The Tribune Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 19, 1986

279 N.L.R.B. 977 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

TRIBUNE CO. 977
The Tribune Company and International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO-CLC and Local 721. Cases 8-CA-14861,
8-CA-15181, 8-CA-15337, 8-CA-15337-2, 8-
CA-15337-4, and 8-RC-12406
19 May 1986
DECISION , ORDER, AND
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
ELECTION
conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended
Order. 3
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
ELECTION
IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid bal-
lots have not been cast for International Union of
Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
and its Local 721 and that it is not the exclusive
representative of these bargaining unit employees.
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND STEPHENS
On 30 December 1983 Administrative Law
Judge James J. O'Meara Jr. issued the attached de-
cision. The Union and the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Re-
spondent filed an answering brief. The Union and
the General Counsel excepted to, among other
things, the judge 's failure to address allegations of
the complaint and related objections which were
fully litigated at the hearing.
On 30 August 1984 the Board, without passing
on all the exceptions, issued an unpublished Order
remanding the proceedings to the judge for further
findings and conclusions regarding these allega-
tions. On 16 October 1984 the judge issued the at-
tached supplemental decision regarding these alle-
gations. No exceptions to the supplemental decision
were filed.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, i and
i The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge 's credibility
findings The Board's established policy as not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir
1951 ) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings
2 In affirming the judge 's finding that the interrogations of employees
did not violate the Act or constitute objectionable conduct , we rely on
our decision in Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), affd 760 F 2d
1006 (9th Cir 1985) Each of these employees, except Laura Lemmon,
publicly supported the Union In Laura Lemmon 's case Supervisor Harry
Newman 's query regarding how her name came to appear on union liter-
ature was prompted by Lemmon's having told Newman earlier that she
did not support the Union Newman testified he was concerned her name
was being used without her knowledge Therefore, a legitimate basis ex-
isted for Newman's inquiry In none of these instances is there objective
evidence in view of all the circumstances that the interrogations would
tend to have a coercive effect We disavow any statements of the judge
that appear to rely on the subjective effect of the interrogations
In the absence of exceptions to the judge's supplemental decision, we
adopt the judge's conclusion regarding the allegations discussed in that
decision In the absence of any exceptions to either the judge's original
decision or his supplemental decision , the Board adopts the judge's find-
ings that the Respondent did not unlawfully institute new work rules for
delivery personnel, threaten to eliminate part-time advertising supplement
"stuffing" work, threaten employees with harsher conditions , discharge,
loss of mileage payments or pension coverage , state that bargaining
would be futile ; create the impression of or engage in surveillance of em-
ployees ' union activities , restrict or prohibit the distribution of union lit-
erature, deny drivers mileage payments or the renewal of delivery con-
tracts with raises ; deprive union adherent of normal contact with other
employees or exclude them from training sessions ; increase wages and
benefits , solicit grievances ; or single out union adherents by refusing to
give them green carnations for St . Patrick's Day.
3 In view of our adoption of the judge's recommendation that the elec-
tion objections be overruled, we shall issue a certification of results of
election
Charles Z Adamson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joseph A . Rotolo, Esq., for the Respondent.
Richard Rice, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES J. O'MEARA JR ., Administrative Law Judge.
The original complaint in this case was issued on July
30, 1981 ,1 as Case 8-CA-14861 and was based on a
charge filed on May 19 by International Union of Elec-
trical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC
and its Local 721 (the Union). From time to time, and up
to and including the hearing on these matters, the com-
plaint was amended by consolidating it with Cases 8-
CA-15181, 8-CA-15337, 8-CA-15337-2, and 8-CA-
15337-4, each of which complaints were based on
charges subsequently filed by the Union. An additional
amendment comprising the withdrawal of paragraph 20
of the consolidated complaint was requested by the Gen-
eral Counsel and allowed.
The answer of the Respondent to the amended com-
plaint comprises a specific denial of each allegation of
unlawful conduct contained in the consolidated amended
complaint.
On February 10 the Union filed a petition for certifica-
tion by the Board as the exclusive representative of the
employees in a specified bargaining unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining . As of February 7 the Union had
received authorization cards from 113 of the 224 employ-
ees of the Respondent comprising the bargaining unit.
Due to terminations and new hirings the number of em-
ployees on the date of the election was 235. An election
to resolve the Union's petition was held on April 6, at
which 228 of 235 eligible employee voters cast ballots.
Of the 228 ballots so cast, 97 were for the Union and 119
were against the Union. Twelve ballots were challenged.
I All dates hereinafter stated are in 1981 unless otherwise indicated
279 NLRB No. 138
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The challenged ballots comprise an insufficient number
to effect the results of the election.
On April 13 the Petitioner filed objections to the con-
duct of the Employer allegedly affecting the results of
the election. The Regional Director, in considering the
Union's objections to the election, consideration of pend-
ing unfair labor practice charges against the Employer,
and observing that evidence to support the allegations of
the unfair labor practice were coextensive with evidence
to be offered in support of the Union's objections, or-
dered that the matter of the objections be consolidated
with the unfair labor practice case and heard simulta-
neously.
The case was heard in the city of Warren, Ohio, on
May 3-7, 12, and 13, 1982. The hearing was reopened
subsequent thereto and further evidence was heard on
November 22, 1982. At the sessions comprising this hear-
ing the parties were given an opportunity to present evi-
dence in the form of witnesses and documents and to
argue their respective positions. At the close of the hear-
ing, the parties waived oral argument and summation and
filed briefs which have been received and considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is now, and has been at all times ma-
terial, a corporation duly organized under and existing
by virtue of the laws of the State of Ohio with its princi-
pal office and place of business located in Warren, Ohio,
where it is engaged in the publication of the Warren
Tribune-Chronicle, a daily newspaper of general circula-
tion which holds membership in, and subscribes to, inter-
state news service and advertises nationally sold prod-
ucts, and whose gross volume of business exceeds
$200,000 per annum.
I find that the Respondent is now, and has been at all
times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
I further find that it will effectuate the policies of the
Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.
II. THE LABOR UNION
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 721, are now,
and have been at all times material herein, labor organi-
zations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Background
The Tribune Company (the Respondent) is engaged in
the publication of the Warren Tribune-Chronicle, a daily
newspaper of general circulation, in the city of Warren,
Ohio, and its surrounding locale. In performing its func-
tions, it engaged personnel to perform the circulation of
the paper whom it describes as "contract carriers" and
"contract tube carriers." It has been the position of the
Respondent that these "contract carriers" and "contract
tube carriers" are independent contractors and not em-
ployees of the Respondent and thus should not have
been included in the bargaining unit. The Regional Di-
rector has ruled that notwithstanding the contract be-
tween the Respondent and its "contract carriers" and
"contract tube carriers" they are employers under the
Act and thus are included in the bargaining unit which
the Union seeks to represent.
Although the Respondent does not accede to this de-
termination, it has stipulated to the inclusion of the "con-
tract carriers" and "contract tube carriers" in the bar-
gaining unit for the purposes of this case only.
B. The Union Election
On February 10, 1981, the Union filed its petition for
recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of the em-
ployees of the Respondent identified as follows:
All full time and regular part time employees of the
employer and all mechanical and non-mechanical
departments of the Warren Tribune-Chronicle at
240 Franklin Street, S.E., Warren, Ohio , including
circulation, classified advertising, mailroom , mainte-
nance, commercial advertising, editorial business
office, composing-coldtype, pressroom , engraving,
machine repair, cafeteria employees, contract driv-
ers, motor tube route drivers and district sales man-
agers, but excluding all managerial employees, con-
fidential employees and professional employees,
guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act.
As of February 7 the Union possessed valid authoriza-
tion cards signed by 113 of the persons in the unit de-
scribed above at which time the total number of persons
in the unit was 224. Between February 7 and the date of
the election, April 6, the total complement of this unit
increased to 235. At the election of April 6, 97 votes
were cast for the Union and 119 votes were cast against
the Union for a total of 216 valid, counted votes. There
were 12 additional challenged ballots resulting in a total
number of ballots cast of 228. As noted above, the chal-
lenged ballots, if resolved in favor of the Petitioner, are
not sufficient to affect the results of the election.
The Petitioner filed timely objections to the conduct
of the Respondent allegedly affecting the results of the
election. Subsequent to the filing of these objections the
Union requested to withdraw Objections 7 and 13 of a
total of 16 objections. The objections, therefore, remain-
ing to be resolved in this proceeding are as follows:
Objection 1-The Union contends that on or
about February 9, and continuing thereafter, the
Employer informed its employees about a new re-
tirement plan in order to cause them to vote against
the Union.
Objections 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 14-The Union al-
leges that the Employer threatened its employees
with loss of benefits and wages if they supported
the Union, that if the Union won the election the
Employer would not negotiate a contract with the
Union, that the employees would lose their jobs if
they went on strike and further that Respondent in-
terrogated the employees regarding their union
sympathies.
TRIBUNE CO 979
Objections 6 and 11-The Petitioner contends
that the Employer prohibited its employees from so-
liciting and distributing literature on behalf of the
Union while permitting solicitation and distribution
unfavorable to the Union.
Objections 9 and 10-In essence, the Union al-
leges that the Employer isolated employee support-
ers of the Petitioner, thereby depriving them of
normal contact with other employees and prohibit-
ed known adherents of the Union from attending
Employer-sponsored campaign meetings.
Objection 12-The Petitioner contends that the
Employer singled out supporters of the Union by
refusing to give them green carnations on St. Pat-
rick's Day.
Objections 15 and 16-These objections comprise
allegations that the employer increased wages and
benefits in order to interfere with the rights of its
employees to select a collective bargaining agent,
and by other non-specific acts and conduct, inter-
fered with the rights of the employees to select
such a representative.
C. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations
1. The alleged threats
In the days shortly after the commencement of the or-
ganizing campaign, the question of which employees
would be included in the description of the bargaining
unit was before the Regional Director. The specific ques-
tion involved was whether or not the contract drivers
and motor tube drivers under written contract with the
Respondent were to be included in the bargaining unit.
The contracts under which the contract carriers operat-
ed are entitled "Motor Tube Independent Contract
Agreement" and "Delivery Independent Contract Agree-
ment," respectively. These contracts provide, in essence,
that the contractor is to furnish a suitable vehicle and a
driver to operate that vehicle. The contractor was re-
quired to pay such drivers for all gasoline, oil, parts, re-
pairs, etc ., and to maintain liability insurance to cover his
operation. The contractor was further required to pay all
state and Federal taxes , maintain proper registration, and
driver, chauffeur, and public utility licenses . The con-
tracts further provided that the contractor was in exclu-
sive control of the distribution of the newspapers entrust-
ed to him and that the company should have no liability
for expenses incurred, injuries, or damages to property
incurred by the contractor, its employees, or other per-
sons resulting from the contractor's operation. The con-
tractor was further permitted to perform the subject
matter of the contract according to his own judgment.
The Regional Director determined that such contrac-
tors were employees and were to be included in the bar-
gaining unit (this ruling is not at issue in this case be-
cause the Respondent , for the purposes of this case, stip-
ulated that such contractors are employees).
During the consideration of the issue of the legal status
of these contractors, the Respondent, on February 24,
advised the contractors in writing of the potential results
in the event the contract drivers were deemed employ-
ees. The written statement contained the following:
1. The present contract could be considered an
employment contract.
2. Drivers would not be permitted to freely sub-
stitute for their routes.
3. All drivers would have to be employees,
scheduling of employees days off would be per-
formed by management instead of the present free
substitution.
4. IRS could determine that both the Trib and
the drivers must pay taxes , with a strong possibility
of retroactive tax payments due to be paid by both
the Trib and the drivers.
5. Insurance certificates for vehicles would have
to meet company standards.
6. Specific pick-up and delivery times would
have to be scheduled by the circulation department
if the drivers were considered hourly employees
7. There could be no sub-contracting by the driv-
ers.
In addition to the aforementioned change of conditions
under which the contract drivers would work, several
state laws relating to employees would then come into
effect. The laws cover areas such as pension require-
ments, income tax withholding requirements , social secu-
rity withholding, contribution requirements, and contri-
butions by the Respondent under the Ohio Unemploy-
ment Workers' Compensation Act. This would require
specific information regarding record requirements to
comply with the several laws relating to employees.
Such laws did not apply to independent contractors.
The status of the motor tube contractors and delivery
contractors in the judgment of the Company was such
that the contractor was not an employee of the Respond-
ent. When the Regional Director ruled these to be em-
ployees includable in the bargaining unit, it was clear
that the independent status of the contractor was open to
question , if not, in fact , eliminated . Thus , the Respondent
was faced with the dilemma of maintaining its position of
treating these contractors as employees and complying
with the several laws of the State applicable to employ-
ees but not applicable to independent contractors.
Particularly important to the Respondent was the
question of vicarious liability arising from the actions of
the carrier if that carrier is deemed to be an employee.
Such circumstances would prompt a prudent respondent
to make those changes necessary to insure control over
the operation such as the ability to hire, fire, schedule,
and otherwise direct the operations of such delivery per-
sonnel . It would prompt such a respondent to set up pro-
cedures to obtain and maintain the records necessary to
comply with the several laws of the State and other gov-
ernmental agencies in order to comply with the sub-
stance of such laws regarding employees. Thus, the con-
tractors were advised, in the notice of February 24, of
the potential changes which would probably come about
in the event these contract drivers were deemed employ-
ees. The issue was not one over which the employees, by
their activities, could influence. The question was a legal
matter which was initially determined by the Regional
Director and, although stipulated for limited purposes by
the Respondent , remains one . Accordingly , the Company
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
advised that if they are deemed to be employees, certain
control over operations would be lost to the contractor.
No activity on the part of these employees could be
deemed to influence the outcome of the Respondent's di-
lemma. Contrariwise , it would seem that such personnel
should be advised of such a drastic potential change in
their arrangements with the Respondent at the earliest
possible moment . It is concluded that the Company's
action in this regard did not threaten reprisal or other
detriment to the drivers because of their union activities
or the activities of the Union itself. The action of the Re-
spondent in this regard is not deemed a violation of Sec-
tion 8(axl) of the Act.
Sometime in March a meeting was held between As-
sistant General Manager Peter J. Murphy and several
employees regarding the current procedures in effect in
the mailroom regarding the occasional requirement to
stuff the papers with separate advertising flyers or in-
serts . This procedure was performed by part -time em-
ployees in the mailroom . Murphy discussed the competi-
tive problem the paper had in satisfying advertisers who
chose to adopt the insert method of advertising in the
Tribune . Some of the Tribune's competitors use the
newspaper carriers to stuff such inserts after the papers
are delivered to the carriers. The Tribune chose to adopt
the use of part-time , on-premises employees as long as
the cost of so doing was competitive . At the meeting
questions from the employees were entertained. It was
inquired by an employee whether or not the Tribune was
going to abolish its current system of stuffing inserts by
part-time employees . The meeting was advised by
Murphy that the company could adopt the other method
and added that , "as we continuously said throughout the
campaign . . . in collective bargaining with the Union,
you can either get more, the same or less, but under pre-
vailing conditions of the election campaign, nothing can
be promised."
In late February or early March , a contract driver was
told that in the event the Union became the representa-
tive of the employees defined in the bargaining unit that
she, as an employee , could not permit her husband to
drive the delivery vehicle since she, not the husband,
would then be an employee of the Respondent. The con-
tract driver to whom such statement was made did not
have a driver's license and the employment of another
driver by this independent contractor was necessary to
accomplish the distribution for which she had contract-
ed.
In March the circulation manager , Thomas M. Stith,
stated that in the event the Union became the bargaining
agent of the employees, the employees could lose free
parking and subsidized cafeteria, could obtain reduced
wages, and could be denied the use of substitutes in car-
rying out their functions. The circulation manager told
the employees that they could "end up receiving either
more or the same or less" in the event of collective bar-
gaining with the Union.
About the same time , Stith had a conversation with a
contract driver . That driver questioned Stith regarding
the continuation of a subsidized cafeteria stating that he
had heard rumors that such would then be terminated.
Stith denied any knowledge of such a rumor and stated,
"In the event that the Union came in there was a possi-
bility that they could get more , the same , or less. It was
all negotiable."
These are examples of the general policy of the Com-
pany regarding all matters of employee -employer rela-
tionships in the event of collective bargaining . The Com-
pany's policy in this regard was expressed in a letter of
March 20 to all its employees . Part of that letter read as
follows:
Collective bargaining is a give-and -take process in
which no one can predict what will result. The
Union may promise but they cannot guarantee any-
thing . Although the Tribune will certainly bargain
in good faith , all wages , benefits , and working con-
ditions are negotiable and employees could lose, get
more or just keep what you already have as a result
of bargaining . . . even with the Union and the
Tribune bargaining in good faith , there are no guar-
antees that wages, benefits or working conditions
will improve or for that matter stay the same during
negotiations.
Therefore, to specify, in response to employees' ques-
tions what might , in the future, develop in regard to a
specific item such as the mailroom stuffers' program, is
one which , if the Union becomes the exclusive bargain-
ing agent, will be negotiated and the result "could" be
the change in procedures regarding insert advertising. It
is argued that such dialogue analysis turns on the ques-
tion of whether the Respondent or representative used
the word "could" or "would ." In this instance , the wit-
ness for the Government , Delores Gootee , acknowledges
that the work "could " was used . Therefore , the incident
was no more than a specification of the general statement
made in the letter from the Respondent to its employees.
These incidents do not constitute violations of Section
8(ax 1) of the Act.
About March 26, an employee, Frances Plewa, while
in the cafeteria and near a table where Zell Draz, the
general manager , and two employees were seated, over-
heard Draz say that "the IUE stands for ignorant, une-
ducated employees." Plewa acknowledged that another
conversation was taking place at the table but she did
not recall the content of that dialogue . It is ludicrous to
contend , as the General Counsel does , that such a state-
ment overheard under the conditions set forth in this
record constitutes coercion against prounion employees.
To characterize this incident as "unlawfully informed
employees who were wearing union buttons" is simply
not supported by the evidence . Draz , in attempting to
recall the situation, testified that the incident occurred
the day after a birthday party given to her by several su-
pervisors . She was relating to the group at the table
some of the funny presents . One of these presents was
from Tom Stith and was a T-shirt with IUE on it. She
asked him what it meant and he said it meant ignorant,
uneducated employees . The witness overheard part of a
conversation between Draz and other persons. It was not
directed to her or to other employees . It was not intend-
ed to nor could it influence any of the employees against
the Union and does not violate the Act.
TRIBUNE CO. 981
Plewa also testified that , apparently in the same con-
versation, she heard Draz say that "if they thought
things were tough now they should wait until this is
over" and "if they attempted union activity again she
would make them cry." In view of the manner in which
Plewa overheard the derogatory acronym about the
Union, the accuracy of the rest of her testimony regard-
ing the eavesdropping is suspect . Draz denied "saying
anything stupid like that." Under the circumstances and
having observed the demeanor of this witness and her
acknowledged limited ability to overhear the total con-
versation , prompts me to discredit her testimony and, for
reasons hereafter expressed, credit that testimony of
Draz . I find that the foregoing incident does not consti-
tute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
About January 28, Katheryn Snowball, an employee,
was having lunch with Robert Hyman, a supervisor.
During such occasion, Hyman and the employee en-
gaged in a discussion about the company handbook and
the Union. During that conversation, Hyman made the
remark that if the Union won the election, the Respond-
ent could hire a lawyer and start from zero, and it might
take an employee 2 years to reach the wages, hours, and
working conditions currently enjoyed by the employees.
Such a statement by Hyman is no more than a specifica-
tion of the general statement made by the Respondent to
its employees that as a result of negotiations, things such
as wages , hours, and working conditions are to be nego-
tiated and the results of such negotiations cannot be fore-
told. Again, the witnesses called by the General Counsel
appear to repeatedly recite isolated instances in both
formal and informal conferences with supervisors as vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act. Such testimony,
because it does not comprise the essence of the entire
conversation, can hardly be evaluated to provide a clear
determination that such constitutes a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. On the contrary, such surgically ex-
cised statements do not discharge the onus on the Gener-
al Counsel to prove such acts by a preponderance of the
evidence . I find that this episode does not establish a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
An employee , James Harrington , testified that on
March 17 , Ralph Karafe , a supervisor , called Harrington
to Karafe's office. He testified that Draz was there and
Karafe said nothing more than , "If I voted for the Union
I was going to go out the door ." He alleges that Draz
shook her head in agreement . The meeting took 20 to 30
seconds . This isolated incident is incredible . I do not
credit the testimony of Harrington because it does not
conincide with the practices engaged in by the Respond-
ent and its supervisors and, in essence , testified to by
most of the witnesses in this case . Karafe and Draz
denied the incident , Draz stating that she was never in
the office of Karafe with Harrington. The subject matter
of this testimony is so incongruous with the evidence of
this case depicting the Respondent 's conduct of its cam-
paign against the Union that I discount it and discredit
Harrington 's testimony.
About March 25, a supervisor of the composing room,
John Perfette, advised an employee, Cheri Fellows, that
because she was at the bottom of the seniority list she
would always be the first to go in the event of a layoff.
Fellows testified that Perfette threatened her with layoff
and loss of benefits if the Union was successful. Perfette
testified that he stated to her that in the event there was
a layoff, she would be the first to go and if there was a
strike, she would lose her company benefits while she
was on strike. These discussions occurred in more than
one conversation and were the result of Fellows ques-
tioning Perfette about the content of campaign letters
which the Respondent had passed out to employees. This
is a further example of the practice of the General Coun-
sel in this case to present a supervisor's comment made
in answer to a question by an employee as a positive, un-
solicited statement of that supervisor. The subject matter
of Perfette's comments was contained in the letter dis-
tributed by the Respondent to the employees and was
simply a repetition of the details in the document. There
is no contention that the letter contained unlawful com-
munications . I find that the foregoing does not violate
Section 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act.
In the second week of February, one Laura Lemmon,
a motor tube driver, inquired of her supervisor, Harry
Newman, whether or not her overpayment for mileage
reimbursement would be lost as a result of negotiations
with the Union. Due to changes in her route, Lemmon
had been receiving approximately $80 per week in excess
of that to which she would have been entitled for mile-
age reimbursement under the terms of her contract. An
adjustment was made by her supervisors whereby this
overpayment was not eliminated but other reimburse-
ments to her were reduced or eliminated. On this occa-
sion Lemmon expressed to Newman that she feared the
overpayment would be eliminated as a result of negotia-
tions with the Union. Newman testified that he was care-
ful to use the phrase which he had been told to use and
which had been used over and over again in employee
discussions with management and that is that negotia-
tions could end up producing more , less, or the same.
This incident does not comprise a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, rather it is the statement from a super-
visor prompted by an expressed fear of an employee.
Again, his response was reflecting the policies of the
Company in responding to employee questions. I find
that such is not a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On February 27 a campaign letter from the Company
was distributed . It had references to some changes in the
pension plan. Debbie Yost, a supervisor, asked an em-
ployee, Delores Cidowski, whether she had any ques-
tions. Debbie Yost denied saying that Cidowski's retire-
ment would "be on the line" and the Company would
not make any contributions for 2 or 3 years. Yost testi-
fied that "I don't even talk like that." Yost said that she
told her that everything is negotiable. She could have
the same , more , or less , there is no way of knowing what
would happen . This phrase , in essence, is the phrase
which management had directed its supervisory person-
nel to use in response to such questions . The written ma-
terial in relation to the campaign distributed by the Com-
pany was distributed to all employees. The supervisors
were instructed to inquire whether or not the recipient
had any questions regarding the distribution on matters
such as this pension plan and, if so, they were to state
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that such things are negotiable. Yost stated that she told
Cidowski the whole thing could possibly drag on for 2
or 3 years. She did not state that the Company would
stop contributing to the pension plan for 2 to 3 years.
Yost's testimony is more credible than Cidowski's and in
conformity with the logical answer to a baited question.
This is another example of surgically excising a conver-
sation between management and an employee by attrib-
uting the response to a question from an employee as a
positive statement by a supervisor. Debbie Yost's re-
sponse to Cidowski's question was that the entire process
could take 2 to 3 years, not that the Company would
stop making payments on the pension fund for 2 to 3
years. I do not find that the evidence of this incident is
sufficiently credible nor accurate to meet the burden of
proof required of the General Counsel to establish a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel has alleged that about April 3,
Supervisor Bruce Crawford told employee Cidowski that
he wished the employee would not go to the Union
meeting scheduled for April 5 and, if the employee went,
the employee should be aware of the consequences of
union representation before voting. Cidowski testified
that Crawford and she were discussing the Union and
she told Crawford exactly how she felt. She told him she
was discouraged with the way the Company handled the
campaign and she would be attending the union meeting
on Sunday and "no one or nothing was going to stop
me." Cidowski also testified that Crawford responded
that he wished she would not attend the meeting and, if
she did, she should be aware of the consequences of
union representation before she voted. Cidowski admit-
ted that employees received many letters from manage-
ment asking employees to consider all the facts before
voting, consider the consequences both pro and con, and
to review all the facts before voting either for or against
the Union. It had been the Company's policy published
by both written letter and in a speech by Publisher Draz
that the employees should be urged to recognize the seri-
ousness of their act and consider carefully before they
vote. In no incident was there any implied threats of re-
prisals. Crawford could not recall the specific conversa-
tion about which Cidowski testified. He maintained that
in all instances, when questioned on such subject matters,
he advised them that negotiations could result in more
benefits, the same benefits, or less benefits. I do not find
the statement attributed to Crawford as a threat in any
way nor intimidating to Cidowski nor to any other em-
ployee nor should it have been so perceived by Cidowski
or to anyone to whom she relayed the incident. I do not
find this to be in violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act.
On March 25 the Respondent distributed to all its em-
ployees a certain letter attempting to answer questions
which "had been asked." The General Counsel contends
that this letter of March 25 was distributed in order to
discourage union activity because it misrepresented em-
ployees' employment and reinstatement rights. The mate-
rial in the letter regarding employment and reinstatement
was contained in the first question and answer in the
letter. That question and answer was as follows:
Q. Do I risk losing my job during a stake?
A. An emphatic "Yes." If you chose to strike
over the terms of a contract you can be permanent-
ly replaced by another worker. This is the law.
Your replacement can keep your job after the strike
is over.
This is the only reference to a letter from the Respond-
ent to its employees about which the General Counsel
complained . The Respondent has used many letters in
the conduct of its campaign . It is deemed significant that
only one was deemed to violate the act (as a result of a
single question and answer). This effort to recite the law
to employees is probably best avoided. The significant
terms of this statement is the limitation of the nature of
the strike about which it refers as one "over the terms of
a contract ." I deem this characterization an economic
strike and not a strike arising as a result of an unfair
labor practice. The status of employees after a strike
should be important to an employee in determining
whether or not he wishes to involve himself as a member
fo a union. The results of such conduct should be antici-
pated in order that an intelligent decision may be made
by such employee. It is difficult to convey such informa-
tion to laymen. It is not necessary that the Respondent
provide the employee with a legal brief as long as the
essence of the statement is correct and does not have the
effect of misinforming the employee. Although it is true
that other circumstances could result in the reinstatement
of the striker, such as a strike to protest an unfair labor
practice , or a situation where a permanent replacement
leaves the job creating a right in the striking employee to
be recalled. Although the letter from the Respondent
about which the General Counsel complains did not set
forth all the potentials, the statement was essentially cor-
rect and certainly is one which should be conveyed to
the employee in order that he or she may be an informed
voter. It is also true that in the event the Union felt that
the members of the bargaining unit should be informed
in more detail , it certainly had the opportunity to so
inform . I find that the statement in the letter of March 25
is essentially a correct statement and one which the
voting employee should be aware. It is not a violation of
Section 8(a)(l)(A) of the Act.
About March 5, an employee, Delores Gootee, went
to Murphy's office to advise him that she was on the
Union's committee and to stress her reasons. During this
conversation, which lasted about 2 hours, Gootee raised,
among other things, the question of job security. In re-
sponse to this specific question of Gootee, Murphy point-
ed out that during an earlier union campaign in 1980
people who began the campaign were still employed by
the Tribune and that such example should ease the con-
cern of the employees about job security. Gootee also
raised the question of the persistency of the Company
against the Union in the present campaign. Murphy
stated that the Tribune had a right, if it believed that it
did not want a union , to oppose the Union whether it
meant the expenditure of time and money in order to do
so and that the Company had the right to defend itself
against the Union just as the Union had the right to at-
tempt to unionize the Tribune 's employees . Gootee ad-
mitted that the Company had informed its employees
TRIBUNE CO
that there were rights on both sides . Regarding questions
of the rights of management , Murphy stated to Gootee,
notwithstanding the Union 's success, that the Respondent
would still run the newspaper.
On the following day Murphy , in a conversation with
an employee , Lois Benke (which entailed approximately
15 minutes), told Benke that if the Union won and the
Company lost, collective bargaining would commence
and the employees could get more , the same , or less and
that there would be no guarantee on the results of col-
lective bargaining . He expressed that he felt the paper
had a good relationship with its employees but the Union
could constitute an intervention of this relationship and
that on certain matters the Company would have to go
through the Union instead of solely to the employees, as
in the past.
Sometime in March General Manager Zell Draz read
a prepared address to employees . This address was read
several times to several groups of employees because the
number of employees was greater than would allow a
single, unified meeting . Draz read the speech so that
there "couldn 't possibly be any mistake ." The speech
read by Draz on these occasions began with the follow-
ing text:
I would prefer talking to you informally about the
election but I cannot . The nearness of the election
dictates that I read from a prepared statement so
that I can document what I tell you today . The ap-
proach of this most important election also prevents
me from answering questions when I finish.
The speech given on these occasions by Draz is not re-
produced in its entirety here nor in any portion from the
context because no specific allegation is made that the
contents of the speech , as written , violates the Act.
On February 23, during one of Draz' talks with the
employees in the photography room , she stated in regard
to wages that "I don't see how we are going to give you
anymore than you are already getting whether we have
a Union or not ." She added that "You can 't get blood
from a stone ." However , in this regard , she further told
these employees that she could not tell them that they
were going to have any more or less of anything because
if the Union became the collective-bargaining representa-
tive, those matters would have to be negotiated.
2. Alleged surveillance of union activity
The General Counsel contends that Supervisors Crow-
ley, Kistler, Profera, Grinelli, Rudolph , Sekella, New-
man, Leigh , and Perfette engaged in unlawful surveil-
lance of union adherents while they were engaged in
union activity and discriminatorily followed and ob-
served union adherents while they were engaged in their
normal , ordinary , work-related activities . An employee,
Gootee, testified that her job requires her to move all
about areas of the building, and that her supervisor, Ru-
dolph, would watch her from his desk or follow her into
other departments . She testified that it would be hard to
say how often this happened , but he was there every
time she turned around . Gootee admitted that Rudolph's
job takes him throughout the building also and because
983
there was reconstruction being completed on the prem-
ises, the various departments were close in proximity to
one another . She did know that after the reconstruction
provided a specific area for her department , the alleged
surveillance "tapered off."
Rudolph , the supervisor whom Gootee contended en-
gaged in this surveillance , was Gootee 's supervisor; Ve-
ronica Smith was her supervisor and her position in the
office at the time was immediately next to Gootee,
making surveillance activity unlikely , and unnecessary.
Gootee also stated that her duties would require her to
go to the composing room . On those occasions Supervi-
sors Grinelli , Perfette , or Profera would stop and ask her
what she wanted . Gootee claimed that this went on until
August or September , 6 months after the election. Grin-
elli acknowledged that when she observed persons such
as Gootee in the composing room , it suggested to her
that they had some problem for that would be the only
reason they would be there . She would ask if she could
help them . She engaged in this practice before, during,
and after the union campaign.
Perfette 's testimony is substantially the same . The role
of the supervisor is to resolve problems that arise and
not have their employees engaged with interruptions on
such matters . This has always been and continues to be
the policy . Lois Benke, an employee; Roger Trimbell, a
contract driver ; Cheri Fellows, 'Laura Lemmon,' Gerald
Cunningham , Jake Click, a contract driver ; Frances
Plewa, and Larry Coat all testified to the effect that they
were followed about the premises while engaged in their
work for the Respondent by various of the several super-
visors of the Respondent. In each of the foregoing cases,
the supervisor denied specific surveillance for any pur-
pose and explained that his presence at the time and
place about which the various employees complained
comprised the performance of his duties as a supervisor.
None of the employees testified to any significant act of
surveillance by a supervisor inconsistent with that super-
visor's ordinary and expected work . Also the time ele-
ments involved in the alleged surveillance extends
beyond the date of the election and, therefore , after the
union campaign and suggests that the surveillance was of
the employees ' ordinary and expected duties as such em-
ployees and not of union activities . The disruption of the
location of the various departments , due to renovation of
the Respondent 's premises , contributed to the perception
of the employees that a change in surveillance took place
with the onset of the union campaign. The evidence also
discloses that no instance of such surveillance was direct-
ly related to the union activity of the observed employ-
ee. Accordingly , I do not find that the perceived surveil-
lance of the several employees by the supervisors was in-
consistent with the duty of the supervisor nor had the
exercise of that duty intensified or changed during the
union campaign . The intensification of discussion be-
tween employees, as well as employees and supervisors,
during the union campaign, attributed to the union cam-
paign itself, undoubtedly gave the employee the suspi-
cious impression that surveillance was intensified and di-
rected toward their union activities . The inference above
described is not sufficient to discharge the burden of
984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
proof in order that a finding of a violation of Section
8(axl) can be made . Accordingly, I find that the Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(axl) of the Act by
unlawful surveillance of union activities.
3. The alleged unlawful interrogation of employees
About February 3 Circulation Manager Thomas M.
Stith was alleged to have interrogated employee Frances
Plewa on her union activity and union sympathies.
Plewa contends that Stith, during an overtime session at
the Respondent 's facility , asked Plewa why she thought
a union was needed . Plewa allegedly told him what she
thought and that she was 100 percent for the Union. She
had begun her overt union involvement in December
1980 and Stith was fully aware of it at the time he talked
to her. Plewa continued her union advocacy through the
election. Stith testified that it was not necessary to ask
Plewa about the Union because she frequently stated to
him and others that she was a union supporter . She had
handbilled in favor of the Union outside the plant in
early January and she wore a union button from the
onset of the campaign.
The Board has held that interrogation of an employee
is not a violation of the Act, per se, but only if under the
circumstances it constitutes interference , restraint, or co-
ercion. See Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591 (1954).
The objective rather than the subjective effect on em-
ployees is the test . It is clear that in this case a known
active union adherent would not be coerced by such a
dialogue with Stith. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Stith
denied that he had such a conversation with Plewa stat-
ing that it was not necessary to discuss union matters
with her because she had frequently stated to him, and
others, her reasons for being a union supporter . I do not
fmd the interrogation by Stith on February 3 to consti-
tute a violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act.
On March 13 Supervisor Harry Leisy interrogated em-
ployee Patty Lutz. She testified that Leisy asked her
how she felt about the Union and what she thought of
Draz' speech. Lutz told him how she felt and that was
the end of the conversation . Lutz had worn a union
button from the beginning of the union campaign and
her name had been used on union literature . She had
publicly indicated her support of the Union and the in-
terrogation by Leisy did not comprise unlawful interro-
gation of this employee regarding her union activity. No
restraint or coercion of the employee is shown . Such dia-
logue, without more, is not evidence of unlawful interro-
gation.
Another incident occurred on February 16 where Su-
pervisor Harry Newman allegedly interrogated Laura
Lemmon, a motor tube driver, regarding her name ap-
pearing in certain material distributed by the Union to
the employees . Lemmon testified that she was asked by
Newman how her name got on the list. Newman testified
that because an employee 's name had been used on union
literature without his knowledge, he asked her if she was
aware that her name was being used . Such discussion
with this witness cannot be characterized as interroga-
tion . The simple questioning of the employee about her
knowledge of her name being used on union literature is
not interrogation giving rise to interference , restraint, or
coercion of the interrogated employee or other employ-
ees.
About February 16 employee Roger Trimbell testified
that he was interrogated by Supervisor Harry Newman
in the mailroom . Trimbell testified , "[H]e came up and
asked me what my thoughts were about the Union. I
told him that I was for it and he said he was not for the
Union, that he said there was no place for the Union,
these days." This discussion between the subject employ-
ee and the supervisor did not comprise any interference,
restraint, or coercion nor did it violate the employees'
rights under the Act. It did not influence the employee
or others and, therefore , is not in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
About January 20, prior to February 7, in which the
Union obtained its majority by signatures on its cards,
Lois Benke , an employee, alleges that she was interrogat-
ed about her union activity and sympathy. Benke early
in January was an outspoken union advocate . She wore a
union button and passed out union literature and her
name was on union literature dispensed during the union
campaign. Keith Keister , a supervisor , allegedly interro-
gated her why the people wanted a union . Her answer to
him was that she did not feel qualified to answer a ques-
tion like that . It is deemed significant that in these in-
stances the interrogation was a one-on -one dialogue. In
each case it arose in such an incidental manner between
parties who already knew the other's basic feelings on
the issues. It in no way comprised a threat or a promise
or could be deemed to have influenced, coerced, or re-
strained such employee . If such conduct constitutes a
violation , it is clearly de minimus and does not constitute
a violation of the Act.
4. The no-distribution rule
The General Counsel has alleged that the Respondent
had "discriminatorily and disparately enforced or main-
tained an unlawful no-distribution , no-solicitation rule or
policy against union supporters. The alleged incident ap-
parently took place in the vicinity of the Respondent's
receiving dock . This dock is an elevated platform above
a parking lot area immediately adjacent thereto with
stairs leading from the parking or truck level to the dock
level. At the end of the dock level there is an employee
entrance to the Respondent 's work area . This dock is the
locale from which papers are loaded onto delivery trucks
for distribution in the afternoon . In the morning, the
docks are occupied by receiving deliveries of preprinted
inserts, employees' uniforms , and other miscellaneous
supplies . Because reconstruction was underway on the
premises at the time , the dock was also being used to re-
ceive construction materials . A freight elevator, located
on the dock itself, is frequently used by the janitorial
staff in its functions.
On January 21 two prounion employees were handing
out union material . These two, and others among them
likewise engaged , were standing at the foot of the stairs
leading up to the dock from the parking lot. Some of this
group were on the dock level itself. Peter Murphy told
these people on that occasion that they were to leave the
company property and to go to the sidewalk. Frances
TRIBUNE CO 985
Plewa told Murphy at that time that she believed they
were within their rights to remain there. Murphy left and
returned 5 minutes later to advise those so distributig
union material that they could stay at the property
where they were located but they would have to stay in
the parking area and not on the dock level itself. They
complied with Murphy 's request and continued to dis-
tribute their literature. Later on that morning, Murphy
specifically advised Plewa that she could pass out litera-
ture at that location as long as she did not block the en-
trance or cause any litter. Murphy further stated that he
had instructed company supervisors to keep the dock
level area itself clear of "pro -company and pro-union
handbilling ." On March 4, Production Manager Hyman
wrote a memorandum wherein he recorded the fact that
he had told procompany employees that they could not
handbill on the docks but must remain in the parking lot
area or the cafeteria.
It appears from the evidence reflecting this and similar
isolated incidents of handbilling both procompany and
prounion that no specific policy was expressed by the
Company. Both prounion employees and procompany
employees were allowed to solicit support by passing
leaflets to employees in a manner designed to maintain
orderly ingress to and egress from the Respondent's fa-
cility. The incident about which the General Counsel
complains, where Murphy advised those distributing
union literature to do so from the sidewalk, was clearly
in error. Within a few minutes thereafter Murphy cor-
rected the error by returning to those to whom he had
spoken and advising them that they could distribute on
the parking lot, but not on the dock where company op-
erations were taking place . This incident does not estab-
lish a discriminate or disparate policy regarding distribu-
tion and solicitation . On the contrary , it indicates efforts
on the part of the Respondent 's management to exercise
care in protecting the rights of all employees regarding
their union or company preferences. It does establish a
violation of the Act.
D. The Alleged 8(a)(3) Violations
The General Counsel contends that about mid-Febru-
ary the Respondent discriminated against an employee,
Laura Lemmon , in respect to her hire , tenure, and/or
terms and conditions of employment by refusing to reim-
burse her for monetary amounts not paid to her by cus-
tomers for the reason that Lemmon had joined , assisted,
or favored the Union or had engaged in concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection . A motor tube route driver
under contract with the Respondent , Lemmon, was
known to be a union supporter because her name ap-
peared on union literature distributed to employees of
the Company . Her engagement as a motor tube route
driver involved her driving her personal vehicle on a
newspaper route and placing individual copies of news-
papers in "tubes" located at the curb of customers' resi-
dences . It also required her to erect the post and tubes
for the use of new subscribers on and along her route.
According to the terms of her contract, she was to be
paid for erecting the posts and tubes and given compen-
sation or credit for those customers who did not pay
their bills.
A supervisor, Harry Newman , was assigned the re-
sponsibility to supervise the motor tool drivers in Janu-
ary. Among the term of the contract between the motor
tube drivers and the Company was the determination of
mileage driven by such drivers in order that they may be
reimbursed according to the provisions of the contract.
Soon after Newman undertook his new responsibilities,
he began to ride with each of the 15 motor tube carriers
to verify the mileage incident to their routes to correctly
ascertain the rate of reimbursement. His survey disclosed
that some drivers were being overpaid, but at a relatively
insignificant amount of $15 per week In Laura Lem-
mon's case , however, he observed that she was being
overpaid $80 per week and this had continued for some
period of time under the supervisorship of Newman's
predecessor . In consultation with the circulation manag-
er, Newman determined that Lemmon's overpayment of
$80 per week was of such magnitude that she should
absorb some part of her own collection losses which
amounted to between $6 and $15 per week. After
Newman had determined this condition , on the next oc-
casion that Lemmon applied for credit he told her that
she would be paid for the manual labor involved in put-
ting up the tubes and posts but that she would have to
absorb the collection losses as a setoff against her $80-
per-week overpayment. Lemmon acknowledged that she
was being overpaid for mileage . (Since this time, addi-
tional mileage has been added to Lemmon 's route so that
the $80 overpayment was absorbed. At that time her
credit for collection losses was also restored.)
The simple facts that Lemmon was a known union ad-
herent and that her contract was subject to adjustment to
more nearly reflect the terms of that contract are not
evidence of a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Interrelation between the Respondent and its contract
carrier , Lemmon , in this case , is reflective of a continu-
ing "business as usual" arrangement . There is no evi-
dence to cause one to relate the treatment of Lemmon
by the Respondent to Lemmon 's union or Section 7 ac-
tivity. There is no question about the facts, as related by
the evidence. The evidence does not meet the burden of
the General Counsel to establish that these circumstances
amount to a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The General Counsel also alleges that on April 28 the
Respondent deprived an employee of a new employment
contract and a scheduled raise because of his union ati-
vity. One Roger Trimbell, a contract driver, with a
fellow contract driver, Overly, went to Circulation Man-
ager Tom Stith to inquire about a new contract and a
raise . Trimbell alleges that Stith said , "There was noth-
ing that could be done while this mess with the NLRB
was going on." Trimbell contends that Stith 's predeces-
sor, Sekella, had advised him in 1980 that the contracts
would extend from April to April and that in April there
would be a new contract and a raise . Overly, who ac-
companied Trimbell to Stith's office on that date, also
testified that they had talked to Stith about a raise. He
did not testify that there was a prior promise by Stith's
predecessor. This same testimony was given by one Jake
986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Click; however, his testimony was that Sekella had said
the Company would evaluate the contracts in September
and, if it did not, in April and if things were in order he
would go to the boss for more money for those contract
drivers . Click testified that no promises of a raise were
made by Sekella.
It is significant that the contracts signed by the various
contract drivers did not contain an expiration date. The
alleged discussion of a reevalution and "more money"
for the drivers "if things were alright" made in 1980 is
not deemed to be a raise scheduled for April 1981. To
the contrary , the credible evidence on this matter indi-
cates that Stith complied with the terms of the contract
with the drivers where the contract provided for adjust-
ments due to the increase in gasoline prices and such ad-
justments were made . A statement in April 1980 , that the
contracts would be reviewed in April 1981, and if "ev-
erything went alright he would go to the boss for more
money for us in April 1981 ," is not a promise of a sched-
uled wage increase . Certainly , if Stith had told the driv-
ers that there was nothing that could be done while the
"mess with NLRB was going on" he was stating a cor-
rect proposition because the matter of increases of "em-
ployees" compensation was a negotiable matter. There
was no evidence in this record that the discussion of the
contract carriers, contract , or compensation or the result-
ing effect of such conversation was in any way related to
the union activity of any or all the contract carriers. It is
deemed that this transaction does not comprise a viola-
tion of Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
The General Counsel contends that in July the Re-
spondent established a new policy for the annual picnic
sponsored for its employees which provided, among
other things, for a separate picnic with less desirable
prizes for union supporters and that such new policy was
instituted because the Respondent believed that "they"
had engaged in union activity . The evidence in support
of this allegation suggests that the prior practice of the
Company to have a company picnic involving all its em-
ployees was changed to separate the affair from the con-
tract drivers. It is clear that the interest of the contract
drivers with regard to such a picnic may well be sub-
stantially different from that of the other employees of
the Company. It is unimportant why the decision to sep-
arate two picnics was made by the Company in 1981. It
is also insignificant that the value of the prizes or cost of
the picnic to the Company might have varied between
the two groups. The inference of the General Counsel is
that because a large percentage of the contract carriers
were union supporters , the Company chose to separate
them from the other employees at the picnic and to
spend less, per capita, on the drivers' picnic than for the
other employees because of their union proclivity. Not
only does the evidence not bear this out, but the nexus
between the picnic and the employees ' union or Section
7 activity is totally lacking. I do not find that the circum-
stances involving the picnic in the summer of 1981 in
any way violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The General Counsel alleges that about April 7 Super-
visor John Perfette discriminated against union commit-
tee members Nancy Warren, Larry Coat, and Jerry Cun-
ningham in respect to their hire , tenure, and/or terms
and conditions of employment by refusing to train them
while training others in their department on a new piece
of machinery and therefore denying them the opportuni-
ty to improve and update their job skills and that such
action was taken because of the union activity of the
named employees . The three employees allegedly dis-
criminated against in this regard are Nancy Warren,
Larry Coat, and Jerry Cunningham . They contend that
the Company was installing a new "plate-making proc-
ess" and was demonstrating it on April 7. Warren, Coat,
and Cunningham , known union supporters , were alleged-
ly excluded from the demonstration . Others invited to
the demonstration , however, were union supporters. The
demonstration was for the benefit of the employees in
the engraving department. The three alleged discrimina-
tees were not employees of that department but rather of
the composing department . Further, the session was not
a training session but just a session for demonstration in
order to familiarize the employees with the new ma-
chine.
Perfette , the supervisor, testified that this occasion was
a demonstration lasting about 7 to 10 minutes . It was not
a training session for any of the employees , but simply a
demonstration to keep the employees advised about what
was happening in the newspaper printing industry gener-
ally and specifically the Respondent 's facilities . Subse-
quently, intensive training was given to employees of the
engraving department who would be called on to engage
themselves with the new equipment . The invitation to
employees to observe the demonstration included known
union and company supporters and was not limited to
antiunion employees nor were three alleged discrimina-
tees excluded because of their union support . The evi-
dence is insufficient to establish a violation of Section
8(a)(3).
The General Counsel alleges that on October 8 an em-
ployee , Lois Benke, was discriminated against by being
given a written warning because the Respondent be-
lieved that she was a prounion employee. Lois Benke's
job title was that of an accounting clerk and included the
operation of a computer terminal assigned to her to per-
form designated daily, weekly, and monthly computa-
tions . Her supervisor was Keith Kister . On October 8
she received a written warning for failing to perform a
crucial month end closing function for the month of Sep-
tember. The evidence in this regard establishes that
Benke failed to perform her duties according to her job
description either through a misunderstanding or her in-
ability to perceive the importance of checking that a in-
dispensable function was performed. Much evidence con-
cerning the details of Benke 's default is contained in the
record; however, none of this evidence establishes that
the treatment of Benke in this regard was in any way
connected to her prior or present union adherence. It is
unimportant to evaluate the culpability of Benke for the
misfeasance in the performance of her duties. The evi-
dence establishes that Benke was "written up" in the
usual course of the Respondent's relationships with its
employees There is no evidence of any connection be-
tween Benke's union advocacy and the "disciplinary"
TRIBUNE CO. 987
action taken by the Respondent . I do not find this a vio-
lation of Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
Effective January 1, several of the Respondent's em-
ployees, who had obtained good supervisory evaluations,
were granted a 10-percent increase in salary . Prior to this
date and under the new management of Zell Draz, cer-
tain wage scales were established for the several jobs
filled by the Respondent's employees. Delores Cidowsky
was found to have been receiving salaries above the
scale then set for her job. As a result , Personnel Director
Robert Crowley informed her that because she was al-
ready receiving in excess of the amount the wage in-
crease had been set for the job, she would receive only
an 8-percent increase instead of the designated 10 per-
cent . These circumstances also occurred in the case of
two other employees who complained to Draz about the
reduction in their wage increase . As a result of this in-
quiry , Draz granted the wage increase to the two em-
ployees who had brought the matter to her attention
and, in order to be certain that the condition did not
exist with others , looked into the issue . She then found
that Cidowsky had also been treated thusly. Draz ac-
cordingly increased the wage of Cidowsky from the 8
percent she had received as of January 1 to the 10 per-
cent which she should have received.
The increase received by Cidowsky as of March 4 was
not a "unprecedented wage increase" as contended by
the General Counsel. The circumstances arose from an
unauthorized attempt by the personnel director prior to
March 1 to bring the wage scale of these employees into
line with the set scale for the job. When Crowley's
action was brought to the attention of Draz, she reme-
died the perceived inequity. This condition came about,
on, or before January 1, and its remedy in March of that
year, when brought to the attention of Draz, is not
deemed to be a grant of a benefit in violation of Section
8(axl) or (3) of the Act.
On February 28 a contract driver, Roger Trimbell,
discussed a question regarding some undefined future
benefits with Assistant General Manager Peter Murphy.
Murphy advised Trimbell that there was nothing that
could be done until after the election and that if the
Company lost the election , the matter would be a subject
of negotiation with the Union and if the Company won
the election, it still could be discussed after the election.
This dialogue between the employee and the assistant
general manager did not comprise a promise or an im-
plied promise of future benefits dependent on the Union's
losing the election . It is deemed that Murphy , candidly
and correctly , in a general way advised the questioning
employee about the manner in which benefits can be
considered after the election . It is deemed that this cir-
cumstance is not a violation of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of
the Act.
Around early April, in a meeting with Murphy and
the contract drivers, the drivers were told on this and
other occasions that if the Union was succcessful in their
campaign, negotiations would commence after which the
employees could end up with more , the same , or less
than they currently have. A driver, Trimbell, was left
with the impression that Murphy said that after the elec-
tion the contract drivers would get a 15-percent raise.
Trimbell testified that Murphy did not say that after the
Union was gone the drivers would get a 15-percent raise,
but that such an impression was left with him. The evi-
dence in support of this allegation is insufficient to con-
clude that a promise of a 15 -percent raise after the union
campaign was made by Murphy or any other member of
management of the Respondent. Also at this meeting, a
contract driver asked Stith if the contract drivers were
going to receive any type of raise in the new contract.
Stith replied that he could not do it now because of the
union situation . It is inconceivable that if Murphy had
advised that they could expect more , the same , or less
through negotiations with the Union that he would also
promise a wage increase under the new contracts after
the union campaign . This is particularly signified by the
acknowledgement of Trimbell that Murphy did not say
that a raise would be considered but that it was the "im-
pression" left with Trimbell. The evidence regarding this
incident is insufficient to preponderate over the estab-
lished policy of the Respondent that in the event the
Union was successful , negotiations would result in more,
the same , or less in the form of wages and benefits to the
employees . I conclude that the General Counsel has not
established this incident with sufficient evidence to pre-
ponderate.
About February 11 Delores Cidowsky was paid a cer-
tain sum of money comprising "bereavement pay." It is
the policy of the Respondent to pay a certain amount of
salary to employees who suffer the loss of a close rela-
tive. Employee Cidowsky was on vacation in September
1980 when her mother passed away . A question arose in
the mind of Cidowsky whether or not she would be enti-
tled to this "bereavement pay" because her mother died
while Cidowsky was on vacation. She was advised by
her supervisor, Bruce Crawford, that she would be enti-
tled to the pay notwithstanding that she was on vacation
at the time of the loss. Although this advice from Craw-
ford occurred shortly after her mother's death, she heard
nothing more about it until February when a similar case
involving another employee was brought to Cidowsky's
attention. This other employee had received "bereave-
ment pay" for loss incurred while he was on vacation.
She inquired about this discrepancy to Richard Sekella,
director of marketing . Sekella expressed surprise that she
had not received this pay because she was entitled to it.
A check of records indicated that Cidowsky was not, in
fact, paid this money and that the lack of payment was
an oversight. Therefore, in February, to correct the
oversight, Cidowsky was paid for September 29, 30, and
October 1, 1980. The General Counsel contends that the
granting of "bereavement pay" which allegedly had been
previously denied her was an act designed to discourage
union activity. It is clear from the uncontradicted evi-
dence in this situation that union activity had absolutely
nothing to do with the adjustment with this employee's
benefit in the form of due "bereavement pay." The nexus
attempted to be displayed by this action on the part of
the Respondent is unfounded and is, or borders on, the
ludicrous . I find no violation of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of
the Act arising from this transaction.
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
About February 25 General Manager Draz provided
for the payment of $1000 to each of two employees, El-
eanore Coppersmith and Mary Reese . The payment was
made to these two employees because, in the judgment
of Draz , they were entitled to some compensation arising
from facts surrounding an Equal Employment Opportu-
nity case brought by several female employees against
the Respondent . Several employees brought a class suit
for recovery of equal pay for equal work under the pro-
visions of the Equal Employment Opportunity laws.
These several employees were compensated by settle-
ment with the Company for substantial amounts of
money allegedly due because of unequal treatment. Two
of the employees similarly situated had not joined in the
lawsuit as a member of the class and, therefore, received
no funds from the settlement . However , Draz felt that
because they were also victimized by the Company, they
should be entitled to some compensation and, according-
ly, provided a $1000 payment to each of these two em-
ployees.
This payment is alleged by the General Counsel to be
made to discourage protected concerted activity and that
the payment was made for loyalty to the Respondent.
The underlying facts in the incident belie any connection
with union activities by the two employees so compen-
sated and a negative effect on other employees. It is un-
derstandable that when a class of employees receive
compensation to which the Company felt they were enti-
tled because of past wrongs , those within the class but
not pursuing their rights may also be entitled to some
compensation . It is admitted that the amount paid to
nonparticipating employees was substantially less than
that received by members of the class with whom settle-
ment was made . It is not concluded that such payments
were in any way connected with Section 7 or union ac-
tivities on the part of these employees . It is also clear
that any rumor started as the result of such payments
that they were made to compensate "loyalty" to the
Company is unfounded. The incident is logically ex-
plained by Draz and only by a torture of the facts and a
vivid imagination could one conclude that the conduct
was in any way contrived to, nor did it, affect the other
employees of the Company. To conclude that such an
act was designed to influence other employees in favor
of the Company and against the Union is a conclusion
which the facts of the matter does not support.
The Employer frequently held meetings with its em-
ployees between January and the election of April 6.
During one of these meetings Draz reminded the em-
ployees that if they had any problems, her door had
always been open and was still open and there was no
reason why they could not come down and discuss with
Murphy or Draz the problems they have experienced.
The General Counsel contends that this is a solicitation
of grievances and that by maintaining an "open door"
policy she would resolve such grievances to the detn-
ment of the Union and its campaign . This inference
drawn by the General Counsel from the "open door"
policy is also unfounded. Draz testified without contra-
diction that she had always maintained the "open door"
policy. Her predecessor, who was her mother, had main-
tained a "close door" policy and one would have to ring
a bell in order to get in. Draz always maintained that her
door was open to employees. The policy of listening to
employees was not one which was required to be aban-
doned because of the union campaign . It is the continu-
ance of a policy in existence prior to the union campaign
and is not a violation of the Act.
On March 17 a florist, one of the advertisers in the
Respondent 's paper , provided, as was its practice, green
carnations for St . Patrick 's Day . These were , on this oc-
casion, distributed by Draz to various female employees
throughout the Company . Draz did not employ any pre-
ordained distribution method in the disposition of these
flowers . As she came across a female employee or
caught the eye of the female employee, she gave a
flower to that employee . There were insufficient flowers
to provide one for each of the female employees. When
the flowers were exhausted , as a result of Draz distribu-
tion method , several female employees were not among
the recipients . The General Counsel contends that this is
discrimination because Draz distributed the flowers to
known company supporters and refrained from distribut-
ing them to union supporters . One employee who did
not receive a flower was a union adherent and others
who did receive a flower were company adherents. Ci-
dowsky , a public declared union supporter, was given a
flower by Draz. The General Counsel contends that this
incident was discriminating and pursued to discourage
union activity among its employees . Such a conclusion is
rejected. There is no question that there were an insuffi-
cient number of flowers to provide each and every
female employee with one, therefore, some distribution
would have had to be undertaken that would not pro-
vide a flower for each of the female employees. The evi-
dence strongly suggests that no prounion nor antiunion
discrimination method was employed . The evidence es-
tablishes that procompany and prounion female employ-
ees were all considered as a recipient of the flowers by
Draz. The contention by the General Counsel that this
constitutes a unfair labor practice is rejected.
E. The Alleged 8(a)(5) Violations
The General Counsel has initially alleged nine occur-
rences which he contends are violative of Section 8(aX5)
which makes the refusal to bargain with the Union an
unfair labor practice. The General Counsel's allegations
in this regard are as follows:
1. Respondent implemented a retirement plan on
or about March 23, 1981, which was substantially
different from the retirement previously in effect.
2. On or about July 11, 1981, Respondent institut-
ed a new policy applicable to contract drivers re-
garding the filling of open job positions in that clas-
sification.
3. Around July 1981, Respondent instituted a
new job evaluation and review system for its em-
ployees.
4. On or about September 1981, Respondent insti-
tuted a new method of posting jobs for bid.
5. In July 1981, Respondent established employee
committees.
TRIBUNE CO. 989
6. In July 1981, Respondent established a new
policy for the annual picnic sponsored by its em-
ployees.
7. In April 1981, Respondent failed to give its
drivers an annual wage increase.
8. On October 30, 1981 , Respondent changed the
system of using contract drivers to circulate its pub-
lication.
9. In November 1981, Respondent eliminated a
mailroom position of the mailroom dock clerk.
On October 14, 1982,2 after the close of the evidence
in the initial several consolidated cases, the General
Counsel petitioned to reopen the hearing in these cases
and consolidated them with Case 8-CA-15337-4. This
petition was allowed and a hearing thereon took place
on November 22. In that complaint the General Counsel
alleged that about May 21 , Respondent General Manager
William Zammer created an impression among its em-
ployees that their union activities and/or concerted ac-
tivities conducted for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection were under surveil-
lance by the Respondent . The complaint also alleged that
the Respondent violated Secton 8(a)(5) of the Act by en-
gaging in acts and conduct without prior notice to the
Union , or having afforded the Union an opportunity to
negotiate and bargain by:
1. Between March 17, and March 21, the Re-
spondent reduced the hours of employment of sev-
eral employees and laid off five part-time employ-
ees.
2. On or about May 18 , Respondent changed the
shift assignment and hours of an employee.
3. On or about May 21 , Respondent laid off four
employees.
4. On or about May 31 , Respondent changed the
hours and conditions of employment for its employ-
ees by discontinuing its practice of not publishing
on major holidays and commencing publication on
major holidays , including May 31 , and requiring
employees to work in accordance with this change.
The General Counsel alleges that the aforestated acts are
violations of Section 8(aX5) of the Act.
Treating first the allegations of violations of Section
8(a)(5), as will be discussed below, the obligation to ne-
gotiate on these matters is dependent on, in this case, a
determination that the election of April 6, 1981, is not
sustainable and must be set aside. In view of the conclu-
sions hereinafter stated, these charges may be disposed of
by simply stating that there was no obligation on the
part of the Respndent to negotiate these matters with the
Union.
The allegations in the consolidated Case 8-CA-15337-
4 regarding violations of Section 8(a)(l) is also deemed
not violative of the Act. The occurrence giving rise to
such allegations took place on May 21 . Zammer, then
the general manager of the Respondent , held a meeting
for employees to bring them up to date on certain func-
tions of the Respondent . Such meetings had been held
prior to this date with employees from time-to-time. The
meeting on May 21 was the first such meeting after the
conclusion of the Board hearings on May 13. At this
meeting , Zammer advised the employees that the Re-
spondent had purchased a neighboring newspaper, The
Newton Falls Herald, that there would be an increase in
health insurance cost, changes in the editorial staff, and
other business items . During such discussion , Zammer
explained the potential results of the prior hearing. He
explained that the administrative law judge could rule in
three ways-he could dismiss the matter entirely, he
could order a new election, or he could grant a bargain-
ing order . He stated that if a bargaining order was grant-
ed, the Company could appeal to the Supreme Court if
necessary. He also stated that the Company would wel-
come a new election and that there was a change in cli-
mate because some of the union supporters were gone
either as the result of voluntary terminations or elimina-
tion of their positions such as those of the contract driv-
ers. It is this speech that the General Counsel contends
gave the employees the impression of surveillance. It is
clear from the record in this case that the employees of
the Respondent were open, outspoken , and militant con-
cerning the Union . Many of their names appeared on
union literature , many wore union buttons , union T-
shirts, and distributed handbills for the Union. The evi-
dence throughout this case shows clearly that the em-
ployees of the Respondent were polarized and overt
about their leanings . It would not take surveillance to de-
termine that the termination of employment for whatever
reason would alter the number of prounion employees.
Even more significant is the fact that a majority of the
contract drivers were prounion. This fact was stipulated
to by the parties. The elimination of the contract drivers
would have the possible effect of reducing the number of
prounion employees. This is the basis on which the Gen-
eral Counsel contends that the employees were given an
impression of surveillance. Such an impression is unwar-
ranted and the perception by some employees that this
surveillance took place is insufficient to constitute a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The General Counsel had requested that a bargaining
order be issued in this case requiring the Respondent to
bargain with the Union . In the alternative, although not
specifically pleaded, the General Counsel requests an
order setting aside the election of April 6 , 1981, and or-
dering a new election.
The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1968), held that a bargaining
order is permissable in two categories of cases . First, in
exceptional cases in which "outrageous" and "pervasive"
unfair labor practices have made a fair election impossi-
ble. Second, in less extraordinary cases , in which a union
has obtained majority support, the employer's unfair
labor practices serve to undermine the union 's majority
strength, and the possibility of a fair election is slight.
Each category requires a fording that the respondent is
guilty of unfair labor practices , which are characterized
2 All dates hereinafter stated are in 1982 unless otherwise indicated in the former case as "outrageous" and "pervasive," and
990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the latter case in which such practices serve to under-
mine the union's majority strength and the possibility of
a fair election is slight.
As heretofore determined, on February 7, 1981, the
Union held a card majority of one. Subsequent to that
date and prior to the election of April 6, 1981, 4 employ-
ees were terminated and 15 new employees were added
to the Respondent 's employee complement (there is no
allegation that the 4 employees were terminated as a
result of union or Sec. 7 activities). On March 9, 1981, a
Decision and Direction of Election was issued directing
the election of April 6, 1981. The petition for certifica-
tion of the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
Respondent's employees was received by the Respondent
about February 10, 1981. At that time, both the Re-
spondent and the Union commenced their respective
campaigns designed to succeed in the forthcoming elec-
tion.
The complaint comprises a myriad of instances which
the General Counsel characterizes as unlawful threats,
interrogations , promises , surveillance , and discrimination
against its several employees in violation of the Act. The
foregoing findings of fact attempt to treat each of the al-
legations independently and to categorize them within
the characterization used by the General Counsel. Sec-
tion 8(c) of the Act states:
The expressing of any views, argument , or opinion,
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed , graphic, or visual form , shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this Act, if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.
The Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
618 (1968), stated:
Thus, an employer is free to communicate to his
employees any of his general views about unionism
or any of its specific views about a particular union,
so long as the communications do not contain a
"threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
Viewing the character of the episodes comprising the
General Counsel's case , I am compelled to conclude that
the alleged statements of the Respondent 's supervisors
were taken out of context or made to appear as a posi-
tive statement of such supervisor when such was not the
fact. Another tactic reflected by the evidence submitted
by the General Counsel is what I characterize as "bait-
ing." The Respondent had distributed many written com-
munications to its employees as the essence of its cam-
paign . The Respondent directed its supervisors to ask of
its employees on the receipt of these communications
whether or not they had any questions . In several inci-
dents, the question was asked by an employee resulting
in the simple "yes" or "no" response by the supervisor.
In such instances the employee testified to the dialogue
as a positive statement from the supervisor . Such con-
duct mitigates against the credibility of the employee
witness and does not support a fording that the commu-
nication comprises a threat or promise or other positive
statement authored by such supervisor. Also mitigating
against the General Counsel 's case is the frequent use of
episodes which can be classified as minutiae and not of
sufficient materiality to support a conclusion that they
comprised a threat or promise or any other such unlaw-
ful act. Examples of such episodes are seen in the alleged
discriminatory distribution of green carnations on St.
Patrick's Day to the female employees and the over-
heard conversation of General Manager Draz relating
that someone had expressed that IUE stands for "igno-
rant, uneducated employees." These episodes are reflec-
tions of much of the case of the General Counsel.
It is clear that the Respondent engaged on an aggres-
sive campaign to persuade its employees to reject the
Union at the upcoming election . It was not without ex-
perience , having engaged itself in such a campaign a few
years prior thereto. I do not conclude from the evidence
in this record that the Respondent engaged in "brink-
manship" which , had it done so, would have done so at
its peril . As noted before , the Employer has a right to
campaign for the defeat of the Union. It is not assumed
that it will be unsuccessful nor that it should refrain in
total from communicating the contents of its campaign to
its employees. It is deemed significant in this case that al-
though numerous written communications were dissemi-
nated by the Respondent to its employees, only one con-
tained material which the General Copunsel contends
comprises an unlawful act and, in that case , I have here-
tofore found that it sufficiently and correctly espressed
the rights of employees.
The General Counsel seems to give importance to the
acts of the Respondent after the question of the legal
status of its contract carriers was raised . As heretofore
stated, the legal relationship between the Respondent and
its contract carriers is of obvious importance to the Re-
spondent. Simply, the potential for vicarious liability of
the Respondent for acts of its "contractor" would give
rise to a desire on the part of the Respondent to exercise
more control over its carriers than it would had they
been deemed independent contractors. The pendancy of
a union campaign should not and does not preclude the
Respondent from taking those reasonable business and
legal steps to conduct its business in a reasonable way.
As suggested above, the reason for the Employer's
conducting a majority campaign prior to an election is
clearly to dissipate the union majority. In this case, its
campaign may have been the reason for the defeat of the
Union in the election. Several factors tend to support the
result of the election. First, the Union originally had a
majority of one. Second , a gross change of 19 employees
occurred from the date of the Union's majority to the
date of the election . Third , the Respondent 's campaign
was designed to influence the employee to vote against
the Union 's petition . It cannot be assumed that such cam-
paign was totally fruitless.
It is, of course, recognized , and the General Counsel
contends , that the campaign of the Respondent was the
medium through which the several allegedly unlawful
acts were committed and that such conduct contributed
to, or caused in itself, the destruction of the union major-
ity. I do not find that conduct of the Respondent was
TRIBUNE CO. 991
unlawful. The Respondent consistently and admittedly
told its employees that matters such as "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment are nego-
tiable" items when a union becomes the bargaining agent
of the employees. It communicated this fact to the em-
ployees numerous times during the course of the cam-
paign . The only deviations from this suggested by the
testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses appear
when dialogue is taken out of context or the dialogue is
made to appear as a positive statement of a supervisor
designed to negatively influence an employee.
Numerous occasions are reflected in this record when
the alleged unlawful incident arose from a one-to-one
dialogue resulting in the framing of the witness' testimo-
ny in a context not intended by the author nor likely per-
ceived by the witness. The employees of the Respondent
were not only polarized, as evidenced by the number
who wore union labels, but also participated in the union
dissemination of written material and personally ex-
pressed their views to supervisors. I do not conclude that
the subjective results of the conduct of the Respondent,
as evidenced by this record, could conceivably intimi-
date or coerce the employees of the Respondent.
Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel has
failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Respondent is guilty of violations of Section
8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act. The alleged violations of'Sec-
tion 8 (a)(5) are predicated on an obligation on the part of
the Respondent to negotiate on matters of wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment with the Union. Be-
cause the election of April 6, 1981, resulted in the defeat
of the Union's petition, I find that no obligation on the
part of the Respondent to negotiate with the Union exist-
ed and the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
V. THE OBJECTIONS OF THE UNION TO THE
ELECTION
For the reasons set forth above , it is recommended
that the objections to the election filed for and on behalf
of the Union are overruled and the election of April 6,
1981, is affirmed and deemed terminative of the Union's
petition.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, The Tribune Company, is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act and the Board has jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter and the parties of this pro-
ceeding.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma-
chine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 721 is
now, and has been at all times material herein , a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
3. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the Act as alleged herein.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record , I issue the following recommend-
ed3
ORDER
It is ordered that the amended consolidated complaint
be dismissed in its entirety and the objections of the
Union to the election of April 6, 1981, are overruled.
s If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions , and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 .48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
JAMES J. O'MEARA JR., Administrative Law Judge. I
issued an initial decision on December 30, 1983. On
August 30, 1984 , the Board remanded the case to me for
further findings of fact, credibility resolutions, conclu-
sions of law, and recommendations in regard to eight
specific allegations and related election objections.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ALLEGED 8(A)(1) VIOLATIONS
A. The Alleged Threats'
The General Counsel alleges that about February 6,
1981,2 the Respondent threatened employees with loss of
benefits and unspecified reprisals by telling a group of
employees that if the Union became the bargaining rep-
resentative, the employees would lose everything and the
Union would make a great place to work an intolerable
place to work.
Lois Benke was an open union advocate . Her name
was on all the union literature distributed during the
campaign. She testified that on February 6, she attended
a meeting where Assistant General Manager Peter J.
Murphy was present . She stated that at that meeting,
Murphy stated that he felt that the Tribune did not need
a union and if a union came in , "We would lose every-
thing we had and start over from zero. It would make
what was a very desirable place to work, undesirable."
Four other office employees were present at the meeting.
Murphy denied making the statement quoted by
Benke . He repeatedly , during the course of his testimo-
ny, contended that "We constantly stated throughout the
campaign that there would be no guarantee as a result of
collective bargaining , but that again , as a result , the em-
ployees could either get more, the same or less." Al-
though Murphy denied that he stated that the Union
would make it an undesirable place to work , he acknowl-
edged that he had said that the Company and the em-
ployees had a good relationship and with the interven-
tion of a third party a change would take place which
was something they should think about.
i The above-captioned paragraph supplements paragraph "C The Al-
leged 8(a)(1) Violations, I The alleged threats," in the initial decision.
2 All dates are in 1981 unless otherwise stated
992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Throughout the course of the campaign conducted by
the Respondent, the employees were told by manage-
ment, particularly Peter Murphy, that in the event the
Union succeeded, collective bargaining could result in
the employees either getting more, the same, or less and
that there could be no guarantee of the result. Murphy
has contended this to be the Tribune's expressed position
throughout the course of the campaign. Other employ-
ees, both union and nonunion, confirmed that this was
the essence of the Respondent's campaign. Such a state-
ment does not violate the Act. The characterization of
Murphy's statement of February 6 is not beyond the
scope of what he in fact said. It is conceivable that nego-
tiations could range from zero base to infinity. I con-
clude that Benke, in this instance and others throughout
the course of the testimony, characterized the statement
made by Murphy in a manner beneficial to the current
interest of the Union and her own. I fmd, as Murphy
contends, that he was extremely careful about his state-
ments to employees in view of his prior experience with
a union-organizing campaign. In several instances in this
record Murphy's statement about the possibility through
collective bargaining of "more, the same or less" is fre-
quently related by the witness as a more specific state-
ment. This is reflected in the use of the word "would"
by the witnesses in the face of the contention by Murphy
that he used the word "could." Notwithstanding this
quality of Benke's testimony, it is clear that the state-
ments of Murphy in this regard, at this time and place,
were not those which would affect the freedom of
choice of the members of the bargaining unit. The es-
sence of this statement of Murphy contains the funda-
mental feature of collective bargaining and was a matter
about which the members of the bargaining unit should
be informed. I fmd that the statements attributed to
Murphy at the February 6 meeting were not those as tes-
tified to by the witness Benke. I conclude that the evi-
dence adduced by the General Counsel in support of the
instant allegation is insufficient to discharge the General
Counsel's burden of proof.
In the latter part of March, during a conversation in-
volving an employee and Assistant General Manager
Murphy, in reference to the Union, a supervisor, Robert
Hyman, allegedly threatened an employee that if the em-
ployee did not like the way things were, the employee
should "get out."
Floyd E. Overly testified that sometime in February at
a meeting between Murphy and Hyman and the distribu-
tor drivers, Hyman stated, "If you don't like the way
things are run, get out." Overly recalled nothing more of
this statement. No further testimony of this incident is
contained in the record . Murphy denies that he was at a
meeting where any such conversation occurred. Hyman,
no longer employed by the Tribune, did not testify.
There is no evidence that the statement of Hyman, if it
occurred, was made in a union context. Overly's testimo-
ny is similar to much of the General Counsel's witnesses'
testimony in this case. The statement is clearly taken out
of context. One is not able to determine any connotation
or innuendo that such statement carried. This evidence is
not probative of an unfair labor act. It does not comprise
a scintilla of evidence to support a conclusion that the
conduct comprised a threat, or any other unlawful act.
The General Counsel cites American Spring Wire Corp.,
237 NLRB 1551, 1552 (1978), as support for his conten-
tion that such a statement violates the Act. A reading of
American Spring Wire Corp. clearly points out the posi-
tion I take in this regard. In American Spring Wire the
Respondent's president stated: "to those of you who still
think that you can win more with the Union than you
have with us in the past nine years-well, you are dead
wrong-leave us alone-get the hell out of our plant."
The distinction I make is seen clearly in the statement al-
leged to have been made by Hyman, "If you don't like
the way things are run, get out." The nexus between a
union activity or antiunion animus is clearly lacking in
the case at bar and it is clearly present in the American
Spring Wire case . The contract carriers' status with the
Respondent was subject to change. Their inclusion in the
bargaining unit, as directed by the Regional Director,
would create a change in their independent contractor
status and thus their relationship with the Respondent.
This change in status was wholly independent of wheth-
er the Union won their organizational campaign or not.
There is no nexus in Hyman's statement to the union suc-
cess or failure.
The General Counsel had alleged that the Respondent,
through Assistant Foreman James Marco, about April 4,
threatened an employee with job loss, more onerous
working conditions, and stricter disciplinary rules if the
Union became the bargaining representative of the em-
ployee.
The General Counsel called Patty Lutz to testify re-
garding this alleged incident. Lutz was a mailroom em-
ployee and a union activist. She wore a union button
throughout the campaign . Lutz' testimony, in essence,
was that Marco, in talking to another employee, Theresa
Dutting, was "going over" a letter that the Respondent
had distributed to employees. This letter (not in the
record) apparently listed certain subject matters which
could be negotiated if the Union was successful. The
letter was described by Lutz as follows:
On the one side it had a list of things that could be
negotiated for giving up or whatever for the Union
if the Union came in . On the backside there were a
list of things that could be negotiated.
James Marco denied that he threatened any employee or
employees with job loss or with more onerous working
conditions and stricter disciplinary rules if the Union
became the bargaining representative. Marco contends
that he consistently stated that everything could be nego-
tiable, that an employee could get more, the same, or less
during negotiations.
Lutz was deemed to be a witness hostile to the Re-
spondent . The extent of her inability or refusal to re-
spond to the counsel for the General Counsel's questions
as he apparently expected or desired was sufficiently
clear in the record to justify the use of leading questions.
Even with that tool counsel for the General Counsel
could not persuade Lutz to be more definite about her
testimony . On cross-examination Lutz testified that the
context of Marco 's discussion with Dutting was in
TRIBUNE CO. 993
regard to matters which could be negotiated if the Union
came in. In effect, an analysis of Lutz' testimony estab-
lished that Marco's discussion with Dutting was consist-
ent with the contents of the letter . I deem it significant
that nothing contained in the letter was deemed to be
unfair or incorrect and therefore unlawful by the Gener-
al Counsel because the letter does not comprise a part of
the allegations against the Respondent in this case. It is
my conclusion that the discussion between Marco and
Dutting reported by Lutz did not comprise a threat of
loss of job, nor more onerous working conditions, nor
stricter disciplinary rules if the Union was successful. I
conclude that the testimony of Marco is credible , that he
restricted his discussion with the employees to the state-
ment that in the event of union negotiations, the employ-
ees could get more, less, or the same of what they cur-
rently enjoyed . Apparently , Marco, in this instance, was
carrying out the directions of the Respondent with
regard to his relationship with employees in response to
the letters distributed by the Respondent . The Respond-
ent consistently has contended that supervisors were di-
rected to answer questions about the content of the let-
ters distributed to the employees. There was no directive
from management precluding supervisory personnel from
discussing matters in this regard with employees of the
Respondent. To the contrary, they were specifically ad-
vised to discuss the contents of the Respondent 's letters
with the Respondent 's personnel . It is my conclusion that
the subject allegation is not sustained by the evidence.
The General Counsel has alleged that on January 22,
Supervisor Stanley Raphoon threatened an employee
that if the Unions were successful in organizing the Re-
spondent, employees ' wages would go back to minimum
wage.
The General Counsel 's evidence in support of this alle-
gation comprises the testimony of Anthony Monti, a
former employee of the Respondent . He testified that on
January 21, he was speaking with another employee, Bill
McAuley, and had told McAuley that if "we vote a
union in we get better wages and better benefits." At
that moment his "boss," Stanley Raphoon , walked over
and said that "if we vote for the Union , then our wages
will be cut to minimum wage." There was no further
conversation in this regard. Raphoon is no longer em-
ployed by the Tribune and did not testify. This expres-
sion of opinion on the part of the witness and Raphoon
does not constitute an interference , coercion, or restraint
of the rights of the witness nor his fellow employee in
regard to protected activity . It is the kind of statement
that was, no doubt, made frequently in general conversa-
tion between employees , including supervisory employ-
ees. It is such an isolated incident that I do not deem it
to comprise a violation of the Act. It is not suprising that
in a vigorous campaign employees would have such dis-
cussions between themselves and supervisors . It com-
prises simply an expression of opinion on the part of both
parties . It does not violate the Act.
The General Counsel also alleges that in January 1981
Gerald Rudolph , an assistant sales manager, interfered
with, restrained , and coerced Respondent's employees in
order to discourage its employees from union member-
ship , activity, and sympathies by interrogating an em-
ployee about the employees ' union activities and by ad-
vising the employees that recourse to the NLRB was
futile.
The testimony in regard to this incident was provided
by Delores Gootee, who testified that in early January,
well prior to February 7, the date on which the Union
allegedly had a one-card majority and before the Febru-
ary 10 date on which the Union filed its election petition,
she had a conversation with Rudolph during which he
allegedly asked her what she thought about the Union.
She responded that she thought the Union was a good
thing and the NLRB was the only thing that could help
them with employment problems. Gootee testified that
Rudolph then told her that the NLRB could not help
her because it was just a "farce."
Rudolph denies having had such a conversation with
Gootee . Gootee elaborates on the conversation by stat-
ing that during the conversation Gootee's husband was
discussed . Her husband is a union electrical construction
member and was in the process of using the union hall
method of employment in order to seek employment. It
is difficult to assign credibility to one or other of the par-
ticipants in this conversation . Like so many other inci-
dents alleged in this case as violations of the Act, a state-
ment or comment has been isolated from the otherwise
more general conversation (her husband 's efforts to seek
work through the Union). It is clear that the statements
attributed to Rudolph are taken out of context from the
conversation in general . It is also true that the conversa-
tion was between Rudolph and Gootee with no other
employee being a participant in the conversation nor
present when in occurred . The conversation allegedly
took place at a time when the Union was not known to
have a majority of the employees and had not filed its
petition for representation . Gootee , an active promoter
of the Union , continued to be such after the commence-
ment of the critical period between the time of the public
campaign of the Union and the election. It can hardly be
argued that such a statement interfered with , restrained,
or coerced the Respondent 's employees in order to dis-
courage its employees from union activity . It is clear
from the evidence that, in fact, it did not discourage
Gootee, although I recognize that it is the subjective not
the objective results of the statement that are material. I
conclude that the statement of Rudolph , even if made,
does not tend to interfere with, restrain , or coerce the
Respondent's employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. The statement of
Rudolph , if made, comprises his opinion elicited in re-
sponse to Gootee's statement that the employees must
rely on the NLRB for relief . The statement , again of Ru-
dolph , in no way was accompanied by any threat, prom-
ise, or force nor could it reasonably had been assumed to
be such by Gootee . It is my conclusion that for the
above-stated reasons the statement of Rudolph to
Gootee, even if made , does not comprise a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel has alleged that about September
10, the Respondent, through William Zammer, the gen-
eral manager, interfered with , restrained , and coerced its
employees in order to discourage its employees from
994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union membership, activities, and sympathies by waving
a copy of the charge in an NLRB case before an em-
ployee while advising the employee that the charge was
"stupid and ridiculous" and that the employee was
"stupid and ridiculous" and that the employee should
repeat this to the Board and see if Zammer gave a
"damn."
It is clear that the violation, if any, here alleged did
not affect the election of April 5. Lois Benke was an
active union supporter, as set forth above. It is further
clear from the testimony that Benke was less than con-
tent with the manner in which management was assign-
ing her work which she perceived to be excessive. Alleg-
edly due to this excessive workload, she was unable to
attend various meetings and otherwise engage herself in
union activities. It is Benke's contention that not only
her union activities but also her age caused management
to discriminate against her. The incident involving
Zammer about September 10 was Zammer's reaction to
Benke's charges with the Board. It is clear that Zammer
was angered by what he deemed frivolous allegations by
Benke . His reaction did not constitute any act of intimi-
dation or coercion. Zammer was entitled to express him-
self under the Act and the first amendment and his exer-
cise of those rights did not comprise any coercion,
threat, or force against Benke or other employees.
The General Counsel also alleges that about Novem-
ber 16, the Respondent, through assistant Pressroom
Foreman Robert Terry, interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees by telling an employee during a
discussion of charges under investigation by the Board
that the reason the fellow employee had received a
warning during the previous months was because of "this
union stuff."
Attellio DiGiacobbe testified that on November 16, 7
months after the election, Terry was giving him an
"update" on what was going on in regard to the NLRB
proceedings. In the process of this "update" he learned
that Lois Benke had received a warning. DiGiacobbe
asked Terry about Benke's warning and Terry told him
that it was because of "this union stuff." The testimony
regarding this incident is deemed insufficient to even ap-
proach establishing the Benke was disciplined because of
her union activity or that DiGiacobbe was restrained or
coerced by a supervisor's statement to DiGiacobbe that
Benke was disciplined for union activity.
It was the Respondent's practice to distribute copies of
all unfair labor practice charges to supervisors so that
they could explain them to their employees and keep the
employees informed of developments. A charge was filed
on November 12, 1981, by the Union which included
charges of discrimination against employees, including
Lois Benke, because of written warnings and undue har-
rassment allegedly because of her union activities. It is
not clear that a copy of this charge was being used by
Terry to update DiGiacobbe; however, from DiGia-
cobbe's testimony it can be reasonably assumed that such
was the case . DiGiacobbe said that Terry stated that
Benke had received a warning. Case 8-CA-15337 in-
cludes on the face of it the allegation that Benke had
been issued a written warning. As a result of this disclo-
sure to DiGiacobbe, DiGiacobbe asked why Benke had
received a warning . Terry said, "this union stuff." Such a
response to such a question is reasonable when one looks
at the written charge Terry was explaining to the em-
ployees . It is clear on the face of that charge that Lois
Benke had received a written warning and the charge al-
leged that it was because of her activities on behalf of
the Union . The response of Terry to the question was,
therefore, reasonable , accurate, and not such as would
tend to coerce or interfere with the freedom of the em-
ployees to conduct Section 7 activities . For the forego-
ing reasons , I conclude that the allegations of the inci-
dent on November 16 do not comprise a violation of the
Act.
B. The Alleged Unlawful Interrogation of Employees
The General Counsel alleges that about February 28,
1981, Robert Hyman interrogated an employee, solicited
grievances, and impliedly promised benefits when he
asked that employee what benefits the drivers wanted,
advised the employee that he would check on the bene-
fits, and asked the employee if the employee received
more benefits, would it change his sympathy for the
Union.
This alleged episode was testified to by Richard Trim-
ble, a contract driver who was terminated when he went
to Florida in June 1981 and failed to return when expect-
ed. Trimble testified that about February 28, Hyman
asked him "What do you drivers want?" Trimble told
him that they wanted "mainly-hospitalization and vehi-
cle depreciation allowance." Hyman allegedly asked him,
"If I can get these things for you, would it sway the out-
come?" Trimble responded, "You let me know tomor-
row." No one else was present during this conversation.
The next day Peter Murphy met Trimble in the parking
lot and told him that he had talked to Hyman and there
was nothing they could do until after the election. This
conversation was isolated between Trimble and Hyman.
Because Hyman's suggested that there would be some
way to satisfy the needs of the contract drivers, an im-
plied promise of a benefit was made. However, the next
day Murphy advised Trimble that nothing could be done
until after the election. This episode is consistent with
the Company's policy in the conduct of its campaign.
Murphy has frequently said that in the event the Union
succeded, all matters regarding conditions of employ-
ment would be negotiable and the employees could
obtain more, less, or their conditions could remain the
same . Taking the entire conversation as Trimble related
it, one can clearly see that Trimble was not made a
promise of benefit but, on the contrary, was told that no
consideration of working conditions could be made
during the pendency of the union campaign. Taking to-
gether these repeated statements of Murphy that these
matters would be negotiable if the Union won, it cannot
be said that Trimble was misled, interfered with, re-
strained, or coerced in the exercise of his rights under
Section 7 of the Act. Whatever implication was left after
Trimble's conversation with Hyman was dispelled by his
further conversation the following day with Murphy. I,
however, do not credit the testimony of Trimble in this
regard . Trimble prefaced his recitation with the dialogue
TRIBUNE CO.
between Hyman and himself by saying that Hyman said,
"If you tell anyone this, I'm going to deny it " and then
Hyman asked , "What do you drivers want?" In my judg-
ment, Trimble set the stage for an anticipated denial by
Hyman. Trimble had also lost his job as a contract driver
when he failed to return from Florida as expected in
July 1981 . Notwithstanding my conclusion that the epi-
sode, if it occurred, was not such that would constitute a
violation of the Act, I do not credit Trimble's testimony,
notwithstanding the failure of Respondent to call Robert
Hyman as a witness.
This episode is reflective of the propensity of the Gen-
eral Counsel 's witnesses to relate that portion of an epi-
sode which serves their end. The testimony of Trimble
regarding Hyman 's statements of February 28 appears to
be evidence of an improper interrogation and a promise
of benefits. However, when the entire episode is pack-
aged to include the remarks by Murphy to Trimble in
this regard , one can see that Trimble was advised cor-
rectly that no matter of benefit can be discussed while
the union campaign was pending and, if the Union was
successful , it would become a matter of negotiation with
the union-bargaining committee . I do not find this con-
versation to be a violation of the Act.
C. Credibility
In deternuning ' the credibility of each of the witnesses
called by the General Counsel to adduce evidence in
support of the specific allegations of the complaint, I
have considered not only the issue of the truth or falsity
of the testimony of such witness but, more importantly,
the propensity on the part of such witnesses to create the
impression of a threat of reprisal , interference , restraint,
and coercion of employees by the various supervisory
personnel of the Respondent. This was attempted by
recitation of dialogue which is obviously incomplete and
isolated from the overall discussion or dialogue at the
time (statements out of the context of the discussion) and
one-on-one discussions between employees sympathetic
to the union causes and minor supervisory personnel
management. It is clear that the campaign philosopy
adopted by management in pursuit of their vigorous
campaign against the union organization effort was that
in the event the Union succeeded , matters involving sala-
ries and working conditions would be subject to negotia-
tions and that in negotiations the employees could gain,
lose, or remain the same as far as these negotiable mat-
ters are concerned . The fact that Respondent used the
written method for communicating with its employees
on the subject matter and only one of such communica-
tions was deemed by the Union to be faulty reflects the
care with which the Respondent took not to overstep
the lawful limits of an antiunion campaign. The Re-
spondent has also directed its supervisors to respond to
questioning by the employees regarding these written
campaign documents. This gives rise to the practice ap-
parent in this record of interrogations by the employees
of the Respondent 's supervisor of a nature whereby the
interrogation is caused to appear as a positive statement
by the supervisor. This enables the witness for the Union
to testify truthfully about the innuendo or impression
perceived by the author of the question . I am compelled
995
to conclude that the general statements of the Respond-
ent that in the event the union campaign succeeds, such
matters will be negotiated and may result in more, less,
or the same were communicated to all the Respondent's
employees and that any deviation from such expressed
campaign philosopy arose when the prounion employee
chose to perceive a dire meaning on the part of the Re-
spondent . The resolution of the issues in this case is pri-
marly accomplished by the application of the principles
expressed in the case of Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB
591, 594-595 (1954). There the Board in treating the
question of unlawful interrogation stated:
There is the strong implication that the dissenting
members would hold interrogation to be coercive
per se, which, of course, means wholly without
regard for the circumstances in which it occurs.
This would mean that a casual , friendly, isolated in-
stance of interrogation by a minor supervisor would
subject the employer to a fording that he had com-
mitted an unfair labor practice . . . . The Board is
required to determine the significance of particular
acts of interrogation in the light of the entire record
in the case . . . .
In summary , it is my conclusion that the alleged unlaw-
ful acts with which the General Counsel charges the Re-
spondent comprise isolated instances of dialogue between
employees and supervisors occurring in the course of a
vigorous management versus union campaign . The effort
by both parties was primarily to inform the voting mem-
bers of the bargaining unit in order that a more intelli-
gent, considered vote could be cast by that employee.
The absence of naivete among the employees is clearly
evidenced by the ability of those employees to isolate ap-
parently damaging dialogue and attribute the saying to
the various levels of supervisory personnel. When such
episodes are displayed by the evidence, it is clear that no
coercion, intimidation, threat, or promise could have rea-
sonably been perceived by the relating employee or
coemployees. To attribute a more significant result
would amount to the cloaking of the employees with a
level of susceptibility much lower than perceived by me.
For these reasons and those expressed in the initial deci-
sion, it is my conclusion that the General Counsel has
failed to discharge the onerous of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in regard to each of the numerous
allegations of unfair labor practices recited in the con-
solidated complaint herein.
II. OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
The Union's objections were considered in the deter-
mination of the specific charges of unfair labor practices
relating to the specific objection.
Objection I alleges that commencing about February 1,
1981, and continuing thereafter , the Employer informed
its employees regarding a new retirement plan to cause
its employees to vote against representation by the Peti-
tioner . It was stipulated by the parties that the issue re-
garding the retirement plan alterations are intended to
comprise a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, herein
determined to be a matter subject to negotiation only if a
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
duty to bargain was found . No such duty was found to
exist.
Objection 2 alleges that about February 24, 1981, the
Employer threatened its employees with loss of benefits
due to their activities on behalf of the Petitioner. No
threat to the employees regarding loss of benefits due to
their activities on behalf of the Union has been found.
This objection is overruled.
Objection 3 alleges that in the course of the campaign,
the Employer informed its employees that it would not
negotiate a contract with the Petitioner if it won the
election and notified the parties that if the Petitioner
won the election , they could suffer a loss of wages and
benefits. This objection is not sustained by the evidence
on which findings and conclusions have been made in
this regard . This objection is overruled.
Objection 4 alleges that about March 25, 1981, the em-
ployer informed its employees that if they went on
strike , they would lose their jobs . It has been determined
herein that the information regarding the status of em-
ployees' tenure in the event of a strike was essentially
correct and did not comprise a violation of the Act. This
objection is overruled.
Objection 5 alleges that about March 19, 1981, and con-
tinuing thereafter , the Employer threatened part-time
employees that if the Petitioner won the election, they
would suffer a loss of employment and/or benefits. It has
been determined that the evidence does not support the
allegation that such threats took place on the part of the
Respondent and that the evidence is insufficient to estab-
lish such a threat . The objection is overruled.
Objection 6 alleges that throughout the course of the
campaign the Employer prohibited its employees from
soliciting and distributing literature for the Petitioner. No
evidence of such demonstration, solicitation, and distrib-
uting is contained in this record . This objection is over-
ruled.
Objection 7 alleges that throughout the course of the
campaign the Employer engaged in surveillance of em-
ployees distributing literature on behalf of the Petitioner.
This objection was withdrawn.
Objection 8 alleges that throughout the course of the
campaign the Employer interrogated its employees con-
cerning their activities, interests , and opinions on behalf
of the Petitioner . This objection is based on factual mat-
ters which have not been established by the evidence in
this case . The objection is overruled.
Objection 9 alleges that throughout the course of the
campaign the Employer isolated supporters of the peti-
tioner and prevented them from having normal contact
with employees of the Employer. There is no evidence
to support this allegation and the objection is overruled.
Objection 10 alleges that throughout the course of the
campaign the Employer excluded employees who were
known adherents of the Petitioner on attending meetings
of employees thereby depriving them of the benefits re-
ceived by those employees who were invited to the
meetings . There is no evidence to support the allegation
contained in this objection and the objection is over-
ruled.
Objection 11 alleges that throughout the course of the
campaign the Employer permitted employees who were
against the Petitioner to engage in solicitation and other
activities while prohibiting the same rights to employees
who were adherents to the Petitioner . There is no evi-
dence to support the allegation contained in this objec-
tion and the objection is overruled.
Objection 12 alleges that about March 17 , 1981, the
Employer refused to give green carnations on St. Pat-
rick's Day to employees who were adherents of the Peti-
tioner . There is no evidence to sustain the allegations
contained in this objection and the objection is over-
ruled.
Objection 13 alleges that about March 31, 1981, the
Employer reinstituted the Tribune Employees Handbook
Committee in order to interfere with the rights of its em-
ployees to select a collective-bargaining representative.
This objection has been withdrawn.
Objection 14 alleges that during the course of the cap-
tive audience meetings , the Employer threatened its em-
ployees for engaging in activities on behalf of the Peti-
tioner. There is no evidence to support the allegations in
this objection and the objection is overruled.
Objection 15 alleges that about March 4, 1981, and con-
tinuing thereafter , the Employer increased the wages and
benefits of its employees in order to interfere with the
rights of its employees to select a collective -bargaining
representative . There is no evidence of this to support
the allegations contained in this objection and the objec-
tion is overruled.
Objection 16 alleges that by the acts set forth above
and by other acts and conduct the Employer interfered
with the rights of its employees ' to select a collective-
bargaining representative . There is no evidence sufficient
to support the allegation contained in Objection 16 and,
to the contrary, the evidence herein is determined to pre-
clude the allegations in this objection and the objection is
overruled.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent , The Tribune Company, is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act and the Board has jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter and the parties to this pro-
ceeding.
2. International Union of Electrical , Radio and Ma-
chine Workers , AFL-CIO-CLC and its Local 721, is
now, and has been at all times material herein , a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the Act as alleged herein.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed3
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings , conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
POWs
TRIBUNE CO. 997
ORDER
It is ordered that the amended consolidated complaint
be dismissed in its entirety and the objections of the
Union to the election of April 6, 1981, are overruled.