The Travelers Indemnity Companyv.Trov, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 10, 2020

92067396 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 10, 2020)

Hearing: November 19, 2019 Mailed: July 10, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

The Travelers Indemnity Company

v.

Trov, Inc.
_____

Cancellation No. 92067396
_____

David M. Kelly of Kelly IP, LLP for The Travelers Indemnity Company, Petitioner.

Peter Harvey of Harvey & Company for Trov, Inc., Registrant.
_____

Before Shaw, Kuczma, and Dunn, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Dunn, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Trov, Inc. (Respondent) owns Registration No. 4884473 on the Principal Register
for the mark TRŌV, in standard characters1, for
[C]omputer application software for mobile devices,
namely, software for collecting, indexing, storing and
managing personal financial information and information
relating to the user’s personal and real property, sharing,
bookmarking, indexing, storing, collecting and showcasing
content, articles, images, and products relating to the
user’s personal and real property and financial assets,

1 The USPTO standard character set includes Ō, described as “Latin capital letter O with
macron.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) § 807.03(b) (2020).
This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Precedent of the TTAB
PrePrecedent of the TTAB
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obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies,
purchasing and selling goods, and managing personal
property for the purpose of lending, borrowing, and
donating such property, and for managing information
regarding personal property for use in curating on-line
offers and advertising such property in connection with
offers for the private sale of such property, in International
Class 9.2
In its petition for cancellation, The Travelers Indemnity Company (Petitioner)
pleads ownership of marks which comprise or include the term TRAVELERS, some
with stylization and design elements, the subject of registrations and common law
use, for various insurance and related services (Petition to Cancel, Paras. 3-10, 1
TTABVUE 13-213). Petitioner also pleads ownership of five “TRAV-formative” marks
(TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES, TRAVPAY, TRAVCARE, and TRAVCARE NURSE
LINE), also the subject of registrations and common law use, for workers’
compensation insurance, medical care consultation services, and online information
and resources in the field of insurance and risk control (Petition to Cancel, 11-16, 1
TTABVUE 22-24).4 At Paragraph 12, Petitioner alleges “The ‘TRAV’ portion of the

2 Registration No. 4884473 issued January 12, 2016 from an application filed March 13, 2015,
and alleges December 15, 2014 as its date of first use anywhere and in commerce.
3 TTABVUE refers to the Board’s electronic docket, the location on the USPTO website where
the publicly viewable trial record and briefs can be found. The first number is the docket
entry and the second, if applicable, is the page within the entry.
4 The petition to cancel also pleads common law use of the marks TRAVBOOKS (Para. 11),
and TRAVQUOTE, TRAVSHARE and TRAVGLASS (Para. 16). 1 TTABVUE 22, 24.
Petitioner’s brief does not refer to the TRAVBOOKS mark. The testimony submitted with
respect to the TRAVQUOTE, TRAVSHARE and TRAVGLASS marks admits that any use
has long ceased: “Travelers over the years has used other TRAV-formative marks, including
TRAVQUOTE for online insurance rate quote services from 2000 to 2012, TRAVSHARE for
underwriting of workers’ compensation insurance for several years beginning in 1998, and
TRAVGLASS for online automobile glass repair claims handling from 2001 to 2002.” 14
TTABVUE 53-54. Accordingly, these marks will be given no further consideration. Otto Roth
& Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1320, 209 USPQ 40, 43 (CCPA 1981) (plaintiff
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[five TRAV-formative] marks listed in Paragraph 11 above is a shorthand for the
famous TRAVELERS mark and name” and at Paragraph 13, Petitioner alleges
“Travelers often highlights the TRAV part of its TRAV-formative marks by displaying
it in different font, different lettering, different color, and/or different style as shown
in the representative examples below.”5 1 TTABVUE 22. The petition to cancel also
pleads ownership of the mark and trade name TRV, the subject of common law use
for insurance and related services (Petition to Cancel, Paras. 17-23, 1 TTABVUE 24-
25), alleging “The TRV Mark is a shorthand for the famous TRAVELERS trade name
and trademark and has been for years” (Para. 17, 1 TTABVUE 24).
Petitioner seeks partial cancellation of the registered TRŌV mark on the grounds
that the mark was not in use with all of the listed software functions at the time the
application was filed (Petition to Cancel, Paras. 24-25, 30-42, 1 TTABVUE 26, 27-33),
and because the registered mark when used with the software is likely to create
confusion with Petitioner’s TRAVELERS marks, five TRAV-formative marks, and
TRV mark and trade name as used on its insurance and related services (Petition to
Cancel, Paras. 26-29, 1 TTABVUE 26-27).6 The petition to cancel includes Trademark

“must prove he has proprietary rights in the term he relies upon to demonstrate likelihood of
confusion as to source”).
5 Because these allegations specifically link TRAV to the five pleaded TRAV-formative marks,
no rights in the term TRAV alone have been pleaded.
6 Because the petition does not allege that TRAV is the common characteristic of the TRAV-
formative and TRAVELERS marks, that the common characteristic TRAV is distinctive, or
that the TRAV-formative and TRAVELERS marks have been promoted so that the public
associates not only the individual marks, but the TRAV common characteristic with a single
source, there is no pleaded claim of likelihood of confusion based on a family of TRAV marks.
See Wise F&I, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 USPQ2d 1103, 1107 (TTAB 2016) (“A plaintiff
must plead ownership of a family of marks in its complaint in order to rely on the marks as
a family as a basis for sustaining the opposition at trial...”). In addition, because the petition
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Status and Document Retrieval copies of the pleaded registrations showing status
and title.
In its answer, Respondent denies the salient allegations of the petition for
cancellation. Respondent did not plead any affirmative defenses.
Both parties filed briefs and participated in an oral hearing.7 We deny the petition
to cancel.

I. THE RECORD
The record consists of the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the involved registration.
Petitioner submitted testimonial and rebuttal declarations and exhibits from
corporate officers John Morris, Vice President, Advertising & Media8, and Michael

does not allege that TRAVELERS and TRV share a common characteristic, there is no
pleading of a family of TRV marks. Finally, Petitioner’s brief (72 TTABVUE 43) contends
that the pleaded marks TRAVELERS, TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE,
TRAVCARE NURSELINE (stylized), TRAVPAY, and TRV “share the insurance-industry-
unique letter string T-R-V at the beginning part of the mark.” Petitioner offers no legal
support for a likelihood of confusion claim based on proprietary rights in the presence of the
same letters in a different order in different terms. In any event, the purported family of
“unique letter string T-R-V at the beginning” marks basis for the likelihood of confusion claim
also was unpleaded. The evidence regarding the letters T, R, and V (distinguished from the
pleaded TRV mark) will be considered for what probative value it possesses in connection
with the similarity of the individual pleaded marks and TRŌV.
7 Both parties submitted copies of Board decisions with their briefs, a practice which is
permitted. Because the Board is not bound by decisions designated “not a precedent,” they
will not be individually addressed but have been considered for whatever guidance they
provide. Respondent additionally attached two pages of new evidence to its brief. This
evidence is untimely and will be given no consideration. See In re Omega SA v. Alpha Phi
Omega, 118 USPQ2d 1289, 1300 n.18 (TTAB 2016). Respondent’s request for costs and
attorney’s fees is denied. Trademark Rule 2.127(f), 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(f).
8 14 TTABVUE (testimonial declaration), 11-12, 15-19, 37, 69-70 (testimonial exhibits
including multimedia files), 60 (public rebuttal declaration) and 61 (confidential rebuttal
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Bucci, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel9; and notices of reliance with a duplicate
copy of its pleaded registrations10, excerpts from the discovery depositions of
Respondent’s corporate officers Scott Walchek, who also served as Respondent’s Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness, Jeffrey Berezny, David James Gemmell, and Mark
Dowds11, excerpts from Respondent’s discovery responses12, copies of Respondent’s
requests for extension of time to oppose Petitioner ’s ITU application Serial No.
87169654 for the mark TRV13; excerpts from printed publications and websites
featuring Petitioner’s pleaded marks14; excerpts from a website showing Petitioner’s
TRAV perfin15; excerpts from websites featuring Respondent’s mark, and excerpts
from documents produced by Respondent in discovery (authenticated by
stipulation).16
Respondent submitted testimonial declarations and exhibits from corporate
officers Scott Walchek, Chairman and CEO, David James Gemmell, Chief Technology

declaration). To the extent necessary to discuss matter submitted under seal, the Board will
discuss information designated as confidential in general terms.
9 13 TTABVUE (testimonial declaration) and 60 (rebuttal declaration).
10 8 TTABVUE.
11 29, 31, 33, 34, 63 and 65 (public) and 30, 32, 35-36, 64, and 66 (confidential) TTABVUE.
12 9, 10, 28, and 62 TTABVUE.
13 27 TTABVUE, 69-70 TTABVUE.
14 20, 23-26 TTABVUE.
15 22 TTABVUE. Petitioner’s brief includes a definition of “perfin” as “a postage stamp having
perforated initials punched into the paper: used by businesses to prevent unauthorized use
of stamps.” 73 TTABVUE 31 n.14.
16 9 TTABVUE 30; 21 TTABVUE; and 28 TTABVUE.
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Officer, and Mark Dowds, Chief Strategy Officer17; and notices of reliance with
excerpts from the discovery deposition of Petitioner’s corporate officer John Morris
who also served as Respondent’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness18, the discovery
depositions of Respondent’s corporate officers Scott Walchek, Jeffrey Berezny, David
James Gemmell, and Mark Dowds19, Respondent’s other TRŌV and TROV
registrations20, Petitioner’s TRV application21, and Petitioner’s discovery responses,
including excerpts from documents produced in discovery (authenticated by
stipulation).22
While all evidence has been carefully considered, not all evidence will be
discussed. Much evidence is duplicative, with the same exhibits being submitted as
attachments to declarations, and also under notice of reliance. In addition, much
evidence is no more than the parties wrangling over wording under the guise that
evidence is misleading (i.e. three different versions of the same discovery deposition
being submitted).

17 52, 54, and 56 (public) and 53 and 55 (confidential versions for Walchek and Gemmell)
TTABVUE.
18 38 TTABVUE.
19 40, 42, and 44 (public) and 39, 41, 43, and 45 (confidential) TTABVUE. These depositions
were submitted under Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4) to counter Petitioner’s submissions.
20 46 TTABVUE.
21 47 TTABVUE
22 58 TTABVUE 37; 48, 57-58 TTABVUE.
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II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
A. Respondent’s objections
Respondent objects to Petitioner’s notice of reliance Nos. 5 and 7 on the grounds
that the exhibits are irrelevant and misleading, and to No. 14 as hearsay.23
Notice of reliance No. 5 is “representative samples of Internet websites, including
Respondent’s website displaying statements concerning the anticipated first use of
Respondent’s Mark for the products and services identified in the challenged
registration.”24 The objection is overruled. On its face, the evidence involves
Respondent’s use of its mark, and so it is relevant. To the extent that Respondent
contends that this evidence is misleading because the use relates to services, and not
the software described in the subject registration, Respondent may (and did)
introduce evidence establishing the context for the use.
Notice of reliance No. 7 is a “representative sample of an Internet website
displaying Travelers’ use of ‘TRAV’ as a perfin.”25 The objection is overruled, but not
for the reasons argued by Petitioner.26 The evidence is relevant to the pleaded

23 80 TTABVUE; 21, 22, 26 TTABVUE 4-5, 44-60.
24 21 TTABVUE.
25 22 TTABVUE.
26 Because the petition did not plead “Travelers’ longstanding use and practice”, we reject
Petitioner’s arguments that the evidence is relevant to “Travelers’ longstanding use and
practice of expanding the scope of its TRAVELERS brand profile by adopting T-R-V-formative
shorthands and abbreviations of its famous TRAVELERS mark, including how such practice
impacts the conceptual and commercial strength of those formative marks and their
association with Travelers. Such use is also relevant to underscore the dominant portion of
Travelers’ marks: ‘T,’ ‘R,’ and ‘V.’” 83 TTABVUE 4.
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allegation that “[t]he ‘TRAV’ portion of the [five TRAV formative] marks listed in
Paragraph 11 above is a shorthand for the famous TRAVELERS mark and name.”
Notice of reliance No. 14 comprises representative examples of media articles
relevant to “the nature and extent of the public exposure to the TRAVELERS Mark,
the strength and fame of the TRAVELERS Mark, the media attention of the
TRAVELERS Mark over many years, and the widespread recognition of the
TRAVELERS Mark by the media and the general public,” and “[w]ith respect to the
[three] printed publications published before January 1, 1998, such materials are
admissible for the truth of the matters therein as an ancient document under Fed. R.
Evid. 803(16).”27 The objection is overruled. The Board’s rules specifically allow
printed and online publications to be introduced by notice of reliance. See Trademark
Rule 2.122(e), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(e); Safer Inc. v. OMS Invs., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031,
1039 (TTAB 2010) (“This approach facilitates the introduction of matter for the
limited purpose of demonstrating what the documents show on their face.”). With
respect to the three articles dated prior to January 1, 1998 referring to the “strong
brand name” of the TRAVELERS mark, the Board follows the federal practice and
considers them for the truth of the matter, in adherence to the ancient document
exception to hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(16); Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., 111
USPQ2d 1080, 1086 n.20 (TTAB 2014) (‘“[s]tatements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established’ are not considered
hearsay, and therefore, are not excluded by the hearsay rule … [and] Rule of Evidence

27 26 TTABVUE 4-5, 44-60.
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902 provides that newspapers and periodicals are self-authenticating.”) (citations
omitted).
B. Petitioner’s objections
Petitioner objects to Respondent’s notice of reliance No. 5 as unauthenticated, to
the Google Analytics exhibit to the Walchek declaration as unauthenticated and
irrelevant and misleading, and to various statements from Respondent’s declarants
as not based on personal knowledge, hearsay, and as irrelevant and misleading.28
Notice of reliance No. 5 identifies copies of four registration certificates issued to
Respondent, one for the subject registration, two registrations for a mark identical to
the subject mark, and one registration for the mark TROV:29
REGISTRATION MARK SERVICES
Registration No.
4364627
Filed 11/16/12
Issued 7/9/13
Cancelled
2/14/20

TRŌV
International Class 36
Financial services, namely, wealth management
services
Registration No.
4364628
11/16/12
Issued 7/9/13
Cancelled
2/14/20

TROV
International Class 36
Financial services, namely, wealth management
services
Registration No.
5691963
Filed 3/13/15
Issued
3/5/19

TRŌV
International Class 35
Data compiling and analyzing in the field of insurance;
financial record-keeping for insurance underwriting
and insurance risk management; and promotion of
insurance services on behalf of third parties

28 74 TTABVUE.
29 46 TTABVUE. The registration certificate for the subject registration is duplicative. As
noted earlier, the file of the involved registration, which includes a copy of the certificate, is
automatically of record. Trademark Rule 2.122(b).
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International Class 36
Financial valuation of personal property; providing
insurance premium rate quotes via on-line means;
providing information in insurance matters; providing
web-based, automated and customized personal
financial management services, namely, customized
management of personal property records; and
providing information on insurance matters

International Class 42
Providing a web site featuring technology that enables
users to collect, index, store and manage information
relating to the user’s personal property, to obtain
insurance quotes, and to purchase insurance policies;
software as a service (SAAS) services featuring
software for collecting, indexing, storing and managing
information relating to the user's personal property,
obtaining insurance quotes, and purchasing insurance
policies; and electronic data storage

On February 14, 2020, subsequent to their submission at trial, Registration Nos.
4364627 and 4364628 were cancelled under Trademark Act Section 8. The cancelled
registrations are evidence only that the registrations issued, and are not evidence of
use of the marks at any time. Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta, 126 USPQ2d 1601, 1606
(TTAB 2018). See also Action Temp. Sers. Inc. v. Labor Force Inc., 870 F.2d 1563, 10
USPQ2d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
The registration certificate for remaining Registration No. 5691963 does not
include the current status and title information, and so fails to comply with
Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2). Accordingly, the objection is sustained with respect to
according the registration any statutory presumptions under Trademark Act Section
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7(b).30 Plain copies of registrations are public records and may be admitted for what
they show on their face. Trademark Rule 2.122(e); Rocket Trademarks Pty. Ltd. v.
Phard S.p.A., 98 USPQ2d 1066, 1070 n.11 (TTAB 2011); Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Sunex
Int’l Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (TTAB 1987).
Turning to the Google Analytics exhibit, Respondent’s CEO Walchek introduced
two screen shots titled “Google Analytics,” asserting that Respondent requested a
report “in order to determine how many times users initiated the process of obtaining
a quote and/or policy via the ‘Insure Now’ button on the Trōv App,” and that “This
type of data is obtained in Trōv’s regular course of business.”31 The objection to lack
of foundation or authentication is overruled.32 An objection to foundation or
authentication raised for the first time in a trial brief is untimely because the party
offering the testimony (whether by deposition, affidavit or declaration) does not have
the opportunity to cure the alleged defect. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Life Care
Servs. Corp., 227 USPQ 389, 391 (TTAB 1985). Accord Moke Am. LLC v. Moke USA,

30 Contrary to Respondent’s contention (78 TTABVUE 11), the failure to provide a status and
title copy of its registration is not a procedural deficiency, but central to the substantive value
of the registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (certificate of registration of a mark is prima facie
evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark); Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 931 F.2d 1551, 18 USPQ2d 1710, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(registrations not of record where plaintiff’s copies of registrations submitted with complaint
did not show current status or title). Because it is not a procedural deficiency, Petitioner did
not waive the objection by first raising it in its brief. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Tiger Lily
Ventures Ltd., 124 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (TTAB 2017) (“The Board approaches evidentiary
objections differently depending upon whether they are procedural or substantive in
nature.”).
31 52 TTABVUE 6; 53 TTABVUE 88.
32 Petitioner’s objection to the one sentence summary, or annotation, which Respondent added
above each screen shot without explanation is sustained. We consider only the screen shots.
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LLC, 2020 USPQ2d 10400 *5 (TTAB 2020) (sales records admitted as hearsay
exception under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) because objection that records lacked foundation
is an untimely procedural objection only raised in brief); Nahshin v. Prod. Source
Int’l, LLC, 107 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (TTAB 2013) aff’d, 112 F. Supp. 3d 383 (E.D. Va.
2015) (“We find that all of respondent’s objections to responses and documents based
on asserted lack of authentication are untimely and waived.”). The objection that the
evidence is misleading and irrelevant also is overruled. The evidence of how
Respondent’s software is used is relevant to both the likelihood of confusion and
nonuse claims, and we disagree that the evidence is misleading as to the nature of
the software.
We turn to the hearsay objections to statements in Respondent’s three
declarations by witnesses Dowds, Walchek, and Gemmell.33 Petitioner asserts that
Dowds’ declaration regarding (i) the statements on the nature of the TRŌV software
by the party which introduced him via email to a representative of Respondent, and
(ii) the statement of the representative of Respondent expressing an interest in the
TRŌV software, are hearsay. 56 TTABVUE 4. 34 The objection is overruled. In neither
case is the statement offered for the truth of the statement, but merely to show that
the statement was made.
The majority of the objections contend that a statement was irrelevant,
misleading, or the witness lacked the personal knowledge to so testify. The cases cited

33 52-56 TTABVUE, redacted and confidential versions.
34 We note that no objection was made to the email itself, which was submitted as an exhibit
to the declaration.
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by Petitioner are apposite for the legal principles for which they are cited, but bear
no relation to the instant facts. These objections are overruled. Respondent’s witness
Walchek (Paras. 18, 20-23, 52 TTABVUE) asserts that the insurance functionality of
the TRŌV software has evolved, and then supports that assertion with a description
of the history of the insurance function, which involved its initial deployment in other
countries. This provides context for Respondent’s use in the United States, and is
relevant to both the nonuse and likelihood of confusion claims. Because TRŌV is the
phonetic spelling of “trove,” the reference to a dictionary definition is not misleading.
Walchek Para. 24, 52 TTABVUE. Respondent’s witness Dowds testified that he sent
follow-up email messages to Respondent’s representative after their meeting. 56
TTABVUE 5. Because communication can be defined as bilateral and Dowds’ emails
received no response, this is not inconsistent or misleading based on Dowds’
deposition testimony that communications “went dead” after the meeting.
Respondent’s witnesses Walchek (Paras. 8, 12-13, 52 TTABVUE) and Gemmell
(Paras. 9-10, 54 TTABVUE) describe how the TRŌV software worked with wording
such as “user who wished to …, then would …,” “the TRŌV app allowed a user to …,”
and “The process was as follows: First the user would add an item…” The witnesses
are testifying to their personal knowledge of how the software works, using typical
descriptive language to explain the various steps users would have to take to access
different functions, and in that context the language neither would be mistaken for a
report on witnessed behavior nor is misleadingly inconsistent with Respondent’s
other descriptions of the software.
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Petitioner makes the same objection that the witness lacked personal knowledge
about Walchek’s statement that there was a July 2013 meeting between Dowds and
a representative of Petitioner (Para. 29, 52 TTABVUE35), and Dowds’ statement that
Petitioner’s representative knew “full well” the nature of Respondent’s TRŌV
software (Paras. 9-10, 56 TTABVUE).36. The objection is overruled. Walchek’s
position with Respondent and familiarity with Respondent’s business records
provided the necessary knowledge for his testimony about the meeting, and Dowds’
participation in the email, phone call, and in-person meeting with Petitioner’s
representative provided the necessary knowledge for his testimony that Petitioner’s
representative knew the nature of TRŌV’s software. The objection that Walchek had
no personal knowledge or qualifications to conclude that the use of the macron in
TRŌV stands out to customers also is overruled. 52 TTABVUE, Para. 25. Walchek’s
conclusion was included in a description of how Petitioner selected its mark.

III. PRIOR DEALINGS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
The record shows that on July 2, 2013, a third party introduced herself and
Respondent’s Vice President for Business Development , Mark Dowds, by email to
Andrew Gristina, National Fine Art Practice leader with Travelers Inland Marine as
business partners, briefly describing the TRŌV software; that on July 8, 2013, Mssrs.
Gristina and Dowds talked by phone, and on July 16, 2013, Mssrs. Gristina and

35 Petitioner also objects to Walchek Para. 30, for the same reason, but that paragraph makes
no reference to the meeting.
36 56 TTABVUE 5.
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Dowds met in person at Travelers New York offices to explore a sales opportunity for
the TRŌV software.37
In August 2016, Walchek met with representatives of Respondent at the Plug and
Play conference matching startup companies with potential investors to explore a
business arrangement.38
On September 13, 2016, Petitioner applied to register the mark TRV (standard
characters) for “insurance services in the field of property and casualty, namely,
insurance underwriting, insurance claims servicing, loss control and risk evaluation
for others, and providing information in the field of insurance.”39 On February 4, 2017
and May 2, 2017, Respondent filed requests for extension of time to oppose which
expired July 9, 2017.40 On April 19, 2017, Respondent sent an email to Petitioner
stating, in part41:
Trōv has become aware of The Travelers’ United States Trademark Application
Serial No. 87169654 for “TRV” in Class 36 and is concerned that the adoption
and use of that mark by The Travelers will cause marketplace confusion due
to the mark similarities between “TRV” and “TRŌV” in combination with the
associated services with which the “TRV” mark will be used. As you are no
doubt aware, Trōv requested and received an extension of time in which to
oppose registration of Application Serial No. 87169654 and is still considering
whether to proceed with the opposition proceeding. Before making a decision,
it would like to hear from The Travelers regarding the mark conflict. Would
you please, therefore, provide additional information about how The Travelers
intends to use the “TRV” mark and why it believes that confusion is unlikely

37 52 TTABVUE 10, 56 TTABVUE 4-5, 8-17.
38 52 TTABVUE 10-11; 61 TTABVUE.
39 Application Serial No. 87169654 based on Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b);
13 TTABVUE 3; 47 TTABVUE.
40 13 TTABVUE 3; 26 TTABVUE.
41 Id., also 7-8.
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notwithstanding the obvious mark similarities and the apparent overlap in
services.

On June 15, 2017, Petitioner responded to Respondent, stating in part42:
Your email implies that your client has prior rights, and you are asking
Travelers to defend its use and registration of TRV. … given the fame of the
TRAVELERS mark, Travelers’ prior use and registration of its TRAV-
formative marks, and its prior use of TRV in connection with insurance and
insurance-related products and services, it is Trov that should explain to
Travelers why Trov’s use and registration of the TROV mark for competing
insurance and insurance-related products and services does not violate
Travelers’ prior rights.

On September 27, 2017, Respondent responded to Petitioner stating, in part43:

There is no conflict between “TROV” and “TRAVELERS” or any of the “TRAV”
formative marks and your letter does not contend otherwise. … None of the
“uses” you point to in support of Travelers’ position even approaches use of
“TRV” as a service mark in Class 36. As such, your assertion of prior use “in
connection with insurance and insurance-related products and services” is
empty. Trov is satisfied, based on additional information that it obtained
subsequent to April 19, that no further action in relation to Application No.
87169654 is warranted.

On November 27, 2017, Petitioner filed the petition to cancel.

IV. STANDING
Standing is a threshold issue that must be proven by a plaintiff in every inter
partes case. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.2d 1270, 111
USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See also Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 188 (CCPA 1982); N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET
Prods. & Servs., Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1497, 1501 (TTAB 2015). Proving ownership of

42 Id. at 4, 10-11.
43 52 TTABVUE 12, 100-02.
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trademark registrations establishes Petitioner’s direct commercial interest and its
standing to petition for cancellation of Respondent’s registration on the ground of
likelihood of confusion. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d
1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET Prods. & Servs., Inc., 114
USPQ2d at 1501. If Petitioner establishes its standing with respect to any pleaded
ground for cancellation, it has the right to assert any other ground as well, that also
has a reasonable basis in fact. See Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 213
USPQ at 190; A&H Sportswear Co., Inc. v. Yedor, 2019 USPQ2d 111513, *3 (TTAB
2019).
With its petition to cancel (and again during trial), Petitioner submitted status
and title copies of its pleaded registrations showing its ownership and that the
registrations remain valid.44 Petitioner also submitted testimony averring its use of
the pleaded TRAVELERS, TRAV-formative, and TRV marks.45 This is sufficient proof
of Petitioner’s standing. In addition, we note that Respondent does not dispute that
Petitioner has standing to bring its claims.

V. VOID AB INITIO FOR NONUSE
Under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), a mark may not be
registered unless it is “used in commerce.” Section 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127, provides that “[t]he term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark

44 1 TTABVUE 35-117 (TRAVELERS marks), 119-32 (TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES,
TRAVPAY, TRAVCARE, and TRAVCARE NURSE LINE marks).
45 14 TTAB 4-72.
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in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” In
a use-based application, when at the time of application there was no use on any of
the goods or services specified, the application and resulting registration is void.
Aycock Eng’g, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 1357, 90 USPQ2d 1301, 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“The registration of a mark that does not meet the use requirement is void
ab initio.”).
However, an application is not deemed void ab initio if the applicant made use on
any of the listed goods at the time the use-based application was filed. Instead of the
application being abandoned (or the resulting registration being cancelled) , the
application or registration is amended to delete the goods on which the mark had not
been used. Barbara’s Bakery, Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1289 (TTAB 2007)
(“In a use-based application filed under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C.
1051(a), registration is allowed only as to goods upon which the mark is being used
as of the application filing date, and an opposition will be sustained as to any of the
identified goods as to which it is shown that no use had been made as of the
application filing date.”); Grand Canyon West Ranch LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, 78
USPQ2d 1696, 1698 (TTAB 2006) (“[A]n application should not be treated as void as
long as the mark was used on some of the identified goods or services at the time the
application was filed.”). To be clear, Petitioner does not assert that Respondent failed
to use its mark on the software listed in the registration at the time the underlying
application was filed, but that the software did not offer the insurance functions listed
in the application, so that those functions should be deleted from the registration.
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What is “bona fide use of the mark in the ordinary course of trade” may vary over
time as markets and businesses change. Lewis Silkin LLP v. Firebrand LLC, 129
USPQ2d 1015, 1018 (TTAB 2018). See also M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d
1368, 114 USPQ2d 1892, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress expressly rejected
inclusion of a statutory definition for ‘bona fide’ in order to preserve ‘the flexibility
which is vital to the proper operation of the trademark registration system.’”)
(citation omitted). Trademark use with software, and service mark use with web-
based services, which is bona fide and sufficient to support registration evolves as
those technologies evolve, changing what is considered the “ordinary course of trade.”
See, for example, In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d 936, 121 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[A] mark used with a web-based offering may equally identify the provision
of software, rather than a service. For these reasons, careful analysis is required to
determine whether web-based offerings, like those JobDiva provides, are products or
services.”); Lens.com Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts Inc., 686 F.3d 1376, 103 USPQ2d 1672,
1676 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]hether consumers actually associate a mark with software,
as opposed to other services, is a factual determination that must be conducted on a
case-by-case basis.”); On-Line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56
USPQ2d 1471, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Because it found that AOL had provided its
users with ‘access’ to its service through on-screen menu items, the TTAB determined
that AOL had used the ONLINE TODAY mark [with services ‘providing access to
online computer services offering computer-industry news, commentary and product
reviews’], and hence did not abandon the mark.”).
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The facts regarding the functions of Respondent’s software at the time the
application was filed are undisputed46: Respondent’s software allowed the user to load
its insurance agent’s contact information and a personal inventory of valuables, and
thereafter, the user could select an item from inventory and select an option to “insure
now.” With selection of this option, the software generated an email to the insurance
agent prepopulated with the details regarding the item that the user wished to
insure, and opened the user’s email application so that the user could hit “send.”
Further actions by the user unaided by the software were required to obtain the
insurance quote or policy, namely sending the letter and receiving the third party
response.47
The parties disagree on whether these facts support use of the mark on software
with the function of “obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies.” In
support of its claim that they do not, Petitioner relies on Respondent’s discovery
deposition testimony and written discovery responses indicating that Respondent
could not provide insurance quotes or policies at the time the application was filed
because it was not licensed to do so, and that, as set forth above, use of the software
did not result in quotes for, or sales of, insurance policies from Respondent to the
software user.48 Respondent maintains that a significant function and purpose of its
software was to assist the user in obtaining insurance quotes and policies for the

46 Petitioner’s brief, 73 TTABVUE 33-34; Respondent’s brief, 77 TTABVUE 15-16; Petitioner’s
reply brief, 82 TTABVUE 16-17.
47 9 TTABVUE 20; 54 TTABVUE 4-5; 55 TTABVUE 10-88.
48 9 TTABVUE 20-24.
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goods listed in the user’s inventory, that this function was employed by users, that
its use of the mark on its software is sufficient to support its registration, and that
the requirements for use of a mark in connection with insurance services and on
software are not identical. In its reply brief, Petitioner contends that the register
includes registrations with software which specifies that the software is “for use in”
certain applications, that Respondent could have employed this language, and that
the difference between “software for … obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing
insurance policies” as identified in the registration, and “software for use in obtaining
insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies,” which more exactly describes
Respondent’s software, is fatal to Respondent’s claim of use.49
We find Respondent’s use in commerce is sufficient to support its use with the
listed software. One factor bearing on our determination is our disagreement that
there is a distinct or notable difference between software “for” obtaining insurance
and software “for use in” obtaining insurance. In both cases, the function of the
software is provided with the necessary specificity. We do not disagree with
Petitioner’s argument that software for obtaining insurance could be construed as
software for directly obtaining insurance from the provider of the software. However,
we disagree that it is the only construction of those words, and find that software for
obtaining insurance also could be construed as software for use in obtaining
insurance. See On-Line Careline Inc., 56 USPQ2d at 1476 (“The crux of the TTAB’s

49 82 TTABVUE 23.
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analysis involved determining the meaning of ‘providing access.’ The TTAB found
that ‘access’ could mean enabling users to obtain a particular service.”).50
Another factor bearing on our determination is the multifunction nature of the
software, and how it is likely to be perceived by prospective purchasers. As set forth
in the identification of goods, the software collects information about the user’s
property to create an inventory for the user, and manages that information to
facilitate various third party transactions involving the property, including
insurance. Within that context, we do not believe that prospective purchasers would
expect only to obtain insurance directly via the software, and might expect, correctly,
that the inventory information may be organized by the software as an aid to
obtaining third party insurance. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 121 USPQ2d at 1126 (“[I]t is
important … to review all the information in the record to understand both how the
mark is used and how it will be perceived by potential customers.”).
The multifunction nature of the software and how it is likely to be perceived by
prospective purchasers distinguishes this case from Nationstar Mortg. LLC v.
Ahmad, 112 USPQ2d 1361 (TTAB 2014), cited by Petitioner for the proposition that
the sale of insurance requires licensing which Respondent does not possess, and so
Respondent cannot use the mark in connection with the software functions of

50 We also disagree with Petitioner’s contention (73 TTABVUE 33) that Respondent’s and
third-party website advertisements and Respondent’s press release (21 TTABVUE) for “on-
demand insurance coming soon to the US” confirms that Respondent’s software did not allow
the user to obtain insurance or purchase insurance policies at the time the application was
filed. This is just another iteration of the same point: insurance can be obtained directly and
indirectly, and the fact that Respondent’s software now facilitates the user obtaining
insurance directly does not prove that it did not first facilitate the user obtaining insurance
indirectly.
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“obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies.” In Nationstar, the Board
sustained an opposition based on the claim of fraud, finding that applicant ’s
averments were fraudulent as to his use of the mark for the “real estate brokerage;
rental of real estate; real estate management services, namely, management of
commercial and residential properties; real estate investment; residential and
commercial property and insurance brokerage; mortgage brokerage; and business
finance procurement services.” In addition to testimony which the Board found
lacking in credibility, and the dearth of any documents, in Nationstar the Board found
these services to be regulated activities, requiring a license from the state to be legally
rendered, that the applicant lacked such a license, and so, for the purpose of fraud,
applicant’s averments of use in commerce with the services were false. In this case,
at the time the application was filed, Respondent was not licensed to, and did not,
offer the same services as an insurance agent or company. However, as discussed, we
find that the software functions of “obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance
policies” were performed by preparation of the customized insurance request email,
and these functions do not require a license.51

51 Petitioner also urges us to follow the ruling in Scholastic, Inc. v. Mishkoff, Cancellation
No. 92062342, 2017 WL 6384045 (TTAB Dec. 12, 2017). 73 TTABVUE 52. In that decision,
which is not designated as a precedent, the Board granted a motion for summary judgment
on the claim that the application underlying the subject registration was void ab initio for
nonuse of the mark with the registered goods “downloadable electronic publications, namely,
novels featuring videos” because “[o]n the evidence of record, there is no genuine dispute of
material fact that there is no version of [registrant’s sole electronic publication] available for
purchase by consumers that contains embedded video.”
The cases are not alike. In the Scholastic case, the respondent testified that he intended to
use the mark with novels including video, and took some actions toward creating that
product, but never saw any video in the product which he uploaded for sale, and had no
evidence that any consumer ever was able to view video in his novel for sale. Because the
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We disagree with Petitioner’s insistence that the only way that software may serve
in “obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies” is as the tool of a
licensed insurance agent or agency, and so we also disagree that the software
preparation of the customized email messages requesting insurance quotes for
specific items from the user’s inventory as an end to obtaining an insurance policy for
those items does not serve as software offering “obtaining insurance quotes,
purchasing insurance policies,” especially when that function is one of several
functions of software for organizing a personal inventory as an aid to transactions.
The parties hotly dispute the degree to which the “insure now” function was used
by consumers of the software. We do not find this to be a relevant point. Because the
record establishes that the mark was used on the software in commerce, and the
software included the described software functions, the use is sufficient. It does not
matter if consumers who purchased the software used the insure function.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Respondent’s
website advertisements for “on-demand insurance coming soon to the US” are
admissions that its software did not offer the insurance functions listed in the
registration at the time the underlying application was filed.52 The record
demonstrates through testimony and registrations for the identical TRŌV mark for

TRŌV software aids the user in obtaining insurance quotes and policies by preparing a letter
describing the items to be insured, we do not see a similar incongruity between the TRŌV
goods as described in the registration and the TRŌV goods as used in commerce.
52 21 TTABVUE.
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insurance services that Respondent offered insurance services in the United States
after its TRŌV software was in use.53
On balance, and taking into account the totality of the evidence of record, we find
that Respondent was using its TRŌV mark in commerce with the software identified
in its registration at the time the underlying application was filed, and that Petitioner
has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the application was void
ab initio in part because the mark was not in use with the software functions of
“obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies” at the time the
application was filed.

VI. PRIORITY OF USE AND LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Our analysis of this claim reflects Petitioner’s pleaded TRAVELERS marks, five
TRAV-formative marks, and TRV mark and trade name
A. Petitioner’s TRAVELERS Marks
Petitioner owns the following registrations for TRAVELERS marks54:

MARK/REGISTERED GOODS/SERVICES

TRAVELERS
(standard characters)

Registration No. 1611053
filed June 29, 1988
issued 08-28-1990
Underwriting and administering
services for commercial, personal and
group insurance, fidelity, surety and
guaranty bonding services, credit card
services, and counseling services in
regard to insurance claim
administration in Class 36

53 52 TTABVUE 6-10; 46 TTABVUE.
54 8 TTABVUE 15-100. As discussed later in this decision, Petitioner contends (73 TTABVUE
17-18) that the subject registration is likely to be confused with its insurance and related
services. For this reason, we follow Petitioner’s example in its brief and list only the insurance
related services from each pleaded registration.
Cancellation No. 92067396

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MARK/REGISTERED GOODS/SERVICES
renewed

Electronic mail services in the insurance
industry in Class 3855

Other goods and services in Classes 16,
28, 35, 41, and 42

Registration No. 3494647
issued 09-02-2008
renewed
Insurance underwriting services in the
fields of property and casualty;
insurance agency and brokerage
services, namely, policyholder services
and services to agents and brokers;
providing information in insurance
matters, among other services in Class
36

Providing on-line non-downloadable
software in the field of insurance in
Class 42

Other goods and services in Classes 35
and 41

Registration No. 3494648
issued 09-02-2008
renewed

Same as Registration No. 3494647

TRAVELERS NETAPPOINT
(standard characters)

Registration No. 3892103
Issued 12-21-10
renewed

Providing temporary use of online, non-
downloadable software to facilitate data
collection for use in contracting and
appointing prospective insurance
agencies and agents in Class 42

55 We list these services as did Petitioner in its brief, but note that Petitioner offered no
evidence or arguments directed to these electronic mail services.
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MARK/REGISTERED GOODS/SERVICES

Registration No. 3991520
Issued 07-12-2011
§§ 8 & 15 accepted and acknowledged
Insurance underwriting services in the
fields of property and casualty;
insurance agency services; providing
information in the field of insurance;
providing a website with information
and resources in the field of insurance,
among other services in Class 36

Registration No. 3991521
Issued 07-12-2011
§§ 8 & 15 accepted and acknowledged
Same as Registration No. 3991520

TRAVELERS CLICK
(standard characters)

Registration No. 4429212
Issued 11-05-13
§§ 8 & 15 accepted and acknowledged
Property and casualty insurance and
surety services, namely, rating, quoting,
underwriting, binding, and issuing
insurance coverage and surety bonds via
an online, non-downloadable interface
software portal in Class 36

Providing use of online, non-
downloadable software for rating,
quoting, underwriting, binding, and
issuing insurance coverage and surety
bonds in the field of property and
casualty insurance, and that allows
insurance agents to manage their
customers and accounts in Class 42

MYTRAVELERS
(standard characters)

Registration No. 4538222
Issued 05-27-14
Property and casualty insurance
services, namely, providing property and
casualty insurance underwriting
services for policyholders online, and
excluding underwriting services for
travel insurance in Class 36

Providing online non-downloadable
interface software for computers for use
in providing insurance policyholders
services in the field of property and
casualty insurance, and excluding any
such services for travel insurance in
Class 42
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Petitioner also pleads common law use of the mark TRAVELERS since 1865 for
insurance services, including property and casualty insurance.
We focus our likelihood of confusion analysis on Registration No. 1611053 for the
standard character mark TRAVELERS because it was the first registered, and that
mark includes fewer points of difference from Respondent’s registered mark than the
other pleaded marks which also include additional wording or a design element. If we
find that there is no likelihood of confusion with this registered mark in connection
with “underwriting and administering services for commercial, personal and group
insurance, fidelity, surety and guaranty bonding services, credit card services, and
counseling services in regard to insurance claim administration,” there is no need for
us to consider the likelihood of confusion with Petitioner’s other TRAVELERS marks.
See N. Face Apparel Corp. v. Sanyang Indus. Co., 116 USPQ2d 1217, 1225 (TTAB
2015) (citing In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010)).
1. PRIORITY
A party claiming prior use of a mark may petition to cancel a registration on the
basis of such prior use pursuant to Section 14 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
See Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Bros. Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1281, 1284 (TTAB 1998). In
a cancellation proceeding where both the petitioner and respondent are owners of
registrations, the petitioner must prove priority of use. Christian Broad. Network Inc.
v. ABS-CBN Int’l, 84 USPQ2d 1560, 1565 (TTAB 2007). To establish priority on its
likelihood of confusion claim under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, Petitioner
Cancellation No. 92067396

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must prove that, vis-à-vis Respondent, it owns “a mark or trade name previously used
in the United States . . . and not abandoned.”
Petitioner submitted uncontradicted testimony regarding its use since 1865 of the
TRAVELERS mark for its property and casualty insurance.56 Respondent submitted
uncontradicted testimony regarding its “conservatively–claimed date of first use of
the TRŌV mark” of December 15, 2014, and does not contest that Petitioner has
priority of use of its TRAVELERS mark.57 Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has
established the necessary prior use in connection with its likelihood of confusion claim
as to the TRAVELERS mark.
2. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION BETWEEN TRAVELERS
AND TRŌV MARKS
Under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), a mark may not be
registered if it “consists of or comprises a mark … or a mark or trade name previously
used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used
on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion….” Id. Our
determination under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of
likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ
563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (the DuPont factors). Petitioner bears the burden of proving its

56 14 TTABVUE 5.
57 52 TTABVUE 6, 16. Respondent’s testimony includes the statement that it “released the
first version of its ‘TRŌV app’ in 2013” accompanied by a document with a list of versions
numbers with the “ready for sale” date to “Apple,” which we assume is an abbreviated
reference to the buyer’s corporate name. Without further explanation, this testimony and
document is insufficient to demonstrate an earlier date of first use.
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claim of likelihood of confusion, including its priority of use, by a preponderance of
the evidence. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 55 USPQ2d at 1848.
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities
between the marks and the similarities between the goods and services. See
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”). We must consider each relevant DuPont factor for which there were
arguments and evidence. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d
1797, 1800 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant to every case,
and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”) (quoting
In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).

Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Services,
Channels of Trade, Conditions of Sale, and Purchasers

We turn to the DuPont factors regarding the similarity or dissimilarity of the
respective goods and services, their channels of trade, and conditions of sale and
prospective purchasers. With respect to the second DuPont factor comparing
Petitioner’s services to Respondent goods, “[t]his ‘relatedness of the goods’ factor
compares the goods … in [Respondent’s registration] with the goods and services in
[Petitioner’s] registration. Even if the goods and services in question are not identical,
the consuming public may perceive them as related enough to cause confusion about
the source or origin of the goods and services.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press
Cancellation No. 92067396

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Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
“There can be no rule that certain goods or services are per se related, such that there
must be a likelihood of confusion from the use of similar marks in relation thereto.”
H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1715, 1723 (TTAB 2008).
We make our determination regarding the similarities between the parties’
services and goods, channels of trade, and conditions of sale and buyers based on the
goods as they are identified in the application and registrations. Octocom Sys. Inc. v.
Houston Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). The application and registrations themselves may provide evidence of the
relationship between the goods and services. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press
Inc., 62 USPQ2d at 1005; Merrit Foods v. Associated Citrus Packers, Inc., 222 USPQ
255 (TTAB 1984). In this instance, we disagree with Petitioner’s contention that as
identified in the application and registration, the goods and services are legally
identical. As with its nonuse claim, Petitioner insists that the phrase “obtaining
insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies” which appears in the identification
of Respondent’s goods makes the software equivalent to its “underwriting and
administering services for commercial, personal and group insurance, fidelity, surety
and guaranty bonding services, credit card services, and counseling services in regard
to insurance claim administration.”58 As with the nonuse claim, we reject a reading
of Respondent’s identification of goods which ignores that a single software

58 73 TTABVUE 46.
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application is described, and instead treats each listed function as a separate piece of
software equivalent to a service performed for the same purpose.
Respondent’s goods are “software for collecting, indexing, storing and managing
personal financial information and information relating to the user ’s personal and
real property, sharing, bookmarking, indexing, storing, collecting and showcasing
content, articles, images, and products relating to the user ’s personal and real
property and financial assets, obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance
policies, purchasing and selling goods, and managing personal property for the
purpose of lending, borrowing, and donating such property, and for managing
information regarding personal property for use in curating on-line offers and
advertising such property in connection with offers for the private sale of such
property.” The focus of the software is the user’s property, and the functions include
not just collecting and organizing the data about the property in general, but as an
aid to different transactions, including but not limited to obtaining insurance for
individual assets. The identification of goods does not support Petitioner’s argument
that Respondent uses its mark with “software for obtaining insurance quotes,
purchasing insurance policies” in a way “legally identical” to the way that an
insurance business, including Petitioner, offers insurance quotes and policies.59

59 Specifically, we disagree with Petitioner’s statement (73 TTABVUE 46) that “The Trov
Registration broadly covers ‘computer application software for mobile devices, namely,
software for . . . obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies. . . . ’” This
language takes words from the identification of goods out of context. As discussed in
connection with the claim that the underlying application was void for nonuse, Respondent’s
software as identified in the registration manages information about the user’s property
including obtaining quotes and purchasing insurance for that property, which is a more
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While we focus our analysis on Registration No. 1611053, we would not find
Respondent’s software legally identical to the services in any of Petitioner’s pleaded
TRAVELERS registrations, including those services which include online software.
As discussed in connection with the nonuse claim, there is no bright line
distinguishing software and services. Petitioner offers insurance quotes and policies
through services and software, but this is not a distinction which makes a difference
in this likelihood of confusion analysis. Respondent’s software which includes the
function for “obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies” cannot be
divorced from the other functions of the software in managing information about the
user’s property. As is plain from the identification of goods, the function of
Respondent’s software in “obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies”
does not stand alone, but is integral to the multifunction nature of the software, and
thus is not merely a software version of Petitioner’s insurance services, which are not
limited to insuring any particular person or property, and are not performed only in
connection with asset management.
While not legally identical, it is clear that Respondent’s software, which facilitates
obtaining insurance for specific assets, is related to Petitioner’s insurance services.
Petitioner’s registration specifies that its services include property and casualty
insurance, and those subsets also are encompassed by its general “insurance
services.” We take judicial notice of the definitions of “asset” and “casualty

limited and specialized function than broadly obtaining insurance quotes and purchasing
insurance policies with no limitation as to who or what is being insured.
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insurance.60 The management of asset information by Respondent’s software includes
using the information to obtain appropriate insurance, such as the property
insurance offered by Petitioner. Casualty insurance insures against loss to person or
property from accident, and so also is a way of insuring assets, albeit the assets of the
injured and not the insured. In sum, while Respondent’s multifunction asset tracking
software differs from Petitioner’s insurance services, we find the goods and services
are related for purposes of determining a likelihood of confusion. See Weider Publ’ns,
LLC v. D&D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1359 (TTAB 2014) (holding
SHAPES for a variety of beauty salon, day spa, and health spa services likely to cause
confusion with SHAPE for magazines where the services are of the type normally
featured in the magazines). For this reason, we find that the second DuPont factor
favors finding a likelihood of confusion.
With respect to the third and fourth DuPont factors, the trade channels for the
parties’ goods and services, and the conditions under which, and to whom, sales are

60 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/asset:
asset noun
:an item of value owned
assets plural
:the entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate applicable or
subject to the payment of debts

Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/casualty%20insurance: casualty insurance
:insurance against loss from accident (as automobile, burglary, liability, accident
and health, and workmen ’s compensation insurance and corporate suretyship)
consisting in the U.S. of all forms of insurance written commercially except life
insurance and the forms of property insurance written by fire and marine
companies
The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries
that exist in printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB
2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Cancellation No. 92067396

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made, we also find a relationship, though not as close as the relationship argued by
Petitioner. We disagree with Petitioner’s contention (73 TTABVUE 46) that
The Trov Registration is not restricted as to any type of
insurance quotes or policies and thus is presumed to cover
all types of insurance quotes and policies, including for
P&C insurance. Nor is the Trov Registration restricted to
any particular classes of consumers, channels of trade, or
nature of use.
As plainly shown by the identification of goods, Respondent’s software function for
obtaining insurance quotes and purchasing insurance policies is restricted to users of
the software and applies only to the user’s property recorded in the software.
However, there is no restriction on Petitioner’s property and casualty insurance
services, and so customers for those services may include Respondent’s subset of
software users interested in obtaining insurance for their property.
The channels of trade and conditions of purchase for Petitioner’s insurance
services and Respondent’s asset management software also are related with respect
to the insurance function of the software. That is, the software directs the user to
suppliers of property insurance such as Petitioner, and so the software and the
insurance company are located at consecutive links in the insurance distribution
chain. While we make this finding based on the goods and services as described in
the registrations, the record includes corroborating evidence showing that
Respondent’s customers also include insurance brokers who solicit existing or
potential clients by offering the TRŌV software so that the customers or potential
customers could inventory their possessions and realize the need for additional
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insurance.61 Indeed, as set forth earlier in this decision, Respondent approached
Petitioner about a business relationship in which Petitioner would provide insurance
through Respondent’s software.
We briefly address the parties’ other arguments regarding the third and fourth
DuPont factors. Respondent contends that consumer confusion is less likely where,
as here, the prospective consumers are sophisticated and likely to exercise care in
choosing software or insurance to manage and protect their “personal valuables.”62
Petitioner argues that neither party has restrictions to a particular class of consumer
or price point in its registration, and Respondent’s discovery responses show that it
uses the same common promotional channels as Petitioner – for example, Internet
and television ads, social media and their own websites.63 We agree that as identified
in the registrations, neither Respondent’s software nor Petitioner’s insurance
services appeal to only sophisticated consumers.
Where prospective consumers may span a spectrum of sophistication, we base our
decision “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.’’ Stone Lion Capital
Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“Although the services recited in the application also encompass sophisticated
investors, Board precedent requires the decision to be based ‘on the least
sophisticated potential purchasers.’”). While our decision is based on the wording of

61 30 TTABVUE 21-22.
62 77 TTABVUE 36.
63 10 TTABVUE 24; 73 TTABVUE 47.
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the goods as identified in Respondent’s registration, we note corroboration as to a lack
of consumer sophistication in the record. While asset management software may
involve property not widely held by general consumers, Respondent specifies in its
brief that its software also includes provisions for managing cameras and computers,
property which is widely held by general consumers. Similarly, while the ordinary
consumer may have little awareness of casualty insurance, Petitioner ’s property
insurance includes homeowner’s insurance, which also may appeal to the general
consumer. Finally, as to Respondent’s point that consumers would take care in
choosing goods or services which safeguard their possessions, it is well-settled that
even careful or sophisticated purchasers who are knowledgeable as to the goods or
services are not necessarily knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune to
source confusion arising from the use of very similar marks on or in connection with
goods and services. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Pierce-Arrow Soc’y v. Spintek Filtration, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 471774,
*16 (TTAB 2019).
For these reasons, we find that the third and fourth DuPont factors also favor
finding a likelihood of confusion.
Actual Confusion
The seventh and eighth DuPont factors consider “the nature and extent of any
actual confusion as to the source of the parties’ goods and services,” and “the length
of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without
evidence of actual confusion.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. “The absence of any reported
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instances of confusion is meaningful only if the record indicates appreciable and
continuous use by [defendant] … of its mark for a significant period of time in the
same markets as those served by [plaintiff] … under its mark[].” Citigroup Inc. v.
Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1645, 1660 (TTAB 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d
1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In other words, for the absence of actual
confusion to be probative, there must have been a significant opportunity for
confusion to have occurred. Barbara’s Bakery, Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d at
1287.
Respondent points to Petitioner’s discovery responses and deposition testimony
indicating that Petitioner was unaware of any instances of actual confusion.64 The
record includes unchallenged testimony that December 15, 2014, the date alleged in
Respondent’s registration, was Respondent’s date of first use in commerce.65 We do
not consider the three year period of concurrent use by the parties without actual
confusion to be probative on likelihood of confusion. Compare In re Guild Mortg. Co.,
912 F.3d 1376, 2020 USPQ2d 10279 *6, (TTAB 2020) (“Guild nonetheless presented
evidence of concurrent use of the two marks for a particularly long period of time—
over 40 years—in which the two businesses operated in the same geographic
market—southern California—without any evidence of actual confusion.”); Promark
Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 n.47 (TTAB 2015) (“In
about seventeen years of co-existence there have been no reported instances of actual

64 39 TTABVUE 16; 58 TTABVUE 23-25.
65 52 TTABVUE 6.
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confusion.”); Turdin v. Tribolite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, 1483 (TTAB 2014) (“Turdin
testified that he and Trilobite have co-existed for thirteen years without a single
instance of confusion.”). We find the seventh and eighth DuPont factors to be neutral.
Market Interface between the Parties

The tenth DuPont factor considers “the market interface between applicant and
the owner of a prior mark [including] … laches and estoppel attributable to owner of
prior mark and indicative of lack of confusion.”66 DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. Most
decisions involving this factor address an agreement which evinces the parties’
business-driven conclusion and belief that there is no likelihood of confusion, and
weighs heavily in favor of a finding that confusion is not likely. In re Opus One Inc.,
60 USPQ2d 1812, 1820 (TTAB 2001). See also Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de
France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1 USPQ2d 1775, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[I]n trademark
cases involving agreements reflecting parties’ views on the likelihood of confusion in
the marketplace, ... such agreements may, depending on the circumstances, carry
great weight ....”). Compare The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1629,
1641 (TTAB 2007) (“Applicant has not explained how the agreement “negates” the
likelihood of confusion and we do not find that it does.”).

66 The affirmative defenses of laches and estoppel were not pleaded in the answer, and the
Board does not consider unpleaded defenses unless they were tried by consent. Citigroup Inc.
v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 USPQ2d at 1655. Petitioner’s specific objections (82
TTABVUE 18 n.7) to Respondent raising the defenses in its brief preclude trial by consent.
Id. The circumstances alleged as support for laches and estoppel are considered only to
determine if they evince a belief on Petitioner’s part that no confusion is likely.
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Where, as here, there is no prior agreement, “evidence which would support
[defendant’s] affirmative defenses of laches or acquiescence” may have some
probative value “to the extent that it ‘is indicative of a lack of confusion,’ i.e., to the
extent that it shows that the [plaintiff] believes that confusion is not likely to result
from [defendant’s] use of its mark… .” In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d at 1821.
Respondent points to the prior dealings between the parties, and the documents
produced by Petitioner in which Respondent’s name appears, and contends that
Petitioner’s failure to specifically object to Respondent’s use of TRŌV for its software
indicates that Petitioner did not believe that there was a likelihood of confusion.67 We
agree with Petitioner’s argument, in essence, that the brief and unproductive prior
meetings between the parties meant much more to Respondent than Petitioner, and
that the documents in which Respondent’s name appears reflect regularly conducted
industry research rather than an acceptance of Respondent’s use of its mark
indicating that Petitioner had concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion.68
See In re Ass’n of the U.S. Army, 85 USPQ2d 1264, 1274 (TTAB 2007) (“The evidence
of record applicant relies on in the present case simply does not suffice as a substitute
for [a valid consent agreement between applicant and registrant].”); In re Thomas, 79
USPQ2d 1021, 1028 (TTAB 2006) (“Nor will we infer from registrants’ failure to
respond to applicant’s letters that registrants have consented to registration or that

67 77 TTABVUE 38-39.
68 82 TTABVUE 18-16.
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registrants have no objection to the registration of applicant ’s mark.”). We find the
market interface factor to be neutral in weighing likelihood of confusion.
Strength of Petitioner’s TRAVELERS Mark

We next consider the fame or strength of Petitioner’s mark in order to evaluate
the scope of protection to which it is entitled. “In determining the strength or
weakness of a mark, we consider both its inherent strength based on the nature of
the term itself and its commercial strength based on use in the marketplace.” Tao
Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1057 (TTAB 2017); see
also In re Chippendales USA Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength
(distinctiveness) and its marketplace strength (secondary meaning).”); J. Thomas
McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:80 (5th ed.
Jume 2020 update) (“The first enquiry focuses on the inherent potential of the term
at the time of its first use. The second evaluates the actual customer recognition value
of the mark at the time registration is sought or at the time the mark is asserted in
litigation to prevent another’s use.”).
In order to determine the conceptual strength of the cited mark, we evaluate its
intrinsic nature, that is, where it lies along the generic-descriptive-suggestive-
arbitrary (or fanciful) continuum of words. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Accord Two Pesos
Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 23 USPQ2d 1081, 1083 (1992) (“Marks are
often classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness … (1) generic; (2)
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descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.”). In assessing the conceptual
strength of a mark, we may consider dictionary definitions “to determine the ordinary
significance and meanings of words.” Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co. of N. J., 203
F.2d 737, 97 USPQ 330, 332 (CCPA 1953). Accord In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d
1670, 1673 (TTAB 2018) (“Given the meaning ‘smoking hot’ has in relation to the
goods, the term has some degree of conceptual weakness in connection with cosmetics
and is at best highly suggestive when used in connection with such goods.”). We take
judicial notice of the term TRAVELER as a word in ordinary use, defined as “one that
travels: such as one that goes on a trip or journey.”69 Because travelers leave their
homes, and thus are unable to ensure the safety of their personal or real property or
to prevent injury by accident, they are likely to need insurance to protect themselves
and their property from loss. We thus find the term TRAVELERS to be somewhat
suggestive of Petitioner’s insurance services. StonCor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings,
Inc., 759 F.3d 1327, 111 USPQ2d 1649, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“A suggestive mark
‘requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature
of the goods’”) (citations omitted).
With respect to commercial strength, we turn to Petitioner’s use and promotion of
the term TRAVELERS in connection with its insurance services. See Cadence Indus.
Corp. v. Kerr, 225 USPQ 331, 334 (TTAB 1985) (“[W]ith sufficient sales, advertising
and promotion thereof, a suggestive mark may well be categorized, despite its
suggestive nature, as a strong mark.”). Whether or not a mark is initially suggestive,

69 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/traveler.
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and therefore would have less distinctiveness than an arbitrary or fanciful mark, once
the mark is found to be famous, that means it is a strong mark and is entitled to a
broad scope of protection. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63
USPQ2d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Importantly, Respondent does not contest
Petitioner’s claim that its TRAVELERS mark is famous.70
However, we must assess the extent of the fame of the TRAVELERS mark because
in the likelihood of confusion context, fame “varies along a spectrum from very strong
to very weak.” Midwestern Pet Foods Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d
1046, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)). Fame for likelihood of confusion purposes arises “as long as a significant
portion of the relevant consuming public … recognizes the mark as a source
indicator.” Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d at 1694. Fame for likelihood of confusion purposes
may be measured indirectly by the volume of sales of the goods or services sold under
the mark, advertising expenditures, and other factors such as length of time of use of
the mark; widespread critical assessments; notice by independent sources of the
products identified by the marks; and the general reputation of the products and
services. Bose Corp., 63 USPQ2d at 1308.
Petitioner’s submissions include all of these indirect indicia of fame. The mark
TRAVELERS for property and casualty insurance has been in use in commerce for

70 While Respondent refers to Petitioner’s “asserted fame” and “purported fame,” rather
than argue against or counter Petitioner’s evidence of fame, Respondent asserts there can
be no confusion between such dissimilar marks “no matter how famous TRAVELERS may
claim to be.” 77 TTABVUE 25, also 36-37.
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more than one hundred and fifty years, and its use has been widespread, including
its appearance on each of the millions of insurance policies sold annually, its printed
materials distributed to the public such as brochures, invoices, notices, claims
communications and insurance cards, its annual SEC filings, and for the past 20
years, on every page of its website.71 Petitioner has earned billions of dollars of
revenue each year for the past several years.72 There is testimony and documents
showing use of the mark TRAVELERS for property and casualty insurance services
in connection with millions of dollars of advertising each year for the past several
years. Petitioner advertises its TRAVELERS insurance services in national television
and radio advertisements, in national newspapers and general interest magazines,
through sponsorship of notable sporting events and the New York City Ballet, in
airports, on subway trains, and on billboards.73 Petitioner also advertises its
TRAVELERS mark for insurance services electronically through search engine
marketing, banner ads, email marketing, third party “rate comparison” websites, its
mobile app, and its Facebook and Twitter accounts.74 The TRAVELERS mark for
insurance services has received significant media attention in national publications,
including references to the strength of the TRAVELERS mark.75 Based on these facts,

71 14 TTABVUE 6, 15, 30-33; 17 TTABVUE; 69 TTABVUE 2464-67; 70 TTABVUE 2-3570.
72 14 TTABVUE 6-7, 10; 69 TTABVUE 169-74, 462-67, 756-61, 1061-65, 1365-69, 1670-75,
1967-72, and 2284-89.
73 14 TTABVUE 10-14, 24-29, 33-42; 16 TTABVUE 4-55, 57-70; 18 TTABVUE; 23 TTABVUE;
69 TTABVUE 2433-35, 2437-60, multimedia files; 70 TTABVUE 3572-73, 3575-37, 3739-43.
74 14 TTAB 15-24; 15 TTABVUE 4-33, 35-39, 41-75, 78-89, 91-113; 18 TTABVUE 49-50.
75 26 TTABVUE; 69 TTABVUE 2430-31.
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Petitioner has established that the TRAVELERS mark is famous for property and
casualty insurance services, and therefore is entitled to a wide scope of protection in
that field.
It is well established, though, that evidence sufficient to prove fame may
nonetheless be insufficient to establish likelihood of confusion. Coach Servs., Inc. v.
Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1720 (Fed. Cir.
2012). As the Federal Circuit has declared, the likelihood of confusion standard:
[M]eans more than the likelihood that the public will recall
a famous mark on seeing the same mark used by another.
It must also be established that there is a reasonable basis
for the public to attribute the particular product or service
of another to the source of the goods or services associated
with the famous mark. To hold otherwise would result in
recognizing a right in gross, which is contrary to principles
of trademark law and to concepts embodied in 15 USC
§ 1052(d).

Univ. of Notre Dame v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505, 507 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Similarity or Dissimilarity of the TRAVELERS and TRŌV Marks

We turn to the DuPont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks.
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. Registrant’s mark TRŌV differs in significant ways from
Petitioner’s mark TRAVELERS in appearance, sound, meaning, and overall
commercial impression. Although the marks both begin with the letters TR, and have
V as their fourth letter, the mark TRŌV comprises four letters in total, and the mark
TRAVELERS is more than twice as long with nine letters. With respect to
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appearance, the six different letters outweigh the similarities of three common letters
and lead to differing appearance.
We reject Petitioner’s contention that the rarity of the letters T, R, and V in the
property and casualty insurance industry increases the similarity between the marks
TRŌV and TRAVELERS. Based on Petitioner’s Vice President Morris’ personal
knowledge of the names of Petitioner’s competitors, and listings of top 100 and top 25
property and casualty insurance companies in the United States from 2016-2018,76
Petitioner contends:
Until Trov came along, no other competitor in the property and casualty
insurance field used a mark or business name that … featured the letters T, R,
and V in any order in the beginning part of its trade name or trademark. 73
TTABVUE 10.

In fact, of all the P&C insurers that are on lists of the “Top 100” and “Top 25”
P&C insurers published by leading insurance industry publications, Travelers
is the only one that uses the letters “T,” “R,” and “V” in the beginning part of
its trademark and/or trade name. 73 TTABVUE 31-32.

Other than Travelers with its TRAVELERS, TRV, and TRAV-formative marks
and names, there are no P&C insurance competitors that use the letters T, R,
and V as, or in the first part of, a trade name or trademark. 73 TTABVUE 38.

This similarity of appearance is even more significant because Travelers is the
only company in the insurance space that uses the letters “T,” “R,” and “V” as
its trademark and trade name or in the beginning part of its trademark or
trade name. 73 TTABVUE 44.

The similarity between the beginning portions of Travelers’ TRAV-Formative
Marks and the TROV mark is even more significant here given the uniqueness
of the T-R-V combination in company names and brands in the insurance
industry. 73 TTABVUE 46.

76 14 TTABVUE 53-54; 12 TTABVUE 136-53.
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With these arguments, Petitioner seems to claim proprietary rights to the letters
T, R, and V “in the first part of a mark,” meaning that the letters do not have to be
sequential, but may include intervening characters. This is an impermissible claim
of multiple unspecified marks, and so will be given no consideration. In re Int’l
Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 51 USPQ2d 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Cineplex
Odeon Corp. v. Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, 56 USPQ2d 1538 (TTAB 2000).77
In connection with our assessment of the similarity of the marks TRŌV and
TRAVELERS, we turn to Petitioner’s argument that its TRAVELERS mark is
perceived by the relevant public as employing the letters T, R, and V in the first part
of its mark, and those letters are so rarely employed at the beginning of marks or
trade names in the property and casualty insurance industry that any mark with the
letters T, R, and V “in the beginning part of its trade name or trademark” such as
TRŌV is confusingly similar to the TRAVELERS mark.
Because Petitioner cites no legal support, and its evidentiary support is, at best,
incomplete, we accept neither the factual premise nor the conclusion. The record does
not establish that the letters T, R, and V are rarely used in the beginning of marks
or trade names in the property and casualty insurance industry. There is no context
for the listing of 100 companies in the field, and no way of knowing if those companies
comprise most of the industry. There is no evidence that the purchasing public

77 The exception which recognizes a single mark with a variable element is not applicable
here. The exception requires that the possible variations of the mark must be limited in
number and legally equivalent, so as not to change the commercial impression of the mark.
In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812-13 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
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considers trade names as equivalent to trademarks. While Petitioner uses part of its
name as an element in some of its marks, there is no evidence that this is industry
practice. A listing of company names in a field does not equate to a list of all the
marks used by those companies in the field.
We find even less support for the premise that the purchasing public perceives the
famous TRAVELERS mark as employing the “rarely used” letters T, R, and V at the
beginning of the mark. While the mark is registered in standard characters and
theoretically could be displayed in a way which emphasized those letters, there is no
evidence that Petitioner has done so. Moreover, there is no evidence that emphasizing
three nonsequential letters in a nine letter mark with a recognized dictionary
meaning would alter the perception of the mark from the common meaning to the
three letters. Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based
on the marks in their entireties, our analysis is not predicated on dissecting the
marks into their various components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224
USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667
F.2d 1005 , 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not
be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in
determining likelihood of confusion.”). We reject the argument that the TRAVELERS
is perceived for its use of the letters T, R, and V, and find that the marks TRŌV and
TRAVELERS convey different visual impressions, and thus are dissimilar in
appearance.
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As to how the marks sound, TRŌV is one syllable and in the singular, while
TRAVELERS is three syllables, and in the plural form. Aside from the common initial
TR sound, any similarity in sound diminishes thereafter. Because the letter V is the
last letter in the mark TRŌV, it has a different impact than the letter V in the mark
TRAVELERS, where it merely ends the first of three syllables in the mark. We find
that the marks TRŌV and TRAVELERS convey different aural impressions, and the
marks do not sound alike.
As to meaning, we find that the mark TRŌV will be perceived as the term “trove”
when used on Respondent’s goods. Respondent’s CEO testified that “The name Trōv
was inspired by, and meant to evoke, the concept of a ‘treasure trove.’”78 We take
judicial notice that the term “trove” is a word in ordinary use, defined as “a valuable
collection: TREASURE.”79 Because Respondent’s registration specifies that its
software “collects” information about the user’s “assets” and “real and personal
property”, we find the term TRŌV to be suggestive of the function of Respondent’s
software, i.e., to inventory the user’s valuables. For the purposes of comparing the
marks in terms of meaning and commercial impression, we find the meanings
denoted by the terms TRŌV, “trove”, and TRAVELERS, “travelers”, are different.
In support of our finding that TRŌV will likely be perceived as the term “trove”
when used on Respondent’s goods, we find that “TROV” is the phonetic version of the
word “trove,” and the word “trove” differs from the mark TRŌV in the elimination of

78 52 TTABVUE 8.
79 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trove.
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the last silent letter E and the addition of the macron over the letter O. The silent
letter E and the macron serve the same function to make clear that the O in TRŌV
and “trove” is pronounced as a long vowel. In connection with refusals based on
descriptiveness and likelihood of confusion, the courts and the Board long have found
that the phonetic equivalent of a word will be perceived as the word. See In re
Research & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]here
is little room in which to debate the similarity between ROPELOCK and ROPELOK
in appearance and sound”); In re Hercules Fasteners, Inc., 203 F.2d 753, 97 USPQ
355, 358 (CCPA 1953) (“We are of the opinion that ‘Fastie’ is merely a phonetic
spelling of ‘fast tie’ and that it connotes that which unites or joins quickly”); Andrew
J. McPartland, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 164 F.2d 603, 76 USPQ 97, 99 (CCPA
1947) (“[T]he term ‘Kwixtart’ is but a phonetic spelling of the term ‘quick start’ and
was intended to describe merely that appellant ’s battery would start a motor or
engine quickly”).80 See also Nazon v. Ghiorse, 119 USPQ2d 1178 (TTAB 2016) (“We
recognize that Opposer’s mark is SEXSTROLOGY, but consider the references to
SEXTROLOGY relevant to our determination as to whether Opposer has proprietary

80 See In re Calphalon Corp., 122 USPQ2d 1153 (TTAB 2017) (holding SHARPIN, the
phonetic equivalent of “sharpen,” merely descriptive of knife blocks with built-in sharpeners);
In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198 (TTAB 2009) (holding URBANHOUZING would be perceived
by consumers as the equivalent of the descriptive term URBAN HOUSING); In re Ginc UK
Ltd., 90 USPQ2d 1472, 1475 (TTAB 2007) (“The generic meaning of ‘togs’ not overcome by
the misspelling of the term as TOGGS. . .”); In re Stanbell, Inc., 16 USPQ2d 1469 (TTAB
1990), aff’d, 20 USPQ2d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (ICE PAK held generic for ice packs); In re
Hubbard Milling Co., 6 USPQ2d 1239 (TTAB 1987) [MINERAL-LYX held generic for mineral
licks for feeding livestock].

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rights in her mark since the two terms are nearly identical and, indeed, can sound
the same.”).
We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that TRŌV will not be perceived
as TROVE because “consumers [are not] expected to understand or appreciate the
role of diacritic symbols—such as a ‘macron’ over the ‘O’ —in the English language.”81
In our view, whether consumers understand a diacritic depends on which diacritic it
is. Diacritics are the literal guide to the vocal pronunciation of letters or combinations
of letters, defined as “a mark near or through an orthographic or phonetic character
or combination of characters indicating a phonetic value different from that given the
unmarked or otherwise marked element.”82 A macron is a diacritic, defined as “a
mark − placed over a vowel to indicate that the vowel is long or placed over a syllable
or used alone to indicate a stressed or long syllable in a metrical foot.”83
Some diacritics are infrequently used in English.84 However, the macron is
regularly used in English dictionaries and recognized as a guide to pronunciation. See
E. I. Runner Co. v. W. F. Young, Inc., 77 F.2d 638, 25 USPQ 392, 393 (CCPA 1935)
(“It will be noticed that ‘RōBENE’ is printed with a small ‘o’ with a macron. … The
first syllable of the word ‘RōBENE’ is pronounced with a long ‘o’ as in ‘roe.’”); The
Ruberoid Co. v. Globe Roofing Prods. Co., 106 USPQ 374, 375 (Comm’r 1955)

81 73 TTABVUE 43.
82 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diacritic
83 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/macron
84 The unpublished case Petitioner cites for the proposition that consumers do not understand
diacritics involved a different diacritics, namely the diaresis or umlaut. In re MNMCO LLC,
Serial No. 78622540, 2007 WL 4438609, at *3 n.4 (TTAB Dec. 14, 2007).
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(‘“Kolorgran’ can be pronounced ‘color-grann or ‘color-grain.’ The same word with the
macron is more likely to be pronounced ‘color-grain,’ particularly by those who notice
the macron.”). In fact, the term “trōv” appears in the dictionary definition of “trove”
as the guide to the pronunciation85:
→
The cases in which the Board has held that there is no correct pronunciation of a
mark that is not a recognized word are not incompatible with the cases finding that
consumers recognize phonetic equivalents, it means only that the two lines of cases
involve different facts. StonCor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., 111 USPQ2d at
1651; In re Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 162 USPQ 227 (CCPA 1969). On this
record, we find the term TRŌV would be perceived as the phonetic equivalent to the
word “TROVE.” The term “trove” is not arbitrary but suggestive as applied to
Respondent’s asset management software record, and the record does not indicate
any other word which TRŌV could be perceived to be.
The testimony that TRŌV sometimes is mispronounced, and that third party
typesetting and graphic layout limits do not always allow Respondent to display its

85 See n.80, supra.
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mark with a macron, does not alter our finding.86 We credit the evidence on both
points, but note that there is no evidence that TRŌV or TROV is mispronounced as
TRAV. We find that evidence of the mispronunciation of TRŌV does not outweigh the
visual similarities of the terms TRŌV and “TROV” to the word “trove,” or the
suggestiveness of the word “trove” when applied to asset management software.
Because Respondent’s mark TRŌV likely will be perceived as the word “trove,”
and because the words “trove” and TRAVELERS are words in the common parlance
with distinct and unrelated meanings, we find the marks TRŌV and TRAVELERS
convey different meanings. See Nat’l Distillers and Chem. Corp. v. William Grant &
Sons, Inc., 184 USPQ 34 (CCPA 1974) (DUET and DUVET were held not to be
confusingly similar in view of the finding that DUET is a common word in the English
language with a clear and obvious meaning not possessed by DUVET).
Both the marks TRŌV and TRAVELERS are registered in standard characters
with no design element, so there is only the literal element to compare the marks as
used on or in connection with the parties’ goods and services. We find the marks differ
in appearance, sound, and meaning. We find the mark TRŌV is suggestive of the
focus of Respondent’s software on assets, whereas the mark TRAVELERS is
suggestive of prospective purchasers of Petitioner’s insurance. We find the marks
TRŌV and TRAVELERS create different commercial impressions when used in

86 32 TTABVUE 13-17; 36 TTABVUE 11-13. In fact, words similar to “trove” have multiple
pronunciations (the words clove or stove are pronounced differently from the words glove and
love, which are pronounced differently from the word prove), and so we find Respondent’s
term TRŌV as likely to be pronounced correctly as the word “trove” itself.
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connection with Respondent’s software and Petitioner’s insurance services. See Coach
Services, 101 USPQ2d at 1721-22 (“[S]ubstantial evidence supports the Board’s
determination that Triumph’s COACH mark, when applied to educational materials,
brings to mind someone who instructs students, while CSI ’s COACH mark, when
used in connection with luxury leather goods, including handbags, suitcases, and
other travel items, brings to mind traveling by carriage.”).
In sum, under the first DuPont factor, we find that the appearance, sound,
meaning, and overall commercial impression of the marks TRŌV and TRAVELERS
are sufficiently dissimilar to render confusion unlikely.
Conclusion as to likelihood of confusion between
TRAVELERS and TRŌV marks
“In a particular case, any of the DuPont factors may play a dominant role.” Weider
Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., LLC, 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1361 (TTAB 2014)
citing DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567; Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em, 14 USPQ2d at 1550 (TTAB
1990), aff’d, 951 F.2d 330, 333 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“We know of no reason why, in a
particular case, a single DuPont factor may not be dispositive.”). Despite the DuPont
factors of fame, the relationship between the goods and services, the channels of
trade, and prospective purchasers favoring a finding of likelihood of confusion, and
the factors of actual confusion and market interface being neutral, the factor of the
dissimilarity of the marks TRŌV and TRAVELERS is dispositive. Citigroup Inc. v.
Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(despite the fame of Opposer’s CITIBANK marks and virtual identity of services,
court upheld Board’s finding of no likelihood of confusion with CAPITAL CITY BANK
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marks based in large part upon the dissimiliarity of the parties’ marks). On balance,
and taking into account the totality of the evidence of record, with respect to
Petitioner’s TRAVELERS marks, we find that Petitioner has failed to prove likelihood
of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
B. Petitioner’s TRAV-formative Marks
Petitioner owns the following registrations for the marks TRAVCOMP,
TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, TRAVCARE NURSELINE (with line design), and
TRAVPAY, which Petitioner calls the “TRAV formative” marks.87
MARK/REGISTERED GOODS/SERVICES

TRAVCOMP
(standard characters)

Registration No. 2345794
filed 08-11-99
issued 04-25-2000
renewed

Administration of workers compensation claims and
cost containment services in Class 36

TRAVSOURCES
(standard characters)

Registration No. 3644700
filed 05-13-08
issued 06-23-2009
renewed

Providing online information and resources in the
field of insurance and risk control in Class 36

TRAVCARE
(standard characters)

Registration No. 4498838
filed 07-16-12
issued 03-18-2014
Sec. 8 accepted

Providing workers’ compensation insurance claim
assessment services, namely, claim reporting and
claim processing, all provided through an integrated
nurse advice telephone hotline in Class 36

87 8 TTABVUE 102-125. As with the TRAVELERS registrations, we list only the registered
services to which Petitioner refers in its brief.
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MARK/REGISTERED GOODS/SERVICES

(NURSELINE disclaimed)

Registration No. 4498839
filed 07-16-12
issued 03-18-2014
Sec. 8 accepted

Same as Registration No. 4498838

TRAVPAY
(standard characters)

Registration No. 4641530
filed 10-11-11
issued 11-18-2014

Insurance administration services in Class 36

Insurance administration services, namely,
providing use of online non-downloadable software
for linking payroll information to workers’
compensation premiums in Class 42

1. PRIORITY
As set forth above, each of Petitioner’s five TRAV-formative registrations issued
from an application filed earlier than Respondent’s application filed March 13, 2015,
establishing Petitioner’s priority under Trademark Act Section 7. In addition,
Petitioner submitted uncontradicted testimony regarding use of each TRAV-
formative mark prior to Respondent’s TRŌV first use date of December 15, 2014,
averring use since 1998 for the mark TRAVCOMP, use since 2008 of the mark
TRAVSOURCES, and use since 2012 of the marks TRAV CARE, TRAVCARE
NURSELINE, and TRAVPAY.88 Respondent does not contest that Petitioner has
priority of use of its TRAV-formative marks. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has

88 14 TTABVUE 48-53.
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established the necessary prior use in connection with its likelihood of confusion claim
as to the TRAV formative marks.
2. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION BETWEEN TRAV-
FORMATIVE AND TRŌV MARKS
We now turn to each relevant DuPont factor for which there are arguments and
evidence regarding Petitioner’s TRAV-formative marks and Respondent’s TRŌV
mark.
Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Services, Channels of Trade,
and Purchasers

We first address the second, third, and fourth DuPont factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity between the goods and services, their trade channels, and
their buyers. Because Petitioner’s pleaded marks TRAVCOMP, TRAVCARE,
TRAVCARE NURSELINE, and TRAVPAY marks are used in connection with related
workers’ compensation insurance services, we discuss them together. We take judicial
notice that “workers’ compensation” is defined as “a system of insurance that
reimburses an employer for damages that must be paid to an employee for injury
occurring in the course of employment.”89 Respondent registered its TRŌV mark for
software for asset management, with an insurance function to obtain quotes and
obtain insurance for those assets.
Petitioner submits testimony describing the services offered in connection with
the TRAVCOMP, TRAVCARE, TRAVCARE NURSELINE, and TRAVPAY marks,

89 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/workers%27%20compensation.
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“some of which are used online and/or have been used in connection with software.”90
Petitioner’s submission includes sample promotional materials for what Petitioner
describes in its brief (73 TTABVUE 31) as its TRAVCOMP “workers’ compensation
insurance claim investigation and management services,”91 its TRAVCARE and
TRAVCARE NURSELINE “workers’ compensation insurance claim assessment
services,”92 and its TRAVPAY “insurance administration software for linking a
policyholder’s payroll information to workers’ compensation premiums.”93
With respect to these four marks, Petitioner offers no evidence that Respondent’s
software and Petitioner’s services, trade channels, or buyers are related beyond the
mere fact that they involve insurance in some way. The identification of Respondent’s
software and the recitation of Petitioner’s services include no overlap or logical nexus
from which we could derive evidence of a relationship between software for asset
management with an insurance function to obtain quotes and obtain insurance for
those assets, and Petitioner’s varied workers’ compensation insurance services. The
extremely broad facts that Respondent’s software and Petitioner’s services have some
connection to insurance and to software are not enough to show that the goods and
services are related to or would be encountered by the same consumer. The Board has
held that “there can be no rule that certain goods or services are per se related, such
that there must be a likelihood of confusion from the use of similar marks in relation

90 14 TTABVUE 47.
91 11 TTABVUE; 19 TTABVUE 136-58.
92 11 TTABVUE 4-12, 20, 22-56.
93 11 TTABVUE 58-61, 63, 66, 68, 70, 72, 77-84, 86-109.
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thereto.” H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform Inc., 87 USPQ2d at 1723. “[A] finding that the
goods are similar is not based on whether a general term or overarching relationship
can be found to encompass them both.” Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp.,
94 USPQ2d 1399, 1410 (TTAB 2010) (citing Harvey Hubbell Inc. v. Tokyo Seimitsu
Co., Ltd., 188 USPQ 517, 520 (TTAB 1975)); In re W.W. Henry Co., 82 USPQ2d 1213,
1215 (TTAB 2007) (“[T]o demonstrate that goods are related, it is not sufficient that
a particular term may be found which may broadly describe the goods”); see also Bose
Corp., 63 USPQ2d at 1310 (stating, in dicta, that “a broad general market category
is not a generally reliable test of relatedness of products”).
Turning to the TRAVSOURCES mark, Petitioner’s services are broadly defined in
the registration as “providing online information and resources in the field of
insurance and risk control.” At best, as with the general insurance services offered in
connection with the TRAVELERS mark, Respondent’s software which facilitates
obtaining insurance for specific assets has some relationship to Petitioner’s online
insurance information services. Construing the services broadly, Respondent’s
TRAVSOURCES service could include online information regarding insurance for
assets such as those managed by Respondent’s software.
Petitioner’s submission includes sample promotional materials for what
Petitioner describes in its brief (73 TTABVUE 31) as its TRAVCOMP “online
resources in the field of insurance risk control and management.”94 We note that
Petitioner submitted no evidence showing any overlap in the channels of trade or

94 19 TTABVUE 161, 165, 167, 169, 173, 177-178, 179, 186, 188, 191-197.
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prospective purchasers of its TRAVSOURCES services and Respondent’s TRŌV
software. Based on the relationship shown by Petitioner’s broad recitation of services,
at best there may also be a relationship between the channels of trade and prospective
purchasers for Respondent’s software which facilitates obtaining insurance for
specific assets and Petitioner’s online insurance information services.
In sum, we find the DuPont factors of relationship between the goods and services,
channels of trade, and prospective purchasers to favor Respondent with respect to the
TRAVCOMP, TRAVCARE, TRAVCARE NURSELINE, and TRAVPAY marks, and to
favor Petitioner with respect to the TRAVSOURCES mark.
Strength of Petitioner’s TRAV-formative Marks

Turning to the inherent strength of Petitioner’s TRAV-formative marks, each
mark TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, TRAVCARE NURSELINE, and
TRAVPAY comprises a coined or fanciful term not found in a dictionary. See Nautilus
Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173, 1181 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“A fanciful mark is a non-dictionary word concocted by the trademark
holder for its product…”). Coined or fanciful terms are typically considered strong.
Id.; Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Bata Narodni Podnik, 222 F.2d 279,
105 USPQ 432, 437 (CCPA 1955) (“A strong and fanciful mark is entitled to broad
protection.”); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1740 n.18 (TTAB
2014) (“Whether AKEA is a coined term or a Sardinian greeting, it is an inherently
strong mark.”).
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Petitioner did not submit evidence regarding the commercial strength of any of
the TRAV-formative marks. Unlike the case with its TRAVELERS marks, Petitioner
points to no advertising expenses dedicated to, or revenues derived from, any of the
services offered under the TRAV-formative marks. The only examples of use are
Petitioner’s promotional materials, and the record does not include any details as to
how or to whom those materials were distributed. Although the testimony states that
an unspecified amount of the promotional materials are available on Petitioner’s
website, we do not assume that every visitor to a website encounters every page on
the website.
Petitioner argues for commercial strength with its contention that the TRAV-
portion of the TRAV-formative marks is a shorthand for the famous TRAVELERS
mark and name. 73 TTABVUE 30-31. As a preliminary matter, we take judicial notice
that the term “TRAV” is listed in the dictionary as an abbreviation for “travel.”95 We
further take judicial notice that the term “travel” is not just the root of the term
“travelers,” but an industry in which workers’ compensation claims may be filed. For
example, see Alcatraz Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750,
1762 (TTAB 2013) (“The record shows that purchasers of respondent’s services are
not limited to leisure travelers visiting Annapolis but also include entities involved
in the travel industry, including petitioner itself which once purchased respondent’s
services, for resale to consumers.”), aff’d mem., 565 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

95 Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trav.
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In support of its position that TRAV in the TRAV-formative marks will be
perceived as TRAVELERS, Petitioner cites the promotional materials showing “The
‘TRAV’ portion of each TRAV-Formative Mark … is often displayed in different fonts,
colors, and/or styles from the other wording in such marks, and reinforces and
promotes the TRAVELERS brand,” 96 and its past use of a TRAV perfin. On this first
point, we note that with the exception of the mark which is limited
to a particular presentation, the other four TRAV-formative marks are registered in
standard characters. See Trademark Rule 2.52(a) (“Applicants who seek to register
words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof without claim to any particular
font style, size, or color must submit a standard character drawing that shows the
mark in black on a white background.”). While Petitioner undoubtedly has
emphasized the TRAV portions of the mark in some of its promotions for the services
under those marks, there is no statement that it has done so exclusively, and its
registrations offer no bar to using other displays in the future. Cunningham v. Laser
Golf Corp., 55 USPQ2d at 1847-48 (“The record shows that the registration for the
LASERSWING mark contains a ‘typed drawing.’ … Therefore, it is irrelevant that
Cunningham has a particular display for his mark in commerce, and the Board was
correct to ignore those features.”).97 More importantly, as already noted in connection
with the other DuPont factors, except for their presence on Petitioner’s website, there

96 See footnotes 88-91, supra, for record references to the promotional materials for each
TRAV-formative mark.
97 Effective November 2, 2003, Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. §2.52, was amended to replace
the term “typed” drawing with “standard character” drawing. TMEP §807.03.
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is no evidence as to the circumstances in which the relevant purchasing public
encounters Petitioner’s promotional materials with any of its TRAV-formative marks,
including the mark.
In support of its contention that TRAV in the five TRAV-formative marks is
perceived as a shorthand for the TRAVELERS mark, Petitioner submits website
pages with images of envelopes with stamps perforated by the sender to prevent theft,
including two envelopes (dated 1918 and 193198) sent by Petitioner with a TRAV
perfin:99

This evidence is unconvincing because the perfin itself is barely noticeable, there is
no testimony or other evidence explaining how long or how often the perfin was used
or how a prospective purchaser would encounter it, and there is no nexus between

98 Petitioner’s brief refers to a third example, but this does not appear in the record.
99 11 TTABVUE 120-21; 22 TTABVUE 15-16.
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any perception of the perfin by prospective purchasers in 1918 or 1931 and the
current perception of the TRAV-formative marks by prospective purchasers.
In sum, while we find the TRAV-formative marks TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES,
TRAVCARE, , and TRAVPAY to be inherently strong coined terms,
there is no evidence that they have been made commercially strong, and we disagree
that record demonstrates that the fame of the TRAVELERS marks extends to the
TRAV-formative marks.
Similarity or Dissimilarity of the TRAV-formative and TRŌV Marks

Registrant’s mark TRŌV differs significantly from Petitioner’s marks
TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, , and TRAVPAY in
appearance, sound, meaning, and overall commercial impression. Although the
marks both begin with the letters TR, and have V as the fourth letter, the mark TRŌV
comprises four letters in total, and Petitioner’s TRAV-formative marks are between
seven and seventeen letters long. The additional letters do not serve to reinforce the
three letters which the marks have in common, but instead create a different visual
impression.
As to meaning, as previously discussed, the mark TRŌV will be perceived as the
term “trove” when used on Respondent’s goods. In contrast, each TRAV-formative
mark is a coined term without recognized meaning. For the purposes of comparing
the marks, the meanings denoted by the terms TRŌV and TRAVCOMP,
TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, , and TRAVPAY are different
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inasmuch as Petitioner’s marks suggest a connection either with Petitioner or travel
generally.
As to the sound of the marks, the TRAV-formative marks form multisyllabic terms
whereas TRŌV is a single syllable. Aside from the common initial TR sound, the
marks do not share similarities in sound overall. We find that the marks TRŌV and
TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, , and TRAVPAY
convey different aural impressions, and the marks do not sound alike.
We find the marks differ in appearance, sound, and meaning, and create different
commercial impressions when used in connection with Respondent’s software and
Petitioner’s workmen’s compensation and online insurance information services. In
sum, under the first DuPont factor, we find that the appearance, sound, meaning,
and overall commercial impression of the marks TRŌV and TRAVCOMP,
TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, , and TRAVPAY are sufficiently
dissimilar to render confusion unlikely.
On balance, the only DuPont factors to favor the finding of a likelihood of confusion
between the TRŌV mark and the TRAV-formative marks are the relationship
between the goods and services, channels of trade, and prospective purchasers as to
the TRAVSOURCES mark, with those factors otherwise being neutral as to the other
marks. In combination with the finding that the TRAV-formative marks are not
commercially strong, the factor of the dissimilarity of the marks TRŌV and
TRAVCOMP, TRAVSOURCES, TRAVCARE, , and TRAVPAY is
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dispositive. With respect to the TRAV-formative marks, we find that Petitioner has
failed to prove likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
C. Petitioner’s TRV Mark
1. PRIORITY
Petitioner does not own a registration for the pleaded mark and trade name TRV,
and so must prove a priority date earlier than Respondent’s December 15, 2014 date
of first use in commerce. 100 Hydro-Dynamics Inc. v. George Putnam & Co. Inc., 811
F.2d 1470, 1 USPQ2d 1772, 1773 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The common law and the Lanham
Act require that trademark ownership be accorded to the first bona fide user.”).
Petitioner’s proprietary rights may arise from a prior registration, prior trademark
or service mark use, prior use as a trade name, prior use analogous to trademark or
service mark use, or any other use sufficient to establish proprietary rights. Herbko
Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
A party challenging registration of a trademark due to a likelihood of confusion with
its own unregistered term cannot prevail unless it shows that its term is distinctive
of its goods or services, whether inherently, through the acquisition of secondary
meaning, or through “‘whatever other type of use may have developed a trade
identity.”’ Towers v. Advent Software Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 16 USPQ2d 1039, 1041 (Fed.

100 As set forth earlier, Petitioner owns a pending Trademark Act Sec. 1(b) application for the
mark TRV (standard characters) for “insurance services in the field of property and casualty,
namely, insurance underwriting, insurance claims servicing, loss control and risk evaluation
for others, and providing information in the field of insurance.” Also as set forth earlier,
Respondent has proven its first use date of December 15, 2014, a date prior to Petitioner’s
filing date of September 13, 2016.
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Cir. 1990) (quoting Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 209
USPQ 40, 43 (CCPA 1981)).
Here, as set forth in the discussion of the pleadings, Petitioner has pleaded rights
in TRV as a mark and a trade name.101 Petitioner contends that its TRV stock symbol
has been in use since 2007102, that its use of TRV includes service mark and trade
name use, and has become interchangeable with its famous TRAVELERS mark and
trade name. In support of its contention that TRV is a service mark and trade name,
Petitioner submits testimony with representative examples of third party news
articles and blog posts, its Securities and Exchange (SEC) filings103, its websites,
email addresses, domain names sending traffic to its Travelers website, and social
media posts. Respondent contests that TRV is distinctive and acts as either an
indicator of source or a trade name, arguing that TRV is perceived only as Petitioner’s
stock symbol.104

101 Priority based on use analogous to service mark use must be pleaded, and Petitioner has
not done so in this case. Cent. Garden & Pet Co. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co., Inc., 108 USPQ2d at
1142-43; Fair Indigo LLC v. Style Conscience, 85 USPQ2d 1536, 1538-9 (TTAB 2007).
102 73 TTABVUE 16-20. We take judicial notice of the glossary at Investor.gov, a webpage of
the SEC, and its entry for “ticker” which states “Each publicly traded common stock in the
U.S. receives a short abbreviation that identifies it, known as its stock symbol or stock ticker
symbol. Some stocks have single-letter ticker symbols while others may have up to five.
Letters that appear after a ticker provide additional information. For instance, the letter “Q”
after a ticker signifies that the company is in bankruptcy.”
Https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/ticker.
103 We take judicial notice of the fact that “The federal securities laws require publicly
reporting companies to disclose information on an ongoing basis. For example, domestic
companies must submit annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and
current reports on Form 8-K for a number of specified events and must comply with a variety
of other disclosure requirements.” Https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/investing-basics/glossary/form-10-k.
104 77 TTABVUE 39.
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Service Mark Use of TRV

Under Trademark Act Section 45, “a mark shall be deemed to be in use in
commerce … on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce ….” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See Couture
v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379, 113 USPQ2d 2042, 2043 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“On its
face, the statute is clear that a mark for services is used in commerce only when both
[1] ‘it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and [2] the services
are rendered ….’”). To function as a service mark, a mark must be used in a manner
that creates in the minds of potential consumers a direct association between the
mark and the services. In re Universal Oil Prods. Co., 476 F.2d 653, 177 USPQ 456,
457 (CCPA 1973). “The ultimate question here is this: whether purchasers would
perceive [Applicant’s] mark[] to identify [the services listed in the application].” In re
JobDiva, Inc., 121 USPQ2d at 1126.
We turn first to the 216 online articles and blog posts offered to show third party
recognition of the term TRV as interchangeable with the mark TRAVELERS for
insurance. At the outset it is important to note that there are zero instances in which
TRV appears without the term TRAVELERS. While all articles have been considered,
the representative examples below include each year prior to Respondent’s December
15, 2014 first use date:
Fitch has upgraded its Issuer Default Rating (IDR) on The Travelers
Companies, Inc. (NYSE:TRV) to ‘A+’ from ‘A’ and its ratings on TRV’s senior
unsecured notes and subordinated notes to ‘A’ and ‘A-’ respectively.
Additionally, Fitch has upgraded its insurer financial strength (IFS) ratings
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on TRV’s insurance company subsidiaries to ‘AA’ from ‘AA-’ The Rating
Outlook is Stable. See below for a list of ratings.
Fitch Ratings Upgrades Travelers’ IDR to ‘A+’; IFS to ‘AA’ Outlook Stable,
Business Wire, May 21, 2007105

Moody’s Investors Service has assigned an ‘A3’ rating to U.S.-based The
Travelers Companies Inc.’s around $500 million senior unsecured notes
issuance, due 2018. Moody’s said the proceeds are expected to be used for
general corporate purposes. The ‘A3’ rating on these notes has been placed on
review for possible upgrade, in line with the ongoing review for possible
upgrade of TRV’s long-term and short-term debt ratings . . . However, they are
tempered by company’s exposure to cyclical pricing trends in the
property/casualty insurance sector which will likely result in pressure on
TRV’s operating margins in the coming years.
Travelers Companies’ $500 Million Notes Issuance Assigned ‘A3’ Rating-
Moody’s, Thomson Financial News, May 8, 2008106

Prompted by the federal stimulus package, Travelers (TRV) has issued
insurance specifically targeted for road construction workers, firming shares.
Sector Update: Financials, Midnight Trader Live Briefs, August 21, 2009107

Allstate (ticker: ALL) is an interesting stock. First, it is - perhaps - the only
large public insurer where there is a fundamental story to be told. Not much
is really happening in our view at companies such as Chubb (CB), Travelers
(TRV), or Ace (ACE).
The State of Allstate’s Risks, Rewards, O’Neill, “Barron’s Online, December 30,
2010108

The Travelers Companies (NYSE:TRV) has been downgraded by TheStreet
Ratings from a buy to hold. The company’s strengths can be seen in multiple
areas, such as its revenue growth, largely solid financial position with
reasonable debt levels by most measures and reasonable valuation levels.
However, as a counter to these strengths, we also find weaknesses including
deteriorating net income, poor profit margins and weak operating cash flow.
Highlights from the ratings report include:
TRV’s revenue growth trails the industry average of 20.7%. Since the same
quarter one year prior revenues slightly increased by 3.4%. This growth in

105 25 TTABVUE 662.
106 Id. at 622.
107 Id. at 566.
108 Id. at 423.
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revenue does not appear to have trickled down to the company ’s bottom line,
displayed by a decline in earnings per share.
The Travelers Companies Inc. Stock Downgraded (TRV), TheStreet, August 10,
2011109

Thursday has been a pretty middling day for Dow Jones insurance titan
Travelers Cos. (NYSE:TRV). The company reported earnings of $1.26 per share
- yes, well better than the 88 cents Travelers recorded in the year-ago period,
but far from the $1.38 consensus estimate from Wall Street analysts. TRV
shares flirted between gains and losses since the bell, but were down less than
1% in midday trading.
Should I Buy Travelers? 3 Pros, 3 Cons, Taulli, Investor Place, July 19, 2012110

Travelers Companies (TRV) helped lift the Dow, with shares climbing more
than 2% after the insurer reported a rise in profits. Shares of Coach (COH)
jumped 10% after the upscale retailer posted better-than-expected
sales and earnings.
Stocks rebound after fake tweet spooks investors, CNNMoney, April 23, 2013

Among concerns expressed on Wall Street, Bernstein Research analysts wrote,
“Travelers is a disciplined company and defensive stock, but after 3 years of
cyclical margin expansion, we believe margins are peaking, future earnings
growth will slow, and given recent stock momentum, we expect TRV is likely
to lag in the coming year.”
Travelers Operating Profit Falls as Catastrophe Costs Rise – Update, Dow
Jones Institutional News, July 22, 2014111

With a few exceptions discussed below, we find that the third party articles and
blog posts feature announcements or discussions of Petitioner’s stock performance, or
activities which affect that stock performance (such as an upcoming joint venture),
and identify Petitioner as a company with publicly traded common stock by using its
stock symbol TRV. The articles, however, do not show use of TRV as a service mark
indicating the source of insurance services. In support of this finding we note that the

109 Id. at 388.
110 Id. at 326-27.
111 Id. at 234-35.
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use of TRV as the stock symbol sometimes is specified, with a notation that the
“ticker” follows the company name,112 the stock symbol is accompanied by the
exchange on which the ticker appears, such as TRV:NYSE113, or all companies listed
in the article also are accompanied by their stock symbol.114 In addition, we find that
when the TRV stock symbol appears in parentheses following the Travelers company
name in an article discussing the company’s stock performance , or vice versa with the
Travelers company name appearing in parentheses after the TRV stock symbol, this
use of TRV will be perceived merely as a stock symbol. Moreover, where the first use
of TRV in an article is tied to its function as a stock symbol in one of these ways, the
use thereafter of TRV alone in the same article discussing Petitioner’s stock
performance likely will be perceived as having the same function.
Because the third party articles and blog posts in which TRV appears are devoted
to stock performance, we find no distinction between those articles which appear
within a business publication which also includes articles of more general interest,
and those articles which appear within a publication devoted to tracking stock
performance. These instances of TRV use do not advertise, or serve to create the
necessary association with, Petitioner’s insurance services. Although there is no bar

112 Id. at 423, 513, 606, 609, 612, 641, 666.
113 Id. at 254-55, 286, 326, 340, 388, 439, 463, 547, 632, 662. NYSE is the acronym for the
New York Stock Exchange. Https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/NYSE.
114 Id. at 246-48, 250-52, 258-59, 262-64, 278-80, 282-84, 298-99, 302-04, 306-08, 310-12, 314-
15, 318-19, 330-31, 333-35, 345-46, 351-53, 355-57, 362, 366, 368-70, 372-74, 376-77, 380,
393-95, 397-98, 403-04, 410-12, 414-17, 432-33, 436-37, 446-48, 456-57, 459-60, 474-76, 481,
489-90, 492-93, 495-97, 505-11, 554-55, 563, 580-81, 584-85, 590-99, 601, 603-04, 616, 619,
624-30, 638, 644, 648-53, 662, 666-70.
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to a stock symbol also functioning as a service mark, there is no presumption that a
stock symbol is also a trademark or service mark. See CCI Corp. v. Cont’l Commc’ns,
Inc., 184 USPQ 445, 447 (TTAB 1974) (“[W]hat may happen in the trading of stock
on the various exchanges or what impression persons may gather from reading daily
stock reports in newspapers is largely divorced from the actual circumstances and
conditions that one encounters in the marketing milieu surrounding the offering and
sale of goods and services”); The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 179
USPQ 496, 496 n.4 (TTAB 1973) (“There is evidence to show that the letters ‘GT’ are
used as a ticker symbol by various stock exchanges, including the New York Stock
Exchange, to identify opposer on the exchange. However, there is no indication as to
why these letters were adopted by these stock exchanges, while there is testimony
that opposer is not known in the tire trade by any such initials.”).
Below are the five instances of third party use of TRV to refer to Petitioner which
are not used in connection with stock performance:
The Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Travelers Indemnity Company
(TINDY, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Travelers Insurance Group
holdings Inc. (TIGHJ a non-insurance holding company, which is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Travelers Property Casualty Corp. (TPC), a non-insurance
holding company, which is a wholly- owned subsidiary of The Travelers
Companies Inc. (TRV), a publicly traded holding company.
Association Examination Report of First Trenton Indemnity Company as of
December 31, 2009 by the Connecticut Insurance Department115

Growth
1. Liberty Mutual - 169.9%
2. Allstate - 67.4%
3. American Family - 34.6%
4. Esurance - 15.2%

115 Id. at 529.
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5. Travelers - 7%
Highest Engagement (Calculation of Likes, Comments, Shares, and
Impressions that each FB post receives)
1. Travelers - 303
2. USAA - 124
3. MetLife - 105
4. American Family - 89
5. Nationwide – 69
Average Reply Time (HH:MM:SS)
…

1. @WeAreFarmers - 2:28:00
2. @amfam - 3:33:00
3. @Nationwide - 3:47:00
4. @TRV_Insurance - 3:51:00
5. @StateFarm - 4:17:00”
Benchmarking Group Rates Allstate at the Top of Insurers Using Social Media,
Property Casualty 360 - National Underwriter, January 30, 2013116

Insure yourself. Talk to a rental insurance agency such as Travelers Insurance
(TRV) or Allstate (ALL) about pet-ownership. Insurers can add pet riders that
will cover you if your dog causes harm to someone, which might help a landlord
feel at ease.
Get out of the Doghouse, Seven Ways to Get a Leg up on a Pet-Friendly Living
Space, Margaret Littman and Jamie Damato, WeSeed, June 1, 2009117

Then, Colleen O'Brien, PETA’s director of communications, wrote Unleashed
with some “exciting news”: Today, PETAs Primatologist, Julia Gallucci, was
told by the CEO of Dodge that, after receiving complaints from PETA and other
animal protection groups, the company has made the decision to remove the
chimpanzee from their commercial. . . . Dodge joins Travelers Insurance (TRV),
AT&T (T) and Europcar, all of whom pulled or altered ads with chimpanzees
in just the last month after being contacted by PETA.
Why Chrysler Could Be the Next Apple, Rohrlich, Minyanville, August 16,
2010118

For more than 15 years, Ariola has written and directed commercials for
brands such as Coca-Cola, Mercedes-Benz, Nike, and Levi’s. That Travelers

116 Id. at 292.
117 Id. at 577.
118 Id. at 450.
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Insurance (TRV) ad where people and cars snowball down a San Francisco
street? That was him.
Q&A: Director Dante Ariola Trades Car Ads for Colin Firth, Bloomberg, April
25, 2013119

The first two examples recognize Petitioner as an insurance company – one is a
state insurance examination report and the second is a comparison of insurance
companies by their use of social media – but are written for insurance industry
professionals to show compliance with regulation and competition in specific areas.
Of the latter three examples written for a general audience, which would include
prospective purchasers of insurance, the term TRV appears in a parenthetical
following Travelers. These three articles showing use of the TRV as a shorthand
reference to Travelers are insufficient to show public recognition of TRV as a service
mark for insurance services.
Petitioner points to its “Investor Relations” and “SEC Filings” pages for examples
of its own use of TRV.120

119 Id. at 269.
120 11 TTABVUE 127, 757.
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As shown, each page includes the TRAVELERS mark with the red umbrella
design on the upper left hand and the domain name Travelers.com on the upper right
hand. On the Investor Relations page, TRV appears twice, both times linked to NYSE
(TRV:NYSE), the stock exchange on which Petitioner’s stock is traded. On the SEC
Filings page, TRV appears in parentheses after the corporate name Travelers Cos.
Inc. in the 8-K Abstract which describes the event which required the filing. We find
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the pages on Petitioner’s website address stock performance and related activities,
and so specifically link TRV to its function as Petitioner’s stock symbol, and do not
advertise or create an association with Petitioner’s insurance services. The pages,
which bear the date “01-28-2019” and “01-25-2019” also are deficient in establishing
use of TRV prior to Respondent’s first use date of December 15, 2014.
The SEC filings themselves, which include filings for 2013 and 2014 showing use
of TRV prior to Respondent’s first use date, comprise thousands of pages and have
been made of record with testimony that the filings are available on the website and
are mailed to Petitioner’s shareholders.121 Also on its website, Petitioner points to the
use of TRV in synopses of its quarterly financial results which Petitioner posts and
which are reviewed by “many investors and financial services professionals.”122 See
sample excerpt:123

121 11 TTABVUE 128-613; 13 TTABVUE; 70 TTABVUE 2656-3567.
122 13 TTABVUE 68; 11 TTABVUE 616-756.
123 11 TTABVUE 622.
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Because the use of TRV occurs only sporadically in these SEC filings and quarterly
financial presentations, and the filings and presentations are dedicated to meeting
the requirements of a publicly traded company or summarizing reported financial
activities, and not to advertising insurance services, these filings also fail to
demonstrate the necessary association between TRV and Petitioner’s insurance
services. In re Pitney Bowes, Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1417, 1419 (TTAB 2018) (“For
advertisement specimens such as Applicant ’s webpages, ‘[i]n order to create the
required ‘direct association,’ the specimen must not only contain a reference to the
service, but also the mark must be used on the specimen to identify the service and
its source.’”) (citation omitted).
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Petitioner submits testimony regarding TRV use as a formative in two domain
names, various email addresses, and as part of its Twitter handle 124, excerpted
examples shown below. The record indicates that “since May 2016, Travelers has used
the TRV Mark as part of the URL www.home.trv, which re-directs to the
www.travelers.com website” and “[s]ince September 2016, Travelers has owned the
domain name www.trv.com, which includes the TRV Mark. Visitors to www.trv.com
are automatically re-directed to Travelers’ home page at www.travelers.com, where
Travelers’ insurance products and services are promoted and sold as discussed
above.”125 Because the URLs do not identify a website which advertises or has any
association with Petitioner’s insurance services, but merely redirect traffic to a URL
which does not include TRV, this use is insufficient to establish service mark use. See
In re Roberts, 87 USPQ2d 1474, 1479 (TTAB 2008) (finding that irestmycase did not
function as a mark for legal services, where it is used only as part of an address by
means of which one may reach applicant’s website, or along with applicant’s other
contact information on letterhead); In re Eilberg, 49 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (TTAB
1998). Moreover, the dates of use occur after Respondent’s first use date of December
15, 2014.
With respect to the email addresses, Petitioner submits testimony that “[t]he TRV
Mark in these email addresses signifies to recipients and senders that the email
comes from or is being sent to Travelers, i.e., TRV is used as a shorthand for the

124 14 TTABVUE 68-73.
125 Id. at 72-73.
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TRAVELERS trademark and trade name” and “[r]epresentative examples of
Travelers’ external use (including dates of use) of the TRV Mark in connection with
various email addresses are listed below.126 We exclude those addresses with use
occurring after Respondent’s first date of use: 127
• TRVCyber@ems.travelers.com (used since 2013 by Travelers’ Cyber to send
marketing emails to Travelers’ agents)
• TRVExCas@travelers.com (used since 2008 by Travelers’ Excess Casualty
to receive a consumer’s reply email to marketing emails sent by Travelers’
agents)
• TRVSelAc@travelers.com (used since 2008 by Travelers’ Select Accounts to
receive a consumer’s reply email to marketing emails sent by Travelers’
agents)
• TRVNatPr@travelers.com (used since 2008 by Travelers’ National Property
as a ‘replyto’ address for agent email communications)
• TRVGlobT@travelers.com (used since 2008 by Travelers’ Global Technology
as a ‘reply-to’ address for agent email communications)
• TRVDaCal@travelers.com (used since 2013 by Travelers’ Data Call
Communications to communicate with Travelers’ Direct Assignment clients)

Petitioner’s testimony also refers to attached “representative examples of Travelers’
use of TRV in its email addresses for marketing, promotion, and communications
purposes.” However, none of the examples attached include dates prior to
Respondent’s first use date, but as shown in the example below are email messages
dated 2017 and 2018.128

126 14 TTABVUE 72.
127 14 TTABVUE 71.
128 12 TTABVUE 14-41.
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In the absence of documentary support, combined with the fact that TRV is not
separable from the remainder of the email address, we find that the parenthetical
following each email address does not provide sufficient detail as to how actual and
prospective insurance customers encounter the email addresses for us to conclude
that TRV is perceived as a source indicator for insurance services. For example, there
is no evidence as to how often these email addresses are used or the nature of the
marketing material included in the emails which would cause the sender to associate
the email address with Petitioner’s insurance services.
Finally, we turn to Petitioner’s testimony regarding its two uses of TRV on
Twitter, namely its use of the “handle” @TRV_Careers to issue messages, or tweets,
and its use of TRV to refer to itself within its tweets.129 With respect to the first use,
Petitioner asserts “since as early as 2011 and continuing to the present, Travelers
has used the Twitter account handle “@TRV_Careers” in connection with promoting

129 14 TTABVUE 68-71.
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Travelers’ recruitment programs and hiring opportunities.”130 The screenshot of
Petitioner’s Twitter page follows131:

The page is dated September 14, 2018 and the tweets are dated August 31 –
September 13, with the most recent dated “21 hours”, presumably a reference to
earlier on the day the screen shot was taken, September 14, 2018. This evidence does
not demonstrate that insurance customers would perceive the TRV in the term
@TRV_Careers as a mark for insurance services, and does not demonstrate use prior
to Respondent’s first use date of December 15, 2014. See Nazon v. Ghiorse, 119

130 Petitioner’s testimony also cites two other Twitter handles which included TRV, but states
that use of both handles ceased in 2014. No documentary support with details showing the
association of the mark with the services accompanies the testimony. 14 TTABVUE 69-70.
131 12 TTABVUE 4-7.
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USPQ2d at 1185 (“On this record, Opposer has not shown that the use of
SEXSTROLOGY as her Twitter handle created trademark rights in the term.”).
With respect to Petitioner using Twitter posts to refer to itself as TRV, most of the
tweets include references to the handle TRV_Insurance, with no specific connection
to insurance services.132 The following tweet is representative:

In addition to lacking the connection of TRV to Petitioner’s insurance services,
there is no testimony relating to the extent of consumer exposure to the social media
platforms (such as the number of followers, likes, or other analytics) which would
demonstrate prospective purchaser recognition of TRV as a service mark. See
Performance Open Wheel Racing, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Club Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 208901,
*9 (TTAB 2019) (“[I]f Applicant is going to submit testimony/evidence about the
pervasiveness of its social media, then Applicant should provide an explanation about
how it is probative.”).
Having carefully considered Petitioner’s evidence of priority, we find that it fails
to demonstrate that purchasers would perceive TRV as a mark to identify the source
of Petitioner’s insurance services.

132 12 TTABVUE 9-12.
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Trade Name Use of TRV

A trade name is “any name used by a person to identify his or her business or
vocation.” Trademark Act Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127; W. Fla. Seafood Inc. v. Jet
Rests. Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 31 USPQ2d 1660, 1665 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “[A] trade name
lacking any independent trademark or service mark significance may bar registration
of a trademark or service mark that is confusingly similar to that trade name.”133
Martahus v. Video Duplication Servs. Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 27 USPQ2d 1846, 1850 (Fed.
Cir. 1993). The standard for establishing trade name use is less stringent than
establishing use as a trademark. To establish trade name use, an “organization need
only to have used a name.... in a manner that identifies the company by that name....
to the public.... [N]o particular formality of adoption or display is necessary to
establish trade name identification.” Nat’l Cable Television Assoc’n Inc. v. Am.
Cinema Editors Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Brooks
v. Creative Arts by Calloway LLC, 93 USPQ2d 1823, 1833 (TTAB 2009). Accord
Weldon Farm Prods., Inc. v. Packaging Enters., Inc., 197 USPQ 584, 589 (TTAB 1977)
(“[N]owhere does the Act require that a trade name must be actually used on goods,
much less in a prominent manner on goods, in order to serve as the basis for a refusal
to register under Section 2(d); all that is required is that the designation in question
be a name or title which has been lawfully adopted and previously used in the United

133 A trade name which also has significance as either a trademark or a service mark may be
registered, whereas a trade name lacking any such significance may not. Martahus, 27
USPQ2d at 1850.
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States by any entity engaged in trade or commerce and capable of suing or being sued,
and not abandoned.”).
Implicit in the requirement that the trade name identify the company is the
requirement that the trade name is distinctive. “[T]rade identity rights arise when
the term is distinctive, either inherently or through the acquisition of secondary
meaning.” Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 57 USPQ2d 1720,
1722 (Fed. Cir. 2001) quoting Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 16 USPQ2d at 1041.
“[I]f an opposer’s alleged means of trade designation is not distinctive--does not
identify source--then there is no basis upon which to compare such a thing with the
applicant’s mark to determine whether confusion as to source is likely.” Otto Roth v.
Universal Foods, 209 USPQ at 44. The party asserting a trade name must show that
its trade name is “‘of such a nature that the use thereof by [plaintiff] would have been
sufficient to create a proprietary right therein, namely, an association by the
applicable trade of the name or term exclusively with [plaintiff] and its [services].”’
Brooks v. Creative Arts by Calloway, LLC, 93 USPQ2d at 1832 (quoting Fluid Energy
Processing & Equip. Co. v. Fluid Energy, Inc., 212 USPQ 28, 35 (TTAB 1981)).
In determining whether TRV was distinctive as a trade name prior to
Respondent’s date of first use, we exclude the evidence showing use of TRV as a stock
symbol, either because the use is accompanied by other indicia of stock symbols or
because the use occurs exclusively in connection with a discussion of stock
performance. However, as set forth above, the record includes other uses of TRV
which, while not sufficiently associated with Petitioner’s insurance services for
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service mark use, are not exclusively uses as a stock symbol and so identify TRV as a
trade name of Petitioner. More specifically, the handful of examples of third party
use, Petitioner’s website via the 2013 and 2014 SEC filings and presentations,
Petitioner’s email addresses, and Petitioner’s Twitter page all show use of TRV as a
trade name to identify Petitioner. See West Florida Seafood, 31 USPQ2d at 1663
(“[W]hether a particular piece of evidence by itself establishes prior use is not
necessarily dispositive as to whether a party has established prior use by a
preponderance. Rather, one should look at the evidence as a whole, as i f each piece of
evidence were part of a puzzle which, when fitted together, establishes prior use.”).
We reject Petitioner’s contention that TRV is interchangeable with Travelers as a
trade name. Thousands of pages in this record demonstrate the long and wide use of
Travelers as a trade name as well as a famous mark in use prior to Respondent’s first
use date of December 15, 2014. The evidence of use of TRV as a trade name is scant.
Nevertheless, under the broad definition of a trade name, we find that both Travelers
and TRV are trade names for the same company, albeit with widely varying degrees
of use by Petitioner and the public.
Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated priority of trade name use
of TRV for its likelihood of confusion claim.
2. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION BETWEEN TRV TRADE NAME AND
TRŌV MARK

As a preliminary matter we address Petitioner’s contention that Respondent’s
correspondence, set forth above with respect to the prior dealings between the parties,
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equals an admission that the marks are confusingly similar.134 More specifically,
Petitioner contends “Trov’s letter, including its admissions as to the mark’s ‘obvious’
similarities and that marketplace confusion is not only likely but, in fact, ‘will’ occur,
are admissions against interest and highly persuasive evidence in the likelihood-of-
confusion analysis.”135 Respondent contends that it did not issue a cease and desist
letter but an inquiry, and Respondent disagreed with Petitioner’s characterization of
its rights, but believed the inquiry satisfied.136
We disagree that the ultimate legal question of likelihood of confusion can be
determined by an admission. “Facts alone may be ‘admitted’.” Interstate Brands Corp.
v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 576 F.2d 926, 198 USPQ 151, 153 (CCPA 1978); Lasek
& Miller Assocs. v. Rubin, 201 USPQ 831, 838 (TTAB 1978). Accord Ultra Elecs., Inc.
v. Workman Elecs. Prods., Inc., 192 USPQ 497, 498 (TTAB 1976) (“[A] letter of
infringement in which a party expresses the view that there is likelihood of confusion
between its mark and that of the adverse party is not necessarily controlling on the
question of likelihood of confusion”). Factual statements made in the letter may be
taken as admissions and the earlier opinion may be received in evidence “as merely
illuminative of shade and tone in the total picture confronting the decision maker.”
Interstate Brands Corp., 198 USPQ at 154. Thus, we will consider admitted by
Respondent the facts of “obvious mark similarities.” We find the statement as to

134 73 TTABVUE 42.
135 Id.
136 77 TTABVUE 33-35.
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“apparent overlap in services” is not necessarily an admission relevant to this
proceeding since the subject registration does not feature services but goods, and at
the time the statement was made, the record shows that Respondent had obtained
registrations for the same mark for services. See Martahus, 27 USPQ2d at 1849
(“VDS’s allegedly inconsistent comments, when read as a whole and in context with
all of the activities preceding VDS’s submittal of its reply brief to the TTAB, suggest
little more than an admission that, although VDS was not certain that a likelihood of
confusion existed, VDS nonetheless believed that it was entitled to priority if such a
likelihood was found.”).
Strength of Petitioner’s TRV Trade Name

The trade name TRV is a coined term without a dictionary definition, and thus is
conceptually strong as applied to Petitioner’s insurance services. In view of the
scarcity of its use, and the dearth of any evidence regarding Petitioner’s promotion of
the TRV trade name, we find that TRV is not commercially strong. As noted earlier
in this decision, TRV does not appear in any document which does not also include
Travelers, whether as a mark or a trade name. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument
that this means that the fame of the TRAVELERS mark extends to TRV, we find
there is no evidence that the purchasing public encountering TRV without
TRAVELERS will perceive TRV as identifying Petitioner. This factor is neutral.
Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Services, Channels of Trade,
and Purchasers

Because the trade name TRV identifies an insurance company, the services offered
by the company have some relationship to Respondent’s asset management software
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with a function for obtaining insurance. Construing the TRV insurance services
broadly, Petitioner’s services could include insurance for assets such as those
managed by Respondent’s TRŌV software. Based on the relationship between
Petitioner’s insurance services and Respondent’s software, there may also be a
relationship between the parties’ channels of trade and prospective purchasers.
In sum, we find the DuPont factors of relationship between the goods and services,
channels of trade, and prospective purchasers to favor Petitioner.
Similarity or Dissimilarity of TRV Trade Name and TRŌV Mark

Registrant’s mark TRŌV differs from Petitioner’s trade name TRV in appearance,
sound, meaning, and overall commercial impression. While the marks both begin
with the letters TR, and end in the letter V, the letters TRV are Petitioner’s entire
trade name while Respondent’s mark TRŌV has the additional vowel Ō.
As to the sound of the marks, the letters TRV likely are pronounced as three
syllables (TEE ARE VEE) where TRŌV is a single syllable. The marks do not share
similarities in sound. We find that the marks TRŌV and TRV convey different aural
impressions, and the marks do not sound alike.
As to meaning, as previously discussed, the mark TRŌV suggests the term “trove”
when used on Respondent’s goods. In contrast, TRV is a coined term without
recognized meaning. See In re Gen. Elec. Co., 134 USPQ 190 (CCPA, 1962) (VULCAN
and VULKENE held not to be similar in view of the well-known significance of
VULCAN); Diamond Alkali Co. v. Diversified Chems. Corp, 145 USPQ 156 (TTAB
1965) (no likelihood of confusion between opposer ’s trade name DIAMOND
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CHEMICALS and applicant’s mark DI-CHEM). For the purposes of comparing the
marks, the meanings denoted by the terms TRŌV and TRV are different.
We find the marks differ in appearance, sound, and meaning, and so create
different commercial impressions when used in connection with Respondent’s
software and Petitioner’s trade name for its insurance company. In sum, under the
first DuPont factor, we find that the appearance, sound, meaning, and overall
commercial impression of the marks TRŌV and TRV are sufficiently dissimilar to
render confusion unlikely.
On balance, the only DuPont factors to favor the finding of a likelihood of confusion
between the TRŌV mark and the TRV trade name are the relationship between the
goods and services, channels of trade, and prospective purchasers. In combination
with the finding that the TRV trade name is not particularly commercially strong,
the factor of the dissimilarity of TRŌV and TRV is dispositive. With respect to
Petitioner’s TRV trade name, we find that Petitioner has failed to prove likelihood of
confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.

VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, taking into account the totality of the evidence of record, we find that
Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (i) the
application was void ab initio in part because the mark was not in use with the
software functions of “obtaining insurance quotes, purchasing insurance policies” at
the time the application was filed; or (ii) that there is a likelihood of confusion
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between Respondent’s mark TRŌV and Petitioner’s TRAVELERS marks, TRAV-
formative marks, or TRV trade name.
Decision: The petition to cancel is dismissed.