The Dolese Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 4, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 95 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

THE DOLESE COMPANY 95
The Dolese Company (Pre-Stress Plant) and Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO,
Local 627 . Case 16-CA-5199
June 4, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On February 11, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Elbert D. Gadsden issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, The Dolese Compa-
ny (Pre-Stress Plant), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, its
officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein
be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges
unfair labor practices not found herein.
I We correct the following inadvertent errors which do not affect our
conclusions herein:
In sec . III, B , first paragraph, last line, "Foreman Carroll H. (Toby)
Cole" should read "Structural Inspector John Clark."
The paragraph in which In . 10 appears gives an account that combines
two telephone conversations by Sandra Stringfellow to Respondent. Mrs.
Stringfellow's testimony is that she called Respondent on two successive
days , Friday, June 8 and Saturday , June 9.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ELBERT D . GADSDEN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
a charge of unfair labor practices filed on June 25 , 1973, by
International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO,
Local 627, herein called the Union , against The Dolese
Company, herein called the Respondent , the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a
complaint against Respondent on or about July 25, 1973,
alleging that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7),
and Sections 8(a)(3) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. The
Respondent filed an answer, which in relevant part denied
that it interrogated its employees about their union
activity; that it offered its employees wage increases and
other conveniences if they did not join the Union; that it
prohibited employees from distributing union literature
during nonworking times and places; that it encouraged its
employees to state their grievances and complaints; and
that its discharge of employee Carl Stringfellow was related
to any unfair labor practices.
A hearing in the above matter was held before me at
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on October 10, 1973. Briefs
have been received from counsel for the Respondent and
the General Counsel, respectively, and have been carefully
considered.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, is now, and has been at all times material
herein, a corporation duly organized under and existing by
virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and is engaged
in manufacturing prestressed and precast concrete prod-
ucts at its Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, plant. In the course
of conducting its business operations at its Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, plant during the past 12 months, Respondent
purchased and received supplies and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 which were shipped to its Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, plant from points outside the State of
Oklahoma.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO,
Local 627, herein called the Union , is now and has been at
all times material herein a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
M. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
Union Activity
It was stipulated by the parties at this proceeding that the
supervisory status of Foreman Carroll (Toby) Cole, Plant
Production Superintendent George Mercer, Foreman
Marvin (Sam) Basden,General Superintendent of Concrete
Operations Jack Hammond, and Mike Martin are not in
issue . The parties further stipulated that the petition for the
union representative election at Respondent's plant was
filed March 15, 1973; that it was approved by the Regional
Director on April 23, 1973; that the election was held on
May 24, 1973, during which time the Union received 36
"yes" and 4 "no" votes; and that the result of said election
has not been certified as of the date of this proceeding.
211 NLRB No. 15
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dischargee Carl (Doug) Stringfellow was hired by
Respondent - as-a laborer-in December 1972 at a salary of
$3.15 per hour. After working 90 days for Respondent, his
salary was raised to $3.25 per hour. Stringfellow worked in
the crew of leadman Prentiss Green, which crew was under
the supervision of Foremen Carroll (Toby) Cole and
Marvin (Sam) Basden, who in turn reported to Plant
Superintendent George Mercer. On or about March 12,
1973,1 union representatives were contacted by employees
of Respondent to organize plant employees.
On June 6 and 7 the plant's normal or official
working time was from 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., unless work
which necessitated completion was not completed at that
time . Stringfellow obtained permission from Foreman Cole
and leadman Green, on June 6, to leave work at 3:30 p.m.
Whether or not Stringfellow also obtained permission to
leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 7 and whether he called in
on June 8 to report that he would be absent from work
because of illness are matters in dispute between the
parties . Nevertheless, Stringfellow left work at 3:30 p.m. on
June 6 and 7 and did not report to work on June 8. His
departure from the plant at 3:30 p.m., on June 7, was
reported to Plant Superintendent Mercer on June 7 by
Foreman Cole. In reliance on the report, Superintendent
Mercer prepared a discharge statement in accordance with
company procedure, indicating that Stringfellow was
discharged June 8 for taking off from work early on June 7,
without proper permission and because he was absent from
work on June 8 without furnishing any reasons therefor.
Superintendent Mercer signed the statement . Although his
signature alone is usually sufficient, on this occasion, Mr.
Mercer said he called in Foreman Cole and leadman
Green and had them sign the statement also, since he
prepared it upon information furnished by Cole, on June 7,
and upon Green 's subsequent statement on June 8 that he
(Green) only gave Stringfellow permission to leave at 3:30
p.m. on June 6.2
Issues
In regard to the alleged discriminatory discharge of Carl
(Doug) Stringfellow in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, and the other alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, the principal questions presented for decision are
whether Stringfellow actually left the job early without
permission on June land failed to report for work on June
8 without explanation, and was therefor discharged for
cause , rather than for union activity; and whether
Respondent through its managers and agents did in fact
engage in unlawful interrogation of its employees, made
promises of rewards to them, prohibited them from lawful
distribution of union literature , and/or encouraged em-
ployees to submit grievances and complaints to discourage
said employees' organizational efforts, all, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. Interrogation of Employees and Promises of
Wage Increases and Other Benefits
The alleged discriminatee , Carl Stringfellow, testified
I Hereinafter all dates will refer to the year 1973 unless otherwise
specified.
that on or about March 12, he telephoned Bill Grant, the
union representative, and requested some union cards
which he (Stringfellow) later picked up, distributed, signed
one himself, and procured signed cards from 12 to 15
fellow employees at Respondent's plant. He further stated
that he and other employees spearheaded the Union's
organizational effort by engaging in promotional talk with
fellow employees and also handbillmg at the plant's gate
on or about March 15, when he was seen by Plant
Superintendent George Mercer and Foreman Carroll H.
(Toby) Cole who knew about his union activity.
Stringfellow further testified that during the morning
break on or about March 19, Foreman Carroll (Toby) Cole
approached him and asked him, "who handed the union
cards out?"; that being fearful of losing his job, he said he
did not know; and that Cole then asked him did he sign a
union card and he (Stringfellow) said, "I did." On April 24,
while at the end of bed B on the jobsite, Foreman Cole said
to him, "We didn't need the Union and that he could be
our negotiator, and that the Company was giving us a 25-
cent an hour raise anyway"; that on the afternoon of May
3, while at the end of bed B, Cole again said to him that
they (the employees) really did not need the Union because
he (Cole) could get them the same things they wanted and
that he was planning on getting them a 25-cent an hour
raise anyway; and that Cole said: "I want you to get out
there and talk to the guys about this. Now lets hear a big
`No' vote." Cole's alleged statements were made to
Stringfellow during the period of the progress of the
preelection campaign, but Cole denied he made such
statements to Stringfellow.
Stringfellow also stated that on the same day (May 23),
Supervisor Cole approached himself and employee Marvin
Holloman while they were working and his testimony
revealed the following:
A.-and he told us we didn't need the union again.
He said that he would be our negotiator. He told us the
hard workers wouldn't have a chance of moving ahead
because the union goes strictly by seniority.
Stringfellow also testified that on May 20 or 22 a large
trailer was brought on the plant's premises near bed B and
Foreman Cole said to him, "This trailer is for you guys if
you vote the union out . . . if the Union gets voted in,
we're going to lock it up." The trailer was to be used for
breaks during the winter but Stringfellow has seen it used
only for a meeting called by Superintendent Hammond.
Subsequently, on or about May 23 at 9:20 a.m., he was
asked by leadman Green to report to a meeting held in the
trailer; that he attended the meeting and at the direction of
Chief Plant Superintendent Jack Hammond, he and five or
six other employees signed their names on a tablet
acknowledging their presence and Mr. Hammond then
asked them if they had any complaints; that this was the
first time any such meeting was ever held and the
conversations which ensued were as described in the
following testimony:
Q. Did you or anybody else voice any complaints?
2 The facts set forth above are undisputed in the record.
THE DOLESE COMPANY 97
A. I didn't personally but somebody else told him
about the parking lot, that we couldn't drive in it, and
that we have had to have our cars pulled out by
tractors.
Q. Did he respond to this complaint?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said he would do his best to get it fixed. He
said he couldn 't guarantee anything.
Q. Were there any other complaints voiced at this
time?
A. There were a couple more small complaints. I'm
not sure what they were about, and then somebody
started to say something about a raise. He said that the
union couldn 't get us anything that the company didn't
want to give because it was the company's money.
Q. Did he say anything else?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. Was this a regular meeting?
A. No, it wasn't.
Q. Did they conduct monthly meetings at Dolese?
A. Safety meetings every once in awhile, but not
regularly.
Q. Did they ever conduct any complaint meeting
like this before?
A. No, they haven't.
Q. That's the first one they've conducted?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Do you know if they conducted any since that
time?
A. Not while I was there.
Employee Eugene D. Carrera testified that his work
crew, too, was summoned to a trailer house meeting on
May 21 or 22 by Superintendent Hammond, during which
time they were asked to check off their names on a list
acknowledging their presence ; that Mr. Hammond then
told them that he could not brainwash them (the
employees) by the use of a trailer , as the Union's leaflet
had said , because he is not a psychiatrist; that Mr.
Hammond then said the Union could not do anything that
the Company did not agree to do; and that he asked them
if they had any complaints and suggestions to improve
work conditions.
Jack Hammond , general superintendent of concrete
operations for Respondent, credibly testified that he
conducted a series of meetings in the trailer with six or
seven employees at a certain time on one day before the
election . He further testified as follows:
Q. What was the presentation that you made at the
meetings?
A. Well I wanted to be sure the employees
understood the company's position with regard to the
upcoming election, and I wanted to be certain that they
knew the proper procedure in actually voting, so I
explained that to each group along with listening to any
questions they might have or any complaints they
would like to make. I did show this hand bill that had
been handed out with reference to my brainwashing
them so to speak. I told them I was not there to
brainwash them and even if I were I didn't have the
capacity because I was not a psychiatrist. I related my
personal feeling that I would like for them to remain
nonunion , and of course the company felt the same
way, but it was entirely up to them as an individual as it
would be up to me if I were in their shoes. They could
vote any way they saw fit and it would not be held
against them no matter what the outcome of the
election was.
Q. And the union won 36 to 4?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Was there anything said as to the benefits the
union could obtain for them?
A. Yes sir, I told them for sure that the union could
not get one penny for them if the company did not
agree to it.
Q. Do you recall whether these employees asked
questions at these meetings?
A. Yes sir. I don't know if I recall this specifically
but I believe it might have been Spears who asked
something about vacations, and I stated to him what
our policy was at the time on vacations and holiday
pay, whatever our benefits were at the time. If they had
questions about it, I'd clarify it for them.
Q. How long have you been with Dolese?
A. Just past 23 years.
Q. Approximately how many different plants does
the company operate?
A. Plant to plant, probably 30 to 40 different actual
plant facilities.
Q. That includes ready-mixed plants, rock quarries,
sand plants and other types of operations?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Is this pre-stress plant the first plant the
company has had that has had a union election?
A. No sir.
Q. Do you have plants presently under union
contracts?
A. Yes sir.
Again referring to the trailer meeting about May 24, Mr.
Hammond was asked:
Q. Why did you take roll?
A. So that I personally would know if there were
some people that I didn't get a chance to visit with.
Q. Did you ask the employees whether they had
any complaints or suggestions?
A. I don't recall asking that question, no sir.
Q. How did these complaints that were aired come
about?
A. I imagine they came out in answer to my
question, "Now if you fellows have any questions or
comments or anything on your mind, I'll be glad to
listen to you on anything you've got to say, but I
certainly want you to understand that I have no right
and will not make any promises because it is not legal."
They understood that the clearest of all.
Q. Had you ever conducted a meeting of this
nature before at this pre-stress plant?
A. No sir.
Q. Have you conducted a meeting of this nature
since that time?
98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. No sir.
Leadman Eugene D. Camera also credibly testified that
on May 23 around ' 3 p.m. Superintendent George Mercer
came up to him and asked if the men (two or four) in his
crew were for the Union and he told him they were; and
that Mr. Mercer said something to the effect that he didn't
guess there was much they could do about it now. Carrera
is still a leadman . He believes he has authority to let a man
off early (the normal quitting time) and he has done so in
the past.
Employee James Ingram testified that he had also
attended a trailer house meeting with Mr. Hammond on
May 22 and acknowledged his presence by signing a tablet
circulated amongst the employees . Mr. Hammond then
asked them:
A. . . . if we had any gripes. Some of the guys
stated the gripes that they had such as the parking lot,
and another gripe was that there was no lunch room.
+ • s a s
Q. Did you voice any complaint?
A. I told him that we didn't have any sick leave. He
said that he didn't have any sick leave, either, so we'd
better not get sick . He said-
Q. Well, go ahead-I'm sorry.
A. He went on to say that the union could not get
us anything that the company was not willing to give.
Q. Do you remember anything else being said
during that meeting?
A. No sir.
Q. Did the company conduct this type of meeting
on a regular basis?
Q. Was this the first meeting of its type to occur
there? _
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Have any meetings occurred since this time?
A. No, they haven't.
Supervisor Cole testified that he was unaware of any
connection between the arrival of the trailer house and the
onset of union activity.
James Ingram credibly testified that he was employed by
Respondent on August 14, 1972; and that although he has
engaged in various forms of union activity such as
soliciting union cards , signing a union card, and attending
union meetings , he nevertheless remains in the employ of
Respondent as an operator . However, Ingram further
testified that in the afternoon on or about March 17, near
the welder's shack, Foreman Cole asked him if he was for
the Union and he replied he was 100 percent for the
Union.3
Prentiss Green credibly testified that he has been
employed by Respondent since September 9, 1972; that he
was under the supervision of Foreman Carroll (Toby)
3 I credit the testimony of James Ingram that Foreman Cole asked hun if
he was for the Union because it is not only undisputed in the record, but is
essentially corroborated by the testimony of Foreman Cole himself.
4 Again I am persuaded not only by the impression I received that Green
was testifying truthfully , but by the logical consistency of his testimony with
all of the employee witnesses and partially consistent with Foreman Cole's
Cole; and that he is and was the leadman of the crew in
which Stringfellow worked. The parties to the proceeding
willingly stipulated that Green is a leadman, that he is in
the same bargaining unit with Stringfellow, and that he is
not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
Green further testified that on or about March 13,
Foreman (supervisor) Cole came up to him and asked him
if he knew who was passing out the union cards and he told
Cole he did not know; that about 7:30 a.m. on March 22,
Foreman Cole asked him did he attend the union meeting
and he told him that he (Green) did; that Foreman Cole
then asked him what was the union meeting about and he
said, about different things; that later that morning,
Foreman Cole asked him if he had signed a union card and
was he for the Union, and he advised him that he had
signed a card and that he was for the Union. Leadman
Green also stated that on May 10 supervisor Cole came up
to him and said: "We don't need a union and if a union is
not voted in, you'll be satisfied with a 25-cent raise"; and
that on the afternoon May 17, Foreman Cole said to him,
"that any young man who has the ability to make it can do
so, but if the Union was voted in they would go by
seniority."4
Eugene D. Carrera credibly testified that he has been
employed by Respondent since July 17, 1972, and has been
a leadman since October 1972; that he formally worked
under the supervision of Foreman Cole when Stringfellow
was employed there, but now he works under the
supervision of Foreman Basden; and that he attended the
union meeting in March and signed an authorization card.
He further testified that on or about March 21, Foreman
Cole came up to him and said, "why don't you take your
pencil with you to the meeting tonight? I want to know
what's going on." There was a union meeting on that night
and Carrera said he attended the meeting. On the next
morning about 9:30 a.m., Foreman Cole asked him what
happened and what he thought about it, and he told Cole
he thought it was a pretty good deal. Cole then said, "that's
good if that's what you want,15
Caroll H. (Toby) Cole credibly testified that he was
employed by Respondent during Stringfellow's tenure with
Respondent, until late August or early September, when he
voluntarily terminated his employment to become em-
ployed by the Thomas Pre-Cast Company; that during his
work tenure with Respondent, he was the supervisor of
Stringfellow and he admitted that he held general discus-
sions with Stringfellow and other employees of Respondent
about the Union; that discussions about the Union during
March-May were frequent and widespread in the plant;
and that about 90 percent of such discussions he had with
the employees were initiated by them and about 10 percent
were initiated by himself. He stated that he did not recall
having any discussion about the Union with Stringfellow
and he did not know whether the latter had signed a union
card.
More specifically, with respect to the general discussions
testimony in this regard . I therefore credit Green 's version of the discussions
held withForeman Cole about union activity.
5 I credit Camera's testimony because it is not disputed and because it is
consistent with the testimony of other employee witnesses, and is essentially
corroborated by Cole's testimony.
THE DOLESE COMPANY 99
about the Union held with employees, Foreman Cole said
he expressed his opinion "that certain conditions regardless
how- good a .man Was that he could come out here and bust
himself wide open for you, you could not push him past
this dude over here that was kind of riding along, coasting.
You could not push this man with experience that had
come right off the field in ahead of him."
Cole also said he knew Knight and Ingram and that he
had engaged in discussions with them, each of them
expressing their own opinion about the Union; that he
probably did ask them questions during their discussions
but he could not remember the substance of them; that he
believes he did ask Ingram was he for the Union and that
Ingram said yes he was for the Union; that he did ask
Camera, "just under what conditions and what he thought
it (the Union) could do better for him that he wasn't
already getting, and general things like this ..." and "just
whether he thought the majority of people was attending
the union meetings"; that it was not personal interest, just
knowing how the men felt , just what was all on their minds,
just to get the general idea of what was going on.
Cole further stated that he did not ask Camera to go to
the union meeting but he might have jokingly asked him to
take his pencil to the meeting . He did not tell Camera that
he wanted to know what was going on but the next day
Camera might have mentioned that most of the employees
were present at the meeting . He knew that Camera and
Ingram were for the Union and he had a good idea that
Stringfellow was for the Union.
On cross-examination Foreman Cole denied that he
asked Green if he signed a union card or who was passing
out cards, but said he did ask him who was for the Union.
He denied that he told Green they did not need the Union
because the Company was going to give them a raise
anyway. He denied he ever told Stringfellow he could be
the employees ' negotiator but admitted he asked Ingram
and Camera how many and who were for the Union and
that he could have asked them if they were for the Union,
he was not sure.
Supervisor Cole testified that he remembered some
discussions about a 25-cent wage increase but stated that
they were in relation to the starting wage rate of a laborer,
which is $3.15 per hour during the probationary period and
then it is increased to $3.25 an hour. He further stated that
Respondent had other classified jobs such as forklift
operator, finisher, and welder, the rate of pay for which is
$3.50 an hour ; and that it was a 25-cent increase in wages
given to an employee who advances from a laborer to one
of these classified jobs.e
Based upon the foregoing credited testimony, I conclude
and find that dischargee Stringfellow was largely responsi-
ble for initiating the organizational effort of Respondent's
employees ; that his leadership participation in the organi-
6 I credit the testimony of Stringfellow regarding Cole's and/or
Superintendent Mercer's inquiries about who was distributing union cards,
and Cole's questions as to whether or not Stringfellow signed a union card,
were he and other employees for the Union, Foreman Cole's statements
about a 25-cent wage increase and his opinion about the disadvantages of
unionization of the employees , because, not only was I persuaded by the
truthful manner in which he testified in this regard, but his testimony is also
essentially corroborated by the testimony of his leadman , Green, and fellow
employee Camera. Said testimony is also partially corroborated by
employee Ingram and by Foreman Cole himself. Moreover, Stnngfellow's
zational effort was known by Respondent (Mercer and
Cole) who interrogated Stringfellow and other fellow
employees about their union interests, activity and affilia-
tion; that Foreman Cole is a supervisor within the meaning
of the Act; that Foreman Cole advised said employees that
he could negotiate for them and that they should not favor
the Union. He stated or implied that they (employees) were
going to receive a 25-cent-an-hour raise anyway and urged
them to vote against the Union; that Foreman Cole asked
an employee to attend the union meeting and report to him
what transpired at the meeting; that Respondent (Superin-
tendent Hammond) called its first and only meeting with
employees a few days before the election for the Union,
and after explaining the nature of the election, encouraged
said employees to express their gripes or complaints; that
although Foreman Cole was the most knowledgeable
supervisor on the union activities of Stringfellow and some
of his fellow employees, and the principal supervisor
interrogating the employees and making promises of
reward to them and statements against unionization, he is
nevertheless an agent of Respondent and, therefore, acted
on its behalf; and that all of such conduct on the part of
Respondent constitutes interference, restraint, and coer-
cive conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. Prohibition Against Distribution of Union
Literature
Dischargee Stringfellow testified that on May 15 while he
was distributing handbills at the plant's gate with Bill
Grant and Tom Patterson, representatives of the Union,
John Clark, from quality control of the Respondent, drove
up and asked Bill and Tom to leave the plant's property.
They did not leave but asked Mr. Clark to go and talk to
Plant Superintendent Mercer. Clark did not ask him
(Stringfellow) to leave the property but turned his car
around and headed towards the plant's office. Stringfellow
further stated that Mr. Clark inspects the concrete beams,
tells them when something is wrong with their work, and he
has seen him pull men off one job and had them perform
another. However, in his testimony Mr. Clark denied that
he actually has or ever exercised such supervisory authori-
ty. He said he merely inspects the beams and that he may
request a leadman or laborer to correct an imperfection. If
the employee fails to make the correction he can only
report the matter to a supervisor (a foreman or the
production superintendent).
With reference to the handbill distribution incident at
the gate on May 15, Mr. Clark gave the following account:
A. I drove up ready to leave the plant a little after
5:00 o'clock and the union people were passing out
their handbills. As I was about to leave the gate or
testimony is credited because it is also consistent with the general tenor of
all of the credible evidence of record relating to interrogation and
discussions about the Union , initiated in part by management (Messrs.
Cole, Mercer, and Hammond) and other employees of Respondent. I credit
Cole's testimony and discredit Stringfellow 's with respect to promises about
the use of the trailer because Stringfellow and other witnesses appeared to
be unsure and somewhat selective in answering questions on this subject.
Moreover, it is not clear from the evidence that the trailer was either held
out or was used as a beneficial inducement to influence the employees on
the matter of unionization of plant employees.
100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
getting close to the gate , one of the union people
approached my car so I slowed down and stopped. He
came over and gave me one of these hand bills and I
looked at it just briefly. I didn't really read anything on
it. Then this union representative asked me if I'd had a
hard day, and I replied, "just like always," or
something to that effect. It was just small talk. He was
getting kind of friendly with me so I just asked him if
he thought that he shouldn't be on the other side of the
fence to be passing out these hand bills. At this, he got
a little upset and asked me who I was. "Who are you?"
he said . I said, "Well I'm working in Engineering."
After he asked me who I was he said, "Who says I have
to get on the other side of the fence?" I said, "Well I
know that George Mercer has said that he doesn't
(want) union representatives on Dolese property
passing out literature." He said, "Well if George said
that, let George come up and tell me himself , and I'm
not leaving unless he does ." So I left and went back to
get Mr . Mercer. I notified Mr. Mercer of this and he
was going to come up with me but at that time we had a
problem with our water supply, so I stayed with him
and we worked on this water supply until about 6:00
o'clock. At the time I left the union representatives
were no longer there . Nobody else was there either.
Q. They were inside the Gate distributing the
literature?
A. Yes, they were at least 50 feet on Dolese
property.
Q. The fence is on the property line?
A. Yes sir, to my knowledge the fence is the
property line.
Q. And by going outside the fence means to go off
of Dolese 's property?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Is there room to go outside the fence without
being run over by cars?
A. Yes sir.
Mr. Clark said Stringfellow did apologize to him the
next day for the conduct of the union representative at the
gate the night before , but he denied that he said , "You guys
will get yours ," as Stringfellow stated.
Stringfellow said they continued to distribute handbills
and then George Mercer drove up, honked his horn, and
pointed down the road , which he (Stringfellow) understood
to mean, for him to leave the gate, so he left . Witness John
Clark said he did not see Superintendent Mercer honk his
horn and Superintendent Mercer testified that he did not
do so when Stringfellow, Green, and Grant were distribut-
ing handbills on May 15, but said he did honk his horn and
pointed down the road on another occasion when
7 1 discredit Stringfellow 's testimonial account of the handbilhng
incident at the gate, and I credit Clark's account because it appeared to be
more logically consistent with the events that followed, especially since
Stringfellow apologized to Clark on the following morning for the conduct
of the union representatives . Since Clark merely suggested that Stringfellow,
Grant, and Patterson step on the other side of the gate , he did not appear to
be talking as a supervisor but a fellow employee, and although he returned
to the plant and reported the incident to Mr. Mercer, the latter did not
return and order them off company property. Moreover, since there is
conflict between Stringfellow 's and Superintendent Mercer's interpretation
Stringfellow and Union Representative Grant had the road
(gate) blocked.?
Based upon the credited testimony of Stringfellow,
Inspector Clark, and Superintendent Mercer, I conclude
and find that Respondent did not attempt to prohibit nor
prohibited its employees from handbilling on company
property on May 15.
D. Respondent's Discharge of Stringfellow
A composite of the credible testimony of Stringfellow,
Green, Cole, and Clark established that Respondent is
engaged in the manufacture of prefabricated, prestressed,
and precast concrete, steel reinforced beams used in bridge
construction; that once you begin to pour the concrete you
cannot stop work until the process is completed; that
although the employees usually completed work around
3:30 p.m. (during the period in question), it was not
unusual to work until after 4 p.m., and only occasionally
until 6 or 6:30 p.m.8
Stringfellow testified that on June 6 and 7 his family was
to move from one house to another and on June 6, he
thereupon asked leadman Prentiss Green could he leave
early (at the usual quitting time 3:30 p.m.), and that Green
said it was all right with him if it were approved by
Foreman Cole and he advised Stringfellow to ask Mr.
Cole; that he (Stringfellow) went to Foreman Cole and
asked him could he leave early (3:30 p.m.) on June 6 and 7
and that Foreman Cole said "OK." Stringfellow further
stated that he left work at 3:30 p.m. on June 7; he
reminded leadman Green that he had to leave at 3:30, and
on his departure at 3:30 p.m., he saw Foreman Cole and
waved goodbye to him; and that Cole, who had a spray
gun in his hand, waved the same (goodbye).
Leadman Green credibly testified that he knew String-
fellow was moving his family on or about June 6 and 7 and
he said he has the authority to allow a member of his crew
to leave work early; that he told Stringfellow it was all right
for him to leave at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 if it were approved
by Foreman Cole; that there may be times when the
foreman will let an employee leave early without his
(Green's) knowledge, but that he did not remember
Stringfellow asking him to leave early on June 7; that after
3:30 on June 7, either he or Foreman Cole asked the other
where was Stringfellow, and Foreman Cole went to the
timeclock and noted that Stringfellow had clocked out at
3:30; and that he (Green) and his five man crew continued
to work until after 3:30. When Foreman Cole asked him
did he give Stringfellow permission to leave early he
(Green) said he replied, he did not remember. At the
hearing, Green said Stringfellow had a trailer hitch
attached to the rear bumper of his car on June 7 but he
of what Mercer's horn honking and hand pointing incident meant (get off
company property or do not block the gate), I cannot credit Stringfellow's
uncorroborated testimony over Superintendent Mercer's.
8 Although there were minor discrepancies in the testimony of the
several witnesses with respect to the usual or official end of the workday, I
believe such discrepancies were reasonable and were due to technical but
honest errors in judgment and memory of each witness in disclosing what
information he deemed significant at the time he was interviewed and
interrogated, and that any errors in said times were not due to bad faith or
dishonesty of any of the witnesses.
THE DOLESE COMPANY
could not remember whether a trailer was also attached to
the same.
Leadman Green further credibly testified that on June 8,
Foreman Cole came to him and told him Plant Superin-
tendent Mercer wanted to see him in his office. He
reported to Mr. Mercer's office, sat down, and a paper
containing a statement about permission for Stringfellow
to leave work at 3:30 on June 7 was placed on the table
before him. He advised Mr. Mercer that he gave String-
fellow permission to leave early (3:30 p .m.) on June 6 but
he could not remember whether he gave Stringfellow
permission to leave early (3:30 p.m.) on June 7. Mr. Mercer
then asked him to sign the statement, which was prepared
before he entered the office, so he signed it because he did
not think there would be any further discussion or contest
about it
Foreman Cole testified that only supervisors and the
plant manager have the authority to allow an employee to
leave work early; and that a leadman can allow an
employee in his crew to leave work early if he finds that it
will not obstruct necessary job progress and he will not
need the particular employee. Specifically, he stated that
on June 6 Stringfellow approached him between 7 and 8:30
a.m. and asked him if he could leave work on the
afternoons of June 6 and 7, at 3:30, because he was in the
process of moving his family. He said he gave Stringfellow
permission to leave at 3:30 p.m. that day (June 6) if his
crew were not running behind the work schedule, and that
he (Stringfellow) could do so by informing his leadman.
However, he said he advised Stringfellow to check with
him on the next day (June 7) about leaving at 3:30, because
it was too far in advance for him to grant approval.
Nevertheless he said if the progress of the work was all
right, it, was possible he could leave early; and that
Stringfellow did not check with him on June 7 and he
[Cole] did not give him permission to leave on June 7.
Foreman Cole said he first learned that Stringfellow had
left early on June .7 when leadman Green approached him
and asked where was Stringfellow and he replied he did not
know. Green then asked him did he give Stringfellow
permission to leave early and he responded, "I certainly
did not." Foreman Cole said he then went and checked the
timecards and noted that Stringfellow had checked out at
3:30 p.m. He then asked Green did he (Green) give
Stringfellow permission to leave and Green said he did not.
Foreman Cole said Green's crew had work to be completed
after 3:30 on June 7, and it was either himself or Green
who initially reported Stringfellow's departure to Plant
Superintendent Mercer. On cross-examination, Foreman
Cole admitted that men are pulled from their assigned
crews to substitute for vacancies on other crews in cases of
emergencies , and that there are interchanges of crew
members on occasion. He also admitted that he reported
Stringfellow's early departure on June 7 to Mr. Mercer on
the same afternoon (June 7), and he wrote up a report to
that effect.
9 1 credit Green's testimonial account of the events which lead to
Stringfellow's discharge because although he appeared to be testifying
truthfully to the extent that he testified, I received the distinct impression
that he was afraid of management because he was uneasy answering
questions which indicated an answer adverse to his supervisor (Mr. Mercer)
who was present in the courtroom ; and because he was careful in not
101
Plant Production Superintendent George Mercer credi-
bly testified that on the afternoon of June 7, Foreman Cole
told him that a man (Stringfellow) had left the plant
without permission and before his job was performed.
Thereupon he prepared a discharge form, which is
standard procedure for all violations of plant rules, to keep
in the files. This prepared statement (Resp. Exh. 2)
indicated that Stringfellow was discharged on June 7 for
leaving work without proper permission from leadman
Green and Foreman Cole; and for failure to report to work
on June 8 without calling in to give an explanation for his
absence. Mr. Mercer then called Foreman Cole and
leadman Green into his office on June 8, and having heard
Green state that he did not give Stringfellow permission to
leave work at 3:30 on June 7, had Green and Cole to sign
the discharge statement , since he obtained from them the
information upon which the discharge was based.
In explaining why Knight was given only a 3-day
suspension for walking off the job at noon without
permission, Mr. Mercer said Knight was a dozer, frontend
loader operator; that such operators were difficult to find
and retain at that time; that Knight was the only operator
that could keep the job going and he was compelled to
consider the alternative punishment (suspension); that
employee Ingram was a forklift operator but not a
qualified dozer frontend lift operator as was Knight; and
that if he had other operators as Knight, the latter would
have been discharged as was Stringfellow. Moreover, Mr.
Mercer continued, other employees have been discharged
for walking off the job, such as one Robert Silar, a skilled
laborer, who left the job without permission for several
days and returned. He was unable to recall the specific
reasons for which said other employees were discharged.
Superintendent Mercer also testified that he did not
complete a discharge form on Knight when he was
discharged because Knight was not a laborer and he
worked under the supervision of Construction Superin-
tendent Pete Peters, who merely asked his opinion about
appropriate disciplinary action. Therefore, it was Pete
Peters' responsibility to complete the suspension form, and
if Peters did not complete the form, it was Peters who did
not comply with company procedure in not doing so.
Sandra Stringfellow, wife of dischargee Stringfellow,
credibly testified, corroborating his testimony, that she
called the office of Respondent on the morning of June 8,
as she had on other occasions, to report that her husband
was ill; that she asked to speak with Superintendent
George Mercer but was advised that he was not there; that
she then talked with Mike Martin, who identified himself,
and informed him that her husband (Stringfellow) would
not be in on that day (Saturday, June 8) because he was ill;
that Martin then said: "Well tell him not to bother because
he has been terminated ... for leaving early on `Thursday'
(probably meant Friday) and to have him come and pick
up his checks." 10
Based upon a composite of the foregoing credible
categorically denying that he gave Stringfellow permission to leave early on
June 7, but instead , he emphatically stated several times, that he did not
remember giving such permission.
10 Although Sandra Stringfellow is the wife of dischargee Stringfellow, I
nevertheless credit her testimony because I received the impression that she
was testifying truthfully. I also credit her testimony , even though
(Continued)
102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
testimony , I conclude and find that the usual end of
Respondent's workday in June was 3:30 p.m.; that if a
pour of concrete was not completed by 3:30 p.m., the
employees would work until it was completed ; that on the
morning of June 6 , Stringfellow requested permission from
leadman Green and Foreman Cole to leave work at 3:30
p.m. on June 6 and 7; that leadman Green who knew
Stringfellow was moving his family on June 6 and 7, gave
him permission to leave work at 3:30 p .m. on June 6,
provided it was approved by Foreman Cole, but he could
not remember whether he also consented to Stringfellow's
leaving at 3:30 p.m. on June 7; that on the morning of June
6, Stringfellow requested permission from Foreman Cole to
leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and 7; that Foreman
Cole granted Stringfellow permission to leave work at 3:30
p.m. on June 6 and granted him qualified permission
(provided he was not needed after 3 : 30 p.m.) to leave work
at 3:30 p.m. on June 7; that Stringfellow did not actually
pour concrete but cleaned the beds before a pour, and the
evidence does not unequivocally show that he (String-
fellow) was specifically needed after 3:30 on June 7; that
Stringfellow left work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and 7 and his
crew worked until after 3:30 p.m. on June 7; that on the
afternoon of June 7, Foreman Cole advised Superintendent
Mercer that Stringfellow left work at 3:30 p.m. without
permission and before his job was completed ; that on June
8, Stringfellow's wife called the plant 's office to report that
he would not be in on that day because he was in and she
was advised that Stringfellow was terminated for leaving
work early on the previous day; that on June 8 leadman
Green advised Superintendent Mercer that he could not
remember whether he gave Stringfellow permission to
leave at 3 : 30 p.m . on June 7, but he was nevertheless asked
by Superintendent Mercer to sign the discharge statement
which was prepared in reliance upon the report of
Foreman Cole ; and that Green thereupon signed the
statement and Stringfellow was officially discharged
forthwith, without any questions or opportunity to give an
explanation.
Based upon the foregoing consolidated findings under B
and D supra, I ultimately conclude and find that String-
fellow 's leadership participation in initiating the organiza-
tional efforts of Respondent 's employees was known by
Respondent ; that Respondent's supervisory personnel's
(Cole, Mercer, and Hammond , especially Foreman Cole)
inquiries and discussions with its employees about their
union interests and activities were too diligent and
persistent to characterize as inconsequential and, therefore,
constituted interference with, restraint upon, and coercion
against Respondent 's employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of Section
8(axl) of the Act. Moreover, when the above violation is
considering along with the evidence and findings under D,
Respondent dented that it received a call about Stringfellow's absence on
the 8 , because the evidence does not indicate that Stringfellow left the job
on June 7 without intending to return or that he had ever left the job early
or failed to call in sick on any previous occasion. Hence I am persuaded that
Stringfellow's testimony, corroborated by his wife that she called Respon-
dent's office to report his illness , is in all probability correct.
I further conclude and find that Respondent's discharge of
Stringfellow was discriminatory and violative of Section
8(a)(3)(1) of the Act.
Analysis and Conclusions
The evidence and findings under B (supra) clearly
establish that Respondent , through its supervisory person-
nel, had knowledge of Stringfellow 's concerted or union
activity and did in fact interrogate Stringfellow and other
employees about their union interests , activities and/or
affiliations . One of its principal supervisors , Foreman Cole,
even advised Stringfellow and other fellow employees that
they did not need the Union because he could be their
negotiator, and he tried to lead them to believe that either
Respondent on its own initiation , or through his efforts,
was going to give them a 25-cent per hour raise and he
urged said employees to vote against the Union . Although
in his testimony Foreman Cole tried to explain that his
statements about a 25-cent increase in wages was referrable
to other job classifications , which paid 25-cent an hour
more than that of Stringfellow's crew, it is highly
improbable that all of the employee witnesses misinterpret-
ed his statements in the same manner. This is especially so,
since some of said employee witnesses were not new
employees and in all probability were sufficiently knowl-
edgeable about the existence of other job classifications, so
as not to have confused them with a wage increase for
themselves.
Moreover, when the chain of discussions between
management and the employees are viewed from every
dimension most favorable to Respondent , I do not believe
that it can be reasonably concluded that such widespread
discussions on the part of Respondent did not exceed the
pale of free speech. On the contrary, such frequent and
persistent inquiries by supervisory personnel of Respon-
dent about employee interest in the Union, about who was
distributing union cards, a foreman volunteering to be the
employees ' negotiator with a promise to obtain them a
raise, asking for complaints , and advising the employees
that the Union cannot get them anything the Company is
not willing to give , all just prior to the union election,
clearly constitute interference with, restraint , and/or
coercion against the employees in the exercise of their
protected rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of
Section 8(axl) of the Act. The fact that most of these
discussions with the employees were carried out by
Foreman Cole alone, does not, unfortunately , exonerate
Respondent from the violation since Foreman Cole,
unequivocally, was a supervisor and agent of Respondent
within the meaning of the Act, and as such , his conduct
was the conduct of Respondent.
With respect to Respondent's contention that String-
fellow left work early without permission on June 7, it is
well established by the evidence of record that Respondent
knew about Stringfellow's union activity, particularly
through Foreman Cole, who made diligent inquiries of
employees as to who was distributing union cards, and he
probably learned that Stringfellow was so engaged.
Foreman Cole also admitted he had an idea Stringfellow
had signed a union card or was for the Union. It is
particularly noted that although Foreman Cole testified
THE DOLESE COMPANY 103
that leadman Green told him he (Green) did not give
Stringfellow permission to leave work early on June 7,
,although-- it .was . possible he did give permission, Green
consistently testified under oath that he did not remember
whether or not he gave Stringfellow permission to leave
early on June 7. It is further noted that the record is barren
of any evidence that Stringfellow's work was unsatisfacto-
ry, that he was guilty of excessive absenteeism , was in the
habit of leaving the job early, that the report of his leaving
early was investigated by Respondent, or that he was given
any warning for his first alleged infraction of a company
rule (leaving the job early). Moreover, it is especially noted
in conjunction with the above-considered factors, that it is
not as though Stringfellow did not report for work or that
he left work before the usual or normal quitting time (3:30)
on June 7, but rather, that he left at the usual quitting time
(3:30) before work of questionable necessity and duration
(1-1 1/2 hour) was completed, and upon highly disputed
circumstances as to whether or not he left without
permission from Foreman Cole or leadman Green.
Foreman Cole admitted that on June 6 Stringfellow
asked him for permission to leave work early on June 6 and
7 and that he gave Stringfellow permission to leave on June
6, and qualified permission to leave early (3:30) on June 7.
Hence, since leadman Green did not deny that he gave
Stringfellow permission to leave early on June 7, which
permission he admitted he could have given but could not
remember whether or not he did in fact give such
permission, it is clear that the circumstances surrounding
Stringfellow's early departure on June 7 are equivocal and
that an unequivocal conclusion that he left without
permission would not be reasonable or fair. However, even
if the evidence showed that Stringfellow did leave early on
June 7 without permission, such one time early departure
(approximately 15 to 90 minutes, at most), without any
evidence that his absence (after 3:30) reasonably affected
work progress, would hardly serve as a reasonable and
believable basis for which he was discharged, in the
absence of other motives. Thus, when Respondent's
knowledge of Stringfellow's union activity is taken into
consideration along with its previously described conduct
in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act, it becomes
obvious that Stringfellow's discharge was substantially
motivated by his union activity and, therefore, was
discriminatory and was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
The fact that Respondent did not discharge Stringfellow
until 2 weeks after the election does not make his discharge
any less an act of reprisal than if it had discharged him
before the election . Nor is the fact that Respondent did not
discharge other employees who were engaged in union
activity along with Stringfellow of sufficient mitigative
significance as to render Stringfellow's discharge nondis-
parate or nondiscriminatory. On the contrary, it is clear
from the evidence that Foreman Cole had several coercive
and restraining conversations with Stringfellow and other
employees about the Union, and it was Cole who
precipitously reported Stringfellow's early departure on
June 7 to Superintendent Mercer , in such a manner as to
cause or recommend his discharge. When Superintendent
Mercer had an occasion to discipline another employee
(Knight) for leaving the job early before 3:30, he merely
suspended him for 3 days. Hence, again it is clear that
Respondent's conduct in discharging Stringfellow was
substantially motivated by Cole's opposing concern about
Stringfellow's leadership role in union activity which he
tried unsuccessfully to discourage.
Although Respondent contends that Stringfellow was
also discharged for failure to call in on June 8 and explain
his absence, this contention was disputed by Stringfellow
and his wife, who testified that the reason for her
husband's absence was reported to Respondent on the
morning of June 8. It is also noted that this disputed charge
is the first and only time the evidence shows that
Stringfellow was charged with not reporting for work
without an explanation. In fact, it appears to be a
pretextual tie-in charge to reinforce the already pretextual
charge of leaving the job early, in an effort to justify
Stringfellow's discharge. However, I credit the testimony of
Stringfellow and his wife, that Respondent was notified on
June 8 that Stringfellow was ill and unable to report for
work and that it was during that conversation that she was
informed that Stringfellow was terminated for leaving work
early on June 7. At the same time, I discredit Respondent's
charge that Stringfellow did not call its office on June 8,
because the person to whom Mrs. Stringfellow testified she
spoke did not appear at the proceeding and Respondent's
denial of receipt of such a call did not impress me as being
credible and appeared self-serving in view of the total
evidence of record.
Finally, when the evidence is viewed in its entirety, it
becomes clear that Respondent's discharge of Stringfellow
was made largely upon the report of Foreman Cole, who
had manifested a deep and opposing interest in the union
activity of Stringfellow and other employees; and that
Respondent discharged Stringfellow without any investiga-
tion of the report, without any warning to him, and without
affording him an opportunity to make an explanation to
the unilateral report of the circumstances which supported
the charge. Under these circumstances I am persuaded that
the evidence does not establish that Respondent's dis-
charge of Stringfellow was for cause. The record does not
show that any other employee was discharged upon what
appears to be such a minor infraction, supported by
nebulous and conflicting evidence.
Moreover, while the record shows that unionization of
Respondent's other plants did not present unfair labor
practice problems, as contended by counsel for Respon-
dent, such freedom from unfair labor practices in its other
plants would not negate unfair labor practices largely
initiated and implemented by one or some of Respondent's
supervisory personnel in the instant plant.
The court, in N.L.R.B. v. Western Bank and Office Supply
Company, 283 F.2d 603 (C.A. 10, 1960), cited by counsel
for Respondent, held that an employer with no antiunion
background, which made no threat, exercised no coercion,
and had said nothing derogatory of any union or union
member, would not be found guilty of discrimination for
discharging an employee for low productivity and unsatis-
factory work. However, while the propriety of this decision
does not appear to be questioned, it is readily observed
that it is not applicable in the instant case, since the
104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employer (Respondent) herein engaged in coercive and
other conduct violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act, and
the employee herein was not shown to have had a record of
low productivity and unsatisfactory work.
Counsel for the Respondent also contends that supervi-
sory personnel of Respondent made an isolated statement
and mere expressions of opinion about the Union to
employees which did not constitute an unfair labor
practice . In support of his contention , counsel cited
N.LR.B. v. Acker Industries, Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (C.A. 10,
1%2). However , while an examination of the above-cited
case reveals that the court held as counsel contends, it is
noted that the facts therein are distinguishable from the
facts in the instant case in the following respects: In the
case cited , the employer made one statement to two
employees, to the effect that "the union could not force us
to close our doors ." The court held that such statement in
the absence of any link between the statement and a
proscribed course of conduct did not constitute an unfair
labor practice ; and that whether such statement is
construed as a threat or mere expression of opinion lies
with the Board. In the instant case, Foreman Cole made
several inquiries of several employees about their union
activity and several statements against the Union ("you do
not need the union ...", including offering the employees
benefits and volunteering to be their negotiator). Hence,
the statements made by the Employer (Cole, in conjunc-
tion with the statements made by Mercer and Hammond)
were not isolated and were in fact accompanied by a
proscribed (repetitious) course of conduct which were of
an interfering, restraining, and coercive nature . Nor were
the statements of the Employer herein remote in point of
time from the election, as was the statement of the
employer in J. S. Dillon & Sons Stores Co., Inc. v. N.LR.B.,
338 F.2d 395 (C.A. 10, 1964), cited by counsel for
Respondent.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Respondent described in section I, above , have a close,
intimate , and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and
commerce among the several states and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
discharged Carl D . Stringfellow in violation of Section
8(aX3) and (1) of the Act , the recommended Order will
provide that Respondent offer him reinstatement to his
job, and, make him whole for loss of earnings within the
meaning and in accord with the Board 's decisions in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, except as specifically
modified by the wording of such recommended Order.
Because of the character of the unfair labor practices
herein found , the recommended Order will provide that
Respondent cease and desist from or in any manner
interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
N.L.R.B. v. Entwhistle Mfg., Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A.
4).
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent , The Dolese Company, is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Operating Engineers,
AFL-CIO, Local 627, is , and has been at all times material
herein , a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of
employment of Carl D . Stringfellow , thereby in an effort to
discourage membership in the Union, a labor organization,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices con-
demned by Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By interrogating Stringfellow and other employees
about their union activities and by offering them a raise,
urging them to vote against the Union and volunteering to
be their negotiator, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by lawful agreements in accord with Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
5. By calling special employee meetings only when
union activity is imminent and encouraging the employees
to submit complaints on grievances , the Employer violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:11
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices warranting a remedial Order, I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it
take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
It having been found that Respondent interfered with,
restrained , and coerced Carl D . Stringfellow and/or its
other employees in the exercise of their Section 7 protected
rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act ; and that it
II In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
ORDER
Respondent, The Dolese Company, its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees at its Oklaho-
ma City plant about their and other employees concerted
or union desires and activities.
(b) Offering to be its employees ' negotiator and promis-
ing to pay them wage increases , while urging them to vote
against the Union or union positions.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
THE DOLESE COMPANY 105
(c) Calling special employee meetings only when union
activity is imminent and encouraging its employees thereat
to submit complaints or grievances.
(d) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or
any term or condition of employment because of their
protected, concerted, or union activities.
(e) In any other manner interfering with , restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act except to the extent that such
rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Carl D. Stringfellow immediate and full
reinstatement to his former position or, if such position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights previously enjoyed,
and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason
of the discrimination against him with interest at the rate
of 6 percent, in the manner described in the section entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of the recommended Order.
(c) Post at Respondent 's plant at Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."12 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed
by Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspic-
uous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
12 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees
about their and other employees' union membership,
activities, and desires.
WE WILL NOT offer to be the employees' negotiator,
promise to pay them wage increases, and urge them to
vote against the Union or the Union's positions.
WE WILL NOT call special employee meetings only
when union activity is imminent largely for the purpose
of encouraging the employees to submit complaints
and grievances to discourage union adherence and
activity.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, Local
627, or any other labor organization, by discharging
employees or otherwise discriminating in any manner
in respect to their tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise and
enjoyment of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by lawful agreements
in accord with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer Carl D. Stringfellow immediate and
full reinstatement to his former position or if such
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
one, without prejudice to the seniority and other rights
and privileges enjoyed by him, and make him whole for
any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of his
discharge, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse
to become or remain, members of said Union or any other
labor organization, except to the extent that such rights
may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Dated By
THE DOLESE COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office,
Federal Office Building, Room 8A-24, 819 Taylor Street,
Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.