TEKNOLOGIAN TUTKIMUSKESKUS VTT OY

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 22, 2020

2020001017 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/439,937 04/30/2015 Esa Kurkela PAPU0118PUSA 6334
22045 7590 12/22/2020
Brooks Kushman
1000 Town Center
22nd Floor
Southfield, MI 48075
EXAMINER
MERKLING, MATTHEW J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1725
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
kdilucia@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ESA KURKELA and MATTI NIEMINEN
Appeal 2020-001017
Application 14/439,937
Technology Center 1700
Before BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN, MAHSHID D. SAADAT, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.
FRANKLIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 5, and 8. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Teknologian
tutkimuskeskus VIT Oy. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2020-001017
Application 14/439,937

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

Claim 1 is illustrative of Appellant’s subject matter on appeal
and is set forth below:
A method for treating waste material including organic components
and radioactive agents, the method comprising:
selecting waste material including organic components and
radioactive agents from the group containing resins, such as resins from
nuclear powerplant, clothes, such as industrial protective clothing and
protective clothing, contaminated wood, contaminated vegetable matter,
such as corn, straw and hay,
gasifying the waste material including organic components and
radioactive agents which are low-level and/or medium-level radioactive
agents at temperatures between 600–950ºC in a fluidized bed reactor and
gasifying the waste material using air at an air ration which is below 1 to
form a combustible gaseous material,
cooling the combustible gaseous material by water quenching so that
temperature is between 300–500ºC after the cooling, and
removing a solid fraction including the radioactive agents from the
combustible gaseous material in a gas cleaning step by filtrating the
combustible gaseous material in the gas cleaning step, and the filtration is
carried out at temperatures between 300–500ºC forming a treated
combustible gaseous material;
scrubbing the combustible gaseous material to remove sulphur; and
burning the scrubbed combustible gaseous material.

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Application 14/439,937

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Mason US 6,084,147 July 4, 2000
Leveson US 2007/0220810 A1 Sept. 27, 2007
Junji2 JP 2006/266967 A Oct. 5, 2006

THE REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 5, and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112(b) or 35
U.S.C.§ 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite.
2. Claims 1, 5, and 8 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Junji in view of Mason and Leveson.
OPINION
Our Decision addresses the claims separately to the extent they are so
argued by Appellant. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential),
cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections . . . .”). After considering the
evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are
persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error for Rejection 1, but not

2 We use the machine translation of this reference provided in the record.
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for Rejection 2. Thus, we affirm Rejection 2 essentially for the reasons
expressed in the Final Office Action and Answer. However, we reverse
Rejection 1. We add the following primarily for emphasis.
Rejection 1
The Examiner rejects claims1, 5, and 8 as being indefinite and states
that using the phrase “such as” is unclear for the reasons set forth on page 2
of the Final Office Action.
We agree with Appellant that these claims are not indefinite. Appeal
Br. 7. A fair reading of the claim language reveals that the use of the term
“such as” is synonymous with “for example”. Its usage therefore is to
introduce examples. We note that a claim must be read in accordance with
the precepts of English grammar. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 715 (Fed. Cir.
1983). There is a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary
and customary meaning. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousel, Inc., 314
F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In light of this, we reverse Rejection 1.

Rejection 2
We refer to the Examiner’s statement of the rejection as set forth on
pages 2–5 of the Final Office Action and on pages 3–5 of the Answer
regarding the Examiner’s position for Rejection 2.
Beginning on page 3 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that claim
1 requires treating waste material at an “air ratio below 1” to form
combustible material. Appellant submits that Junji (the reference upon
which the Examiner relies for teaching this aspect of the claim) does not
teach this limitation for the reasons stated on pages 4–5 of the Appeal Brief.
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We are unpersuaded by this line of argument for the reasons provided by the
Examiner’s reply made on pages 6–7 of the Answer. Therein, the Examiner
states that Junji teaches a pyrolytic process (¶ 13 of Junji). Ans. 6. The
Examiner states that a pyrolytic process is well known as a process that
utilizes air ratios of less than 1. Ans. 6. Notably, Appellant does not dispute
this statement in the Reply Brief. A factual finding not shown by the
Appellant to be erroneous may be accepted as fact. In re Kunzmann, 326
F.2d 424, 425 n.3 (CCPA 1964).
Beginning on page 5 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant also argues that it
is not a routine step for one skilled in the art to substitute Mason’s steam
reformation process for the specific gasification by air process recited in the
pending claims. However, this is not the rejection. As the Examiner points
out on page 7 of the Answer, the Examiner relies upon Mason’s teaching to
cool gas with a scrubbing process and concludes that it would have been
obvious to have incorporated such a cooling technique into Junji. Ans. 4–5.
Appellant’s arguments thus do not address the rejection as presented by the
Examiner and are therefore unpersuasive.
Beginning on page 5 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant also argues that
Leveson’s processes are not equivalent to the claimed process of gasification
by air at an air ratio less than 1, and it is not a routine step to those of skill in
the art to substitute the specific teaching of Leveson with the processes set
forth in independent claim 1. Appellant argues that Leveson discloses that
sulfur components of the combustible gas are removed prior to combustion
as it is easier to remove and prevent pollution by eliminating sulfur from the
flue gas. Leveson ¶ 3. Appeal Br. 5–6. Appellant states that pending claim
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1, on the other hand, requires that the combustible gaseous material resulting
from the preceding gasification process be scrubbed to remove sulphur once
the material has reached a temperature of between 300 and 500°C
[emphasis added]. Appeal Br. 6. We are unpersuaded by this line of
argument for the following reasons.
As pointed out by the Examiner on pages 7–8 of the Answer,
Appellant is arguing claim limitations not present in the claims. We agree
with the Examiner that Appellant’s claim 1 does not require that the sulphur
scrubbing take place after the combustible gaseous material is cooled to
300–500°C. The Examiner states that claim 1 only requires that the
combustible gaseous material is “scrubbed to remove sulphur”.
On pages 2–3 of the Reply Brief, Appellant then argues that Leveson
teaches that sulfur components of the combustible gas are removed prior to
combustion. Leveson ¶ 3. Appellant now argues that pending claim 1
requires that the combustible gaseous material resulting from the preceding
gasification process be scrubbed to remove sulphur after combustion
[emphasis added]. Appellant argues that Leveson teaches removing sulphur
prior to combustion, while the pending claims require that sulphur be
removed from the “combustible gaseous material” that does not exist until
after the recited gasification process, which begins with “waste material”
and produces “combustible gaseous material”. Reply Br. 3. We are
unpersuaded by this line of argument. Again, we refer to the Examiner’s
position (Ans. 7–8) that claim 1 requires that the combustible gaseous
material is scrubbed to remove sulfur. The recitation of “scrubbing the
combustible [emphasis added] gaseous material to remove sulphur” indicates
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that scrubbing occurs to “combustible” gaseous material (i.e., scrubbing
occurs to gaseous material that can still be combusted). Therefore, there is
no requirement that the scrubbing occur after combustion of the gaseous
material. Appellant’s position is that the combustible gaseous material does
not exist until after the gasifying step; however, the combustible gaseous
material remains to be combusted in view of the plain meaning of the word
“combustible”. We note that a claim must be read in accordance with the
precepts of English grammar. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d at 715. There is a heavy
presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousel, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1327.
In view of the above, we affirm Rejection 2.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5, 8 112(b) or
112 pre-
AIA
Indefiniteness 1, 5, 8
1, 5, 8 103(a) Junji, Mason,
Leveson
1, 5, 8
Overall
Outcome
1, 5, 8
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED