximation thereof. The assertion by the Association
Familiale Coubertin and the Fondation of an associational interest in the name
(which the Olympic institution has acknowledged) further indicates that the first
element of a Section 2(a) false association claim is not satisfied here.
This case is unlike others where the mark in question was not the name of the
person or institution at issue, but the public knew the person or institution by the
nickname or close approximation of a name or identity in the mark. For example, in
Nieves & Nieves, the Board held that ROYAL KATE was a close approximation of the
identity of Kate Middleton, the Duchess of Cambridge, even though she did not use
that term as her name or identity, because the evidence showed that on a widespread
basis, “American media uses the term ROYAL KATE to identify Kate Middleton and,
therefore, the American public receives media reports identifying Kate Middleton as
ROYAL KATE.” Nieves & Nieves, 113 USPQ2d at 1647. Here, on the other hand, the
media evidence shows use of PIERRE DE COUBERTIN to refer to the historical
Opposition No. 91233138

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person, and to describe his role in reviving the Olympic Games, but not as the name
or identity of Opposer or of the Olympics.
As another example, in Buffett, the Board found that the opposer “[Jimmy] Buffett
has attempted, through his commercial licensing program, publicity, and
entertainment services, to associate the term ‘MARGARITAVILLE’ with the public
persona of Jimmy Buffett.” Buffett, 226 USPQ at 430. Significantly, the record
included media references to “Jimmy (Margaritaville) Buffett,” “The Monarch of
Margaritaville” and “The Poet of Margaritaville,” as well as testimony from music
industry witnesses that the term was “synonymous” with Jimmy Buffett and “almost
a nickname of” his. Id. The record also included evidence that Jimmy Buffett had
licensed “J.B.’s MARGARITAVILLE” for a restaurant and for clothing goods. Buffett,
226 USPQ at 430. By contrast, in this case, the record lacks similar evidence that
PIERRE DE COUBERTIN would be understood as a nickname of, as synonymous
with, or otherwise reflecting the identity of, the Olympic Movement, and instead
shows that the name would be understood as a reference to the historical person.
D. Whether PIERRE DE COUBERTIN Points Uniquely and
Unmistakably to the Olympic Games
Next, we find that even assuming, arguendo, that PIERRE DE COUBERTIN were
Opposer’s name or identity or a close approximation, the mark does not point
uniquely and unmistakably to Opposer. Thus, Opposer also fails to satisfy the second
prong of the § 2(a) false suggestion test. “[U]nder concepts of the protection of one’s
‘identity,’ ... [a] critical requirement is that the name (or an equivalent thereof)
claimed to be appropriated by another must be unmistakably associated with” the
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institution in question. Univ. of Notre Dame, 217 USPQ at 509. Moreover, this
association must be unique. “The protection afforded a name or its equivalent under
Section 2(a) is acquired only when the name claimed to be appropriated points
‘uniquely and unmistakably’ to the plaintiff’s ‘persona,’ that is the personal or trade
identity of the claimant.” Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 117 USPQ2d at 1497 (citing Buffett, 226
USPQ at 429); see also Hornby, 87 USPQ2d at 1424 (“[T]he name claimed to be
appropriated by the defendant must point uniquely to the plaintiff.”).
As discussed above, PIERRE DE COUBERTIN names a historical person to whose
identity and name certain “values and rights [are] attached” that his heirs, through
the Fondation and the “Association Familiale Coubertin,”68 hold themselves out as
entitled to protect. In general, the evidence relating to PIERRE DE COUBERTIN
refers to and discusses the late individual.69 Some of it includes information about his
title, education, politics, and interests, and in some cases, his family background and
personal life.70 One article submitted by Opposer notes, “Pierre de Coubertin was
primarily a pedagogue and his foremost aim was to reform education. In 1925 he was
one of the founders of the World Pedagogical Union.”71 He also is described as the

68 See id.
69 E.g., 26 TTABVUE 15-61; 28 TTABVUE 12-24, 187-98.
70 E.g., 26 TTABVUE 15 (USA Today article describes how Pierre de Coubertin “had a
political agenda” and “was trying to raise the profile for France after its loss in the Franco-
Prussian War”); 26 TTABVUE 44 (Bonjour Paris article includes family and personal
background, information on his education and travels, and literary accomplishment); 30
TTABVUE 46-48 (Times-Picayune article describes him as “a wealthy Frenchman” whose
“physical activities were pretty much limited to riding horses and rowing,” and his concern
with the “physical degeneracy” of France); 30 TTABVUE 299 (describing Pierre de
Coubertin’s “passion as an educator”).
71 30 TTABVUE 1131 (The Sport Journal).
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founder of the modern pentathlon.72 The IOC’s own publication about Pierre de
Coubertin notes that
His various publications are estimated to run some 15,000
printed pages, without counting his personal
correspondence. This large written output mainly concerns
Olympism, sport and education, but also subjects as varied
as history, geography, sociology, psychology, or politics.73
This evidence emphasizes that Pierre de Coubertin is held out as an individual who
had interests and initiatives other than the Olympics, and is not remembered solely
for his role in the Olympics. His name is associated with the person, rather than
serving merely as a synonym of the Olympic institution.
Even in the context of his role in the Olympics, Pierre de Coubertin is referred to
as a person – not as the name or identity of the Olympics. For example, Opposer’s
Notice of Opposition includes the statement, “Pierre de Coubertin was the founder of
the modern Olympic movement and the International Olympic Committee’s first
president.”74 This corroborates that PIERRE DE COUBERTIN points to the deceased
person, rather than pointing uniquely and unmistakably to Opposer or the Olympic
Movement. As in In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1389 (TTAB
1993), concerning the mark OLYMPIAN GOLDE, “due to the variations in possible
meaning or connotation for the term [], we cannot say on the basis of the present
record that applicant’s mark points uniquely and unmistakably to the USOC.” See

72 E.g., 26 TTABVUE 50; 30 TTABVUE 129, 299, 333, 336.
73 30 TTABVUE 42 (IOC Historical Archives “Pierre de Coubertin: overview of the content
of the archives concerning his biography, mandates and activities from 1882 to 1999”).
74 1 TTABVUE 5.
Opposition No. 91233138

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also Kayser-Roth Corp., 29 USPQ2d at 1385 (“Nor can we say on the basis of the
record before us that the mark OLYMPIC CHAMPION ‘points uniquely and
unmistakably’ to the United States Olympic Committee inasmuch as that term may
as likely point to a contestant representing a country other than the United States in
the Olympic games.”); NASA v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1671, 1676
(TTAB 1987) (the term SPACE SHUTTLE did not point uniquely and unmistakably
to NASA); cf. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH v. Piano Factory Grp., Inc. and Sweet 16
Musical Props., Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 341894, at *7-8 (TTAB 2019) (recognizing that
there may be a false suggestion of a connection with multiple persons or institutions
where those are “other Schiedmayer family-affiliated businesses”) (citing In re White,
73 USPQ2d 1713, 1717-18 (TTAB 2004)).
Opposer implies that the name Pierre de Coubertin may point both to the late
individual and to the Olympic movement without foreclosing the showing that the
name points uniquely to Opposer. Opposer’s argument presents parallels with the
situation addressed in the Federal Circuit’s Notre Dame decision. Specifically, the
name at issue is of a dead person, and more than one entity or group of persons claims
to be associated with the person’s name. In Notre Dame, the Court held:
“Notre Dame” is not a name solely associated with the
University. It serves to identify a famous and sacred
religious figure and is used in the names of churches
dedicated to Notre Dame, such as the Cathedral of Notre
Dame in Paris, France. Thus, it cannot be said that the only
“person” which the name possibly identifies is the
University and that the mere use of NOTRE DAME by
another appropriates its identity.
Univ. of Notre Dame, 217 USPQ at 509.
Opposition No. 91233138

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There are also some commonalities with Pierce-Arrow, wherein the opposer
acknowledged that the name at issue pointed to a defunct car company and its cars,
but claimed that even though it was not the legal successor to the defunct company,
it nonetheless should be viewed as the “de facto successor.” 2019 USPQ2d 471774, at
*18. The Board rejected this claim, noting that the opposer’s acknowledgment that
the mark pointed to multiple “identities” constituted “reason enough for [the Board]
to find that Applicant’s mark does not point uniquely and unmistakably to Opposer.”
Id. (citing Midwest Tennis & Track, 29 USPQ2d at 1388). The Board concluded that
even assuming the defunct car company had name or identity rights, “absent any
showing that some person was or is the successor-in-interest to that company,
whatever rights the defunct entity had were extinguished when it went bankrupt and
ceased to exist … [and] there was no successor to the company who could have passed
rights of any type, years later, on to Opposer.” Id. at *20. Here, Opposer’s concession
that Pierre de Coubertin refers to a deceased person and that Opposer has not
acquired rights to the name from or through the late individual’s estate75 is
inconsistent with Opposer’s Section 2(a) claim.
Opposer focuses heavily on an argument that by adopting this mark, Applicant
intended to falsely suggest a connection with Opposer and the Olympic institution.
In particular, Opposer relies on: Applicant’s acknowledged awareness of Pierre de
Coubertin’s involvement with the Olympic institution prior to Applicant’s adoption of
the mark; Applicant’s adoption of the mark despite knowing of the IOC’s and

75 35 TTABVUE 3, 97.
Opposition No. 91233138

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Fondation’s foreign registrations for PIERRE DE COUBERTIN or COUBERTIN; and
Applicant’s creation of and pursuit of foreign trademark rights in the
logo, which Opposer contends resembles the Olympic rings.76
First, we do not find that the evidence dictates a finding that Applicant intended
to suggest a connection to Opposer or the Olympic movement. Applicant’s awareness
of Pierre de Coubertin, the late individual, and his role in the Olympic movement,
does not equate to an intent to suggest a connection to Opposer. Cf. Univ. of Notre
Dame, 217 USPQ at 509 (evidence that an applicant “intended to identify the
University,” i.e., the opposer, would have been “highly persuasive that the public will
make the intended false association”). We do not find credibility problems with
Applicant’s testimony and evidence regarding the adoption of this mark, nor do Mr.
Van Dijk’s explanation of the selection of the mark, and rationale for Applicant’s
willingness to defend in this proceeding, raise red flags. As to the initialism logo,
interlocking rounded initials are not uncommon. Overall, in our view, the record as a
whole does not persuade us that Applicant intended to falsely suggest that
Applicant’s goods are connected with Opposer or the Olympic Movement.
Second, to the extent any evidence suggests that Applicant intended to suggest a
connection to the late individual Pierre de Coubertin, the situation is similar to that
in Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama. In that case, despite an admission by the

76 67 TTABVUE 29-33 (Opposer’s Brief).
Opposition No. 91233138

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applicants that their mark was adopted as an affectionate reference to the
houndstooth fedora worn by University of Alabama football coach Bear Bryant, the
Board found that the mark as a whole did not closely approximate the identity or
persona of Coach Bryant and, thus was not unmistakably associated with him and
did not point uniquely to him. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 107 USPQ2d at 2027-28.
The Board distinguished prior intent cases on the basis that they involved the exact
name or image of the target person or institution, and where, as in this case, the name
or image is not Opposer’s, the significance of any intent is diminished. Id. at 2027.
Thus, because PIERRE DE COUBERTIN is not Opposer’s name or identity and does
not point uniquely to Opposer, any intent by Applicant with regard to Pierre de
Coubertin, the deceased person, cannot help establish a Section 2(a) claim for
Opposer.
E. Remaining Elements of Section 2(a) Claim
The parties dispute the proper formulation and application of the remaining two
elements of the Section 2(a) claim. The discrepancy between the person named in the
mark – Pierre de Coubertin – and the person or institution bringing this claim –
Opposer – results in the parties’ disagreement over the appropriate analysis of the
other elements. The parties contest which to use – Pierre de Coubertin or Opposer –
for purposes of assessing the existence of a connection and for purposes of assessing
fame. Because of the unusual posture of the claim on this record, and given our
findings that Opposer has failed to satisfy the first two elements of the Section 2(a)
claim, we consider it unnecessary to resolve these remaining disputed elements. See
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Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d at 1389 (addressing only the first two
elements of Section 2(a) false suggestion to find no false suggestion of a connection).
VI. Conclusion
Opposer has not demonstrated that Applicant’s mark falsely suggests a connection
with Opposer. Specifically, Opposer has not satisfied the first two elements of the
Section 2(a) false suggestion of a connection test and its Section 2(a) claim thus fails.
Decision: The opposition is dismissed.