Tessco Communi-cations Inc.v.Total Electrical Services & Supply Co.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 15, 2007

No. 91152912 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2007)

Oral Hearing: June 7, 2006 Mailed: February 15, 2007

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Tessco Communications Inc.

v.

Total Electrical Service & Supply Co.
_____

Opposition No. 91152912
to application Serial No. 76032610
filed on 4/24/00
_____

James E. Shlesinger of Shlesinger, Arkwright & Garvey, LLP
for Tessco Communications Inc.

Raymond M. Galasso of Simon, Galasso & Frantz, PLC for Total
Electrical Service & Supply Co.
______

Before Seeherman, Quinn and Cataldo,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge:

On April 24, 2000, applicant, Total Electrical Service
& Supply Co., a Texas corporation, filed an application to
register on the Principal Register the mark displayed below,
based upon an allegation of its bona fide intent to use the
mark in commerce for "electrical contracting services in the
industrial and energy markets," in International Class 37.1

1 Application Serial No. 76032610.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF
THE T.T.A.B.
Opposition No. 91152912
2

Registration has been opposed by Tessco Communications Inc.
("opposer"). As grounds for opposition, opposer asserts
that it provides numerous products and services in the field
of wireless communications systems; that it is the owner of
the following marks, previously used and registered on the
Principal Register:
TESSCO, in standard character form, for
distributorship services in the field of cellular
telephone and land mobile radio equipment,
in International Class 422;
TESSCO.COM, in standard character form, for
distributorship services in the field of wireless
communications products,
in International Class 353;

2 Registration No. 1674656 issued on February 4, 1992. Section 8
affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged. Renewed.

3 Registration No. 2381499 issued on August 29, 2000. Section 8
affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.

Opposition No. 91152912
3
for
distributorship services in the field of
cellular telephone and land mobile radio
equipment,
in Class 424;

for
catalogs, newsletters and bulletins published
periodically in the field of communications,
in Class 16, and
distributorship services in the field of cellular
telephone and land mobile radio equipment,
in Class 425;
TESSCO TECHNOLOGIES, in standard character form, for
distributorship services in the field of cellular
telephone and land mobile radio equipment,
in Class 426; and

4 Registration No. 1716948 issued on September 15, 1992. Section
8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.
Renewed.

5 Registration No. 1825093 issued on March 8, 1994. Section 8
affidavit accepted. Renewed.

6 Registration No. 1827048 issued on March 15, 1994 with a
disclaimer of “TECHNOLOGIES” apart from the mark as shown.
Opposition No. 91152912
4
TESSCO MAGIC, in standard character form, for
computer programs designed to facilitate product
selection and ordering of communications equipment
and supplies,
in Class 97. Opposer further asserts that it utilizes the
registered domain name www.tessco.com to advertise and
market its products and services on its Internet web site.
Opposer alleges that its trademarks, service marks, trade
name and domain name symbolize considerable good will and
recognition built up by opposer over a substantial amount of
time; that applicant's TESSCO mark, when used in connection
with applicant's services, so resembles opposer's previously
used and registered TESSCO marks for its recited goods and
services as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, and to deceive; and that opposer will be damaged
thereby.
Applicant's answer consists of a general denial of the
allegations in the notice of opposition.8

Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.
Renewed.

7 Registration No. 1979718 issued on June 11, 1996. Section 8
affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged. Renewed.

8 In addition, applicant asserted as an “affirmative defense”
that the notice of opposition fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted; and reserves the right to add such further
affirmative defenses as become known in this proceeding.
However, applicant neither moved to dismiss the instant
opposition on the basis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or added any
additional affirmative defenses. Accordingly, we treat the
“defenses” as having been waived.
Opposition No. 91152912
5
The Record
The record in this case consists of the pleadings and
the file of the involved application. In addition, during
its assigned testimony period opposer filed the testimony
deposition of Robert B. Barnhill, Jr., an officer of
opposer, with accompanying exhibits; a notice of reliance
upon portions of the discovery deposition of Jerry Hudgeons,
an officer of applicant, with accompanying exhibits; answers
from applicant’s first set of supplemental responses to
opposer’s first set of interrogatories; a notice of reliance
upon the declaration of Farrokh Sharifi and accompanying
exhibits, by stipulation in accordance with Trademark Rule
2.123(b); and a notice of reliance upon status and title
copies of the registrations pleaded above. In addition,
opposer submitted with its notice of reliance status and
title copies of the following registrations, also owned by
opposer:
TESSCO, in standard character form, for
catalogs, newsletters and bulletins published
periodically in the field of communications,
in Class 169; and
TESSCO, in standard character form, for
computerized on-line retail services in the field
of communications equipment and accessories;

9 Registration No. 2613962 issued on September 3, 2002.
Opposition No. 91152912
6
business management for others; inventory
management of telecommunications equipment for
others; computerized on-line ordering services in
the field of communications equipment and
accessories; and delivery tracking services,
in International Class 35;
custom packaging and delivery of telecommunications
equipment,
in Class 39;
training in the use of operation of telecommunications
equipment,
in Class 41; and
technical consultation and support in the field of
communications and telecommunications equipment,
namely, trouble shooting of communications and
telecommunications equipment via in person and
electronic means; and antenna, bandpass filter and
cavity type filter tuning services,
in 4210.
During its assigned testimony period, applicant filed a
notice of reliance upon opposer’s answers to its
interrogatories; the declaration of Jerry Hudgeons, an
officer of applicant, by stipulation in accordance with
Trademark Rule 2.123(b); and a supplemental notice of

10 Registration No. 2705928 issued on April 15, 2003.
Opposition No. 91152912
7
reliance containing the verification page from opposer’s
answers to applicant’s interrogatories.
By way of rebuttal, opposer offered by stipulation
pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.123(b) a notice of reliance
upon the second declaration of Robert Barnhill, Jr., an
officer of opposer.
Opposer and applicant filed main briefs on the case,
and opposer filed a reply brief. In addition, both parties
were represented by counsel at an oral hearing held before
the Board.
Evidentiary Matters
Before addressing the merits of the case, certain
evidentiary matters require our attention. First, we note
that in its notice of opposition, opposer pleaded ownership
of Registration Nos. 1674656; 2381499; 1716948; 1925093;
1827048; and 1979718. However, and as noted above, during
its testimony period, opposer filed a notice of reliance
upon status and title copies of these six registrations as
well as its Registration Nos. 2613962 and 2705928.11
Opposer did not move to amend the pleading to add an
allegation of ownership of such registrations. Nonetheless,
applicant has not objected to this evidence, and in
addition, has acknowledged the filing thereof in its brief.

11 These registrations issued, respectively, on the day before the
notice of opposition was filed, and seven months afterward.

Opposition No. 91152912
8
Moreover, we find that applicant was fairly apprised that
opposer was filing the evidence in question in support of
the issue before us. Accordingly we deem the pleadings to
be amended to conform to this evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(b) and Trademark Rule 2.107. See also Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. Jones, 65 USPQ2d 1650, 1953 n.2 (TTAB
2002). Thus, we deem all eight of the registrations relied
upon by opposer to be pleaded and of record.
We further note that applicant has submitted several
exhibits with its brief on the case. These exhibits consist
of printouts of third-party registrations from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Electronic
Search System (TESS) Internet website. We agree with
opposer that these exhibits are untimely, and they have not
been considered. See Trademark Rule 2.123(l). However,
even if we had considered these exhibits in our
determination of the issue before us, the result would be
the same.
The Parties
The record shows that since 1952, opposer has made
continuous use of TESSCO as a trade name and mark to
identify itself as a source of communications and electrical
products in the communications industry; that from 1952
until 1982, opposer represented manufacturers of electronic
communications and power equipment who sold to utilities,
Opposition No. 91152912
9
dealers, private companies and governmental entities that
used two-way radio equipment; that in 1982 opposer became a
primary merchant, working from its own inventory and selling
virtually all of the equipment necessary to build, run,
maintain and use wireless communications systems directly to
end consumers thereof, including cellular carrier stores,
commercial dealers, contractors, utilities, and any other
persons or entities that use, build or maintain such
equipment; that it provides products ranging from highly
sophisticated and complete communications systems to tools
and parts therefor, including electrical supplies, cabling
and fuses; and that it continues to the present to offer
such services under its TESSCO mark. The record further
shows that opposer has established a leading market presence
in wireless communications industry; that each year it
produces and distributes over 65,000 copies of its TESSCO
Solutions Guide, which contains a comprehensive listing of
products available under its mark and is an industry
standard that is available to all classes of its customers
and potential customers; that in addition, it produces and
distributes several specialty books providing instruction in
and marketing of its products to subsets of its customers
and potential customers; that its annual sales under its
TESSCO and TESSCO formative marks was nearly $353 million in
2004 and nearly $500 million in 2005; that it expended over
Opposition No. 91152912
10
$2 million on advertising in 2004 and approximately $3
million in 2005; that in addition to its printed guides,
opposer markets its goods and services by means of its
Internet web site (www.tessco.com), through trade and
industry show advertisements, and direct market solicitation
by sales persons; and that opposer’s customers include
wireless communications carriers, the contractors supporting
such carriers, dealers, network operators, self-maintained
users of such communications, and electrical contractors.
The record shows in addition that since 1999, applicant
has provided electrical contracting services in the
industrial and energy markets under its mark; that
its services include installation, repair and maintenance of
electrical equipment and wiring; and that it has “on rare
occasions installed, as a contractor hired by sophisticated
third parties, wireless communications systems in the energy
and industrial markets” (brief p. 11-12, relying upon
discovery deposition of Jerry Hudgeons, p. 38). The record
also shows that applicant markets the services under its
mark by means of its Internet web site (www.tesscousa.com),
signage, promotional items, and printed advertisements in
trade directories.
Opposition No. 91152912
11
Opposer’s Standing and Priority of Use
Because opposer has properly made its pleaded
registrations of record, and further has shown that it is
not a mere intermeddler, we find that opposer has
established its standing to oppose registration of
applicant’s mark. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222
F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and Lipton
Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213
USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982). Moreover, because opposer’s pleaded
registrations are of record, Section 2(d) priority is not an
issue in this case as to the marks therein and goods and
services covered thereby. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice
King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA
1974). We further note that applicant does not contest that
opposer has made prior use of the marks in its pleaded
registrations.
Likelihood of Confusion
Our likelihood of confusion determination under Section
2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the facts in evidence
that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood
of confusion issue. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also Palm
Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In
re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
Opposition No. 91152912
12
USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and In re Dixie Restaurants
Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We
will concentrate our discussion of the issue of likelihood
of confusion on those registrations of opposer’s which are
closest to the mark for which applicant is seeking
registration, namely, opposer’s registrations for TESSCO in
standard character form for

distributorship services in the field of wireless
communications products12;

catalogs, newsletters and bulletins published
periodically in the field of communications13; and

computerized on-line retail services in the field
of communications equipment and accessories;
business management for others; inventory
management of telecommunications equipment for
others; computerized on-line ordering services in
the field of communications equipment and
accessories; and delivery tracking services;

12 Registration No. 1674656, supra.

13 Registration No. 2613962, supra.

Opposition No. 91152912
13
custom packaging and delivery of telecommunications
equipment;
training in the use of operation of telecommunications
equipment; and
technical consultation and support in the field of
communications and telecommunications equipment,
namely, trouble shooting of communications and
telecommunications equipment via in person and
electronic means; and antenna, bandpass filter and
cavity type filter tuning services14.
The Marks
We turn to the first du Pont factor, i.e., whether
applicant’s mark and opposer’s TESSCO mark, registered in
standard character form, are similar or dissimilar when
viewed in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound,
connotation and overall commercial impression. See Palm Bay
Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot, supra. The test, under the
first du Pont factor, is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison,
but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion
as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under
the respective marks is likely to result.

14 Registration No. 2705928, supra.
Opposition No. 91152912
14
In this case, we find that applicant’s mark,
is identical to opposer’s mark, TESSCO in spelling and
nearly identical thereto in appearance. The stylization of
applicant’s mark does not serve to distinguish it from
opposer’s mark: this mark is registered in standard
character form and thus could be displayed in lettering
similar, or even identical, to applicant’s mark which is
displayed in rather ordinary block capital letters. See,
e.g., In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB
1991); In re Pollio Dairy Products Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012,
2015 (TTAB 1988); and Sunnen Products Co. v. Sunex
International Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (TTAB 1987). The
fact that the letters in applicant’s mark form a
semicircular shape is not a significant distinguishing
element either; because it is by the literal portion,
TESSCO, that consumers will refer to the trademark, it is
this portion that is likely to be remembered rather than the
fact that the letters are arranged in a common shape. See
In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1552 (TTAB 1987) (if
a mark comprises both a word and a design, then the word is
normally accorded greater weight because it would be use by
purchasers to request the goods or services.) Accordingly,
we find that the marks are highly similar in appearance. As
for connotation, because the marks consist of the same term,
Opposition No. 91152912
15
TESSCO, we find that they have the same connotation. We are
not persuaded by applicant’s argument that because its mark
is an acronym for its business name, and opposer indicates
its mark has no meaning, such a distinction supports a
finding that the marks are dissimilar. While it is possible
that applicant’s customers may recognize its mark as an
acronym for Total Electrical Service & Supply Co., given the
above noted similarities in the marks it is equally possible
that applicant’s customers would mistake opposer’s mark for
the same acronym. The fact that the marks have identical
literal elements also results in their being identical in
pronunciation. We find unpersuasive applicant’s argument
that consumers will pronounce its mark by spelling out each
individual letter therein, i.e. “T-E-S-S-C-O,” but pronounce
opposer’s mark in two syllables, i.e., “TESSO-CO.” First,
applicant’s assertion in that regard is unsupported by any
evidence. Second, it is well settled that there is no
correct pronunciation of a trademark. See In re Belgrade
Shoe, 411 F.2d 1352, 162 USPQ 227 (CCPA 1969); and Interlego
AG v. Abrams/Gentile Entertainment Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1862
(TTAB 2002). See also In re Microsoft Corp., 68 USPQ2d 1195
(TTAB 2003) (it is not possible to control how consumers
will vocalize marks).15 In this case, there is no basis for

15 Inasmuch as we have found that applicant’s mark is nearly
identical to opposer’s mark, TESSCO, in standard character form,
it is not necessary for us to consider the similarities between
Opposition No. 91152912
16
us to assume that the identical letters will be pronounced
one way for one mark and a different way for another mark.
We also find that the marks convey the identical
commercial impression.
In view of the nearly identical nature of applicant’s
mark and opposer’s TESSCO mark in appearance, and the
identical nature of the marks in sound, connotation and
overall commercial impression, this du Pont factor heavily
favors opposer.
The Goods and Services
With respect to the goods and services, it is well-
established that the goods and services of the parties need
not be similar or competitive, or even offered through the
same channels of trade, to support a holding of likelihood
of confusion. It is sufficient that the respective goods
and services of the parties are related in some manner,
and/or that the conditions and activities surrounding the
marketing of the goods and services are such that they would
or could be encountered by the same persons under
circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the
marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate
from the same source. See Hilson Research, Inc. v. Society

applicant’s mark and the marks in opposer’s other pleaded
registrations which recite goods and services essentially
identical to those in opposer’s registrations for its mark
TESSCO.

Opposition No. 91152912
17
for Human Resource Management, 27 USPQ2d 1423 (TTAB 1993);
and In re International Telephone & Telephone Corp., 197
USPQ 910, 911 (TTAB 1978). The issue, of course, is not
whether purchasers would confuse the goods and services, but
rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the
source thereof. In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984).
We begin by observing that, as identified, opposer’s
goods and services under its TESSCO mark all concern
communications and telecommunications. Specifically,
opposer provides under its TESSCO mark, inter alia, catalogs
and other periodical publications, as well as training,
technical consultation, distributorship and on-line retail
and ordering services, all in the fields of communications
and/or telecommunications. Applicant’s services, as
identified in its challenged application, include electrical
contracting in the industrial and energy markets. Thus,
applicant’s services, as recited, do not appear to be
directly related to opposer’s goods and services. However,
opposer has submitted testimony and evidence in the form of
its catalog and advertisements that shows its retail
services in the field of communications equipment includes
selling electrical supplies (Barnhill deposition, p. 11 and
Exhibit 1 thereto). Opposer has submitted further testimony
as well as catalog and advertisement evidence that it
provides under its TESSCO mark such electrical supplies and
Opposition No. 91152912
18
also training to electrical contractors working in the
mobile communications field (Id. at 15-17 and Exhibit 2
thereto). Opposer has submitted testimony, moreover, that
because cellular communication requires an electrical
interface, it is increasingly common for electrical
contractors to work in this field (Id). In addition,
applicant’s own advertisements indicate that it provides
“design, construction, installation and maintenance on all
types of electrical projects” including “communications
systems” (Hudgeons Deposition, Exhibit 3). Finally,
applicant admits that, albeit infrequently, it has installed
wireless communications systems in the energy and industrial
markets (brief p. 12). Thus, while applicant’s services, as
recited, may differ from opposer’s goods and services
offered under its registered TESSCO mark, the testimony and
evidence in this case supports the relatedness of, at the
very least, opposer’s Class 16 goods and Class 35, 41 and 42
services and applicant’s recited services.
In view of the related nature of opposer’s goods and
services and applicant’s services, this du Pont factor also
favors opposer.
Channels of Trade
As noted above, applicant’s services are provided in
the industrial and energy fields, while opposer’s goods and
services under its TESSCO mark are provided in the field of
Opposition No. 91152912
19
communications. However, the testimony and evidence
discussed above shows that there exists a degree of overlap
between the field of communications and the energy and
industrial fields. Specifically, applicant has testified
that it installs communications systems in the energy and
industrial fields; and that its advertisements indicate that
it provides design, construction, installation and
maintenance of, inter alia, communications systems. In
addition, opposer’s testimony shows that it provides
distributorship services and training to anyone requiring
communications systems; and that its customers include
electrical contractors. Thus, while opposer and applicant
provide their respective goods and services in specific
fields, the record in this case supports a finding that
these fields are not distinct from one another, but rather,
share common customers, suppliers and contractors. As a
result, applicant’s mark and opposer’s TESSCO mark are
likely to be encountered by the same consumers and potential
consumers.
As a result, this du Pont factor slightly favors
opposer.
Conditions of Sale
The next du Pont factor discussed by the parties is
that of the conditions of sale. Applicant asserts that its
services are expensive, and would be purchased by careful
Opposition No. 91152912
20
and sophisticated users. However, given the overlap
discussed above between the communications field and the
energy and industrial fields, even sophisticated consumers
may not realize that the parties’ recited goods and services
do not emanate from the same source. Furthermore, even if
some degree of care were exhibited in making the purchasing
decision, because the marks both consist of the identical
term TESSCO, even careful purchasers are not likely to
distinguish between the marks based only on the typestyle of
the capital letters and the semicircular shape in which
those letters are depicted in applicant’s mark.
As a result, we find this du Pont factor to be neutral
or to slightly favor opposer.
Fame of Opposer’s Mark
Another du Pont factor discussed by the parties is that
of the fame of opposer’s mark. Opposer asserts that its
mark is well known and, in support of this assertion,
introduces evidence of its annual revenues and promotional
expenditures under its registered marks. Applicant, for its
part, argues that opposer has failed to introduce evidence
sufficient to demonstrate that its mark is well known. We
find that opposer’s evidence, while showing that opposer has
established a leading presence in its market, and has been
highly successful in marketing its goods and services over a
substantial period of time, falls short of demonstrating
Opposition No. 91152912
21
that its TESSCO mark is famous for purposes of our
likelihood of confusion analysis.
As such, we find this du Pont factor favors neither
party.
Similar Marks
In its brief, applicant refers to a number of third-
party marks incorporating the term “TESCO” registered in
connection with various goods and services. However, and as
noted above, none of these registrations was correctly
submitted into the record and hence cannot be considered.
See Trademark Rule 2.122; and In re Shapely, Inc., 231 USPO
72, 75 (TTAB 1986).
Furthermore, even if they had been properly included in
the record, inasmuch as there is no evidence that any of
these third-party registrations are for marks that are
actually in use, the probative value of registrations
showing similar marks even on related goods or services
would still be limited. It is well settled that third-party
registrations are not evidence of what happens in the
marketplace or that the public is familiar with the use of
the subject marks. See National Aeronautics & Space
Administration v. Record Chemical Co., 185 USPQ 563, 567
(TTAB 1975). Thus, they are not evidence that customers are
able to distinguish between similar marks based on only
minor differences between them. See Smith Brothers
Opposition No. 91152912
22
Manufacturing Co. v. Stone Manufacturing Co., 476 F.2d 1004,
177 USPQ 462, 463 (CCPA 1973); Carl Karcher Enterprises Inc.
v. Stars Restaurant Corp., 35 USPQ2d 1125, 1130-31 (TTAB
1995); and In re Hub Distributing, Inc., 218 USPQ 284, 285-
86 (TTAB 1983).
Applicant further asserts that it “found at least one
use of the word ‘TESSCO’ in connection with a company in
Georgetown, Texas during a search of the Internet” (brief,
p. 24). However, applicant made no evidence regarding this
purported finding of record, and therefore its mere
assertion of such use has no probative value in our
consideration of the relative strength of opposer’s TESSCO
mark.
Accordingly, because there is no evidence of any third-
party use of TESSCO marks, this du Pont factor must be
considered to be either neutral or to favor opposer.
Actual Confusion
The final du Pont factor discussed by the parties is
the lack of instances of actual confusion despite over seven
years of use by the parties of their respective marks.
Applicant asserts that the absence of actual confusion
suggests no likelihood of confusion. However, applicant has
not introduced sufficient evidence of the extent of its use
of the applied-for mark for us to conclude that there has
been an opportunity for confusion to occur if confusion were
Opposition No. 91152912
23
likely. Furthermore, it is not necessary to show actual
confusion in order to establish likelihood of confusion.
See Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates Inc. 902 F.2d
1546, 223 USPQ 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, this du Pont factor must be considered to
be neutral.
Conclusion
We have carefully considered all of the evidence
pertaining to priority of use and the relevant du Pont
factors, as well as all of the parties’ arguments with
respect thereto, including any evidence and arguments not
specifically discussed in this opinion.
We conclude that opposer has established priority of
use and that consumers familiar with opposer’s goods and
services under its TESSCO mark would be likely to believe,
upon encountering applicant’s mark for its recited
services that the parties’ goods and/or services originate
with or are associated with or sponsored by the same entity.
In making our determination, we have balanced the relevant
du Pont factors. The factors of the identity between the
marks and the relatedness of the goods and services weigh
strongly in opposer’s favor.
To the extent that any of applicant’s points raise a
doubt about our conclusion, all doubt on the issue of
likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the
Opposition No. 91152912
24
prior user and against the newcomer. See San Fernando Mfg.
Co. v. JFD Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196
USPQ 1, 2 (CCPA 1977).
DECISION: The opposition is sustained, and
registration to applicant is refused.