Taylor Instrument Companies

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 22, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 843 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES
Taylor Instrument Companies and Glass
Bottle Blowers Association of the United
States and Canada, AFL-CIO. Case
11-CA-3037.
June 22, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On February 17, 1967, Trial Examiner Robert
Cohn issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
further found that Respondent had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended that such allegations
be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief,
the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed a brief
in opposition to the Respondent's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, with the following additions:
' In the ab• n'e of exceptions thereto by the General Counsel,
we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's dismissal of 8(a)(1)
allegations concerning Bleyer's "bargaining from scratch"
speeches and Mack's interrogation of employees about union
matters.
There are certain inadvertent errors in the TXD which we
hereby correct. (a) "June 4" is changed to read "June 22 " (TXD,
sec 1, B, 2, ¶1), (b) contrary to the Trial Examiner's statement in
fn 15, the legend on the Welch car's prounion sign does appear in
the record- "Vote yes for GBBA ", (c) "Foreman Mack" is
changed to read "Assistant Foreman Reece " (sec I, D, ¶3 ) The
record shows that White first spoke to Reece about a transfer, and
it was to him she complained about being "bugged" by certain
other employees Otherwise, the Trial Examiner's remarks about
White's conversation with Mack, which occurred shortly
thereafter , are accurate
2 We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the record
evidence rebuts the presumptive validity of the May 6 rule
prohibiting pro- and anti -union activities during working time, by
establishing that Respondent promulgated that rule in violation of
Sec 8( a)(1) for the discriminatory purpose of combating Sec 7
activities , rather than for the legitimate purpose of maintaining
order in the plant As an additional consideration , we note that the
rule was but the first of several unfair labor practices which
Respondent committed in the May-June period in an attempt to
843
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
engaging, mainly during the May-June 1966 period,
in the following conduct: threatening employees
with discharge or other economic reprisal if they
engaged in union activities; promising an employee
that she was more likely to receive a wage increase if
she refrained from union activities; discriminatorily
promulgating a no-solicitation rule against union
activities on company time;2 promulgating and
maintaining an unlawfully broad no-distribution
rule; ordering an employee to remove his car bearing
a prounion sign from the company parking lot;3 and
warning an employee to cease speaking with another
employee because of the latter's activities on behalf
of the Union.'
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding
that the discharge of Osborne Fore, Jr., which
occurred on May 26, 1966, was violative of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In addition to the factors
upon which the Trial Examiner rested his
conclusions, we note that Fore's supervisor, Keiser,
who had warned Fore to change his "politics" in
January, subsequently indicated during a
conversation with Barbara Welch in late June that
Fore's discharge was an example of what
"happened" to employees who failed to heed his
warning.
3. The Trial Examiner found, in the case of Mary
White, who was also discharged on May 26, 1966,
that a "compelling reason" motivating Respondent's
action was the discouragement of not only union
membership, but concerted activities as well. We
agree with the Trial Examiner that White's
solicitation on working time of an employee's
signature on a petition to change working hours was
the event which precipitated Respondent's decision
to discharge her. Her activity in that respect clearly
constituted concerted activity for mutual aid and
impede the progress of the intensified union campaign
3 In affirming the Trial Examiner's finding that the parking lot
incident constituted an 8(a)( 1) violation, we have taken into
account that the incident occurred contemporaneously with
numerous unfair labor practices , and it is fairly inferable
therefrom that Respondent was primarily motivated in the matter
by the union character of the sign . (We note that the record shows
that the incident took place from June 22 to 24, and not, as the
Trial Examiner found , in early June )
" The Trial Examiner also found that when Supervisor Keiser
told Eva Smith on June 3 not to talk with Barbara Welch, he
violated Sec 8(a)(1) because he was substantially motivated by a
desire to isolate Welch , whom he believed to be a union adherent,
from fellow employees In concluding that Keiser was aware of
Welch's union activities in early June , we rely on the following
factors Smith 's immediate supervisor told her on June 4, when
she sought an explanation of Keiser's remark , that he thought
Welch "had gotten mixed up with the wrong crowd "; Keiser
advised Welch on June 4 that she and her husband should give up
any "activities" in which they might be involved ; and Keiser, in a
subsequent 8(aXl) conversation late in June , remarked, inter alga,
with reference to Welch's union button , "I see you didn 't listen to
me " We do not rely on the parking lot incident involving Welch's
husband , Dennis, since, as we noted in the preceding footnote, the
record shows that it occurred in late June
165 NLRB No. 83
844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
protection within the meaning of Section 7. Although
White's concerted activity occurred during working
time, we find, for reasons set out below, that it was
not thereby removed from the protection of the Act.
The amount of working time involved was
negligible-1 minute-and the specific type of
solicitation in which White engaged was not
expressly proscribed by Respondent's published
rules against solicitation, which covered only
commercial solicitation and union solicitation (the
latter invalidly promulgated as we have found
above). However, even if Respondent's no-
solicitation rules are broadly construed as extending
to that specific type of solicitation, it would not alter
the conclusion we reach here. The record
establishes that Respondent discriminatorily applied
its no-solicitation rules by enforcing them only in
instances where concerted activity similar to
White's was involved, while, as the Trial Examiner
found, allowing other forms of solicitation on
working time, including solicitation for cosmetic
products, punchboard raffles, football pools, and the
like. The foregoing considerations persuade us that
the Respondent's real concern was not with White's
negligible misuse of company time, but rather with
the nature of the specific activity in which she
engaged. As White's protected concerted activity
was a substantial contributing reason for the action
taken, we find that Respondent's discharge of White
constituted an independent violation of Section
8(a)(1), in addition to being an 8(a)(3) violation. See
Sandpiper Builders, 152 NLRB 796.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Taylor
Instrument Companies, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended order,
as herein modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(d) and
reletter the present paragraphs 1(d) and (e)
accordingly.
"(d) Promulgating , maintaining , or implementing
any rule prohibiting employees, when they are on
nonworking time, from distributing handbills or
other literature on behalf of any labor organization in
nonworking areas of Respondent's property."5
2. Insert the following paragraph in the Appendix
(Notice to All Employees) after the second
substantive paragraph:
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or
implement any rule prohibiting employees,
when they are on nonworking time, from
distributing handbills or other literature on
behalf of any labor organization in nonworking
areas of our property.
5 The Trial Examiner inadvertently omitted this provision from
the Order and the Notice to All Employees
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT COHN, Trial Examiner: This proceeding under
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (herein called the Act), with all parties
represented, was heard at Asheville, North Carolina, on
September 27-30, 1966,' upon a complaint of the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, dated
July 28, as amended on September 9.2
The complaint alleges, in substance, that Taylor
Instrument Companies (herein called the Respondent or
Company) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by
engaging in certain described conduct, more fully detailed
herein. By its duly filed answer, as amended, Respondent
admitted the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint,
but generally denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices. At the hearing, all parties were given full
opportunity to present evidence, to examine and cross-
examine the witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs.
The parties waived oral argument. Subsequent to the
hearing, helpful briefs were filed with the Trial Examiner
by counsel for each party.
Having considered the record as a whole,3 the briefs, the
arguments of counsel, and upon my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS4
1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Discussion and Setting of the Issues
The Employer, a corporation of international scope,
engaged in the manufacture and sale of scientific,
industrial, and household instruments, such as glass
thermometers, barometers, glass containers for scientific
laboratories, etc., is headquartered in Rochester, New
York. However, in 1964, it built and commenced operating
a plant in Arden, North Carolina. It is only with the latter
operation that we are here concerned.
In the late summer of 1965, the Union commenced an
organizing compaign among the production employees,
which included both male and female workers. It was not
long before the campaign came to Respondent's attention,
the evidence showing that commencing in the fall of 1965,
All dates hereinafter refer to 1966 unless otherwise specified
z The charge upon which the complaint is based was filed
June 1 (subsequently amended on June 13 , June 23 , and July 25)
by Glass Bottle Blowers Association of the United States and
Canada , AFL-CIO (herein called the Union or GBBA)
J Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected
" There is no issue as to the Board 's jurisdiction or labor
organization The complaint alleges sufficient facts, duly admitted
by answer , upon which I may, and do hereby , find that
Respondent is engaged in commerce , and the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES 845
the subject repeatedly arose and was discussed at
Respondent's weekly supervisors' meeting.5
It is clear that it was the policy of Respondent to oppose
the organization of the Arden plant since, as Supervisor
Reese testified respecting the subject matter of the
supervisors' meetings: "Well, I'd say a third of the
meetings consisted of production, two-thirds consisted of
ways and means to combat the union drive."
Apparently, the drive did not secure much support
during the winter of 1965-66. However, by June 23, 1966,
the Union had secured sufficient authorizations to warrant
the filing of a petition for an election.6
The complaint alleges that during the period preceding
the scheduled election, primarily in May and June, the
Respondent, by its officers and supervisors, restrained
and coerced the employees by coercively interrogating
them concerning their union membership and activities,
and by threatening them with economic sanctions should
they continue in such activities. It also alleges that on or
about May 6 the Respondent promulgated and enforced an
illegal no-solicitation and no-distribution rule in the plant,
and that on May 26 the Respondent discharged two
employees because of their union or concerted activities.
Respondent admits the existence of the rule, but denies
that it was promulgated and enforced unlawfully or that
the Respondent engaged in any other unlawful conduct.
While admitting that it discharged the two named
employees on the date mentioned, it asserts that such
discharges were effected for good and sufficient cause and
not for any reason connected with the employees' asserted
union activities.
The issues thus stated, we proceed to analyze the
evidence bearing thereon.
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The no-solicitation and no-distribution rule
Joseph B. McManus, Respondent's industrial relations
manager from 1964 until June 1966 (when he was
succeeded by Whiteford C. Mauldin), testified that he first
raised the question concerning solicitation in the plant at
the supervisors' meetings (hereinabove referred to) in the
late fall of 1965. There, he referred to the company policy
which was that such things as fundraising campaigns,
membership drives, selling of merchandise, etc., were not
to be conducted on company property unless otherwise
approved by the management .' McManus advised the
supervisors that he intended to post a notice to this effect,
as it appeared from complaints he had been receiving from
employees that perhaps such solicitations were becoming
excessive.
Thereafter, McManus prepared and posted, on or about
December 10, 1965, the following notice to all employees:
For the protection of the employees, the Company
does not permit the sales [sic] or solicitation of its
employees for merchandise, selling of chances,
subscriptions, tobacco, candy, pool tickets, etc.
A notable exception is the annual United Appeal
Drive, and there may be other community wide civic
programs, which will be approved by management.
The cooperation of all employees is required to curtail
a large number of departmental solicitations for
worthy or charitable causes, which, in time, could
place an unfair burden on working associates.
McManus further testified that after the posting of such
notice only one incident of violation came to his attention.
This involved an employee, Bruce Plemmons, who was
soliciting signatures on a petition during regular working
hours. The nature of the petition was to change the
working hours at the plant . The disciplinary action
imposed by the Respondent on Plemmons for this violation
was a week' s suspension without pay.
The above-quoted notice to employees was succeeded
on May 6 by the posting of another notice which retained
the first two paragraphs of the first notice, deleted the
third paragraph, and substituted the following:
It is important that our plant and the plant premises
kept neat and clean at all times. Therefore, no
notices, posters, stickers, or similar material may be
posted at any place on Company property except on
the official Bulletin Boards and then only after
approval by the Personnel Department. And, no such
material may be distributed or littered upon any part
of the Company premises.
No employee may engage in any activity either for
or against a union , nor engage another employee in
such activity during the work time of either
employee.8
It is the General Counsel's contention that the May 6
rule is unlawful on two counts: (1) The no-distribution
aspect contained in the third paragraph; and (2) while the
last paragraph thereof pertaining to union activities is
presumptively valid since it only pertains to the worktime
of the employees, the rule was promulgated and enforced
for a discriminatory purpose. On the basis of a careful
consideration of the evidence in the record as a whole, I
agree with the General Counsel.
Taking the second argument first, the record is replete
with evidence showing a variety of solicitations,
canvassing , visiting, and betting carried on in the plant
both before and after the posting of the May 6 notice.
Several employee witnesses credibly testified that during
this period there were solicitations carried on in the plant
during working hours for cosmetic products, punchboards,
raffles, football pools, and the like. There were also
solicitations for employees or their relatives who were ill or
had a death in the family, and for those employees who
might be transferred to the Respondent's Rochester
operation. Although Respondent's supervisors consistently
5 The foregoing findings are based upon the undemed and
credited testimony of Edwin Reese who was, during the period, an
assistant foreman in the glass division but had since left the
Respondent's employ by the time of the hearing
6 See Case 11-RC-2388 A hearing upon such petition was held
July 15, and an election was scheduled to be held on August 22
However, sometime before that date, the Union withdrew the
petition
' This policy was contained in a guide presumably distributed
on or about February 19, 1954, to management representatives
(see Resp Exh 1) However, there is no indication that such
policy was made known to employees prior to the posting of the
notices hereinafter referred to
8 The foregoing language, in addition to being posted on the
company bulletin boards, was incorporated in a handbook
"Welcome" which the Respondent promulgated in the spring of
1966 and mailed a copy to each of the employees in June (See G
C Exh 3)
846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
denied knowledge of the existence of such activities
except for a flower fund which "died a natural death," it
strains credulity to the breaking point to believe that these
activities did not become known to the foremen in the
departments who concededly worked closely with the
employees.9
It is true that after the posting of the May 6 notice there
was a diminution in the volume of such activities, but there
is substantial evidence, in my view, that they did not cease
altogether and that it is reasonable to conclude that
Respondent's supervisors were aware of it. Moreover,
there is substantial undenied evidence in the record that
there were not infrequent visitations among employees
from different departments in the plant during working
hours which were condoned by management except in the
case of the two alleged discriminatees discussed below.
Furthermore, Respondent's evidence on this issue
appears to run at cross-purposes. Thus, Respondent
offered no reason for the imposition of the May 6 rule, and
it must not have been directed toward commercial
solicitations or gambling devices since the supervisors
denied knowledge of such activity; in any event, the
December rule would have covered this type of conduct.
Since the added language in the fourth paragraph relates
directly to union activities, and the third paragraph
impliedly relates to the posting of GBBA stickers in the
plant, it follows, therefore, that the May 6 notice must
have been aimed at union activities. But Respondent
offered no testimony to show that such union talk or
solicitation in the plant disrupted the work schedules or
unduly interfered with the production or efficiency among
the employees. Accordingly, it must be concluded from all
the foregoing that the May 6 rule was promulgated and
invoked primarily to combat the protected concerted
activities of the employees, which is, of course, for a
discriminatory purpose and therefore invalid.' 9
I likewise find, in agreement with the General Counsel,
that the no-distribution aspect of the May 6 rule is invalid.
Thus, under the well-established doctrine announced by
the Board in Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co.," a rule
which bars employee distribution of union literature which
is not limited to working time or to the working areas of the
plant, is presumptively invalid on its face. The
presumption may be rebutted by evidence that special
circumstances regarding discipline or production
efficiency were required by Respondent, making
imposition of the rule imperative in those circumstances.
However, the Company here made no showing of such
special circumstances. To the contrary, it was conceded
that shortly prior to the scheduled election, some of
Respondent's supervisors distributed antiunion literature
at the employees' work benches during working hours,
thereby adding to the proliferation of such material in the
plant. Accordingly, I find and conclude that the no-
distribution aspect of the May 6 rule (par. 3 thereof), on its
face and by its implementation, constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
" It is to be recalled that this was a new plant, and the
supervisory personnel were constantly engaged in a training
program which obviously involved a close supervision of the
relatively new employees. I have also considered the denials as
bearing on the credibility of the supervisors as witnesses
" The Wm H Block Company, 150 NLRB 341; Gooch Packing
Company, 162 NLRB 1; Marion Manufacturing Company, 161
NLRB 55; Ward Manufacturing, Inc, 152 NLRB 1270; Serv-Air,
Inc , 161 NLRB 382
2. The sign in the parking lot
The complaint alleges that the Respondent, through its
Industrial Relations Manager Mauldin, violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by ordering "an employee to move his car
from the Respondent's employee parking lot, because the
employee's automobile had a prounion sticker affixed to
it." The facts regarding this particular incident are not
essentially in dispute. It appears that on or about June 4,
employee Dennis Welch requested of Mauldin permission
to place a printed sign (about 3 by 4 feet in size),
advocating the GBBA, on the roof of his station wagon
when parked in the employee parking lot. Permission was
denied by Mauldin, the latter stating at one point that he
viewed such a sign as "commercial solicitation" in
violation of the company rule, and in any event that he
considered it "unreasonable" to have such a large sign on
the roof of a car while in the parking lot. Mauldin
explained that while the Company recognized employee
rights to wear union buttons in the plant and to place a
prounion sticker on an employee's car bumper, he
considered it an "unreasonable" extension of this right to
place a sign on the car such as Welch suggested.
Nevertheless, Welch did affix the sign on his car and
attempted to park it in the company parking lot. Mauldin
ordered it removed after the commencement of working
hours on at least two occasions during the latter part of
June. Welch complied with the order and removed the car
to a lot across the highway from the Respondent's plant.12
Recognizing the general rule that Section 7 of the Act
protects the right of employees to wear or exhibit union
insignia at work '13 Respondent defends its action on the
ground that "... the incident was a calculated challenge of
a lawful and proper prerogative of management-that of
maintaining discipline, order and good conduct among its
employees."'a Respondent also argues that it harbored no
discriminatory intent in ordering the prounion sign to be
removed from the parking lot as evidenced by the fact that
in August it demanded that an antiunion sign be removed
from the premises.
But these positions do not satisfy the test which the
Board and courts have established to warrant an exception
to the above-stated general rule. This test is that there
must be evidence of "special circumstances" showing that
such a rule is necessary to maintain production and
discipline. Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., supra. Here,
Respondent produced no such evidence; the most that it
could muster in this regard was the testimony of Mauldin
to the effect that he had been receiving reports that there
was "an increasing competitive spirit between prounion
and antiunion employees," and then he testified further as
follows:
Q. This sign on top of the car, does it interfere with
production in any way?
A. No. Not directly.
Q. Well, indirectly?
A. It could in my opinion, it could have; if we had
" 138NLRB615
1 z See Resp. Exhs 5 and 6.
13 Republic Aviation Corporation v N L.R.B , 324 U.S 793,
Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc , 137 NLRB 1484, 1486
" Resp br , p 10 Stated another way in its brief, p 9 "Mr
Mauldin's position was taken in an effort to insure that employee
conduct during the course of the union organizing campaign then
in progress would be kept within proper and reasonable limits."
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES 847
had people who felt strongly against the union, come
out and put a bigger sign on their car, then the union
with a bigger sign on their car. That will affect
production if you get people making signs rather than
producing.
Q. Would this particular sign in any particular case
disrupt the company, yes or no?
You think it could in the future but it didn't did it?
A. I don't know whether it did or didn't.
It did cause some conversation; it could have
interfered with production, I don't know.
In the light of this testimony, I find appropriate to this
case the language of the Board in Caterpillar Tractor
Company, 113 NLRB 553,556:
Contrary to our dissenting colleague's assertion,
the question involved in this case is not whether the
Respondent's conduct in prohibiting the wearing of
the "Scab" button was "a reasonable and proper
exercise of the responsibilities of management," but
whether, as the Supreme Court noted in Republic
Aviation Corporation v. N.L.R.B. [324 U.S. 793],
evidence of "special circumstances" existed which
justified the Respondent's intrusion upon its
employees' congressionally bestowed right to wear
that insignia while at work. The "Scab" button was
worn for approximately 2 1/2 days before its ban, and
yet the record fails to disclose a single instance in
which the Respondent's production processes
suffered interruption. . ., nor does it indicate that so
much as a solitary murmur of resentment was heard
from any employee because of the display of that
button. To permit the abridgement of statutory rights
on the basis of the anxieties expressed herein by the
Respondent, without the least scintilla of evidence
that production would be disrupted or breaches of
discipline would erupt, would be tantamount to
administrative withdrawal of rights legislatively
endowed.' S
Accordingly, I find and conclude that by ordering
employee Welch to remove his car from the employee
parking lot because it carried a prounion sign , Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Bleyler 's speeches
The complaint , as amended, alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees "in a
series of speeches to small groups, that if the union were
voted in , the employees would lose all their existing
benefits and both sides would start from scratch." It is
conceded that during the period from August 8 through 17,
the Respondent 's vice president and general manager, P.
Austin Bleyler , held a series of some 19 meetings with
employees in the plant conference room wherein he made
a speech from previously prepared notes to the
approximately 25 employees who attended each meeting.
The speech was followed by a question-and-answer
session ; all such meetings were held during the
employees' working hours.
It appears that Bleyler made substantially the same
speech at all 19 meetings . Briefly stated, the content of the
speeches was as follows: Bleyler opened by reviewing the
relatively long history of the Company and its inception in
Rochester. He then told of the preparations, planning, and
construction of the Arden facility, that its modern features
contrasted to the Rochester operation , and that the
Company proposed to stay in business for a long period of
time in the future as it had in the past. In order to
accomplish that, Bleyler advised the employees that the
Company had to remain competitive with its domestic and
foreign competition, and that in actuality the employees'
job security was dependent upon how everyone performed
his particular task.
Bleyler then referred to the "Welcome" booklet's which
had been distributed to all employees several months
previously. The purpose of the booklet was, as explained
in the introductory letter, to advise the employees what the
Company expected of them and in return what they could
expect from the Company. Bleyler referred to some of the
benefits which the Company provided, as described in the
booklet, such as vacations, holidays, pensions, and the
like. He stated that although the booklet was given to all
employees both in the factory and in the office, if the
Union were selected as the bargaining agent for the factory
group it would be necessary to "put aside this book [for
them], if the union wanted a contract ... [and] so far as I
know, every union does want a contract. In that case, then
this booklet would be laid aside and in its place would be a
small book about the size of a bankbook which would
contain all the details of the contract." He then discarded
or laid aside the booklet on the table."
Bleyler continued that should the Union come in, the
Company would bargain with it for a contract but that such
bargaining "would be from scratch"; he could not predict
the.results of such bargaining because he did not know
what the Union would ask for or what the Company would
be prepared to give, but that whatever the result was, it
would be contained in a contract . Bleyler used an example
of describing the bargaining process the occasion where
an employee might wish to purchase an automobile; in
such a situation the employee would go to the dealer with
certain things in mind that he desired and probably a price
which he was prepared to pay; and the dealer' s salesman
had his own ideas of what he could sell the car for, taking
into consideration such things as costs, profit, etc., and
that there would be a horse trade between them, much the
same as that between the union representatives and the
15 I am aware that the Board's order was denied enforcement
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (230 F 2d 357).
However, I am bound by the Board's decision until it indicates
acquiescence in the views of a court of appeals or until it is
reversed by the Supreme Court Iowa Beef Packers, Inc , 144
NLRB 615, 616-617 In any event, the basis for such reversal was
the court 's recognition that the legend on the union button, to wit
the word "scab ," inherently arouses such resentment among
employees who are union members as to justify the employer's
apprehension that wearing of such insignia would likely disturb
the efficient operation of the employer' s business The Board so
distinguished the case in Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc , 137
NLRB at 1486 , fn 6 Here . the employer raises no contention that
the language on the sign (the exact terminology of which is absent
from the record) was inherently objectionable
"G C Exh 3
" There was some testimony by a couple of General Counsel's
witnesses that Bleyler threw the booklet on the floor This was
denied by Bleyler, and I credit his denial that he intended such a
result It may well have been that in the particular session which
the witnesses attended , the booklet fell from the table to the floor
In any event , I do not consider this particular incident of critical
significance in resolving this issue.
848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company in order to finally arrive at the terms of a
contract. 18
No witnesses testified that Bleyler stated bluntly that if
the Union came in the employees would lose their existing
benefits, nor was there any testimony that the company
representative stated that Respondent would refuse to
bargain with the Union. Rather, General Counsel contends
that Bleyler's statement that if the Union came in, the
booklet containing employee benefits would be laid aside
and that "bargaining would start from scratch," impliedly
threatened employees sufficiently to remove the
statements from the protection of Section 8(c) of the Act.
In support of such contention, he relies upon such cases as
N.L.R.B. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 327 F.2d 109
(C.A. 7), enfd. in this respect 140 NLRB 899; Hendrix
Manufacturing Company, Inc. V. 1V.L.R.B., 321 F.2d 100„
104 (C.A. 5), enfd. 139 NLRB 397; and Surprenant Mfg.
Co., 144 NLRB 507. The Respondent admits that Bleyler
referred to the benefits in the booklet, and then laid the
booklet aside stating that bargaining would start from
scratch; however, it contends that ". . . the expression was
used in connection with his description of the bargaining
process, in order to clarify misunderstandings caused by
the Union's claim that all privileges or fringe benefits then
existing were frozen and there would be negotiations from
that point foreward."19
In Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., the Board found that in
speeches made prior to the election, the Company's agents
stated, ". . . in effect, that if the union won the elections on
April 21, 1961, Respondent's employees would lose some
of the benefits which they then enjoyed, particularly the
existing vacation plan, and would have to `start from
scratch."'20 The Board went on to find, citing its opinion
in Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc., 137 NLRB 1782, that
such preelection statements contained threats of loss of
benefits and economic reprisal which interfered with the
conduct of the election, and, in addition, that such threats
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
However, the speech made by the employer's president
in Dal-Tex, without going into details, was obviously more
threatening and intimidatory respecting the loss of
employees' benefits and the retaliation to be expected
from union adherence than the speech in the instant case.
Thus the president threatened that it would be several
years before the issue of the validity of the election would
finally be settled; the employees had nothing to gain by
voting for the Union because of the level of wages
presently paid the employees; the Employer would bargain
with the Union on a "cold-blooded business basis," and
the employees "may come out with a lot less then you have
now"; a strike would not hurt the Company because he
would replace the striker and "they will lose all their
benefits"; and so on.
There were no such threats contained in the instant
talks. Accordingly, I find the situation here more akin to
that in the case of Universal Producing Company, 123
NLRB 548. In that case (at 549-550), the employer's
president's speech contained the following quotation:
Should a contract be negotiated, present wages,
benefits, etc. are first thrown out the window. When
negotiating we would start from scratch. Nothing
would be carried over....
*
. and it is reasonable to assume that a contract, if
and when negotiated would pattern [sic] Union plants
for comparable work. We mention all of this because
we want you to know exactly the kind of program and
the kind of system the Union is asking to vote for
[sic].
The Board concluded as follows (at 550):
In considering these remarks in context, we, unlike
the Regional Director, do not believe that they
constitute an unlawful threat to discontinue existing
benefits prior to negotiations . We find, rather, that the
Employer was merely expressing its legal position
that it did not have to start bargaining from the level
of existing benefits, and informing the employees
what they might expect as the result of any
negotiations which might take place. These are
statements which, as the Board has held, the
Employer is privileged to make, and we find therefore
that they do not warrant setting the election aside.
Here the parts of Bleyler's remarks which are under
attack were designed to answer the purported claim of the
Union that benefits were frozen and that it would be a
violation of law for the . . company to take away
anything you now have and enjoy in the way of wages,
hours, working conditions ... etc."21 In my view, Bleyler
was not, by his own language, threatening to take away any
of the employees' benefits should they support the Union,
but was, as in the Universal Producing case, merely
expressing the lawful position of the Company that it was
not required to commence bargaining with the union from
that level of existing benefits, but was privileged, and
intended, to commence the negotiations from scratch.
Like the Board in that case, I find that the Respondent
here was privileged under Section 8(c) to make such
remarks and that they, therefore, do not constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I shall therefore
recommend that that allegation of the complaint be
dismissed.22
18 The foregoing findings regarding Bleyler's speeches are
made upon a synthesis of all the witnesses' testimony regarding
this subject , including those for the General Counsel, for the
Respondent, and of Bleyler himself Most of the testimony as
respects the critical issue is mutually corroborative , but to the
extent that it differs I credit Bleyler who answered the questions
straightforwardly and unevasively This is not to say that the
employees were prevaricating , I simply take into consideration
that (as some of them admitted) they may not have heard
everything that was said, or, being relatively uneducated and
unsophisticated in the subject matter, they were unequipped to
recollect with substantial accuracy the statements made
" Resp br , p 16. In support of such contention, Respondent,
at the hearing, proffered into evidence two transcriptions of
telephone conversations emanating from the Union which anyone
could receive by dialing a certain telephone number. (The
telephone number was presumably secured from union literature
or announcements) The exhibits were rejected by the Trial
Examiner at the hearing on grounds of relevancy and failure of
proper identification (See Respondent's Rejected Exhibits 7 and
8) However, upon further reflection, I find that the documents
may be properly received for the limited purpose of being
information which came to the Respondent's attention which
formed the basis of its subsequent actions and helped to explain
them, without vouching for the accuracy of the information
contained therein or the Charging Union's responsibility therefor.
Accordingly, I will reverse my ruling at the hearing, and receive
such exhibits into evidence
20 140 NLRB at 901-902
2i Resp Exh 7
22 For similar reasons, I find that Hendrix Manufacturing
Company and Surprenant Mfg Co, cited supra, by the General
Counsel, are distinguishable on their facts
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES 849
4. Other acts of interference, restraint, and coercion
a. By George Keiser23
In January, Osborne Fore, one of the alleged
discriminatees herein, had a conversation with Keiser
concerning a scheduled raise to which Fore believed he
was entitled. He asked Keiser if it was his work which was
holding back the raise. Keiser replied that it was not his
work but that he needed to "change his politics." Fore
responded that his politics was his own personal affair,
and asked Keiser what he meant by that; Keiser told him
not to play dumb-that he knew what he meant. Keiser
continued that it was not him (Keiser) or Mr. Mack
(foreman) who was responsible (for the delay), but the
"higher ups" in the plant, but that if Fore would do a good
job and "get straightened out" he felt that he could get the
raise for him.224
It is established by testimony of Respondent's
supervisor (as will be more fully detailed in the section of
this Decision dealing with Fore's discharge) that at the
time of the conversation, Respondent knew that Fore was
a leader in the union movement in the plant, and I am
convinced and find that Keiser sought to utilize Fore's
request for a wage increase as a lever upon which to
pressure Fore to abandon such activities. His use of the
word "politics" as a euphemism for the objectionable word
is not unknown in this realm.25 This conduct, of course,
constitutes a threat violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
From May 8 to June 1, Keiser was out of the plant on
sick leave. During this period, on or about May 24, his
superior, Foreman Mack, had criticized employee Barbara
Welch for talking too much during working hours. Also,
after Keiser returned, he told employee Eva Smith, who
worked near Welch, not to speak to her or have anything to
do with her. These circumstances apparently upset Welch
to the extent that she went into Keiser's office during the
half day worked on Saturday, June 4. She explained that
as the result of the foregoing circumstances, she had
changed her mind about taking her vacation in August (as
had been previously arranged with Mack) and decided to
take it in June. She also asked Keiser about a raise which
she had not received. She testified that Keiser advised that
if she and her husband (who was also an employee and
involved in the parking lot incident hereinabove discussed)
were involved in any "activities" he would advise that they
drop them immediately and that if she had anything to do
with Osborne Fore, to drop that like a "hot potato" and not
to have anything to do with him; and that with the
activities going on around there, if the Company wanted to
find out "who was who they had to ask questions."
Keiser testified that he recalled a conversation with
Mrs. Welch; that they discussed pay raises and he assured
her that he would look over her performance to see
whether or not she was entitled to such a raise, but that no
mention of union or of Osborne Fore was made during the
conversation.
Following her return from a week's vacation, Welch had
another conversation with Keiser in his office, at which
time she wore a union button. According to her testimony,
Keiser pointed to the button and said, "Well, I see you
didn't listen to me." She replied that she had not-that she
thought the Union was the best thing that could happen.
He retorted that he tried to tell her as he had told Fore
months ago, and "see what happened to him." 26
According to Keiser's testimony, Welch came into the
office inquiring about her wage increase and asked him if
it made any difference that she wore her union badge
openly. He replied that it was her productivity that was the
determining factor, and the fact that she wore a union
badge openly had no bearing on her wages. He denied
making any other reference to union activities.
The credibility resolution respecting the foregoing
conversations has been of extreme difficulty. Welch was a
nervous, excitable, talkative person who I am sure was
upset when directed to cease such activities; however,
she also appeared to be a candid, forthright witness whom
I am convinced would not purposefully prevaricate
concerning her testimony. Keiser impressed me as a
careful, calculated witness who did not reveal all that he
knew and sought refuge in general denials. With respect to
the conversation, I find it highly unlikely that he would not
tell Welch why he had advised Eva Smith not to converse
with her (as Welch testified) since the simple answer
would have been that it interfered with production. Also I
believe it unlikely that he would have advised her not to
have anything to do with Fore since, at that time, Fore had
already been discharged by the Respondent and, for aught
the record shows, was no longer about the premises of the
plant. Nevertheless, I believe that he did caution her
concerning her "activities" - meaning union activities - on
both occasions, and his statement that he was telling her
like he told Fore a few months ago, is consistent with the
fact that in January he did advise Fore, as hereinabove
found, to change his "politics." In short, I find appropriate
to these circumstances the oft-quoted axiom from
N.L.R.B. v. Universal Camera Corporation: 27 "It is no
reason for refusing to accept everything that a witness
says, because you do not believe all of it; nothing is more
common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe
some and not all." I find and conclude that Keiser did
caution Welch concerning her union activities, and
impliedly threatened that if she persisted in these
22 The complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that Keiser
was at all times material an assistant foreman in the glass
division , and a supervisor within the meaning of the Act
24 The foregoing finding are based upon the credited
testimony of Fore. Keiser admitted having a conversation with
Fore in January concerning a possible raise in his salary,
testifying that he told Fore that if the latter would "give the job a
real try, I would see what I could do" He denied that he
mentioned "politics" in the discussion-that he never discussed
"politics" with Fore. He further testified that subsequently Fore
did receive a salary increase based upon his (Keiser's)
recommendation.
25 See, e.g, Ken Lee, Inc, 133 NLRB 1598, 1603, fn. 12; see
also Angwell Curtain Company, 94 NLRB 675, enfd 192 F 2d 899
(C.A. 7), where the words "this thing" were found to mean the
organization of the union.
26 Fore was discharged on May 26.
27 179F2d749(CA.2,1950)
850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
activities she might expect recrimination . This, of course,
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act2s
b. By John Carroll
Mary White, one of the alleged discriminatees herein,
testified that during May she had a conversation with her
immediate supervisor John Carroll (an admitted
supervisor within the meaning of the Act) to the effect that
he knew of a couple of people who were working for the
Union (naming Shirley Gaddy, as one), and that they had
better watch their steps because if he caught anyone with
union authorization cards, he could do something about it.
Carroll admitted having several conversations with White
during this period but explicitly denied that he ever
discussed union matters with her.
In light of the fact that the campaign was accelerating
about this time, and there was probably considerable talk
in the plant about it; the evidence further shows, as
hereinabove detailed, that Respondent had reason to
believe that Mary White was active in the Union
movement; the stated policy of Respondent was to oppose
the union activities of the employees, I believe the
probabilities are that such a conversation occurred
substantially as White testified. I therefore find that such
constituted a threat violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
as alleged.
c. ByForrest Young
In late August or the first of September, employee
Juanita Spivey had a conversation with her immediate
supervisor, Forrest Young, in which she asked him about a
wage raise. At the time she was wearing a union button.
Young replied that he did not know much about it, and that
she would have to wait until Mr. Keiser-who was then on
vacation-came back. She stated that she had been
waiting quite a while and did not feel that the Company
had "done right about it." Young replied that ". . . if [she]
stopped to think, maybe it was because of what she was
wearing." She retorted that wearing the button didn't
mean that she was definitely or necessarily for the Union:
"I could wear that badge and still vote the other way."
Young's version of the conversation is that after he
advised Spivey to wait until Keiser returned to talk about
her raise, she asked him if the union button that she was
wearing would make any difference. He responded that
the button made no difference to him, but that it might
with some of the friends that she worked with, and that
was the extent of the conversation.
Spivey impressed me as a candid and forthright witness
and I credit her version of the conversation. By implying
that the likelihood of her receiving a wage increase would
be increased if she refrained from exercising her lawful
28 That Keiser had reason to believe that Welch was involved in
the union activities as of the time of the first conversation is
confirmed by (1) the parking lot incident (hereinabove described)
which occurred about the same time involving her husband and
(2) the credited testimony of Eva Smith who said that during this
period she spoke to Forrest Young, her immediate supervisor
(who worked under Keiser and Mack), and told him that Keiser
had directed that she not speak with Barbara, and she did not see
why Young replied, "Well, I think she had gotten mixed up with
the wrong crowd " Under these circumstances I find and
conclude that a substantial motive behind Keiser's direction to
Smith was to isolate Welch because of her union activities rather
than the legitimate one of being concerned with Smith's
productivity, since, if it had been the latter, Keiser need not have
right to wear a union button in the plant, I find and
conclude that the natural tendency of such a remark was
to interfere with, restrain, and coerce her in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 thereby violating Section
8(a)(1) of the Act 29
d. By William Mack
The complaint alleges that on or about May 24, William
Mack, the foreman in the glass division, interrogated
employees concerning their union membership, activities,
and desires, and the union membership, activities, and
desires of other employees. General counsel makes no
reference to this allegation in his brief, and I find no
evidence in the record to support such allegation. The only
evidence which might relate to this allegation is that
involving Mack's investigation of a report to him that
employees Mary White and Juanita Spivey were obtaining
signatures on a petition relating to a change in working
hours (which will be discussed in more detail, infra). In
neither of these conversations is it claimed that Mack
interrogated the employees concerning their union
membership and activities. I will therefore recommend
that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
C. The Alleged Discriminatory Discharge of Osborne J.
Fore, Jr.
Fore was first employed by the Company in November
1964 as a forklift operator. He was presumably a
satisfactory employee, since his testimony that he
received no complaints about his work is undenied on the
record. However, some trouble with his leg necessitated a
request for a change of position. This was done in
September 1965, when he transferred to the glass
department (where Mr. Mack was foreman) as a
tubemaker trainee.30
It is to be recalled that the union campaign commenced
in August 1965. Fore immediately became active in it,
signing a card and encouraging other employees to do so.
Indeed, he did so on company time until advised by the
union representative to limit solicitations to breaks, lunch
periods, and before and after work. These activities soon
became known to Respondent's supervisors and officers,
the evidence showing that Fore's name was mentioned at
the regular supervisors ' meetings (commencing in October
1965) as being one of the more active union adherents.
Also commencing about this time was a series of incidents
involving Fore's being cautioned by management
representatives for being out of his department without
permission , or for wasting time.
The first of such incidents occurred in October 1965,
when Ed Harker, foreman of the assembly division,
reported to Industrial Relations Manager McManus that
singled out Welch but would have referred to Smith's coworkers
generally. Accordingly, this conduct of Keiser constitutes an
additional act of interference and restraint violative of Sec 8 ( a)(1).
20 The following week she spoke with Keiser concerning the
pay raise, and he replied that he would look into it , that he had
gotten behind in those things due to his being dl and taking a
vacation. He then uttered the ambiguous remark that Spivey had
"really dissappointed him"; however , no explanation was
forthcoming to explain the meaning of that statement Spivey
subsequently received a raise, but that does not, of course, negate
the coercive tenor of Young's statement.
30 This job required a 1- to 3 - year training period after which
the employee emerged as a skilled operator.
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES 851
Fore had been in Harker's department talking to the
timekeeper, Evelyn Splawn. The incident occurred on
Fore's lunch period, at which time he walked the
approximate 150 feet to her work station and asked how
she was getting along after her automobile accident. She
replied, "o.k.," at which time her supervisor, Harker,
approached and asked Fore to leave, which he did. The
whole incident did not consume over 3 or 4 minutes.
However, approximately one-half hour later, Foreman
Mack called Fore into his office, told him that Harker had
turned him in for being in his (Harker's) department, and
wanted to know what Fore was doing there. Fore told him.
Whereupon, Mack advised that the company policy
precluded Fore from wandering into other departments
unless he had express permission from his supervisor and
the permission of the supervisor into whose area he was
going, and that this policy prevailed even though Fore was
on his lunch hour.
In October and November, the evidence disclosed that
there were one or two incidents in which Mack observed
Fore speaking with a person who had approached Fore
during the latter's work period. Apparently when Mack
approached, the other persons left the scene, and Mack
cautioned Fore concerning such activities. Fore asked
Mack what he was supposed to do "when somebody comes
up and talks to me?" Mack suggested that he tell the
person in a gentlemanly manner he had work to do, that it
was not his breaktime and therefore he would appreciate it
if they would see him on his break or lunch period or after
working hours. Mack testified that "the main gist of my
conversation was to the fact [sic] that these conversations
were retarding his progress."
In late December 1965, Fore had a conversation with his
friend Stuart Nanny who worked in the IBM department
of the plant. It was Fore's lunch hour when he went there
and asked the supervisor of that department, Joe Self,
whether he could speak to Nanny. The latter acquiesced.
The content of that conversation was that Fore told Nanny
that a purchaser for the latter's timber would come by to
see him the following Saturday. Nanny thanked him.31
Industrial Relations Manager McManus testified that
Supervisor Self reported the incident to him the same day,
stating that he did not know who Osborne Fore was or
what he was doing in the IBM department. McManus in
turn reported the incident to Fore's supervisor, Mack, who
proceeded to call Fore in and discuss the incident in the
presence of Assistant Foreman Keiser. Fore took the
position that since the incident occurred on his lunch
period and since he received permission from Self, he
thought it was all right. However, Mack told him that the
next time he was caught out of his department they would
have to turn him in to the personnel department.32
During the winter and early spring of 1966, there were
no further incidents involving Fore's being out of his
department. He had the conversation in January with
Keiser, previously adverted to, concerning his wage
increase in which Keiser advised him to "change his
politics." Fore presumably progressed satisfactorily in his
work as a tubemaker trainee and was, in fact, given
additional duties of instructing some newer employees in
the department. This required his leaving his own
workbench on occasions.33
Mack testified that during the latter part of April and the
first part of May, he noted increased frequency of Fore's
visits with other employees and to the men's restroom.
However, he did not "...think it was enough to require a
formal interview or to issue a warning." However, on or
about May 5, he called Fore into his office and discussed
the situation with him. Fore explained that some of the
visits to the restroom were a result of medication which he
had received from the doctor relative to his nervous
condition 34
Fore testified that during the conversation Mack raised
the issue of union activity; that he (Mack) knew that such
activity was going on and although he was not accusing
Fore, he was telling him that the Company did not need a
third party to tell them what to do, and that he was not
going to have it; that further, if he caught anyone putting
up stickers or soliciting for the Union on company time he
would fire them no matter how good a friend they were or
how well he liked them.
Mack denied speaking of the Union during the interview
although he recalled discussion of ". . . such items as
defacement or disfigurement of company property or
company items on company property, . . ." In the light of
the Respondent's opposition to union solicitation on
company time and property (as evidenced by the posting of
the May 6 notice and the parking lot incident, discussed,
supra), it strains credulity to believe that there could have
been a discussion of defacement of company property
without there being a mention of union activities during
the conversation, since the pasting of GBBA stickers
around the plant was clearly a matter of Respondent's
concern.35 Accordingly, based upon this as well as
demeanor considerations, I credit Fore and discredit Mack
as to the contents of this interview.
Events Leading up to the Discharge
On May 25, Fore started to the restroom when he
recalled there was a lady in the department who wished to
know if a female operator name Angela Orr was for the
Union. Fore knew Orr, and on the way to the restroom
stopped momentarily by her work station and told her that
31 Fore and Nanny had done some trading in timber previously,
and Fore knew that Nanny sought a purchaser for his timber.
Fore, having secured such a purchaser , wanted to make certain
that Nanny would be at home the following Saturday when the
purchaser was expected to call.
12 There is disagreement in the testimony of Fore and the
supervisors as to whether he actually secured permission from
Self Self was not called as a witness . However, I do not believe
resolution of this point is critical to my finding on the ultimate
issue of discriminatory discharge.
21 Fore also testified that during this period he had additional
problems with his nerves and leg which troubled him if he sat at
one location for too long a period In January , he took leave for a
week or more when he went to the hospital for treatment and his
case was diagnosed as one of neuritis He also testified that he
had several attacks of this while at work , which came to the
attention of Keiser and the nurse in the plant
3" Mack testified that on one occasion-which apparently led
up to the May 5 conversation-he noted that Fore was absent
from his bench for about 15 minutes on one of his visits to the
restroom ; that Mack visited the restroom on that occasion and
saw Fore having a conversation with an employee named
Edmonds and Dennis Welch However, Fore denied that he had
ever had a conversation with Welch in the restroom and this was
corroborated by Welch who explained that he did not even know
where the restroom utilized by the glass division employees was
located, since he worked in the shipping department on the
opposite end of the plant, a substantial distance away (See Resp
Exh. 4.)
as See, in addition to the language of the May 6 notice,
testimony of Industrial Relations Manager Mauldin as to his
conversation with Dennis Welch
852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this lady had asked him about her, to which Orr replied
"yes," that she knew about it. That was the extent of the
conversation. However, this was observed by Supervisor
Forrest Young, who approached Fore and inquired if he
was out of work. According to Young's testimony, Fore
replied, "No, I am just resting my ass." According to Fore,
he asked Young if the latter was kidding since he had
recently assigned Fore some repairs to perform. Orr did
not hear any of the conversation between the two men
because the aspirator (a machine she was operating) was
on, and made substantial noise 36
Following the conversation, Fore proceeded to the
restroom and then returned to his work station; Young
reported the incident to Foreman Mack.
Mack discussed the incident again with Young that
night when Mack returned to the plant after dinner. The
following morning Mack brought the matter to the
attention of Industrial Relations Manager McManus and
Dr. Liberatore (the factory manager).37 Mack was given
authority to notify Fore that the latter was terminated,
which was done on May 26. On that day, Fore was called
into Mack's office where he was told that he was
terminated because he had used disrespectful language to
his supervisor in front of a female operator and that he had
been "moving around too much."
Concluding Findings as to Fore's Discharge
In this case, as in most others involving alleged
discriminatory treatment under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,
there is evidence of employee dereliction which could
form a justifiable basis for the employer's disciplinary
action. However, where it is shown that the employee has
been active in union or concerted activities, that the
employer was aware of such conduct and was opposed
thereto, the issue presented is whether or not this latter
was the substantial or motivating reason for the discipline.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated the rule
succinctly in a recent case:38
It is, of course, well settled that union activity is no
bar to discharge, for "the right to hire and fire for
sound business reasons is still a managerial
prerogative." N.L.R.B. v. Williams, 195 F.2d 669, 672
(4th Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S. 834 (1952). But if
discouragement of union membership is a substantial,
motivating reason for a layoff, the existence of an
alternate ground of justification is no defense. "The
charge is sufficiently established if, in addition to an
economic ground shown in the Labor Board hearing,
there is proof from which the examiner may fairly
find ... that the layoffs were motivated by a purpose
to interfere with union organizational activities."
N.L.R.B. v. Associated Naval Architects, Inc., 355
F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1966).
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, I
have found that Osborne Fore was one of the first and
most active union adherents among Respondent's
36 Although I have credited Fore with respect to most of his
testimony , I am inclined to believe that he made the remark
attributed to him by Young . However, as hereinafter discussed,
that does not alter my basic rationale respecting the ultimate
issue of the legality of his discharge
34 According to Mack , this was the usual termination procedure
since he did not have absolute authority to fire an employee, only
to recommend the same to Liberatore
as N.L.R B v Lexington Chair Co., 361 F 2d 283, see also
N.L.R B v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc , 346 F 2d 1003 (C.A. 5,
employees and that this came to the attention of
Respondent early in the union campaign; that the
Respondent was bitterly opposed to the campaign and
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) designed to
interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to join the Union. The incidents
relied upon by Respondent as justification for the
discharge are, for the most part, of an insubstantial and
trifling nature when compared to the volume of other
activities extant in the plant during the period such as
interdepartmental visits of relatives and friends,
solicitation for cosmetics, punchboards, and the like, for
which no disciplinary action was imposed, for aught the
record shows. Moreover, most of the specific instances of
Fore's derelictions relied upon by Respondent were
remote in time, occurring in October, November, and
December, 1965, some 5 months prior to the discharge. It is
true that Mack attempted to fill in the vacuum by stating
that he noted Fore away from his work station during April
and May, loitering in the restroom, and the like. But this
generalized, self-serving testimony is accorded little
weight when it is considered in the light of the following
factors: (1) Fore's instructional duties required that he be
away from his machine; (2) his illness, which had been
called to Respondent's attention, necessitated more
frequent restroom visits; (3) if these incidents had been of
a serious nature, they would have been documented and
corroborated as were the previous ones in the late fall of
1965; and (4) the one specific incident mentioned, i.e.,
between Fore, Welch, and Edmonds, is unlikely to have
occurred at all (as I indicated when crediting Fore's and
Welch's denials and noting that Edmonds was not called
as a witness). In addition, I note that Mack did not see fit
to caution either Welch or Edmonds for wasting time in
the restroom on this occasion.
Turning our attention to the incident of May 25, which
gave rise to the discharge, I find that this too was
insubstantial and that a discharge was totally
disproportionate to the alleged offense.39 Thus as shown
by the chart layout of the department (Resp. Exh. 9),
Osborne Fore's route to the restroom from his work station
was as direct a one as could have been taken .40 The
abbreviated conversation between Fore and Orr could not
have taken over a minute, and there is no contention or
evidence that it interfered with production. The remark
assertly made by Fore to Young-that he was "Just resting
his ass"-while admittedly "smart allecky" was not, in the
context of the profanity generally extant in the plant,
insubordinate, or demeaning to the supervisor. And I note
particularly that although a seemingly substantial basis for
the discharge was the use of "foul" language in front of a
female employee, Respondent's officers, during their
investigation of the incident, neglected to ascertain from
Angela Orr whether she, in fact, heard the alleged remark.
In short, Osborne Fore's case seems to me to be one in
which Respondent, from the outset of the union campaign
1965); N L R B v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp, 309
F 2d 32 (C.A 2,1%2).
39 See, e .g., Levinson's Owl Rexall Drugs, Inc, 161 NLRB 1531
40 I note as hearing upon Mack's credibility and the validity of
the Respondent's asserted motive, Mack's recantation that the
timekeeper 's desk was located at point "B" on the exhibit when,
in fact, it had been moved several weeks prior to the incident to
point "J " on the exhibit Thus, there was no impediment in the
aisle "A" through which Fore passed from his work station to the
swinging doors at the top of the exhibit leading to the men's
restroom
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES
and Fore's preeminence in it, set about methodically to
"build a case"41 against him by accumulating trifling
incidents of dereliction so that at a proper time it would
have "cause" to rid itself of him. I thus find and conclude
that the asserted reasons were pretextual, and that the real
reason for the discharge was Fore's leadership in the union
campaign. It was, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
D. The Alleged Discriminatory Discharge of Mary White
White was first employed by the Respondent in July
1965 as an enameler in the glass division. However, due to
the fact that the alcohol used in enameling caused her to
have headaches, she soon requested and secured a
transfer within the same department to the operation of a
graduating machine.42 At all times material, her
supervisor was Assistant Foreman Reece, until he quit the
Company about May 1, being replaced by John Carroll.
Reece credibly testified that White was a competent
employee "when she was working," but that during
October 1965, he received several complaints from her
female coworkers that she was disturbing their work
because of excessive talking and gossiping concerning
matters unrelated to the work.43 Reece cautioned White to
quit bothering the other employees and to keep to herself
opinions as to other people's private lives.
In January, White requested of Foreman Mack a
transfer out of the glass department, complaining that the
other employees were "bugging" her. Specifically, she
accused Reece of showing favoritism to Judy Taylor and
that "Judy Taylor and Mr. Reece were going out together."
Mack advised White that he had received complaints.
about her gossiping and talking about the private affairs of
fellow employees. As a consequence of this interview,
Mack approached McManus, the personnel director,
and told him he (Mack) "wanted her out of the
department. . . ." However, McManus did not agree, and
suggested relocating White at another place in the
department. In February, after having worked at several
jobs, White was eventually, permanently assigned to the
pointing section in the same department. After that
transfer, and until shortly prior to her discharge on
May 26, there is no evidence that White caused any more
"trouble" in the plant.44
White's first union activities commenced in December
1965, when she signed a card and solicited other
employees to do likewise. This solicitation took place on
the telephone, during lunch and break hours, and before
and after work. Reece testified undeniably that he had a
conversation with Foreman Mack concerning White's
union activities at the time when they were having a
problem in assigning White to a new work location (during
January or February). Mack asked him if he knew anything
about her union connections to which Reece replied no,
that he was not sure; that he thought she was for the
41 This expression was also utilized by Industrial Relations
Manager Mauldin in a conversation with Dennis Welch On that
occasion Mauldin told Welch "those people (meaning the union
representatives) can get you in trouble, we are building a case
against you " This was alleged as an additional instance of
violation of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act The threat implicit in such a
remark is obvious, and I therefore find the violation as alleged
4' This machine set forth the degree lines on the thermometer.
41 The three employees involved were Shirley Gaddy, Janie
Underwood, and Judy Taylor, of whom only Shirley Gaddy was
called as a witness by the General Counsel in this proceeding
853
Union, but he didn't know anything specific. However,
Reece testified that White' s name came up several times
in the discussion at the weekly supervisors' meetings as
being one of the leading union adherents, and that she was
mentioned "at least twice" during the month of April.
Events Leading up to the Discharge
It will be recalled that during May, John Carroll, who
had been a leadman, replaced Reece as assistant foreman
in the glass division. On or about May 19, White
complained to Carroll that she and her fellow employees
were overloaded with work while another coemployee,
Paulette Plemmons, was not presently occupied. She
requested Carroll to assign Plemmons to assist with their
work. When Carroll failed to take any action pursuant to
her request, White accused him of favoritism to Plemmons
respecting assignment of work. The following day, Carroll
discussed the incident with Mack, and told him that
according to his record of work assignments he had not
been showing favoritism. Carroll then told Mary White
that he did not think that she had justification for her
accusations and that "if she wanted to start any kind of
trouble that we would both go to see Mr. Mack at this time,
that I would assign work where I saw fit to get the job
done."
On May 24, as a result of Carroll's feeling that tension
was rising in the group, he called a meeting of all
employees in his department, told them that he had
observed tension and personal conflicts among the
employees, the work was not getting done, and he wanted
all of them to subdue their differences and work together
more effectively in the future.
Also on May 24, before worktime, Mary White met a
fellow employee Helen White ( a sister-in-law) in the
cafeteria. The latter had a petition which requested that
working hours be changed during the summer months
from 8-4:30 to 7-3:30, and requested that Mary White
solicit signatures thereon from fellow employees. Mary
White did, in fact, solicit employees to sign the petition
during break and lunch period, securing approximately
one hundred names, practically all of whom were in her
department. However, there was one employee (Brenda
Morrison) whom Mary White solicited outside of her
department just before breaktime. White had been sent by
Carroll into another department (parts stock), and was on
her way back when she stopped to ask Morrison to sign the
petition, which she did. It took about a minute.
Shortly thereafter, Foreman Mack called White into his
office and told her that a reclamation analyst, Connelly
Gillespie, had reported to him that he had seen White in
his department appearing to be getting one of the
employees there to sign a paper. White denied it, and
Mack sent her back to her work station.
A few hours later Mack called White back into his
office. What then occurred varies considerably depending
However, she was not interrogated on direct examination
concerning these matters ; on cross -examination , the subject was
touched upon but not explored sufficiently to be of probative
value
44 Reece testified that the only thing in the way of disciplinary
action that occurred during this February-May period was that
leadman John Carroll pointed out to him that he (Carroll) had
talked to White one or two times for taking too long a break in the
smoking area White admitted that during this period Carroll had
talked to her one time about taking too long a smoking break
299-352 0-70-55
854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
upon the different versions. According to White, she
admitted that she had requested the other girl to sign the
paper but maintained that Mack did not ask her nor did
she explain the contents of the petition. He asked her if
she had read the pamphlet telling about the rules and
regulations of the plant, and she had admitted that she
had. He then asked her if she did not know better than to
"do things like that in the plant" and she admitted that she
did. Mack then said he would overlook it this time. White
then returned to her work station.
Mack's version is that after White initially denied
passing the petition, he investigated this aspect of White's
activities as well as the matters called to his attention by
Carroll respecting the tension in the department; he talked
to Paulette Plemmons, Paulette Rhodey, and Judy
Freeman; Plemmons told him that White was continually
pestering her as to her production, quality of work, time
standards, etc., and that she did not know whether she
wanted to continue to work under those circumstances;
and Paulette Rhodey and Judy Freeman told him that they
felt that they were in the middle between White and
Plemmons and that they did not want to get involved in the
controversy in any manner, but that it was difficult not to
do so since they had to work with both of them. Mack then
called Mary White back into his office and related to her
the results of the interviews he had had with her
coworkers and their complaints; that Mary denied
knowledge of any tension in the department but, again, felt
that she was being discriminated against because Paulette
Plemmons was getting "all of the good work because
Paulette Plemmons was a good-looking girl"; that on this
occasion White admitted soliciting Brenda Morrison to
sign the petition; that Mack asked White if she understood
that she could not walk around in an unauthorized area
and she admitted that she did but added that she did not
see any harm in it ; whereupon Mack sent White back to
her work station.45
Subsequent to the second interview with Mary White,
Mack reported the whole matter to Industrial Relations
Director McManus who called Dr. Liberatore and Vice
President Bleyler into the discussion. The result was that
Mack was instructed to terminate Mary White which was
done the following day, May 26. He called White into his
office and told her that he was dismissing her because of
the petition-signing incident and because she had been
causing trouble again among her coworkers, and that he
had been authorized to terminate her for "time wasting,
general loitering and troublemaking." White conceded
that there were strained relations among the named
employees, but denied that she was the cause of it. 46
Concluding Findings as to White's Discharge
Here, as in the Fore case, General Counsel proved a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing Mary White
was one of the more active union campaigners; that her
activities became known to Respondent and were
discussed in supervisory meetings in an atmosphere of
union hostility shortly before her termination; and that
Respondent meted out to her the most extreme form of
discipline it possessed for engaging in conduct essentially
similar to that for which it merely cautioned or suspended
for 1 week other employees whose union activities were
either nonexistent or at least not so well known or
established."
Respondent seeks to distinguish these cases from
White's by pointing to the latter's "trouble-making"
activities which, it argues, provided more than ample
cause for the discharge and justified the more severe form
of discipline. There is, of course, no question that if such
activities were the real basis motivating Respondent's
decision, the discharge would be legitimate. However, the
sequence of events considered in the context of
Respondent's antiunion convinces me that the Company
seized upon such alleged "trouble-making" activities as a
pretext to justify its action.
Thus, almost a week elapsed between the time Carroll
reported to Mack concerning White's tension-arousing
activities. Mack was obviously content to allow Carroll to
handle the matter in his discretion which the latter did by
addressing the employees as a group but warning White
not to start any trouble. It was only after the petition-
signing incident that the "trouble - making" activities
reached significant proportions in Mack's mind. It was at
this juncture that he apparently realized that this could
provide the necessary ingredient to justify a termination,
and he then endeavored to interview Plemmons, Rhodey,
and Freeman. I am convinced that this was accomplished
after the second interview with White and that the latter
was never given an opportunity to tell her side of the story
prior to the time the decision was made to discharge her.
While the record establishes that there was disharmony in
the group, and a reasonable inference would be that
White's actions were a contributing factor, I remain
unconvinced that she was the sole causative agent, or that
an objective investigation was made (something that the
46 The foregoing testimony of Mack as given on direct
examination was shaken rather substantially on cross-
examination particularly as to sequence of events Faced with his
prehearing affidavit, Mack was forced to admit that he could not
recall whether his conversation with White's coworkers had
occurred prior or subsequent to his second interview with White
The only certainty was that everything was covered with her at
the exit interview Accordingly , I credit White 's version of the
second interview
46 The testimony of Mack and White as to the conversation at
the exit interview is essentially mutually corroborative except that
in his direct testimony Mack neglected to mention the petition-
signing incident as a reason for the termination Yet it is known
that this weighed heavily in his thinking since McManus testified
that about this time Mack notified him that White had been
"involved in soliciting signatures on a petition during regular
working hours , Also, on cross -examination , Mack finally
admitted - " I know one thing for certain , in the termination
interview I covered everything real carefully with Mary and
everything was given her" Accordingly, I find that , as White
testified , Mack did mention the petition -signing incident as one of
the two reasons for the dismissal
47 As previously noted, employee Bruce Plemmons was
suspended for 1 week in February or March by McManus Mack
merely placed Juanita Spivey "on warning" for passing the same
petition that White did
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT COMPANIES
factory manager, Dr. Liberatore, seemingly demanded in
discharge cases) 48
In sum, I am persuaded and therefore find that a
compelling reason for the termination was to discourage
union membership and concerted activities, and therefore
violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section I,
above, occurring in connection with the interstate
operations of Respondent, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the record as a whole, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Taylor Instrument Companies, Respondent herein, is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By engaging in certain described conduct referred to
hereinabove in section 1, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By engaging in the conduct referred to in section I, C
and D, above, Respondent discriminated against
employees in regard to their hire and tenure of
employment, and terms and conditions thereof, and in
order to discourage membership in the Union and their
participation in concerted activities, and thereby has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Except to the extent that violations of the Act have
been specifically found, as set forth above, the General
Counsel has failed to establish by preponderance of the
evidence the remaining allegations of the complaint
herein, and it will be recommended that said complaint be,
to that extent, dismissed.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
4e In this connection , I do not view with favor the Respondent's
failure to call as witnesses any of the coworkers involved,
particularly after I admonished counsel that I would not accept as
probative evidence the reports which Mack testified these
employees gave to him , since it is obviously heresay Although I
am aware of the Trial Examiner 's ruling (affirmed by the Board) in
Aero Corporation , 149 NLRB 1283, 1325, that the issue is the
Respondent 's behef in the substance of the complaint and not
"whether they were in fact true," such testimony would have a
855
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily
discharged Osborne J. Fore, Jr., and Mary D. White, I
shall recommend that the Respondent offer each of them
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges, and that they
be made whole for any loss they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them. Any backpay
found to be due shall be computed in accordance with the
formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices
committed, I shall recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing
upon rights guaranteed to its employees'by Section 7 of the
Act. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 23 NLRB 1058, enfd. as modified
120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4).
Upon the basis of the entire record, the findings of fact,
and the conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The Respondent, Taylor Instrument Companies, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge or other
economic reprisals if they engage in activities on behalf of
a union.
(b) Ordering employees to cease association with other
employees because of their activities on behalf of a union.
(c) Promulgating and enforcing rules against union
solicitation on company time in order to interfere with
union organization or enforcing such rules while
permitting other types of solicitation on company time.
(d) Promising employees that the likelihood of their
receiving wage increases or other benefits would be
enhanced if they refrained from engaging in activities on
behalf of a union.
(e) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of Glass Bottle Blowers Association of the United States
and Canada, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees
in any manner with regard to their rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, hire, tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of their employment.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named labor
organization, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Osborne J. Fore, Jr., and Mary D. White
distinct bearing on the circumstances of the asserted
investigation, the time, place, and manner in which it was
conducted, as well as being quite critical in resolving credibility
problems relating to Mack, White , and Carroll . Additionally, I
note that , in Aero , the complainants were General Counsel's
witnesses who were not interrogated by him on that aspect of the
case, one could hardly expect the Respondent , under those
circumstances, to call them as its witnesses Such, of course, is
not the case here
856 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights or privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them in the manner
set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Notify the above-named employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
this Recommended Order.
(d) Forthwith rescind its existing rule against
solicitation and distribution of literature as posted in May
1966 and published in its employee handbook. This shall
not prevent the Respondent from thereafter posting,
publishing, and enforcing reasonable plant rules for
business reasons, provided such action is not taken for the
purpose of retaliating against its employees for any
organizational activity or for the purpose of discouraging
organizational activity.
(e) Post at its Arden, North Carolina, plant, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."49 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region
11, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.s°
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed in all other respects.
19 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
so In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said
Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Glass
Bottle Blowers Association of the United States and
Canada, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
by discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees in any manner with regard to their rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, hire, tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT promulgate and enforce rules against
union solicitation on company time in order to
interfere with union organization or enforce such
rules while permitting other types of solicitation on
company time.
WE WILL NOT promise employees that the
likelihood of their receiving wage increases or other
benefits would be enhanced if they refrained from
engaging in activities on behalf of a union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge or
loss of benefits if they select a labor organization to
represent them.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist the above-named labor
organization, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL offer Osborne J. Fore, Jr., and Mary D.
White immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them, with interest thereon at 6
percent per annum.
All our employees are free to become, or refrain from
becoming, members in the above-named Union or any
other labor organization.
TAYLOR INSTRUMENT
COMPANIES
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States
of their right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 10th Floor,
Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 723-2911.