THE REYNOLDS AND REYNOLDS COMPANY

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 23, 2021

2020006678 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/618,567 06/09/2017 Robert T. BROCKMAN REYNOLDS.174003 1313
100183 7590 03/23/2021
Locklar PLLC
Michael Locklar
238 S. Egret Bay Blvd. # 386
League City, TX 77573
EXAMINER
RUHL, DENNIS WILLIAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@adolphlocklar.com
docket@al-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBERT T. BROCKMAN

Appeal 2020-006678
Application 15/618,567
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, and
MICHAEL A. VALEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4–8, and 10–15 as lacking patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant
appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject the claims.1 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The Reynolds
and Reynolds Company. Appeal Br. 5.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4–8, and 10–15 under 35 U.S.C
§ 101 in the Non-Final Office Action mailed Sept. 19, 2019 (“Non-Final
Act.”) “because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without
significantly more.” Non-Final Act. 2.
Claim 1, the only independent claim 1, is reproduced below with
numbered annotations added for reference to the limitations in the claim.
1. A method comprising:
[1] detecting an RFID tag with a vehicle intake bay entry
antenna, the RFID tag positioned on a vehicle, the vehicle
intake bay entry antenna positioned at the entry of the vehicle
intake bay of a vehicle service facility;
[2] determining whether the RFID tag is associated with
[2a] a loaner vehicle, [2b] a vehicle having a scheduled
appointment or [2c] a vehicle associated with a walk-in
customer by:
[2i] transmitting from the vehicle intake bay
antenna to a computer system wirelessly, via a local area
network, or a wide entry network the identification of the RFID
tag detected;
[2ii] correlating the identification of the RFID tag
detected with a unique vehicle identifier; and
[2iii] determining whether the unique vehicle
identifier is a vehicle having a scheduled appointment, a vehicle
associated with a loaner vehicle, or a vehicle associated with a
walk-in customer by comparing information in a database with
the unique vehicle identifier;
[3] if the RFID tag is associated with a vehicle having
[2b] a scheduled appointment or [2c] a vehicle associated with a
walk-in customer,
[3i] evaluating the equity or value of the vehicle or
length of time left on a loan associated with the vehicle;
[3ii] when the equity or value of the vehicle or
length of time left on a loan associated with the vehicle meets a
criterion, generating a lead for a salesperson wherein the sales
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lead is an identification of a potential sales customer for the
dealership;
[3iii] communicating the sales lead to a
salesperson for managing the sales lead; and
[3iv] displaying a greeting on a greeting screen,
the greeting screen visible by the customer, the greeting
including a customer name and an advertisement banner.

PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
However, not every discovery is eligible for patent protection. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). “Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. The Supreme
Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether a claim falls
within an excluded category of invention. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012).
In the first step, it is determined “whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If
it is determined that the claims are directed to an ineligible concept, then the
second step of the two-part analysis is applied in which it is asked “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us?” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that this step involves
a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
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Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (citing from Mayo, 566
U.S. at 75–77).
Alice, relying on the analysis in Mayo of a claim directed to a law of
nature, stated that in the second part of the analysis, “the elements of each
claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” must be
considered “to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217
(citation omitted).
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Eligibility Guidance”) (we cite to the Federal Register where the
Eligibility Guidance was published). This guidance provides additional
direction on how to implement the two-part analysis of Mayo and Alice.
Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance looks at the specific
limitations in the claim to determine whether the claim recites a judicial
exception to patent eligibility. In Step 2A, Prong Two, the claims are
examined to identify whether there are additional elements in the claims that
integrate the exception in a practical application, namely, is there a
“meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. (Step 2A, Prong Two).
If the claim recites a judicial exception that is not integrated into a
practical application, then as in the Mayo/Alice framework, Step 2B of the
Eligibility Guidance instructs us to determine whether there is a claimed
“inventive concept” to ensure that the claims define an invention that is
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significantly more than the ineligible concept itself. Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 56.
With these guiding principles in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the claimed subject matter in this appeal is eligible for patent
protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Discussion
Claim 1 is directed to a method, which is a “process” and one of the
broad statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter listed in 35
U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, following the first step of the Mayo/Alice analysis,
we find that the claim is directed to a statutory class of invention. We thus
proceed to Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg.

Step 2A, Prong One
In Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance, the specific
limitations in the claim are examined to determine whether the claim recites
a judicial exception to patent eligibility, namely, whether the claim recites an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. The Eligibility
Guidance directs examiners to search each limitation in the claim to
determine whether it recites abstract an abstract idea. Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 54.
The Examiner found that the steps of the claimed method recite the
abstract idea of “generating a sales lead for a customer” by determining
information from an RFID tag. Non-Final Act. 2. The Examiner found that
the method “represents a method of organizing human activities [which is a]
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type of abstract idea in the form of a sales activity.” Id. “Certain methods of
organizing human activity” is one of the groupings of abstract ideas listed in
the Eligibility Guidance. See Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. “[S]ales
activities or behaviors” is specifically mentioned as an example of this
grouping. Id. The Examiner also found that the steps of the claim of
identifying a sales lead could be accomplished mentally. Non-Final Act. 4.
“Mental processes” are listed in the Eligibility Guidance as one of the broad
categories of abstract ideas. See Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea.
The first two steps of claim 1 involve detecting an RFID tag on a
vehicle “positioned at the entry of the vehicle intake bay of a vehicle service
facility” and using the tag to determine information about the vehicle,
specifically whether the vehicle is “[2a] a loaner vehicle, [2b] a vehicle
having a scheduled appointment or [2c] a vehicle associated with a walk-in
customer” (claim 1, steps 1 and 2). An RFID tag is a radio frequency
identification tag.
RFID tags, particularly passive RFID tags, provide an
inexpensive tag which can be: (1) applied to an object; (2)
powered from the impinging interrogatory signal, thus requiring
no internal power source; and (3) sensed remotely up to several
meters distance without the necessity of locating the tag. Each
RFID tag carries a permanent, unique identifying numeral,
which may be associated with the object to which the tag is
attached.
DePrisco 5.2

2 DePrisco et al., US 2008/0301008 A1, published Dec. 4, 2008 (cited by
the Examiner in a rejection of the claims based on 35 U.S.C § 103, which
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These steps of the claim to recite data-gathering activities namely,
gathering information about the status of the car. The data-gathering steps
are part of the method of organizing the human activity because determining
the vehicle status is the first step of determining whether there is a potential
sales lead. While RFID tags are used to obtain the information about the car,
vehicle information could also be obtained manually by looking up
information about the car, for example, by using the license plate of the car
or asking the car owner.3 Thus, the recited data-gathering steps are also
capable of being accomplished mentally by a human.
Step 3 of the claim determines that, if the RFID tag “is associated with
a vehicle having [2b] a scheduled appointment or [2c] a vehicle associated
with a walk-in customer,” then [3i] “the equity or value of the vehicle or
length of time left on a loan associated with the vehicle” is evaluated. When
a “criterion” is met in the gathered information of step 3i, a sales lead is
generated in step 3ii which is communicated to a salesperson. We consider
these steps of the claim to be part of the method of organizing human
activity because they are the necessary information gathering and
information assessment steps concerning categorizing an individual as a
potential customer, thereby generating the sales lead.
Essentially, the vehicle information gathered in steps 2iii, 3, and 3i of
claim 1 is used to determine whether a service customer at a vehicle service
facility could become a sales customer based on the equity or value of the
vehicle to be serviced or the length of term left on the vehicle loan. Spec. ¶

was subsequently withdrawn). See Applicant’s Response to Non-Final
Office Action, filed Jan. 29, 2019, 7 (discussing DePrisco).
3 See Spec. ¶ 3 which describes “traditional customer vehicle intake
processes” as being “manually intensive.”
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42 (Step 3i). The claim does not require these steps to be performed by a
computer, and thus a salesperson could manually perform them by looking
up the information in an available database or asking the customer directly.
Accordingly, these steps of the claim also involve mental processes, another
category of abstract ideas listed in the Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Once the potential sales customer is identified in claim step 3ii and
salesperson is identified in claim step 3iii, the customer’s name and an
advertisement are displayed on a greeting screen, (step 3iv). We do not
consider this display step to be part of the abstract idea recited in the claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Examiner did not err
in determining that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. We therefore proceed to
Step 2A, Prong Two of the analysis.

Step 2A, Prong Two
Prong Two of Step 2A under the Eligibility Guidance asks whether
there are additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical
application. We must look at the claim elements individually and “as an
ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements integrate
the recited abstract idea into a practical application. As explained in the
Eligibility Guidance, integration may be found when an additional element
“reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field” or “applies or uses the
judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking
the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. 55.
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Appellant argues that step 2 of “determining whether the RFID tag is
associated with [2a] a loaner vehicle, [2b] a vehicle having a scheduled
appointment or [2c] a vehicle associated with a walk-in customer” integrates
“an abstract idea into a specific process for improving identification of sales
leads and is therefore patentable.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant states that it is
“not possible to perform the claimed invention by hand or by merely
thinking” step 1 of detecting the RFID tag on the vehicle because it “requires
equipment that operates in a particular way, not something that could be
performed manually.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims pass
muster at Step 2, Prong Two. It is true that an RFID tag is used to gather
information about the vehicle when parked in the vehicle service facility.
However, merely using a technology to automate a step that could be
accomplished manually is insufficient to confer patent eligibility on claim.
“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via
pen and paper or in a person’s mind.” Versata Development Group, Inc. v.
SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed Cir. 2016)
(“Furthermore, with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”). We acknowledge
that an RFID tag is not a computer. However, like the computer in Versata
and Intellectual Ventures I, the RFID tag is a generic component that
provides generic functionality, namely automatically providing information
about the item on which it is attached, instead of requiring manual
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identification of the item and then manually looking up stored information
about that item. Thus, like the computer, the RFID tag is being used to
automate a step that could be accomplished in the human mind, namely,
data-gathering.
We further note that “mere” data-gathering steps are insufficient to
make a patent-ineligible claim eligible, even when physical steps are
involved. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“even if some physical steps are required to obtain
information from the database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard,
clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability.”).
Consequently, for the reasons discusses above, we are not persuaded
that using the RFID tag to gather information about the vehicle’s status at
the service facility is sufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application
Because we find that the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application under Step 2, Prong Two, we proceed to Step 2B of the analysis.

Step 2B
Step 2B of the Eligibility Guidance asks whether there is an inventive
concept. In making this Step 2B determination, we must consider whether
there are specific limitations or elements recited in the claim “that are not
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may be present” or whether the claim
“simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
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exception, indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56 (footnote omitted).
Appellant argues that the step of detecting the RFID tag at vehicle
service facility as recited in step 1 of the claim is not well-understood,
routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant, citing the Specification,
contends that the use of RFID tags “solves problems associated with . . .
[the] manually intensive process” in vehicle service facilities of searching
for service employees and locating and notifying customers. Id. at 12–13.
We are not persuaded by this argument that the RFID technology
provides an inventive concept to the claim. As explained by the Examiner,
the claim is “using RFID technology in its ordinary and customary manner.”
Non-Final Act. 9. The Examiner referred to the prior art cited in the
obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 to establish that it was known
to utilize RFID tags to gather information about a vehicle. Ans. 5. DePrisco,
published at least 8 years before the asserted effective filing date of the
application on appeal, for example, describes an RFID tag attached to a
vehicle which, when interrogated, allows “a user to access the database to
determine vehicle location, vehicle features and ownership status.” DePrisco
¶ 8. Appellant’s contention, therefore, that the RFID technology recited in
the claim is “not well-understood, routine, or conventional” is contradicted
by the evidence of record.
The use of the RFID technology could confer eligibility to the claim if
it had been used or arranged in a non-conventional manner, but that is not
the case for the claims at issue here. The distinction between when a claim
utilizes a data-gathering sensor in an inventive, non-conventional way, and
when it does not, was articulated in iLife Technologies, Inc. v. Nintendo of
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America, Inc., No. 2020-1477, 2021 WL 117027, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13,
2021). In iLife, the claims were directed to a system comprising a sensor
“that senses dynamic and static accelerative phenomena” of a body and then
processes that information to “determine whether said evaluated body
movement is within environmental tolerance.” The court, in finding the
claim ineligible for a patent because it recited an abstract idea, explained:
iLife argues claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea because it
recites a physical system that incorporates sensors and
improved techniques for using raw sensor data like the claims
we held eligible in Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic,
Inc., 955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020). But in Thales, the claims
recited a particular configuration of inertial sensors and a
specific choice of reference frame in order to more accurately
calculate position and orientation of an object on a moving
platform. 850 F.3d at 1349. We held the claims were not
directed to an abstract idea because they sought to protect “only
the application of physics to the unconventional configuration
of sensors as disclosed.” Id. Likewise, the claims in CardioNet
were not abstract because they focused on a specific means or
method that improved cardiac monitoring technology,
improving the detection of, and allowing more reliable and
immediate treatment of, atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter. 955
F.3d at 1368. In contrast, claim 1 of the ’796 patent is not
focused on a specific means or method to improve motion
sensor systems, nor is it directed to a specific physical
configuration of sensors. It merely recites a motion sensor
system that evaluates movement of a body using static and
dynamic acceleration information.
iLife, *2.
Here, like the claims in iLife, and in contrast to the technological
improvements recited in the claims of Thales and CardioNet, rejected claim
1 is not focused on an improvement to RFID technology. The RFID tag is
“positioned on a vehicle” and the antenna to detect the tag is “positioned at
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the entry of the vehicle intake bay.” Claim 1, step 1. This is the same
conventional configuration and implementation of RFID technology known
in the art. See DePrisco ¶ 8. Appellant does not provide arguments or
evidence that this arrangement is unconventional or inventive, rather than
simply being the standard positions necessary to detect the RFID tag
according to the well-understood principles underlying this technology.
The claim also recites in step 2i that the vehicle intake bay antenna
transmits “the identification of the RFID tag” wirelessly to a “computer
system.” But again, Appellant does not provide arguments or evidence that
the transmission of the RFID tag identification to the computer is
unconventional and inventive.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the rejection of claim 1 as
patent-ineligible. Claims 4–8 and 10–15 are not argued separately and fall
with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

SUMMARY
In summary:

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–8, 10–
15
101 Eligibility 1, 4–8, 10–
15

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TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED