The Paymaster Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 14, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 381 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

THE PAYMASTER CORP
The Paymaster Corporation and United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case
13-CA-7559.
June 14,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On February 16, 1967, Trial Examiner
Leo F. Lightner issued his Decision in the above-
entitled case, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a supporting brief and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, The Paymaster
Corporation, Chicago, Ilinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LEO F . LIGHTNER , Trial Examiner : This proceeding
was heard before me in Chicago, Illinois, on December 13,
1966 , on the complaint of the General Counsel, as
amended , and the answer , as amended , of The Paymaster
Corporation , herein called the Respondent.' The
complaint alleges violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and
(7) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as
amended , 61 Stat . 136, herein called the Act. The parties
waived oral argument and briefs filed by the General
Counsel and Respondent have been carefully considered.
' The charge herein was filed on August 12, 1966 The
complaint was issued on October 21, 1966, and amended at the
opening of the hearing herein
381
During the hearing I reserved rulings on several motions
including Respondent's motions to dismiss the complaint,
and portions thereof. These motions are disposed of in
accordance with the Findings and Conclusions herein set
forth.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is an Illinois corporation , maintaining its
principal office and place of business at Chicago, Illinois,
where it is engaged in the manufacture of checkwriting
machines . During the calendar year immediately
preceding the issuance of the complaint , a representative
period, Respondent shipped goods valued in excess of
$250,000 to points outside the State of Illinois . During the
same period Respondent purchased goods valued in
excess of $50,000 from points outside the State of Illinois.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein
referred to as the Union, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The principal issues raised by the pleadings and
litigated at the hearing are whether the Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) by: (1) the conduct of President
Hirschberg, on July 22, 1966, allegedly constituting
(a) interrogation of employees, (b) demanding that
employees present union authorization cards to him,
(c) threatening employees with legal action, law suits, and
other reprisals, (d) accusing employees of giving false
testimony in a previous Board proceeding, or
(e) threatening employees with loss of employment; or by
(2) Respondent's announcing and placing into effect
improved working conditions and wage raises, in the form
of (a) a pension plan, (b) an improved hospitalization plan,
(c) a suggestion award program, (d) additional holidays,
(e) payment of benefits for military reserve duty, and (f) a
wage increase, all while objections to an election were
pending before the Board. Respondent, by answer, denies
the commission of any unfair labor practices.
B. Supervisory Personnel and Agent
It is undisputed that T. B. Hirschberg, Jr., president of
Respondent, is an agent within the meaning of
Section 2(13) and a supervisor within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act.
165 NLRB No. 33
382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Background and Sequence of Events
The Union commenced an organizing effort at
Respondent's plant on August 24, 1965. On October 26,
1965, the Union filed a charge alleging conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1), Case 13-CA-7219. On November 16, 1965,
the Union filed a petition for election, Case 13-RC-10757.
On December 15, 1965, the Regional Director issued a
complaint, which was withdrawn on December 17, upon
the Regional Director's approval of an informal settlement
agreement which, inter alia, provided for the posting of a
notice. On January 31, 1966, the parties executed a
stipulation for certification upon consent election. On
February 21, 1966, the Regional Director notified the
parties that he had withdrawn his approval of settlement
and issued a new complaint. On March 2, 1966, an election
was held, in which the Union was unsuccessful. The Union
filed timely exceptions to conduct affecting the election,
and on March 28 the Regional Director issued his report
on objections , resulting in a consolidation of the cases.
Thereafter, in April 1966, a hearing was held before a Trial
Examiner.
On December 15, 1966, after the record in the hearing
herein was closed, the Board issued its Decision in the
prior case.' The Board found that Respondent had
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
violation of the provisions of Section 8(a)(1), in certain
particulars, and to remedy these unfair labor practices, the
Board ordered Respondent to cease and desist from the
following conduct: (a) granting or promising wage
increases, a pension or profit-sharing plan, improved
hospitalization benefits, a new system for determining and
handling employees' grievances, in order to interfere with
the employees' choice of a bargaining representative, or as
an inducement to reject and refrain from activities in
support of the Union; (b) keeping under surveillance, or
creating the impression of surveillance, the activities of its
employees in support of the Union; (c) interrogating its
employees in a manner violative of the Act; (d) threatening
plant closure, withdrawal of a cafeteria, or parking lot
privileges, if the Union were successful; (e) threatening
employees with discharge or with physical violence
because of their support of the Union; (f) requiring an
employee, Munizza, to publicly read, to assembled
employees , an antiunion statement ; and (g) posting notices
which modify, alter, or detract from notices posted
pursuant to an order of, or agreement with, the Board. The
Board, finding that a broad, rather than the customary
narrow, remedial order was necessary, in view of the
variety of violations found, and the fact that the remedial
action provided for in the withdrawn settlement agreement
had been found to be ineffective, ordered Respondent to
cease and desist from in any other manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
rights granted in Section 7 of the Act. The Board further
ordered that the notice, which it ordered posted, should be
signed personally by President Hirschberg, and vacated
the election of March 2, 1966, remanding to the Regional
Director the matter of conducting a new election "when he
2 I have taken official notice of the Board's Decision in the
case, identified and reported at 162 NLRB 123
3 The Board , in the prior case , denied a motion to reopen and
consolidate, requested by General Counsel, asserting that the
remand would delay , rather than effectuate , the prompt
enforcement of the Order it issued
deems that circumstances permit the free choice of a
bargaining representative."
It is thus patent that the events herein occurred
between the time of the hearing and the time the Board's
Decision in the preceding case,3 and while some of the
matters complained of herein, as constituting unfair labor
practices, were being litigated.
D. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The events of July 22, 1966
It is undisputed that Friday, July 22, 1966, was the last
day of work at Respondent's plant preceding a closedown
for a vacation period. At approximately 2:30 p.m., a
number of employees, estimated as between 30 and 40,"
were in the locker room preparing to leave when President
Hirschberg entered and engaged Freeman in a
conversation. The conduct of Respondent alleged, in
paragraph VI of the complaint, to be violative of the
provisions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, are premised
entirely on the remarks of President Hirschberg at that
time. The evidence as to what was said is in dispute and is
next considered.
Eugene A. Freeman, who has been employed by
Respondent for 8 years as a welder, credibly asserted that,
while he was engaged in removing items from his locker,
Hirschberg entered the room and walked to a point a few
feet from where Freeman was standing . Hirschberg
advised Freeman that Hirschberg had heard that Freeman
was distributing union authorization cards and inquired
how long he was going to continue to do this. Freeman
responded, "til as long as the United States Government
permitted me to this right." Freeman asserted that
Hirschberg responded by using a profane word and saying,
"This to me and to the United States, the Government, and
then, too he said the same word to the Steelworkers Union
and to the Labor Board." Hirschberg then demanded that
Freeman give him a copy of the authorization card which
Freeman had been distributing. When Freeman advised
Hirschberg that he was out of cards, Hirschberg asserted a
desire to search Freeman. Thereupon, Freeman inquired if
Hirschberg had a search warrant, advising Hirschberg that
he could not search him Hirschberg became angry and
advised Freeman, "If you continue to do this, I will murder
you. I mean legally, not physically." Hirschberg then
advised Freeman that Freeman had lied while appearing
as a witness in the Board hearing, inferentially the
preceding case, and that Hirschberg intended to sue
Freeman and prove that he had prevaricated. Hirschberg
then advised Freeman that Freeman was not an honest
man, called him an S.O.B.,S then inquired, "why don't you
hit me?" Freeman responded, "Violence is not my way."
Hirschberg then stated, "Well, if you can't fight, you'd
better get some brains." Hirschberg started to leave,
returned, and advised Freeman, "While you're on your
vacation you'd better look for another job." Freeman
inquired, "Is that a threat?" Hirschberg then asserted, "If
you want to advance yourself, your wife and your family,
you'd better find some place else to work." Hirschberg
' The estimate of Freeman was 30 to 40, the estimate of
Mumzea was 35 to 40, the estimate of Hirschberg was 11 to 13,
while Morse gave no estimate I do not credit the estimate of
Hirschberg
5 Hirschberg actually used the elongated rather than the
abbreviated form
THE PAYMASTER CORP.
concluded the conversation by advising Freeman that he
would be watching him 6
Richard Munizza, who has been employed by
Respondent for approximately 3 years as a material
handler, corroborated the statements of Freeman, except
Munizza did not recite Hirschberg's invitation to Freeman
to engage in an altercation, or Freeman's recitation of
Hirschberg's reference to the asserted ancestry of
Freeman.7
Freeman and Munizza acknowledged that they were
among the group actively engaged in the effort to organize
Respondent's employees That Respondent was well
aware of these activities is adequately demonstrated by
the undisputed testimony of these two relative to a
meeting of the employees at the behest of Hirschberg,
which occurred on January 5, 1966. On that date
Hirschberg instructed Munizza to read an antiunion
speech which Hirschberg had prepared, at the conclusion
of which Munizza volunteered, to the assembled
employees in the presence of Hirschberg, "Sign up, this is
a lot of balogna." Hirschberg then instructed Freeman to
deliver a speech as to why Freeman thought the employees
needed a union, which Freeman did. At the conclusion of
Freeman's speech, Hirschberg referred to the union
employees who were acting as organizers as "nuts.""
In arriving at my credibility findings I have considered
the demeanor of the witnesses, their candor or lack
thereof, the interest of each in the outcome of the
litigation, and particularly the penchant of Hirschberg to
be evasive and argumentative.
Concluding Findings
During the hearing Respondent sought to develop,
through General Counsel's witnesses, "that Mr. Hirsch-
berg sometimes tends to make somewhat outlandish
statements." The Respondent also urged during the
hearing that there is a distinction between a statement
made to an active union leader and a statement made to
employees who are totally unfamilar with their rights.
Respondent, in its brief, would characterize Hirschberg's
initial inquiry of Freeman as to how long Freeman was
going to continue his efforts to organize employees, as "an
expression of exasperation with respect to Mr. Freeman's
persistent efforts to organize Respondent's employees."
6 1 find of no consequence Freeman's assertion that, during this
exchange , Hirschberg invited a timekeeper named Hollars to
come over and listen to the conversation Hollars did not appear
as a witness
' Hirschberg did not dispute the fact of his confrontation of
Freeman , or the presence of Munizza and other employees
Hirschberg varied his opening remarks to Freeman , initially
asserting that lie stated , " I understand you are passing out some
kind of cards," then asserting that he stated, "I understand you
have been passing some kind of union literature or cards Could
you please give me ones" Hirschberg asserted that Freeman
responded, "I don't have anymore cards " Hirschberg asserted
that lie then stated, "It is very peculiar that you have cards to pass
out all the time but not when I ask you for one," to which Freeman
made the same response . Hirschberg recited that nothing else
was said, then recalled that he had stated, "It 's been officially
posted on the plant in a notice which all employees knows [sic]
the plant is closed at 2 30 and I would like you to be sure that you
leave at 2 30." Hirschberg acknowledged using the profanity
recited by Freeman but denied making any comment about the
Board or the Union
Upon prompting by his counsel, Hirschberg then recalled that
he did state to Freeman "If you are not happy working here, why
don't you go and get another job with some other company, it is
383
Respondent urges that such an inquiry is protected under
Section 8(c). 1 disagree.
In the Blue Flash case " the Board held that
interrogation of an employee , as to union membership,
activities , and desires , is not per se unlawful . The Board, in
that case, found legitimate reason for inquiry, which was
conducted with appropriate safeguards . The Board held
that the test is whether , under all the circumstances,
interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with
the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act.
In the Johnnie's Poultry case "' the Board stated: The
purposes which the Board and courts have held legitimate
(permitting interrogation ) are of two types: Verification of
a union 's claim of majority status, to determine whether
recognition should be extended-and the investigation of
facts concerning issues raised in a complaint where such
interrogation is necessary in preparing the employer's
defense for the trial of the case . The Board further stated:
In allowing an employer the privilege of
ascertaining the necessary facts from employees in
these given circumstances , the Board and courts have
established specific safeguards designed to minimize
the coercive impact of such employer interrogation.
Thus, the employer must communicate to the
employee the purpose of the questioning , and assure
him that no reprisal will take place , and obtain his
participation on a voluntary basis; the questioning
must occur in a context free from employer hostility to
union organization and must not be itself coercive in
nature; and the questions must not exceed the
necessities of the legitimate purpose by prying into
other union matters , eliciting information concerning
an employee 's subjective state of mind , or otherwise
interfering with the statutory rights of the employees.
When an employer transgresses the boundaries of
these safeguards, he loses the benefits of the
privilege.
Prior to the Blue Flash case all interrogation was held to
be per se unlawful . As stated in the Decision in the
Johnnie's Poultry case, that holding has been modified to
permit legitimate inquiry , where legitimate inquiry is
essential and proper safeguards are established. The
incident herein is far from isolated , and, as the Supreme
Court has stated, in the Bryan case, supra, where
easy to get a job with any company nowadays All you got to do is
walk in." Freeman denied that Hirschberg had prefaced his
invitation to Freeman to find another job with the words , "If you
aren't happy here " Munizza was self-contradictory in first
asserting he did not remember any reference, by Hirschberg, to
Freeman's liking his job , then he asserted the remark was so
prefaced While I credit Freeman's version of what was said, I find
the existence or absence of the preface of no consequence
Hirschberg acknowledged that Freeman had not made any
statement indicating his pleasure or displeasure with his working
conditions. To the extent the testimony of Hirschberg is at
variance with that of Freeman and Munizza , I credit the latter
two
s While the events of January 5, 1966, are beyond the
Section 10(b) period, the charge herein having been filed on
August 12, 1966, the Supreme Court has stated that earlier events
may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters
occurring within the limitations period Local Lodge No 1424
IAM, AFL-CIO v N L R B [Bryan Manufacturing Co ], 362 U.S
411 Accordingly, my ruling striking portions of this testimony,
developed by Respondent on cross - examination , as neither
relevant or material, is vacated
0 Blue Flash Express, Inc ,109 N L R B 591
10 Johnnie 's Poultry Co ,146 NLRB 770,775
384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occurrences within the 6-month limitation period in and of
themselves may constitute, as a substantive matter, unfair
labor practices, earlier events may be utilized to shed light
on the true character of matters occurring within the
limitation period, and for that purpose Section 10(b)
ordinarily does not bar such evidentiary use of anterior
events. No claim of legitimate purpose for inquiry has
been advanced herein, rather Respondent has relied upon
denial of the use of specific language. I have found the
denials untenable, not only on the basis of demeanor but
also by reason of the unconvincing nature of the assertions
of Hirschberg. The background record is replete with
instances of employer hostility to union organization, from
which it is reasonable to infer union animus.
Absent requisite safeguards or purpose, I find that the
interrogation complained of was coercive, not only of
Freeman but also the other employees who were
witnesses, and thus, constituted interference, restraint,
and coercion, and was violative of the provisions of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
In so finding I incorporate Hirschberg's demand that
Freeman surrender a copy of the union authorization card
he was circulating, which in the last analysis is also a form
of interrogation concerning union activities. Respondent
would isolate the "request" from the balance of the
conversation and setting. Thus cast, Respondent urges
that the request was made of a known, outspoken, and
strong proponent of unionization and was thus not
coercive. General Counsel correctly casts this event in the
light of the entire conversation, including the use of
invective, the presence of numerous other employees,
whom it may be assumed reacted to Hirschberg's abuse of
a fellow employee, his threat to search Freeman, and his
advice that he would keep Freeman under observation.
The last observation can reasonably be inferred to relate to
Freeman's union activities.
Relative to the allegations of paragraph VI (c) and (d) of
the complaint, i.e., threatening employees with legal
action for having given testimony in a Board proceeding,
and accusing employees of giving false testimony,
Respondent asserts in the alternative that it was "an
irrational outburst" having no tendency to interfere with
Freeman's Section 7 rights, and that General Counsel did
not establish such a threat by a preponderance of the
evidence. Respondent's concept of "preponderance"
apparently turns on the failure of Munizza to corroborate
the assertions of Freeman in toto. I find no merit in this
contention. Respondent concedes, and the record reveals,
that Munizza did corroborate Freeman's assertion that
Hirschberg accused Freeman of having committed perjury
at the Board hearing.''
Respondent urges that an accusation that an employee
committed perjury is synonymous with "name calling,"
citing cases where the Board found "name calling" was
not violative of the Act. Respondent urges that the
accusations of Hirschberg, on July 22, were within the
"I find of no consequence the failure of the Trial Examiner, in
the prior case, to find an outburst by Hirschberg against Munizza
in January violative of Section 8(a)(1). In this connection , it is to be
noted that the Board found it unnecessary to pass upon General
Counsel' s exceptions to the failure of the Trial Examiner to find
other alleged conduct violative of this section, for the reason that
it would be "merely cumulative."
i2 Citing- Certain-Teed Products Corporation, 147 NLRB 1517,
1520; The Duplan Corporation (Forsyth Division), 139 NLRB
1028,1034
General Counsel, to place emphasis on the reasonable
privileges provided under Section 8(c). I do not agree.
General Counsel correctly urges that Hirschberg's
accusations reasonably tend to inhibit the Board's ability
to secure vindication of employee rights protected by the
Act, and that employer interference with the Board's
statutory processes constitutes a violation of Section
8(a)(1) is
Accordingly, I find that Hirschberg's statements to
Freeman, before an audience of 30 to 40 employees,
constituted a threat of reprisal for Freeman's having given
testimony in the previous Board proceeding, and his
undocumented accusation that Freeman had given false
testimony, were, in each instance, conduct constituting
interference, restraint, and coercion, and accordingly
violative of the proscriptions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
General Counsel urges that Hirschberg's advice to
Freeman, "If you want to advance yourself, your wife and
your family, you better find some place else to work,"
coupled with Hirschberg's admission that Freeman had
said nothing during the conversation to cause Hirschberg
to think Freeman was not happy in his job, requires a
conclusion that these comments patently communicate a
threat of discharge to Freeman for having (1) distributed
union literature and (2) given testimony under the Act.
Much of Respondent's argument, that this conduct was
not violative of the Act, is hinged on Respondent's
assertion that Hirschberg prefaced his statement with the
observation, "if Freeman did not like his job." Respondent
would thus assert that Hirschberg's statement was a mere
expression of a "view" or "opinion," if the employee was
dissatisfied.
The statement of Hirschberg cannot be taken from
context or removed from the dialogue which occurred
between him and Freeman in the presence of numerous
employees. It must be viewed as stated by the court in the
Nabors case.13 When statements such as these are made
by one who is a part of the company management, and who
has the power to change prophecies into realities, such
statements, whether couched in language of probability or
certainity, tend to impede and coerce employees in their
right of self-organization, and therefore constitute unfair
labor practices.
In the Fort Smith case," the Board reaffirmed earlier
holdings that the primary question is whether the
statements were inherently coercive in their nature. There
can be little doubt that what Hirschberg sought to convey
was a not too subtle suggestion that if Freeman wished to
improve the economic welfare of himself and his
dependents, he should look elsewhere for employment,
that Respondent would limit such opportunities. There is
not a scintilla of evidence that Respondent was in any
manner, or for any reason, displeased with Freeman's
work product, or work effort, or competency. Ergo,
Freeman's union activities, and his appearance as a
witness in a Board proceeding, were the cause of
Hirschberg's undisguised ire. It is well established that a
consequences of such conduct, correctly asserts that a subpena
can require the attendance of a witness but cannot require a
witness' ability to recall To illustrate, General Counsel calls
attention to the testimony herein of James Morse. Obviously
called by Respondent to corroborate the testimony of Hirschberg,
Morse asserted that while he was present, he did not hear what
was said on July 22
's N.L R B v W C Nabors Co , 196 F 2d 272, 276 (C A 5)
Fort Smith Broadcasting Co., 146 NLRB 759, enforcement
denied 341 F.2d 874 (C A. 8)
THE PAYMASTER CORP.
threat of ecomonic retaliation constitutes interference,
restraint, and coercion. The Board has stated: If
Respondent did not wish the employees to be concerned
with these possibilities there was no need to raise them in
the first place. Having sounded the alarm, Respondent
cannot so easily avoid the effect of its words. Brownwood
Manufacturing Company, 149 NLRB 921.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I find that
Hirschberg's statement constituted intimidation and
coercion, and contained an implied threat that Freeman's
future employment relationship would be adversely
affected by reason of Freeman's having engaged in
protected activities, and having given testimony in a Board
proceeding, and was thus violative of the provisions of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Institution of benefits
It is undisputed that, by letters of July 15 and August 25,
1966, over the signature of President Hirschberg,
Respondent advised its employees that it would institute
and place in effect both new and improved working
conditions and did so.
In the letter of July 15, Respondent advised the
employees that: they would learn the details of a promised
pension plan, after return from their vacation, which
commenced July 22; that Respondent would commence
paying 100 percent of the cost of the individual employee's
hospitalization plan, as distinguished from 75 percent
formerly paid; that compensation for a suggestion box, for
meritorious suggestions, would be reinstituted; that a raise
in wages, of an amount to be determined, would be
effective as of August 8, 1966; that the Friday after
Thanksgiving and half a day on Good Friday would be
added as paid holidays; that employees who were Armed
Forces reservists would be paid the difference between
their regular pay and their reserve-duty pay, during the 2
weeks' reserve-training period. The letter of August 25
announced that: the pension plan was being placed in
effect as of August 8, 1966; the improvement in the
individuals' hospitalization plan had been placed into
effect (as of August 1); the installation of a suggestion
award program providing $25 for each accepted
suggestion would be placed in effect within 2 to 6 weeks;
the additional day and one-half holiday, Friday after
Thanksgiving and one-half day on Good Friday, were
formally declared additional paid holidays; the provision
for reserve-training differential, limited to 2-week periods
per year, was placed in effect; a wage increase of 10 cents
per hour for incentive employees, and 15 cents per hour
for hourly employees, was effective retroactively from
August 8, 1966. The explanations, of Respondent's
witnesses, as to the reasons for the adoption of the
enumerated improvements is next considered.
15 I find it important to note that no surveys were presented by
Respondent , to substantiate the assertions of Gross and
Respondent 's other witnesses . Gross did not know what
percentage of the participating companies engaged in collective
bargaining Gross, who recommended several innovations, made
no representation relative to the extent to which any of the fringe
benefits , instituted by Respondent in August 1966, constituted a
prevailing practice in the metal trade industry No pattern of
Respondent having followed such a trade practice in the past is
asserted
111 find it unnecessary to evaluate the assertion of Gross that in
interviewing applicants for employment, almost a 100 percent of
the applicants questioned him relative to the hospitalization plan
385
Robert Gross, personnel director of the Respondent for
7-1/2 years, related that in the spring of 1966, April and
May, he began working on a program to provide improved
benefits for the employees. Vice President Deanstack was
in charge of production, and was Gross' immediate
superior until his demise, in August 1965, when he was
succeeded by George Williams. Gross asserted that some
of the reference material which he customarily examined,
and to which he referred in May 1966, were the surveys of
the National Metal Trades Association, inferentially a
compilation of fringe benefits and wages in existence in an
unspecified number of the alleged 200 companies who
participated in such surveys.15
Gross asserted he made a number of recommendations
to Williams, inferentially in May 1966, but did not
recommend all of the improvements Respondent
subsequently put into effect. Gross recommended the
Respondent improve the contribution it was making to the
cost of hospitalization insurance, to 100 percent of the cost
of individual plans. Gross explained the literature from the
Tool and Dye Institute, and the surveys from the National
Metal Trades Association indicated this was becoming
more and more popular as a fringe benefit.16 The history of
Respondent's insurance program was'set fdrth by Gross.
Prior to March 30, 1960, the employees paid the total cost
of a Blue Cross, Blue Shield program. At that time,
because of an increase in cost, Respondent changed to an
insurance program of the Tool and Dye Institute, of which
the Respondent was a member, and Respondent started
paying 50 percent of the cost, to the extent it covered the
individual employees, as distinguished from a family plan.
In 1961 the Company assumed 75 percent of the cost of the
individual plans.
Gross asserted that Respondent previously had granted
6-1/2 paid holidays, which were not identified. Gross
related that the office employees had previously been
given "time off" on Good Friday and that he recommended
that all employees should be given a half day on Good
Friday. Gross also asserted that in 1965 Respondent had
given the employees the Friday after Thanksgiving as a
holiday and he thought it best to add this as an additional
paid holiday.17
Gross related that he recommended the provision for
supplementary military-reserve duty pay. Gross explained
that two of the employees inquired if this benefit could be
incorporated in Respondent's policy. Gross asserted that,
as a result of this inquiry, he ascertained from Bob Crane
of the National Metal Trades, otherwise unidentified, that
this benefit was becoming more and more popular,
assertedly by reason of a greater number leaving the
military service and being required to perform such
reserve duty.
Gross asserted that he did recommend a wage increase,
on the basis that the National Metal Trades survey
and over 50 percent indicated their insurance was paid in full by
their prior employers . The record is silent as to how many of the
new employees, if any, had been previously employed in the metal
trade industry . Gross asserted that , in the first half of 1966,
Respondent was hiring additional personnel , having started with a
normal complement of about 172 and having approximately 208 at
the time of his testimony , in December 1966.
171 find it unnecessary to evaluate Gross' assertion that
applicants for employment also inquired about Respondent's
holiday program. I also find it unnecessary to evaluate Gross'
assertion that many prospective employees felt that Respondent
was low in lh'e number of paid holidays and so indicated to him.
386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
indicated that there had been a wage increase every year.
Gross asserted that initially Respondent's supervisors
were considering all the way from a 5- to a 10-cent-per-
hour raise. Gross related that in early June 1966, he met
with Williams, Hirschberg, and three supervisors, Cervak,
Vetrovack, and Cesar. Thereafter, about July 1, at a
meeting with those named and others,'s according to
Gross, the discussion was in terms of a 7-cent-per-hour
increase to incentive employees and a 10-cent-per-hour
raise to hourly workers, which Gross described as being
the same increase they had granted in the previous 2
years, i.e., September 1965 and August 1964. No increase
was granted in 1963. According to Gross, there was a
further meeting prior to the start of vacations, on July 22,
at which time it was decided to wait, "everybody was
supposed to give it their utmost thought," and a final
decision was deferred until after the return from
vacation.iy Gross asserted there was a further meeting of
the supervisors, about August 20, at which time Williams
suggested following something between a 6 and 9 percent
increase. Gross asserted that it was finally determined to
place into effect a 5.7 percent increase amounting to 10
cents per hour for incentive employees, and 15 cents per
hour for hourly employees.
W. M. Williams is a member of Respondent's board of
directors, also acts as an advisor in undefined areas, and
was a vice president in charge of engineering development
until 1961, at which time he inferentially ceased his active
daily participation in Respondent's operation, by reason of
illness.211 Williams asserted that he was in charge of
manufacturing at Respondent's plant, prior to its removal
to its present location, in 1956. Williams related that prior
to 1956 and thereafter until 1961, Respondent had a
suggestion box system and anyone who turned in a
suggestion of any kind received $1. If the suggestion had
merit, awards ranging from $5 to $25 were granted. I find it
reasonable to infer that on an unspecified date between
1961 and 1966 the suggestion awards were discontinued.
The recitation of Gross, relative to the institution of
awards for suggestions, in September 1966, I find vague
and confusing. Gross was self-contradictory in asserting
that he was not present when the suggestion system was
discussed, and later asserting that all the new benefits
were discussed at the June meeting, and all were agreed
upon at that time, except the matter of wages.21 Gross also
asserted that while the formal plan was installed in August
or September 1966, the plan they formerly had was
reinstated in January or February 1966, "but we did not
have any forms to fill out or anything like that until August
or September."22
18 Gross enumerated Jorgen, Reynolds, and Gold, inferentially
part of management
10 Gross explained that they were all supposed to read "any
article they can," and that lie personally read Business News,
Newsweek, and anything else he could get his hands on
20 George Williams, described by Gross as the successor to
Deanstack , did not appear as a witness
21 Gross also asserted that Hirschberg instructed him to get
information on a formal suggestion plan, prior to the vacation
period in July, whereupon he contacted the Morton Suggestion
System and obtained "the whole package "
22Gross asserted the informal plan was the result of a
suggestion made by an employee to Hirschberg that the
suggestion system be reinstated
23 While I find it unnecessary to resolve the credibility of
Mages, he asserted the deferring was "approximately 6 months"
later and also that it was "in late 1964 " Mages was also
inaccurate in relating that Hirschberg was over burdened because
the Company had lost its sales manager, V J Walters, that
W. M. Williams related that in 1960, as the result of a
conversation he had with Hirschberg, he was authorized to
obtain information relative to the cost of a pension plan.
Subsequently, in the same year it was determined that
such an undertaking was too costly and, it can reasonably
be inferred, the matter was dropped.
Bernard W. Mages is a member of the board of directors
and attorney for Respondent. Mages, who is engaged in
the practice of law, has represented Respondent since
1934. Mages related that about January 1964, he had a
discussion with Hirschberg relative to the desirability of
instituting either a pension plan, a profit- sharing plan, or
an insurance plan, the latter including a cash-surrender
value as an option at retirement. Subsequently, Mages
asserted, Hirschberg was overly burdened with company
affairs and deferred any conclusion as to which plan
should be adopted.'' Mages asserted that in the late spring
or early summer of 1965 a pension plan had been decided
upon, but they were advised by labor counsel, " that in
view of the activities of the Steelworkers Union" they
should not grant any benefits at that time as it would be
construed as an unfair labor practice.24 Mages asserted
that after the election in March 1966, they were advised by
labor counsel that it would be proper for them to
reconsider and put a pension plan into effect and in May
1966, he revived the matter with Hirschberg.
Gross acknowledged that in the preceding 5 years the
Company had never placed into effect a package of fringe
benefits, or any benefits other than wage increases and the
improvement in the insurance program. Asked if he were
saying that a bulk or a substantial number of the
companies in 'the metal trades business had placed in
effect the hospitalization plan, the additional 1-1/2 day
holiday, and the military reserve pay, Gross asserted,
"That, or it was a growing benefit, it was showing a trend
of becoming much more popular."2i Gross acknowledged
that he was not saying these benefits were placed in effect
at other companies in 1966.
Contentions of the Parties and Concluding Findings
Respondent asserts the granting of the benefits
described was not violative of the provisions of Section
8(a)(1). Respondent concedes the benefits were granted
after the hearing in the preceding case and before the Trial
Examiner issued his Decision. Respondent advances a
variety of reasons why its conduct should not be found to
be violative of the Act. They are considered seriatim.
Respondent urges that at the time the improved benefits
were announced , in August 1966 , Respondent could not
Dean Stack had suffered a heart attack , and Williams " took ill,
and went more or less into semiretirement " Williams' testimony
was that he had retired in 1961 , and did not indicate any
modification of his activity as a member of the board of directors
and as an advisor thereafter
24 It is noted that the union activity did not commence until
August 24, 1965 Mages also asserted that the discontinuance of
activity relative to a "plan" was in the summer of 1965 Mages
appears to have been self-contradictory in asserting that he
continued , thereafter , to discuss the alternative profit-sharing plan
and insurance plan with Hirschberg. Thereafter , Mages asserted
that they had ruled out an insurance plan or profit - sharing plan
"almost at the inception of my discussions with Mr Hirschberg,
early in 1964 "
25 Asked if it had been the past practice of the Respondent to
issue announcements of improvements in working conditions,
Gross first asserted, "We never did it," and later asserted,
"Normally it is done at the bulletin board or letter or speech "
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 387
have known what recommendation the Trial Examiner
would make relative to setting aside the election, and that
the granting of benefits during the pendency of objections
is not per se an unfair labor practice.26 The cases cited are
inapposite, and I findfit unnecessary to consider the per se
doctrine.
Respondent asserts that General Counsel introduced no
evidence of improper motivation. In view of the ruling of
the Supreme Court in the Bryan case, supra, and the
background herein, considered infra, I find no merit in
Respondent's assertion that there is no showing of
improper motivation.27
Respondent urges that the fact that the Board has held
that Respondent committed unfair labor practices prior to
the election does not establish that Respondent
announced improved benefits "for the purpose of
discouraging employee union activities or support of
membership of the Union." Respondent describes the
unfair labor practices, found by the Board, in 162 NLRB
123, as "trivial violations." I am unable to agree with the
characterization, particularly in view of the Board's
adoption of a somewhat unusual remedy, i.e., the issuance
of a board order "to undo the effect of the massive and
deliberate unfair labor practices committed by
Respondent in its successful efforts to frustrate
organization by its employees," and the unusual
requirement that President Hrschberg personally be
required to sign the notice as the principal provocateur.
Respondent also urges that it had established a business
purpose for the improved benefits, that the pension plan
had been under consideration prior to the union organizing
efforts, and that the suggestion program was de minimus.
Respondent relies on the testimony of Gross that
Respondent needed a substantial number of additional
employees. The short answer is that Gross did not seek to
establish, or represent, that the benefits granted were a
prevailing practice in the industry. To the extent it might
be inferred that Gross sought to establish the package was
essential to attract needed employees, in view of the
evidence, particularly the testimony of Mages that
Hirschberg was, in effect, fulfilling a preelection
undertaking, I would find such an inference untenable.
General Counsel urges that in the preceding case the
Board found the announcement of a wage increase on
October 15, 1965, not September as related by Gross, the
promise of a pension plan or profit-sharing plan, and
improved hospitalization benefits in September and
October 1965, were made in order to interfere with the
Union's organizing campaign. The Board also found that
after the election, while the objections to the election were
pending, on March 29, 1966, Hirschberg's promise that a
pension plan was forthcoming was violative of the
proscriptions of Section 8(a)(1).
General Counsel correctly urges, from the testimony of
Respondent's witness Gross, personnel manager, that it is
patent and undisputed that the Company had not placed a
package of benefits in effect, simultaneously, in the period
of 5 years.
In the Northwest Engineering case28 the Board, in
reversing a Trial Examiner's finding that the granting of a
bonus was consistent with established company practice,
and was granted after the representation election was
held, said:
These additional benefits were granted to employees
while objections to the May 8 representation election
were still pending and unresolved and the possibility
that the Board would direct a second election was
indeed real. Moreover, the Respondent does not show
that the granting of these benefits was governed by
factors other than the election. Upon consideration of
the entire. record in these cases, we conclude that
these benefits were granted as a reward to employees
for having rejected the Union and as a further
inducement to employees to vote against the Union
should the opportunity again arise. As such, the bonus
and vacation pay increases constitute further
interference, restraint, and coercion within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In the Ralph Printing case 29 the Board found:
An election under Board auspices to determine a
majority bargaining representative does not consist
solely of the physical balloting of the employees in the
appropriate unit. Necessarily, the vote of the
employees and the validity of the election itself must
await the Board's post election investigation of
objections properly filed with respect to the conduct
of the election. In the instant case the Petitioner filed
its objections on January 12, 1965, in compliance with
the Board's Rules and Regulations. At the time,
therefore, when the Employer announced that
benefits would be distributed to the employees, the
election of January 6 was clearly subject to
invalidation if the objections were meritorious. We
must therefore view the precipitous haste of the
Employer's promise of improvements to its employees
immediately after a bare majority had cast physical
ballots against the Union as an attempt to gain their
support and to assure a continued majority against the
union representation in the event a second election
was directed by the Board.:10
26 Citing: Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., 152 NLRB 300,
306-307; General Industries Electronics Company, 152 NLRB
1029, 1042.
27 1n citing N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,
Respondent limited its excerpt to:
We think the Court of Appeals was mistaken in concluding
that the conferral of employee benefits while a representation
election is pending, for the purpose of inducing employees to
vote against the union, does not "interfere with" the
protected right to organize.
Thereafter, at 409-410, the Court observed:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now
conferred is also the source from which future benefits must
flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged. The danger
may be diminished if, as in this case, the benefits are
conferred permanently and unconditionally. But the absence
of conditions or threats pertaining to the particular benefits
conferred would be of controlling significance only if it could
be presumed that no question of additional benefits or
renegotiation of existing benefits would arise in the future;
and, of course, no such presumption is tenable.
28 Northwest Engineering Company, 148 NLRB 1136,1145.
29 Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 158 NLRB 1353, fn. 3.
20 See also Ambox, Incorporated, 146 NLRB 1520, 1521, in
which the Board found the granting of a 10-cent-per-hour wage
increase, with knowledge that the Union's objections to the
election were still pending undetermined and that there was a
possibility that a second election would be directed, was a
violation of the Act. The Board held:
This announcement, we find, when considered in the light of
Respondent's earlier unlawful conduct, was calculated to
influence its employees' choice of a bargaining
representative in the event of 'a second election.
While the court denied enforcement of this particular finding,
N.L.R.B. v. Ambox, Inc., 357 F.2d 138 (C.A. 5), with all due respect
to the court, I am constrained to adhere to Board Decisions.
388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In the preceding case, 162 NLRB 123, the Board
adopted findings that the grant of a wage increase in
October 1965, and a promise of a pension or profit-sharing
plan and improved hospitalization benefits in September
and October 1965, were made in order to interfere with the
Union's organizing campaign, and were violative of
Section8(a)(1). The Board also adopted findings that on
January 28, 1966, in a conversation with Marian Grathouse,
Hirschberg advised her that he had given the employees a
raise "which the Union did not want them to have," and
was working on a pension plan, and that after the election
was decided one way or the other, "if the Union was
defeated," the employees would receive everything he had
promised them in 3 to 6 months. This conduct was found
violative of the Act. The Board adopted findings that on
March 29, 1966, while the objections to the election were
pending, at an employees' meeting, Hirschberg exhibited a
purported check in the amount of $50,000, which he said
was a deposit toward the pension plan which, like other
promises, would be forthcoming. This conduct was found
to be violative of the Act. The institution of the suggestion
box system in January 1966, coupled with the fact that only
President Hirschberg had the key to the boxes and would
personally review all suggestions, was aptly described by
the Trial Examiner as, "Its effect can reasonably be said to
be that employees could now have a direct pipeline to the
President of the Company, and to encourage them to use
that approach rather than relying on outside
representatives to present their grievances."
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I find that the
announcement of and the placing in effect of the package
of benefits, including those which had been promised
during the union campaign and were the subject of the
prior litigation, when considered in the light of
Respondent's earlier unlawful conduct, was calculated to
influence Respondent's employees' choice of a bargaining
representative in the event of a second election and, thus,
constituted interference, restraint, and coercion in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and, such of them as
have been found to constitute unfair labor practices, tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in certain unfair labor practices, it will be
recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
General Counsel has urged , in his brief, that a broad
order, as distinguished from a customary limited order, be
recommended . In the preceding case the Board adopted
the Trial Examiner 's finding that the conventional remedy
would be inadequate "to undo the effect of the massive
and deliberate unfair labor practices committed by
Respondent in its successful efforts to frustrate
organization by its employees." Herein , we are confronted
with the unusual situation of a respondent placing into
effect certain previously promised benefits at a time when
the promises themselves were being litigated as violative
of the Act, by reason of the context in which they were
made. The Board is thus confronted with a fait accompli
certainly bordering on, if not constituting , defiance of its
processes. I agree with General Counsel that a broad
order should issue and, as found in the previous case,
President Hirschberg should personally be required to
sign the "Notice."
It is therefore recommended that Respondent be
ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing
upon rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By engaging in the conduct set forth in the above
section entitled "Interference, Restraint, and Coercion,"
to the extent therein found, Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, I
recommend that the Respondent , The Paymaster
Corporation , its officers , agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees concerning their union
membership , activities, and desires , or demanding copies
of a union authorization card being circulated by an
employee, in a manner violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
(b) Threatening employees with legal action for having
given testimony in a Board proceeding or, without cause,
accusing an employee of giving false testimony, in a
manner impinging upon and constituting interference with
the Board 's statutory processes , in violation of Section
8(a)(1)
(c) Threatening employees with economic retaliation by
reason of their having engaged in union activities, or,
alternatively , for their having given testimony in a Board
proceeding.
(d) Granting or promising wage increases , a pension
plan, improvement in the individual cost of a
hospitalization program , the establishment of or
improvement of a suggestion box program , the addition of
paid holidays , or the improvement of other fringe benefits,
in order to interfere with the employees ' choice of a
bargaining representative , or as an inducement to the
employees to reject or refrain from activities in support of
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization.
(e) In any other manner interfering with , restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
THE PAYMASTER CORP.
organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized
in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix. 9'31 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 13, after being duly signed by President
T. B. Hirschberg, Jr., shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
,including all places where notices on each of Respondent's
bulletin boards are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Trial
Examiner's Decision, what steps it has taken to comply
with the foregoing Recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that unless within 20
days from the date of the receipt of this Trial Examiner's
Decision, the Respondent shall notify the said Regional
Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing
Recommended Order'32 the National Labor Relations
Board issue an Order requiring the Respondent to take the
aforesaid action.
91 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
33 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said
Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
389
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees
concerning their organizational efforts, or demand
copies of union authorization card being circulated by
an employee , in a manner violative of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with legal action
for having given testimony in a Board proceeding, or
accuse an employee of giving false testimony, in a
manner impinging upon and constituting interference
with the Board 's statutory processes , and in a manner
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with economic
retaliation by reason of their having engaged in union
activities , or alternatively , for their having given
testimony in a Board proceeding.
WE WILL NOT grant or promise wage increases, a
pension plan, improvement in the individual cost of a
hospitalization program , the establishment or
improvement of a suggestion box program , additional
paid holidays , or the improvement of other fringe
benefits in order to interfere with our employees'
choice of a bargaining representative , or as an
inducement to reject or refrain from activities in
support of United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization , to join or assist United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities , except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.
All our employees have the right to join , or not to join,
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other
union.
THE PAYMASTER
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By T. B. Hirschberg, Jr., President
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 881 U.S.
Courthouse and Federal Office Building, 219 S. Dearborn
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, Telephone 353-7597.
299-352 0-70-26