Tera S. Yoon, Complainant,v.John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 27, 2011
0120093297 (E.E.O.C. May. 27, 2011)

0120093297

05-27-2011

Tera S. Yoon, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.




Tera S. Yoon,

Complainant,

v.

John M. McHugh,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120093297

Agency No. ARHMPHRYS08MAY02141

DECISION

On July 2, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s June 1,

2009, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The Commission accepts

the appeal pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether Complainant established that the Agency

discriminated against him on the bases of national origin (Korean)

and age (60) when he was not selected for a position.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was

self-employed as a small business owner in Alabaster, Alabama. On April

25, 2008, Complainant applied for the position of Director, Family and

Morale, Welfare and Recreation (DFMWR), NF-0340-5, advertised under

vacancy announcement number KRNAFEZ080013WW, at the U.S. Army Garrison

(USAG) Humphreys in Pyongtaek, South Korea. Complainant submitted

his application by email to the Civilian Personnel Operations Center

(CPOC) in Daegu, South Korea According to the vacancy announcement,

which closed on April 25, 2008, the individual would serve as the DFMWR

“for a medium/large garrison with full responsibility and managerial

authority to plan and direct FMWR programs on a complex multi-mission

Army installation.”

On or about April 25, 2008, executives at the Installation Management

Command (IMCOM) Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia finalized the

decision to place a Senior Service College (SSC) graduate (Selectee –

American, 50) into the position. In an email dated April 25, 2008 with

the subject line “Post [SSC] Placement,” the Executive Director

of IMCOM informed the Director, IMCOM-Korea that, “[a]s discussed

it is our intention to place [the Selectee] into [the position].

The Chief, Workforce Development (CWD) of IMCOM and other members of

the IMCOM Senior Executive Leadership Group were copied on the email.

In an email dated April 26, 2008, the Deputy to the Garrison Commander

wrote, “They have assigned a [SSC] graduate against our DFMWR vacancy.

Please cancel all recruitment actions and make the necessary arrangements

to bring this individual on board.” In an email dated April 28, 2008,

the Human Resources Officer (HRO) at CPOC stated that, per a request

from the Chief, Human Resources of IMCOM-Korea, she had cancelled the

vacancy announcement for the position.

In an email dated April 28, 2008, the Agency informed Complainant and

the 13 other applicants1 for the position that management had canceled

the vacancy announcement as of April 25, 2008. The Selectee was placed

into the position effective October 11, 2008.

Complainant alleged that “the whole process of employment” for the

position was discriminatory because the Agency cancelled the vacancy

announcement after he applied to select the Selectee, who was preselected

by management. In addition, Complainant alleged that he should have

been considered for the position if discrimination did not occur, but

he was not considered for the position.

Regarding the cancellation of the vacancy announcement, HRO attested that

she cancelled it on April 25, 2008, after receiving an email stating that

IMCOM intended to place a SSC graduate into the position. In addition,

HRO attested that she was unaware of Complainant’s national origin

and age at the time of the cancellation, because she did not review the

applications, rate the applicants, or generate a referral list prior to

the cancellation.

Regarding the placement of the Selectee into the position, CWD attested

that, like all other SSC graduate placements, it was a decision made by

the IMCOM Senior Executive Leadership Group. In addition, CWD attested

that the IMCOM executives involved in the placement were unaware of

Complainant’s national origin and age at the time of the placement,

because none of them had inquired with CPOC about the applicants who

applied through the vacancy announcement. Finally, CWD attested that

IMCOM placed SSC graduates into vacant positions every year and that,

instead of returning to their old positions, they were placed into new

positions where they could utilize their SSC education.

The record reflects that the Agency has a policy of placing graduates

from the SSC program, a program for developing civilian leadership,

into vacant positions where they can apply their leadership skills.

In a memorandum dated June 5, 2003, the Vice Chief of Staff instituted a

policy of mandatory “directed placement” for all SSC graduates because

“SSC education prepares civilians for positions of greater leadership

responsibility” and “civilians with advanced leadership education

make greater contributions to the Army.” According to the Army Civilian

Training, Evaluation & Development System (ACTEDS) Training Catalog, the

SSC Graduate Placement Program “is a post-training placement process,

established by the [Vice Chief of Staff] in June 2003, that is designed

to maximize Army’s return on investment and provide an avenue for full

utilization of the competencies acquired through SSC … [The Agency]

will consider the SSC students for permanent placement laterally into

known or anticipated vacancies for which they are qualified.”

On June 20, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of national origin

(Korean) and age (60) when, on April 25, 2008, he was not selected for

the DFMWR position.

On July 1, 2008, the Agency issued a final decision dismissing

Complainant’s complaint for failure to state a claim. On October

9, 2008, the Commission reversed the Agency’s final decision and

remanded the complaint back to the Agency for further processing. At the

conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29

C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed

to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

Specifically, the decision found that Complainant failed to show that

the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by the Agency were

a pretext for discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant asserted, among other things, that the Agency

discriminated against him by cancelling the vacancy announcement after

he applied, with the intention to hire the pre-selected Selectee.

Specifically, Complainant contended that this fact in itself was

indicative of discrimination, citing Van Nest v. Dep’t of the Army,

EEOC Request No. 05960752 (Nov. 20, 1998). In addition, Complainant

asserted that the Agency prioritized “its favor and privilege” by

hiring the pre-selected Selectee over having a fair employment process.

In response, the Agency reiterated the arguments from its final decision

and emphasized that the IMCOM executives who placed the Selectee in

the position were unaware of Complainant’s national origin or age.

Specifically, the Agency argued that the IMCOM executives in Arlington,

Virginia had no access to Complainant’s application, which he had

submitted to CPOC in Daegu, South Korea. In addition, the Agency argued

that HRO was unaware of Complainant’s national origin or age when she

cancelled the vacancy announcement.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment

Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Ch. 9, §�

�VI.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review

“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to

the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,”

and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of

record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804

n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s

explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

519 (1993). At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion,

and it is his obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See Hicks, supra.

Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of

discrimination on the bases of national origin and age, we find that the

Agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Specifically, CWD attested that the IMCOM Senior Executive Leadership

Group decided to place Selectee, an SSC graduate, into the position.

In addition, HRO attested that she cancelled the vacancy announcement

after receiving an email stating that IMCOM intended to place a SSC

graduate into the position.

Because the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions, the burden shifts to Complainant to demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s reason was a pretext

for national origin and age discrimination. Upon review of the record,

we find that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s reason

was pretextual.

On appeal, Complainant cited the Van Nest decision for the proposition

that the Agency’s cancellation of the vacancy announcement after he

applied, with the intention of choosing the Selectee, was discriminatory.

However, our review of the Van Nest decision reflects that the Commission

did not make a determination regarding discrimination, but merely held

that the complainant stated a claim and remanded the complaint back to the

agency for an investigation. In addition, we note that the Commission

has held that preselection, per se, does not establish discrimination

when it is based on the qualifications of the selected individual and

not on some prohibited basis. McAllister v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC

Request No. 05931038 (July 28, 1994).

Here, the record reflects that the Agency cancelled the vacancy

announcement in order to place the Selectee, an SSC graduate with

“advanced leadership education,” into the vacant position planning

and directing FMWR programs for USAG Humphreys. In addition, the record

reflects that Agency policy allowed for such placement of SSC graduates.

Although Complainant argued that the employment process was unfair,

there is no indication in the record that the Agency’s actions were

motivated by unlawful discrimination on the bases of national origin

and age. We note that Complainant did not dispute CWD’s testimony

that the IMCOM executives were unaware of his national origin and

age when they chose the Selectee and instructed HRO to cancel the

vacancy announcement. Because we find that Complainant failed to

offer probative evidence demonstrating that the Agency’s selection

decision was based on prohibited bases under Title VII or the ADEA,

we find that, even if the Selectee was preselected, no discrimination

occurred. Ultimately, the Agency has broad discretion to set policies

and carry out personnel decisions, and should not be second-guessed by

the reviewing authority absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Burdine,

supra at 259; Vanek v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906

(Jan. 16, 1997). Accordingly, we find that Complainant failed to show

that the Agency’s explanation for his nonselection was a pretext for

unlawful discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney

with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___5/27/11_______________

Date

1 The record reflects that the other applicants ranged in age from 34

to 69. The Agency did not provide national origin information for the

other applicants.

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0120093297

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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