The Boeing Company

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 14, 2020

2020002529 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 14, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/874,365 10/02/2015 Shuguang Song 15-1463-US-NP 8582
63759 7590 09/14/2020
DUKE W. YEE
YEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
P.O. BOX 6669
MCKINNEY, TX 75071
EXAMINER
ZARE, SCOTT A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/14/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentadmin@boeing.com
ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SHUGUANG SONG, WILLIAM E. KRECHEL,
JAMES L. POBLETE and BRENT PATRICK LEBLANC
____________

Appeal 2020-002529
Application 14/874,365
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–12, 14, 16–19, 21–24, and 26–29,
which constitute all of the claims pending in this application. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The
Boeing Company. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates “generally to an improved
manufacturing system for products and, in particular, to a method and
apparatus for manufacturing an aircraft.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for manufacturing a product, the method
comprising:
identifying, by a computer system, a predicted parts
shortage for parts based on historical parts shortage data and
current parts shortage data;
identifying, by the computer system, a group of parts for
which a shortage is predicted and suppliers that supply the group
of parts;
identifying, by the computer system, a predicted supplier
reaction time to resolve the predicted parts shortage;
identifying, by the computer system, ranked suppliers
from suppliers having a fastest predicted supplier reaction time;
generating, by the computer system, an output of ranked
suppliers with the fastest predicted supplier reaction time;
scheduling, by the computer system, a production of the
group of parts, wherein the predicted supplier reaction time is
used to create a schedule of when the group of parts is to be
produced; and
initiating, by the computer system, the production of the
group of parts by one or more of the ranked suppliers based on
the ranked suppliers with the fastest predicted supplier reaction
time by electronically sending an order to the ranked suppliers at
a predicted lead time in accordance with the schedule; and
managing, by the computer system, manufacture of the
product using the group of parts produced by the ranked
suppliers.
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REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–12, 14, 16–19, 21–24, and 26–29 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 2.
ANALYSIS
Section 101 Rejection
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’
to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Guidance”); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg.
55,942 (available at the USPTO’s website) (“October 2019 PEG Update”).
Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
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organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. rev.
08.2017 Jan. 2018)).
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56.
2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1
Under the first step of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds
that the claimed invention is directed to certain methods of organizing
human activity and/or a mental process. Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner
finds the claims are directed to:
a process for optimizing a production plan by predicting
shortages for parts based on historical data, identifying the
suppliers of the parts that are predicted to incur a shortage,
ranking suppliers of the parts based on their predicted reaction
time to the shortage, and then scheduling and initiating the
production of the parts based on the ranking of suppliers
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which is “a method for organizing human activity.” Id. at 5. Specifically,
the Examiner finds that the claims “may be categorized as a method for
organizing human activity because they are directed to managing production
planning” in that “the claims are directed to managing relationships between
suppliers of parts and a manufacture[r] that uses those parts, by enabling the
identification of parts shortages and subsequently scheduling production of
those parts to minimize the impact of the shortage.” Id.; see also Ans. 4.
The Examiner also finds that the “identifying,” “scheduling a production,”
and “initiating the production” steps “are mental steps that could be
performed entirely in the human mind, for example, by a production
manager.” Final Act. 5. According to the Examiner, the “recited steps
merely require acts that could be performed by a human to make business
decisions related to foreseeing a parts shortage and responding by ordering
the parts from a dependable supplier.” Ans. 4–5.
Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s determination
that the claims are directed to certain methods for organizing human activity
and/or mental processes under Step 2A, Prong 1. Appellant argues that the
claims “do not fall under any of these categories,” and “recite limitations
related to technical elements of supply chain management rather than the
economic, legal, or personal aspects of supply chains.” Appeal Br. 9; see
also Reply Br. 3.
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite
certain methods of organizing human activity and/or mental processes. See
Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4–5; 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Appellant’s Specification describes certain problems that may arise
during the manufacture of an aircraft, including parts shortages and parts
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that do not meet the required quality standard. Spec. ¶¶ 2–9. According to
the Specification, it is “desirable to have a method and apparatus that
overcome a technical problem with reducing parts shortages caused by
suppliers currently supplying parts for manufacturing a product, such as an
aircraft.” Id. ¶ 10. To solve this problem, the Specification describes “a
method and apparatus for managing manufacturing of a product” by “using
one or more of the ranked suppliers, based on the ranked suppliers
identified, thereby enabling a reduction for a risk of a shortage for the group
of the parts.” Id. ¶¶ 30, 32. Claim 1 recites a method that performs the
following steps:
identifying, by a computer system, a predicted parts
shortage for parts based on historical parts shortage data and
current parts shortage data;
identifying, by the computer system, a group of parts for
which a shortage is predicted and suppliers that supply the group
of parts;
identifying, by the computer system, a predicted supplier
reaction time to resolve the predicted parts shortage;
identifying, by the computer system, ranked suppliers
from suppliers having a fastest predicted supplier reaction time;
generating, by the computer system, an output of ranked
suppliers with the fastest predicted supplier reaction time;
scheduling, by the computer system, a production of the
group of parts, wherein the predicted supplier reaction time is
used to create a schedule of when the group of parts is to be
produced; and
initiating, by the computer system, the production of the
group of parts by one or more of the ranked suppliers based on
the ranked suppliers with the fastest predicted supplier reaction
time by electronically sending an order to the ranked suppliers
at a predicted lead time in accordance with the schedule; and
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managing, by the computer system, manufacture of the
product using the group of parts produced by the ranked
suppliers.
Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
Appellant has not persuasively argued why the italicized claim
limitations above do not recite “certain methods of organizing human
activity”—specifically, “managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and
following rules or instructions).” See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
For example, the Specification describes that the “predicted supplier reaction
time” (e.g., identification of how long each of the suppliers takes to resolve a
shortage when one occurs) is identified using “techniques for ordered
events,” which include “release production order, ship items from supplier,
deliver items to the manufacturer, identify part shortage, resolve parts
shortage, or other suitable events.” Spec. ¶¶ 75–76. The suppliers may be
ranked, and production of parts may be scheduled, based on predicted
supplier reaction time. Id. ¶¶ 80–84. Based upon this disclosure, we agree
with the Examiner that the claims recite certain methods of organizing
human activity, and more particularly, managing interactions between
manufacturer and suppliers.
Appellant also has not persuasively argued why the same italicized
steps in claim 1, do not recite “mental processes”—specifically, “concepts
performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion).’” See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For example,
the Specification describes employing “statistical techniques . . . to analyze
historical data” to “generate predictions of shortage.” Spec. ¶ 61. The
Specification also describes identifying “statistical correlations . . . from
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historical manufacturing information.” Id. ¶ 69. The Specification also
describes looking at “historical identification of performance by suppliers”
and “ordered events” to predict “supplier reaction time.” Id. ¶¶ 74–77. A
“visualization of ranked suppliers” is created, showing “a list of suppliers
. . . placed in order based on predicted supplier reaction time.” Id. ¶ 81. The
Specification describes “creating schedules or modifying schedules for
tasks.” Id. ¶ 79. Production is initiated “by placing an order for the group of
parts” and doing so “at an earlier time that reduces a risk of shortage of the
group of parts.” Id. ¶ 80. These are all steps that can be practically
performed by a human being.
Appellant also argues that “the sheer number of parts involved in
manufacturing complex products, in combination with managing multiple
supply chains from different suppliers and tight manufacturing schedules
cannot be managed by human mental means alone and are simply not
feasible without heavy reliance on computerized data processing.” Appeal
Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 2, 4.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because the claims are not
limited in this manner. For example, the claims do not specify the number
of “parts” and, therefore, encompass a minimal number of “parts” that a
human may manage mentally. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification
describes one benefit of the system as “increasing the speed at which
product 102 may be manufactured.” Spec. ¶ 53. We agree with the
Examiner that the “addition of the machine” (i.e., “computer system”) in the
claims “‘function[s] solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a
solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a
computer for performing calculations.’” Ans. 6 (citing Dealertrack, Inc. v.
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Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Relying on a computer to
perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to
render a claim patent eligible. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (“use of a
computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue
simultaneous instructions” is insufficient for patent eligibility); Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (a computer “employed only for its most basic function . . . does not
impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims”). Moreover, the
“mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Accordingly, we conclude claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity and/or mental processes as identified in the 2019
Guidance, and thus an abstract idea.
2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether the claims are “directed to” the identified
abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the
reasons set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Appellant argues that the “claimed invention does more than merely
manage relations between suppliers of parts and a manufacturer but rather
improves the manufacturing process itself including optimizing prediction of
supply chain response and the timing of communication with part suppliers
within the supply chain.” Appeal Br. 8; see also Appeal Br. 9–10; Reply
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Br. 2, 4. In support of its arguments, Appellant cites to paragraphs 53, 54,
and 58 of the Specification. Appeal Br. 9.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 6; Ans. 6–7. Appellant
has not sufficiently shown that the claims are directed to an improvement to
the computer system or technological process. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner’s conclusion that “the use of the computer system does not
improve the functioning of the computer.” Final Act. 6. As the Examiner
properly reasons, “the purported improvements are not improvements to
technology, as they do not relate to computer technology or technology for
actual manufacturing of a product,” and instead “are abstract ideas for
optimizing a production plan that are only generically tied to a computer
environment.” Ans. 5; see also Ans. 6–7. Furthermore, Appellant has not
shown that the alleged improvement to the manufacturing process changes
the manner in which the computer operates or changes the functionality of
the computer itself. Instead, Appellant’s identified alleged improvement is
directed to the abstract idea.
Here, the claimed invention merely uses generic computer
components to collect, analyze, and display data (i.e., the steps are carried
out “by a computer system,” and the orders are sent “electronically”; the
system comprises “a bus system,” “a storage device,” and “a number of
processors,” and “a device that . . . initiates the production of the group of
parts”). See, e.g., Spec ¶¶ 40, 50; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Although the Specification describes that
the “part manager . . . transforms computer system . . . into a special purpose
computer system,” it also states that the “part manager . . . may be a module
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that is executed or implemented in computer system,” which “is a hardware
system and includes one or more data processing systems.” Spec. ¶¶ 40, 54.
These “data processing systems may be selected from at least one of a
computer, a server computer, a tablet, a mobile phone, or some other
suitable data processing system.” Id. Therefore, the claimed computer
components used to perform the limitations in the claim, such as the
“computer system,” are generic computer components (i.e., a computer
system including a computer that executes a part manager module). Simply
implementing an abstract idea using conventional machines or devices adds
nothing of substance. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea
‘while adding the words ‘apply it’’ is not enough for patent eligibility.”);
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84–85 (explaining that “simply implementing a
mathematical principle on a physical machine” does not suffice for patent
eligibility (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64–65, 71).
Appellant also argues that the claimed invention is “directed to
solving a challenge where the ‘claimed solution is necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the realm of computer networks.’” Appeal Br. 8 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC
v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Rather, we agree
with the Examiner that the invention is “related to managing a supply chain
of parts,” and solves the problem of “a shortage of parts for a manufacturing
process” that “predates the use of computers.” Ans. 7. In DDR Holdings,
the Federal Circuit determined that certain claims satisfied § 101 under
Mayo/Alice step two because “the claimed solution amount[ed] to an
inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-centric problem,” i.e.,
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a challenge unique to the Internet. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–59.
The Federal Circuit explained that the claims specified “how interactions
with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result . . . that overrides
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the
click of a hyperlink.” Id. at 1258. The claims, therefore, recited a
technological solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology” that
addressed a “problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks.” Id. at 1257. However, “DDR Holdings does not apply when . . .
the asserted claims do not ‘attempt to solve a challenge particular to the
Internet.’” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d
1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Unlike the patent-eligible claims in
DDR Holdings, the claims here do not attempt to solve a challenge particular
to the Internet. See Appeal Br. 12, 14–17; see also Final Act. 6–9; Ans. 5–7.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the claims fail to integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application.
2019 Guidance, Step 2B
Turning to step 2 of the Alice/Mayo framework, we look to whether
the claims (a) add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply
append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
We agree with the Examiner that the claimed “computer elements” are
merely “generic computer component[s]” that perform well-understood,
routine, and conventional functions. Final Act. 8–9. As discussed above,
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the Specification describes the claimed computer components generically
and evidences their conventional nature. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 40. For example,
the Specification explains that the “part manager . . . may be a module that is
executed or implemented in computer system,” which “includes one or more
data processing systems” that “may be selected from at least one of a
computer, a server computer, a tablet, a mobile phone, or some other
suitable data processing system.” Id. Appellant does not direct our attention
to anything in the Specification that indicates the claimed computer
components perform anything other than the well-understood, routine, and
conventional function of manipulating or analyzing data. See, e.g., Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires
anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and
display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired
information.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending
information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept).
When viewed as a whole, nothing in the claims adds significantly
more (i.e., an inventive concept) to the abstract idea. The claimed
“computer system,” “processors,” and “device[s]” amount to no more than
mere instructions to apply the abstract idea using generic computer
components, which is insufficient to provide an inventive concept.
Furthermore, we are unable discern anything in the claims, even when the
recitations are considered in combination, that represents something more
than the performance of routine, conventional functions of a generic
computer. That is, the claims at issue do not require any nonconventional
computer components, or even a “non-conventional and non-generic
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arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for
performance of the method “on a set of generic computer components.”
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant further argues that the claimed invention is a “novel method
of manufacturing a product” that is a “new and useful process.” Appeal
Br. 7; see Appeal Br. 9–10. However, Appellant’s argument is not
persuasive because it improperly conflates the requirements for eligible
subject matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty (§ 102)
and nonobviousness (§ 103). Although the second step in the Alice
framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not
an evaluation of novelty or nonobviousness. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18. A
novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79. Further,
“under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered
law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the
novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent
eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
Appellant’s preemption arguments are likewise unpersuasive. See
Appeal Br. 7, 10. Although preemption is a consideration, the absence of
complete preemption is not dispositive. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption
may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”). Therefore, even if the
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claims do not preempt the abstract idea, that alone is not enough to render
the claims patent eligible.
Given the claimed generic computer components performing generic
computer functions, we conclude that the combination of limitations in each
independent claim does not supply an “inventive concept” that renders the
claim “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Thus, the claims do not
satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two.
For at least the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 11, and 17 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter, as well as dependent claims 2, 4–8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19,
21–24, 26–29, which were not separately argued.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–12, 14,
16–19, 21–24, and 26–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In summary:
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–8, 10–12,
14, 16–19, 21–24,
26–29
101 Eligibility
1, 2, 4–8, 10–
12, 14, 16–19,
21–24, 26–29

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

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AFFIRMED