Target Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 18, 2012

29-CA-030804 (N.L.R.B. May. 18, 2012)

JD(NY)-16-12
Valley Stream, NY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
TARGET CORPORATION
Case Nos. 29-CA-30804
29-CA-30820
and 29-CA-30880
29-RC-12058
UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL
WORKERS LOCAL 1500
Michael Berger and Lara Haddad, Esqs.,
Brooklyn, NY, for the General Counsel.
Alan I. Model, Esq., (Littler Mendelson, P.C.),
Newark, NJ, for the Respondent.
Jessica Drangel Ochs and Patricia McConnell, Esqs.,
(Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C.),
New York, NY, for the Union.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge: Based on charges filed by United Food
and Commercial Workers Local 1500 (Union) in Case No. 29-CA-30804 on May 23, 2011, and
in Case No. 29-CA-30820 on June 8, 2011, and in 29-CA-30880 on July 8, 2011, a second
order consolidating cases and amended consolidated complaint was issued on December 30,
2011 against Target Corporation (Respondent, Employer or Target).1
The complaint alleges, essentially, that in its Team Member Handbook revised in July,
2009, the Respondent promulgated and since then has maintained certain unlawful rules, as
follows: (a) No-Distribution rule (b) “Use Technology Appropriately” policy (c) “Communicating
Confidential Information” policy and (d) “Unauthorized access to confidential information” policy.
It is also alleged that in its Team Member Handbook revised in July, 2009, and February,
2011, the Respondent promulgated and since then has maintained certain unlawful rules, as
follows: (a) “After Hours” rule (b) No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy (c) “Dress Code” policy
and (d) a Parking Lot policy.
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent threatened employees with discipline for
engaging in activities on behalf of the Union; gave employees the impression that their activities
on behalf of the union were under surveillance; and enforced its no-solicitation policy by
directing employees not to solicit for the Union anywhere on the Respondent’s premises, which
includes non-work areas.

1 All dates herein are in 2011 unless otherwise stated.
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The complaint also alleges that the Respondent threatened employees with unspecified
reprisals for their support for and/or activities on behalf of the Union; distributed a leaflet to its
employees in which it threatened them that its Valley Stream facility would close if they chose
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative; and in or about April and/or May, 2011,
showed its employees a video which states that the Respondent will enforce its solicitation and
distribution policies.
The complaint further alleges that the Respondent enforced its no-solicitation policy by
directing employees not to solicit for the Union on the Respondent’s property, and interrogated
employees regarding their Union activities. Finally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent
threatened its employees that if they chose the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative and there was a strike, the Valley Stream facility would close.
The Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of the complaint.
On May 10, the Union filed a petition in which it sought to represent a unit, essentially, of
all full-time and regular part-time employees. The parties entered into a Stipulated Election
Agreement pursuant to which an election was held on June 17. The Tally of Ballots showed that
of approximately 268 eligible voters, 85 cast their ballots for the Union, 137 voted against the
Union, and there were 6 challenged ballots which did not affect the outcome of the election.
On June 24, the Union filed objections to conduct affecting the results of the election. On
January 20, 2012, the Regional Director for Region 29 issued a Report on Objections, Order
Consolidating Cases and Notice of Hearing. The Report stated that certain objections were
substantially identical to the complaint allegations, and accordingly, ordered that the objections
case and the unfair labor practice case be consolidated for hearing.2
On February 1-3, 6, 7, 10 and 13, 2012, a consolidated hearing was held before me in
Brooklyn, New York. Upon the evidence presented in this proceeding, and my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses and after consideration of the briefs filed by the General
Counsel, Respondent and the Union, I make the following:
Jurisdiction and Labor Organization Status
The Respondent, a domestic corporation with various retail stores, including a retail
store located at 500 West Sunrise Highway, Valley Stream, New York, the only location involved
herein, is engaged in the operation of department stores. During the past year, the Respondent
derived gross annual revenues valued in excess of $500,000 from the operations of its stores
and, during the same time period, received at its Valley Stream facility, goods valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from enterprises located outside New York State. The Respondent admits,
and I find that it has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. The Respondent also admits, and I find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Background
The Respondent, a major nationwide retail store, opened 50 years ago. None of its
1,755 stores have been successfully organized by a union. As set forth above, the Union filed a
petition to represent the employees of the Valley Stream store, leading to a campaign for and

2 The Union withdrew certain objections that it had filed.
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against union representation by the Union and the Respondent.
During the course of the campaign, both parties distributed literature and conducted
meetings in an effort to convince the workers of the merits of their cause. In addition, the
Respondent showed videos to its workers.
Organizational Hierarchy and Operations
The Respondent’s headquarters is located in Minneapolis where the human resource
executives set the employment policies of the Valley Stream store. That store has about 268
unit employees, called “team members” who are supervised by “team leaders” who report to
“executive team leaders.”
The store manager, Laura Pena, is called the “store team leader.” Respondent’s aim is
to provide the best possible experience for its customers, called “guests.” Pena stated that when
she arrived at the store in late September, 2010, she found its operations “scary… pretty much
operationally broken.” Pena testified that she did not want the Valley Stream store to become
Target’s first unionized store, but stated that she did not become upset when she learned that
the Union sought to organize it.
The store’s human resources department is headed by executive team leader Karrien
Stone who became employed at Valley Stream in February, 2011, to correct a “disheveled,
disoriented” human resources operation.
The store is situated in the Green Acres Mall area. It has two parking lots. The employee
entrance to the store is located directly in front of one of the parking lots. The store is open 24
hours a day, seven days a week. However, it is only open to the public for certain hours during
the day. After the store closes for the day, employees on the “overnight shift” perform such
tasks as stocking shelves and preparing and setting displays.
I. Findings of Facts Concerning the Alleged Threats,
Creation of the Impression of Surveillance and Interrogation
A. The Alleged Unlawful Threats
1. Threat to Discharge and the Threat of Unspecified Reprisals
Employee Tashawna Green, an active supporter of the Union, testified that in early
March, 2011, she spoke with employee Matthew King in the store’s fitting room. King told her
that a union was needed in the store and Green agreed. At that point, team leader and admitted
supervisor Deborah Joseph told them “not to let them hear us mention anything about a union.
You could be terminated.” Green asked Joseph if she was serious, and Joseph replied that she
was, adding “they don’t want to hear anything mentioned about a union.”
King testified that in early March, 2011, he was working with Green in the fitting room
when Joseph gave him a work order. King, stating that he was “just playing around” said “oh, we
need a union. We need a union.” He stated that, just then, Joseph walked by and was in a
position to hear his comment. He quoted Joseph as saying “don’t talk like that. You could get
written up for talking like that” or “talking about stuff like that.” Although King first stated that
Green did not say anything to prompt Joseph’s comment, he also commented that he and
Green were speaking about a union, and his pre-trial affidavit states that “Green and I were
discussing unions in general. I don’t recall our exact words.”
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Joseph denied knowledge of the above incident and denied the comments attributed to
her by Green and King, specifically denying telling them that they could be fired for speaking
about a union.
A newspaper article in “Newsday” bears a date of May 16 and pictures Green holding a
“Target Change” poster. “Target Change” is the Union’s slogan used in the campaign. The
article quoted Green as saying that “concerns she and her co-workers have raised were not
being addressed. We decided in order for us to be heard, we need a union, otherwise they are
not listening.”
Green, who stated that she gave statements to the news media about the organizational
campaign, testified that on May 17, admitted supervisor Nicole Barrett “pulled” her into the
men’s accessories department and told her that she saw an article in which Green claimed that
management was not listening to what the workers had to say. Green stated that Barrett read
the article briefly while standing there. Barrett asked her “what management” she was referring
to. Green replied that it was “management overall.” Green quoted Barrett as saying “I’m not
here to tell [you] what to do; it’s [your] decision on how [you] want to vote. Just be careful of
what you do cause you never know what could happen.”
2. The Threats to Close the Store
a. The Leaflet
The Respondent distributed the following leaflet to its employees before the election:
WILL THE STORE CLOSE IF THE UNION GETS IN?
There are no guarantees. Here are the FACTS:
Companies close stores for economic reasons.
Our store will stay open only so long as it meets Target’s
economic and operational needs. A UNION WILL NOT CHANGE
THESE FACTS.
The Union has a terrible record of store closings:
The International union has lost 89,000 members in 10 years
because MEMBERS LOST JOBS.
32 store closings announced by A & P February 11.
The local was happy that only 4 NY stores were closing.
We all owe our jobs to the closing of the Caldor store that was in
our building. It had the union. It closed.
Target’s record is different:
Almost doubling of stores and jobs in the same 10 years where
the UFCW International union lost over 89,000 members!
No dues payments for the right to work.
Target has closed stores that did not perform economically.
Our future depends on:
Each of us, doing our job to the best of our abilities.
Our store’s economic health.
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Would a union help?
Rigid union work rules and seniority systems could hurt.
They could help economically by negotiating wage and benefit
CUTS.
Who wants to pay dues for that kind of help?
WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU HEARD OF A UNION
HELPING MEMBERS DO THEIR JOB … OR BENEFITING A
COMPANY’S ECONOMIC HEALTH?
VOTE NO
/s/ Laura Pena
PS Any leader can show you the union’s membership drop and
A & P store closings. (Emphasis in the original)
The Respondent alleges that the above leaflet was distributed as a response to one of
the Union’s messages contained in a flyer concerned with “myths and facts about union.”
According to the Union’s flyer, one “myth” was that “companies close due to unions.” The “fact”
set forth in the flyer stated that “companies close for economic reasons – and the vast majority
of companies that close are nonunion. Some companies, however, like to keep this myth alive.
Half of employers illegally threaten workers who form a union by saying the plant will close.
Studies have shown that, in fact, unions help decrease employee turnover and can increase
efficiency.”
b. The Meetings with Employees
The Respondent routinely holds frequent, two to three times per day, informal “chat
sessions” or “huddles” during which supervisors speak to the workers concerning matters of
interest relating to the store. During the period prior to the election, the Respondent utilized
those sessions to speak to the workers about the Union. The Respondent’s managers testified
that they were trained by its labor relations department as to what they could and could not
lawfully say to the workers about the union campaign.
In response to the Union’s campaign, the Respondent designed a program in which four
distinct topics were presented to its employees at meetings.
The large number of employees and the different shifts they worked prevented all the
workers from attending the meetings at one time, so each of the four topics was presented at
about 10 meetings of 10 to 15 employees each. Separate videos were shown to the employees
at the first three meetings. It was stipulated that almost all the employees in the unit had been
shown the three videos. The meetings took place between April and June, 2011, before the
election.
Present at the first three meetings were store manager Pena and Pablo Eguez, the
Respondent’s labor relations manager. Respondent’s senior vice president for human
resources, Derek Jenkins, spoke at the fourth meeting. Pena and Jenkins stated that they read
from a script at each of the meetings and did not vary from the script. However, when questions
were asked by employees at the end of each meeting, they did not read from a script in
answering the questions. Pena stated that the purpose of the script was to ensure that she gave
a “consistent” message to all the workers. Workers testified variously that the managers read
from a script at the meetings, or did not read from a script.
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Pena led the first meeting which was concerned with the general topic of “unions.” A
video entitled “Think Hard Protect Your Signature” was shown. Pena testified that the script that
she read portrayed the Union as a business. An actor in the video stated that “a union is a
business. And like any other business, it has to bring in money to survive. But it doesn’t have
any products to sell. Instead, it sells memberships. The more memberships it sells, the bigger
the business.” That video also contained the message that “you can rely on us to enforce all
solicitation, distribution, and harassment policies.”
Employee Charmain Brown testified that at one of the meetings in May at which about
five employees were present, Pena told them that the meeting was called because an employee
mentioned that the union was “harassing” workers. Pena, speaking from a script, told the
assembled workers that the union “took over” Wal-Mart and the union “shut down” that store.
Pena told the employees that her boyfriend was in a union, was injured and, although he was no
longer employed, the union continued to deduct dues from his pay. Pena concluded by saying
that she loved the store and did not want to see it change or go any place, but “if the union
comes in this store is going to shut down.” Brown stated that an employee asked why the store
would would close if the plans were that the store would expand. Pena did not answer that
question.
Pena denied telling the employees that the store would close if the union successfully
organized the employees.
The second meeting, which took place on about June 9, concerned negotiations and
collective-bargaining. A video was shown entitled “Essentials: Collective Bargaining.”
Employee Averil Bracey was present at the meeting and testified that Pena used a flip
chart to demonstrate “the figures if the Union were to come in.” According to Bracey, Pena said
that the Union did not have the “nerve” to collect dues payments itself and instead relied upon
the Respondent to do its “dirty work” by deducting dues from employees’ paychecks. Bracey
stated that Pena claimed that such extra work would cost the Respondent “administration fees”
of $3 million per year “which is going to make the store close.”
Bracey challenged Pena, stating that since a sign advises the store’s customers that it
gives $3 million per week to charity, the Respondent should take one of those weekly donations
and “take care of the union thing.” According to Bracey, Pena became angry, slapped her hand
on the table and said “Averil, I’m not going to go through this with you all night long… it’s plain to
see how you’re voting. I can see you’re voting for the union.” Pena then directed her assistants
to leave and they left with Pena.
Pena conceded that Bracey asked that the money the Respondent gives to volunteer
events should instead be given to its employees. Pena stated that Bracey was loud, boisterous,
and “belligerently disrespectful,” interrupting her repeatedly during the meeting, raising her voice
in a mocking way, and asking how the Respondent could give money to charity rather than to its
employees. Pena denied banging on the table, losing her temper or walking out. Human
resources official Stone denied that Pena or Eguez told the workers that the store may close if
the union came in. She denied that Pena lost her temper, slammed a book on a table or
stormed out of the room in response to Bracey’s comments.
Pena stated that she read from a script and showed employees a flipchart containing the
cost to the Respondent if all employees received a $2.00/hour wage increase and were
guaranteed a 40 hour work-week, benefits the Union allegedly promised to the workers if it won
the election. However, she admitted speaking about union dues at the meetings, but denied
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saying that the Respondent would have to do the Union’s dirty work of deducting dues from
workers’ paychecks.
Pena denied telling the employees, at any meeting, that the store would or may close,
and indeed did not mention anything about a store closing at all. Pena specifically denied telling
the workers that a $3 million expense would cause the store to close, and Eguez denied that
they mentioned that it would cost $3 million to administer the dues deductions. Indeed, Pena
stated that she is in no position to decide if the store would close
At the third meeting, led by Pena and Eguez, a video was shown, entitled “Essentials:
Strikes.” Employee Betsy Ann Wilson saw Pena read from a script.
The fourth meeting, called the “25th hour meeting,” was held on about June 15. Pena
introduced official Jenkins. She stated that they both read from their scripts, rehearsing before
the meetings. They stated that they did not entertain employee questions at the meeting.
According to employee Averil Bracey, Pena spoke from a script and introduced Jenkins.
Bracey stated the Jenkins, not reading from a script, said that the Valley Stream facility was a
good store. He told the workers that sometimes when a union organizes a store, it encourages
the workers to strike, but Target had 33,000 employees who could replace the 280 workers at
the store. He added that “in case of a strike I have no problem closing the store because…
sometimes… when they’re striking they’ll just close a store.” Pena then said that employees
should “vote for yourself... vote no for the Union, because if the union come in then this will lead
to closing the store.”
Jenkins stated that the Respondent’s labor relations department wrote his speech but he
retyped it, putting it into his “own words.” He then returned it to the labor relations department
for its review and approval.
The script that Jenkins stated that he read from, reads as follows on this point:
One thing you need to think about very seriously is that we have
ALMOST 1800 STORES and 350,000 TEAM MEMBERS. We
would have no difficulty hiring PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS
for ECONOMIC STRIKERS. Unions like to call a strike an
“economic war.” The 260 TMs [team members] here against
350,000 does not feel like good odds to me. I repeat 260 against
350,000… (Emphasis in original)
Jenkins testified that his only mention of a store closing was that he told the workers that
the store closed once before when it was owned by Caldor. His script, which he read, stated as
follows on this point:
YOUR STORE CLOSED ONCE BEFORE WHEN IT WAS
OWNED BY CALDOR. I know some of you were here and
remember that situation. At that time, it was RERPESENTED BY
THIS SAME UNION. It closed because the company DID NOT
PERFORM well enough economically to continue operating. THE
UNION DID NOT CHANGE THAT FACT FOR CALDOR.
(Emphasis in original)
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Jenkins testified that, in reading his script to the workers, he emphasized the economic
factors that cause businesses to close. He was aware that employees had asked whether the
store would close, and he answered that this store would not close but that there are reasons
why a store could close. Employees Pebrow and Smaine stated that Jenkins and Laura read
from scripts. Human resources official Stone stated that Jenkins and Pena spoke from scripts,
and she denied that either said the store would close if the union came in or that the store would
close for any reason.
In addition, numerous employees, including Sonia Williams, an active union supporter,
Jennifer Pebrow, Eva Reaves, Betsy Ann Wilson, Wesly Symby, and Antonia Smaine denied
that Pena or Jenkins said that the store would or may close due to the Union during the
meetings held with the workers at which they were present.
Team leader Lance King testified that at the first meeting he did not see any scripts. He
did not attend the next two meetings, but at the fourth meeting, Pena and Jenkins spoke from
scripts. Neither said the store would close because of the Union. He noted that Jenkins said that
a store would close only for business reasons – if it was not meeting sales goals or not making
money.
Pena, Eguez and Jenkins all denied telling the workers that the store would or may close
if the Union was selected as the employees’ representative. Employer official Karrien Stone
denied that Pena or Jenkins said that the store would or may close.
B. The Creation of the Impression of Surveillance
Employee Sonia Williams, a union supporter, stated that on about April 26 and 27, she
distributed about 24 copies of a Crain’s New York article to employees before her work shift and
while she was on her break. The article spoke about this organizing campaign.3
Williams stated that on April 28 she was called in to store manager Pena’s office. Also
present was human resources supervisor Stone. Pena told Williams “Sonia, I know we’re in the
midst of a campaign, but it has been brought to my attention that you are soliciting team
members for the union.” Williams replied that “you know where I stand with the union and if I
speak to a team member, I’m speaking to them off the clock.” Pena answered that “we’re not
supposed to do it in Target premises” whereupon Williams asked “in the break room, on my
break time?” Pena replied “not on Target’s premises.” Williams asked “in the parking lot?” Pena
said “no.” Williams then asked whether she could solicit in the “adjoining parking lot” and Pena
said that she would have to research that, but did not contact Williams with the answer. Pena
concluded the meeting by asking “are we clear on that?” Williams said they were.
Pena denied that she met with Williams in her office with Stone on April 28, but admitted
that she and Stone met with Williams in response to her learning that she had been “soliciting”
employees while they were working. Also Pena had received a report that several employees
claimed that they were being “bothered” by her – being asked by her to speak about
“something.” Pena stated that one of her leaders saw Williams speak to an employee. Pena
testified that she told Williams that she could solicit other workers but not while either she or
those employees were on the clock. Pena denied telling Williams that she could not solicit on
Target’s property. Pena acknowledged that Williams asked if she could solicit in the second
parking lot, and she replied that she was not certain, but she or Stone would respond to that

3 The article is dated April 24, 2011.
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question.
Stone denied meeting with Pena and Williams on April 28, and similarly denied any
meeting in which Williams was told not to solicit on Target’s property. She further denied
prohibiting any employee from soliciting when they were not on duty.
C. The Alleged Unlawful Interrogation
Aly Waddy is the Union’s director of special projects who directed the campaign and
coordinated the Union’s activities. The Union’s campaign to organize the Respondent’s unit
employees began in about March, 2011.
Waddy testified that she had an appointment to pick up several employees on June 9 at
the store and drive them to an organizing meeting. She arrived at the facility just prior to 8:00
a.m. She parked her car and employee Dennis Baker left the store and entered her car. A few
minutes, later, employees Devin Jones and Raul Stewart left the store and were walking to their
car. Waddy left her car and walked toward Stewart’s car. They began speaking at Stewart’s car
when admitted supervisor and executive team leader Michael Casolino, and store security
guard Ajay Bharat approached them.
Casolino asked Jones and Stewart “what are you guys doing?” To Waddy, the two
workers appeared frightened and nervous. According to Waddy, Casolino, referring to all three
employees said ”you guys can’t talk here.” Waddy asked why not and Casolino said that “you
are on Target’s property.” Waddy protested that they were just having a conversation. Casolino
repeated “you can’t talk here.” Casolino repeated that “you can’t talk there.” Waddy asked him if
he is prohibiting people from speaking there and Casolino said “you are on Target’s property.”
Waddy asked him to define which property was Target’s, and Casolino replied “the store, the
two parking lots.”
Later in her testimony, Waddy said that Casolino told her that they could not speak there
“because you are talking about the union.” At that time Waddy asked if they could speak across
the street, and Casolino replied “not if you are talking about the same thing. The whole mall
would have a problem with it.”4 Waddy answered that he could not “mandate” what his
employees speak about, and Casolino replied that “we can do whatever we want, we’re a
corporation.” Waddy said “the whole mall? Really?” Casolino laughed and asked them to leave,
and Casolino then asked employee Stewart what he was doing and Stewart walked away.
According to Waddy, Stewart then opened his car door and started the engine. He then
began to walk away from the area, but then ran away leaving the engine running. After Stewart
left the area, Casolino asked Jones “what are you doing?” and Jones left the area. Then
Casolino told Waddy “you have to go.” She replied that Stewart’s car’s engine was still running.
She returned to her car and sat there, waiting. After about 10 minutes, Jones and Stewart
returned and left in their car. They did not attend the organizing committee meeting that day.
Waddy’s testimony is generally consistent with an incident report she wrote on the day
the incident occurred. Moreover, she testified that she did not recall distributing any literature on
the store’s property prior to the election.

4 Later in her testimony, Waddy stated that Casolino mentioned that whether they could
speak in that area “depends on what they’re speaking about.”
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Casolino testified that during the election campaign he observed Target’s employees
and union representatives distributing literature in the store parking lot. On the day at issue, he
did a “random walk” through the parking lot. As he left the building he noticed three employees
who had just left work being given flyers by Waddy at a car. Waddy testified, contradicting
Casolino, that neither she nor any other Union agents distributed literature at the store or in the
parking lot.
Casolino stated that he approached Waddy alone and told her that “there’s a no
solicitation policy on Target property so you can’t distribute this to any of our team members…
you can’t solicit on Target property. You know you don’t work for Target, you cannot be on our
property soliciting, handing out any kind of material or just giving anything to our team – you
can’t distribute anything.” Casolino and Waddy “argued back and forth” and she asked where
she could “go.” Casolino replied that she could be anywhere not on Target property. According
to Casolino, Waddy became argumentative and he left the area. She remained at the lot for a
period of time and then left, and the employees with her entered their car and left also.
Casolino stated that security guard Bharat was present at the time but did not know if he
was present when he spoke to Waddy. Casolino denied directing any of his remarks toward any
employee, specifically denying that he asked employees what they were doing or telling them
that they could not talk at that location. He also denied that an employee’s car’s engine was
running or that anyone ran from the area. Casolino further denied mentioning anything to
Waddy about the mall.
Guard Bharat testified that on June 9 between 8 and 9 a.m. while standing at the
employee entrance to the store, he observed Waddy hand a “pamphlet” to the store’s cart
attendant in the parking lot. Bharat stated that he called Casolino to accompany him to the
parking lot. He and Casolino approached Waddy. Bharat told her that the Respondent’s no
solicitation policy prohibits solicitation of employees while they were working, and he asked her
to leave the property. He said that no mention was made of union solicitation or soliciting at the
mall. Bharat stated that Casolino did not speak to Waddy.
Bharat stated that about three other employees were in the lot at that time, whom he
later learned had just finished their shifts. He did not hear Casolino say anything to Waddy or
the 3 overnight employees, and did not see a car’s engine running or anyone running from the
lot, stating that if he witnessed such activity he would have called the police.
Store manager Pena testified that on June 9, upon her arrival at the store, she saw
Waddy distributing literature to two employees in the parking lot. She asked Casolino to tell her
to stop “soliciting” in the lot. She did not definitely recall, but she may have also asked Bharat to
accompany Casolino. Nevertheless, two supervisory people went to the lot at her request -
Casolino and an asset protection person.
II. Analysis and Discussion Concerning the Alleged Threats,
Creation of the Impression of Surveillance and Interrogation
A. The Threats to Close
1. The Leaflet
The complaint alleges that the leaflet distributed to employees during the campaign
unlawfully threatened that the Respondent would close its store if the Union successfully
organized its employees.
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As set forth above, the leaflet stated that the store would remain open only as long as it
was economically feasible to do so. However, the leaflet emphasized that the Union “has a
terrible record of store closings” as if it was responsible for a store’s shutting its doors.
Specifically, the leaflet stressed that there were 32 closings of A & P stores which were
represented by the Union, and that the Union lost 89,000 members in 10 years because the
union’s members lost their jobs.
It is well settled in Board law that an employer is free to predict the economic
consequences it foresees from unionization, so long as the prediction is “carefully phrased on
the basis of objective fact to convey [its] belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond [its] control…. If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action
solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to
him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of
retaliation … without the protection of the First Amendment. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575 (1969). Absent the necessary objective facts, employer predictions of adverse
consequences arising from unionization are not protected by Section 8(c), rather they constitute
threats that violate Section 8(a)(1). Homer Bronson Co., 349 NLNRB 512 (2007).
In Quamco. Inc., 325 NLRB 222, 223 (1997), the Board found that the employer created
a “UAW WALL OF SHAME” in which it listed the names of UAW-represented companies that
had closed, and with the respondent’s name followed by a question mark. The Board found that,
although the display was factually accurate as to the union-represented plants that closed, the
display “clearly implies that the closings were the fault of the UAW.’” The Board found that the
employer offered no explanation of the basis for its assertion that the UAW was to blame for the
closings of the other plants, or any objective facts as the basis for a belief that, for reasons
beyond its control, selection of that union might cause this employer’s plant to close.
The Board noted that, as here, there is no evidence that the employees had been told
that the future of the respondent’s store was in doubt or that the respondent had any economic
reasons for considering closing the plant.
Rather, here, the Respondent asserts that the Union first raised the question whether
the store would close if the Union successfully organized it, and the leaflet was the
Respondent’s answer to that question. That may be true, but in answering the question the
leaflet states no objective facts to warrant such a possibility.
Similarly, in Bronson, above, the Board found that the employer’s chart showing that
over the last 15 years, 13 companies, which had been represented by the union that sought to
organize it, closed. The Board held that the employer presented no objective facts to support
the “respondent’s clear implication that the ... plant closing was caused solely by the fact that
the “strike happy” UAW represented those employees.” In finding that the employer threatened
plant closure, the Board found an “inevitable linkage between unionization and job loss, and that
the employees could reasonably infer that “ a vote for the union will threaten the employees’
future employment.”
While it is true that the leaflet mentions that stores close for economic reasons, that
message constituted only a small part of the leaflet, with the major emphasis being on the
union’s being an important factor in the closing of a large number of stores.
I accordingly find and conclude that the leaflet constituted a threat to close the
Respondent’s Valley Stream store, and as such violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
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2. The Remarks Made at the Meetings
As set forth above, employees Bracey and Brown testified that, at meetings conducted
by Respondent’s officials, the workers were told that if the Union was selected as the
employees’ representative, the store would close.
Making a finding concerning what employees hear at a meeting is especially difficult. Of
the more than 200 employees who heard the officials’ speeches, only two testified that they
heard the threats. Significantly, other employees present at the meetings at which the threats
were allegedly made denied hearing those threats. It is clear that if the Respondent was intent
on making such threats it would have repeated the threats at all the meetings held with
employees.
The Respondent’s officials stated that they spoke from scripts and did not deviate from
those scripts. Witness testimony, however, was unclear on this point. Certain employees
testified that they saw them speaking from scripts, and others said that they did not speak from
scripts. A review of the scripts, which are in evidence, establishes that no threats were made as
testified by the employees.
As to Brown’s testimony, she conceded that Pena read from a script during that meeting,
but the script does not contain a threat to close. Brown’s testimony concerning the threat would
have been more credible if there was evidence that the store expected to expand. That would
have supported Brown’s testimony that Pena was asked why the store would close if it had
plans to expand. However, no evidence was adduced that there were plans to expand the store.
As to Bracey’s quotation of Pena that if the Respondent had to undertake to check off
dues, the added expense of $3 million would cause the store to close does not make sense.
First, there is no requirement that an employer agree to a dues check-off clause. Second, the
amount at issue seems unusually large.
Finally, I cannot credit Bracey’s testimony that Jenkins told the workers that if there was
a strike, the store would close, or that if the union was voted in, the store would close. What he
actually said, which is confirmed in the script he read, was that employees could be
permanently replaced in the event of an economic strike.
I accordingly cannot find that Pena or Jenkins threatened employees with store closure
during the group meetings they held with the workers as testified by Bracey and Brown, above.
B. The Threats of Discharge
As set forth above, employees Green and King testified about their conversation
concerning the Union in early March, 2011,which I find was overheard by supervisor Joseph. I
find, as testified by Green and King, that Joseph told them that they should not be speaking
about a union or they could be discharged.
I credit Green and King essentially because their testimony was mutually corroborative.
They both identified the area in which they were situated at the time of their conversation, and
that supervisor Joseph was in the area.
The Respondent correctly notes that there was some discrepancy between the
testimony of the two employees. Thus, King did not recall Green asking if Joseph was serious in
threatening them, and that King did not hear Joseph use the word “union” during their
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conversation. Nevertheless, Joseph’s remark clearly contemplated that she was rebuking the
two because they spoke about the Union.
It is also true, as Respondent argues, that Green’s credibility suffered somewhat in
denying that she spoke with another employee about the union although she testified that she
spoke to King about the need for a union. Further, she denied distributing union literature in the
parking lot although other witnesses saw her engaging in such activities. However, such
infirmities in her testimony do not lead me to discredit it as to the alleged threats.
I accordingly find and conclude that the Respondent unlawfully threatened Green and
King with discharge because they spoke about a union.
C. The Threat of Unspecified Reprisals
I also credit Green’s testimony that supervisor Nicole Barrett told her that she should be
careful in what she does because “you never know what could happen.” Barrett did not testify.
I credit Green because the undisputed documentary evidence supports a finding that this
incident occurred. Thus, Barrett’s comment occurred one day after the Newsday article
appeared in which Green criticized the Respondent for not addressing certain concerns that she
and her co-workers had. As set forth above, Barrett asked her “which management” she was
referring to and warned her to “be careful … cause you never know what could happen.”
Green’s quotation in the article lends support to her testimony that she was warned about such
conduct. Inasmuch as Barrett did not testify, the statement attributed to her was undenied.
I find, as alleged, that Barrett’s comment to Green constituted a threat of unspecified
reprisals.
D. The Creation of the Impression of Surveillance
Regarding the allegation that the Respondent created the impression that it was
engaging in surveillance of employees’ union activities, I credit employee Sonia Williams’
testimony that only one or two days after she distributed about two dozen copies of a
newspaper article concerning this campaign, she was called into manager Pena’s office and told
that it was “brought to my attention that you are soliciting team members for the union.”
The Board's test for determining whether an employer has created an unlawful
impression of surveillance is whether under all the relevant circumstances reasonable
employees would assume from the statement in question that their union or protected activities
had been placed under surveillance. Stevens Creek Chrysler, 353 NLRB 1294, 1295-1296
(2009); Bridgestone Firestone South Carolina, 350 NLRB 526, 527 (2007).
When an employer tells employees that it is aware of their union activities but fails to tell
them the source of that information, Section 8(a)(1) is violated because employees are left to
speculate as to how the employer obtained the information, causing them reasonably to
conclude that the information was obtained through employer monitoring. Stevens Creek
Chrysler, above at 1296; Conley Trucking, 349 NLRB 308, 315 (2007).
Here, Pena advised Williams that she was aware that Williams was soliciting employees
for a union. I find that such a statement would cause Williams to reasonably conclude that Pena
received that information by surveilling her union activities. Inasmuch as Pena did not tell
Williams how she received that information, the violation has been proven.
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Although Pena testified that she received such information from other employees and a
supervisor, such information was not conveyed to Williams, who could reasonably believe that
Pena was watching her. I accordingly find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by creating the impression in Williams that her union activity was under surveillance.
E. The Alleged Interrogation
As set forth above, it is alleged that manager Casolino interrogated two employees,
Jones and Stewart, in the parking lot while they were speaking to Union agent Waddy. The
evidence establishes that Casolino walked up to the group and asked the two workers what they
were doing.
I credit Waddy’s account of the meeting. She gave clear, precise testimony of what
happened at that time. The incident report which she completed that day is consistent with her
testimony.
In contrast, the Respondent’s witnesses gave different versions of the incident, none of
them consistent with each other. Thus, Casolino testified that he approached Waddy alone as
he was doing a “random walk” through the parking lot and he, alone, spoke to Waddy. Pena
testified that she saw Waddy hand out leaflets and asked Casolino to tell her to stop soliciting in
the lot. Security guard Bharat testified that he asked Casolino to accompany him to approach
Waddy and that he (Bharat), alone, spoke to Waddy.
Waddy’s testimony is the only consistent account of the incident. In Rossmore House,
269 NLRB 1176 (1984), the Board set out its rules concerning evaluation of allegations of
interrogation, as follows:
Under Board law, it is [well-established] that interrogations of
employees are not per se unlawful, but must be evaluated under
the standard of whether under all the circumstances the
interrogation reasonably tended to restrain, coerce, or interfere
with rights guaranteed by the Act. In making that determination,
the Board considers such factors as the background, the nature of
the information sought, the identity of the questioner, the place
and method of interrogation, and whether or not the employee
being questioned is an open and active union supporter.
Here, executive team leader Casolino pointedly asked the two employees what they
were doing in the parking lot. The question was unnecessary because he knew what they were
doing there because he testified that they had just finished their overnight shifts. They were
obviously in the parking lot preparing to leave the area, but his questioning them in the presence
of Waddy, who he knew was a Union agent, was designed to elicit what they were doing with
Waddy at the time. That was clearly an attempt to inquire as to their union activities.
There was no evidence that the employees questioned were open or active union
supporters. I find that the questioning by Casolino tended to restrain, coerce or interfere with
their right to engage in union activities. I accordingly find that Casolino’s questioning of the two
employees constituted unlawful interrogation.
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III. Findings of Fact Concerning the Alleged Unlawful Handbook Rules
A. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Complaint and the Handbook Provisions
The complaint alleges that the Respondent has “promulgated and since then has
maintained” in its Team Member Handbook revised in July, 20095, and in its Handbook revised
in February, 20116 certain unlawful rules concerning solicitation, distribution of literature, release
of confidential information, discussion of confidential information, reporting of unauthorized or
misuse of confidential information, and threats of discipline for violating its policy on confidential
information.
The 2009 Handbook was given to employees upon their hire during their orientation
session. The employees signed a receipt that they received and read the Handbook. The 2011
Handbook was made available to employees after the election, but not distributed to the then-
employed workers. Instead, they were told that it was available upon their request. The 2009
Handbook was not rescinded upon the issuance of the 2011 version. It was stipulated that the
2009 Handbook was the only handbook applicable to employees from July, 2009 to at least the
last week of June, 2011.
1. The Respondent’s Information Security Policies
Under the broad heading of “Information Security”, the Respondent’s Handbook sets
forth certain policies concerning employee access to, and use of confidential information. Some
of those policies have been alleged as unlawful, as follows.
a. The “Use Technology Appropriately” Policy
Paragraph 7(b) of the complaint alleges as unlawful, the following:
A “Use Technology Appropriately” policy prohibiting its employees
from releasing confidential guest, team member, or company
information.
The Handbook provides in G.C. 8, p. 54:
Use technology appropriately
Communication technology such as e-mail and the Internet makes
us more efficient and better equipped to serve our guests. Be sure
to use this technology wisely and appropriately to avoid increasing
our risk of a security breach.
If you enjoy blogging or using online social networking sites such
as Facebook and YouTube, (otherwise known as Consumer
Generated Media, or CGM) please note there are guidelines to
follow if you plan to mention Target or your employment with
Target in these online vehicles:

5 G.C. Exhibit 8.
6 G.C. Exhibit 9.
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Don’t release confidential guest, team member or company
information, including any video footage.
Clearly distinguish yourself from Target, so as not to appear as an
official Target spokesperson.
Do not harass or make any threats to guests or team members.
For complete guideline or more information, please see your HR
partner.
Paragraph 7(c) of the complaint alleges as unlawful, the following:
A “Communicating Confidential Information” policy which:
(1) prohibits its employees from sharing confidential information
with other employs;
(2) directs its employees to talk to their supervisors if they are
unsure regarding sharing confidential information; and
(3) prohibits its employees from having discussions regarding
confidential information in the break room, at home or in open
areas and public places.
The Handbook provides in G.C. 8, p. 53:
Communicating confidential information
You also need to protect confidential information when you
communicate it. Here are some examples of rules you need to
follow:
Make sure someone needs to know. You should never share
confidential information with another team member unless they
have a need to know the information to do their job. If you need to
share confidential information with someone outside the company,
confirm there is proper authorization to do so. If you are unsure,
talk to your supervisor.
Develop a healthy suspicion. Don’t let anyone trick you into
disclosing confidential information., Be suspicious if asked to
ignore identification procedures.
Watch what you say. Don’t have conversations regarding
confidential information in the Breakroom or in any other open
area. Never discuss confidential information at home or in public
areas.
Paragraph 7(d) of the complaint alleges as unlawful, the following:
An Unauthorized access to confidential information policy which:
(1) directs its employees to report unauthorized access to
confidential information or misuse of confidential information
to Respondent; and
(2) threatens its employees with corrective action, including
termination and criminal prosecution, for a violation of the
policy on confidential information.
The Handbook provides in G.C. 8, p. 53, as follows:
Unauthorized access to confidential information
If you believe there may have been unauthorized access to
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confidential information or that confidential information may have
been misused, it is your responsibility to report that information by
contacting your supervisor (who should send an e-mail to
Integrity@Target.com or calling the Employee Relations and
Integrity Hotline at 800-541-6838.
We’re serious about the appropriate use, storage and
communication of confidential information. A violation of Target
policies regarding confidential information will result in corrective
action, up to and including termination. You also may be subjected
to legal action, including criminal prosecution. The company also
reserves the right to take any other action it believes is
appropriate.
The term “confidential information” is not defined in the Handbook.
However, certain examples of “confidential information” are given in the
Handbook, pp. 51-52, as follows:
Confidential information
All Target information that is not public must be treated as
confidential. Here are some examples of confidential information:
Non-public company information, including:
Financial information (for example, store sales)
Strategic plans (for example, pricing and capabilities)
Marketing plans (for example, circular prices prior to public
distribution)
Guest information, including guest credit information
Team member personnel records
Protected health information obtained through our pharmacy
operations or medical plans
Annual evaluations of employees by their supervisors are done in April or
May. The performance of the employee during the past year is discussed with
the worker who is told at that time the amount of any wage increase he will be
given. Store manager Pena stated that no directions are given to the supervisors
concerning what they should tell the workers they could discuss with others
about the review process, but it is her understanding that most employees speak
with their co-workers about their wage increases.
In fact, employees testified that they spoke freely and openly with their
co-workers about the exact amount of their raise, and how much they believed
they deserved.
Employees testified that they knew of no restrictions concerning
employees speaking to each other about their wages or benefits, and there was
no evidence that any worker was disciplined for having such discussions.
Employees were not told by their supervisors that they should keep the
amount of their raises confidential, or that they should not speak with other
workers about their raises. On the other hand, employees were not told that they
could discuss their wages with their co-workers.
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Indeed, Dawn Major, the human resources director for the Respondent’s
East Coast region stated that the term “confidential information” does not include
wages, benefits and other terms of employment, noting that employees are
permitted to speak about those items. For example, she stated that it is the
Employer’s policy to encourage the discussion of wages and benefits at work
between the workers and their supervisors. Such opportunities include chat
sessions and group meetings at which employees are asked how they feel about
their job, and during which, wages and benefits may be discussed. Further, Major
testified that the Respondent conducts surveys in which it asks its employees
how they feel about their pay and benefits. Individual discussions with the
workers concerning their pay are also held.
In this regard, it is important to note that the Respondent encourages its
employees to speak with supervisory personnel, not with other workers,
concerning their wages and terms of employment.
However Major testified that employee personnel records, including the
wages and benefits of the workers, and also their personal health information,
medical records, credit card and debt records are confidential information to the
extent that if an employee asked a supervisor for another worker’s “information”
such a disclosure would be prohibited. Major stated that, although that
application of the policy is not included in the Handbook, it is enforced to prohibit
one employee’s learning about the wages and benefits of another through
disclosure by a supervisor. Nevertheless, employees may speak about their
wages and benefits with their supervisors, who encourage such conversations.
2. The “After Hours” Policy
Paragraph 8(a) of the complaint alleges as unlawful, the following:
An “After-Hours” rule prohibiting its employees from returning to
Respondent’s premises, which includes non-work areas, during
their off hours.
The Handbook provides in G.C. 8, p. 20, and G.C. 9, p. 25, as follows:
After hours
Team members must leave the premises after hours. You should
only be on company property during your scheduled work hours or
for other authorized company business.
The evidence establishes that employees visit the Valley Stream store regularly when
they are not scheduled to work, in order to shop, to meet friends who are about to finish their
shifts, to check on a matter in the human resources department, to use a computer there which
is set aside for employee use, or for company sponsored activities. Employee Betsy Ann Wilson
is unaware of any policy that prohibits workers from entering the store when they are not
scheduled to work.
Team leader Lance King stated that he was not aware of any policy stating when he
could or could not enter the property when he was off duty, nor was he aware of any rule which
stated that he could not be in the parking lot after his work hours. On the other hand, no
management person told him that he could return to the Target facility after his work hours.
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Employee Green stated that, although she has shopped in the store when she was off
duty, she is not permitted to enter the break room while off duty. Nevertheless, she has been in
the break room before and after her shift. She also admitted entering the store on her days off to
pick up her paycheck or check her schedule. She conceded not being told that she could not
enter the store when she was not working. She stated that she was never advised that off duty
employees are permitted in the break room.
Human resources official Stone testified that she never told the workers that they were
permitted to return to the premises after their shift. Employees also testified that no one told
them that they could return to the store when they were not scheduled to work that day, or when
their shift was completed.
Dawn Major, the human resources director for the Respondent’s East Coast region, who
is responsible for 433 stores, testified that the “after hours” policy is not enforced in any of the
Employer’s stores, adding that employees are frequently in the stores when they are not
working, in order to pick up a paycheck, check their schedule, see their friends, or to shop for
merchandise. She did not know if employees were told that they were permitted to be in the
store after their regular work hours.
There was no evidence that any employee has been disciplined for being in the store
when they are off duty or not scheduled to work.
Human resources official Stone testified that between April 1, 2011 and June 17, 2011,
8,125 unit employees used their employee discount benefit to make a purchase of merchandise
at the store either before they clocked into work for their shift, after their shift was over, or on a
day when they were not scheduled to work.
3. The “No Solicitation No Distribution Rule”
Paragraph 7(a) of the complaint alleges as unlawful, the following:
A no-distribution rule that prohibits its employees from distributing
any literature at any time on Respondent’s premises, which
includes non-work areas.
The Handbook provides, in G.C. 8, pp. 27-28:
Don’t distribute flyers, pamphlets or other information to
team members.
While you or the team members you’re talking to are on work time
or in work areas, you must not pass out or distribute any
pamphlets or other literature. Also, you must never pass out any
literature and/or products, sell merchandise or exchange money
on Target premises if these activities are for personal profit,
commercial purposes or any charitable organization that is not
part of our Community Relations program.7

7 “Target Premises” is defined under “Common Terms” on page 61 of the Handbook as “all
the buildings, grounds, vehicles and parking areas Target uses to conduct its business.”
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Paragraph 8(b)of the complaint alleges as unlawful the following:
A No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy prohibiting solicitation or
distribution of literature by its employees, at all times on
Respondent’s premises, which includes non-work areas.
The Handbook provides in G.C. 8, p. 44-55, as follows:
No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy
Please follow and help enforce the Target No Solicitation/No
Distribution Policy, which states: Target wants to make sure all
team members can work free of distraction and uncomfortable
pressure that can be created by solicitation and distribution. That’s
why Target maintains a No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy for
all team members and others with authorized access to Target
property.
The policy is simple: during working time (yours or your fellow
team members) and in work areas, you cannot “solicit” team
members. “Soliciting” includes things like asking co-workers to join
organizations or pools, to buy memberships or subscriptions, or to
make pledges or gifts to charities.
“Working time” does not include meal and break periods, or any
other time when a team member is not expected to be engaged in
work activities. The “No Distribution” part of the policy requires
that team members do not distribute literature during working time,
in work areas, or through Target communication channels,
including e-mail.
Certain activities are prohibited at all times on Target premises.
Soliciting, distributing literature, selling merchandise or conducting
monetary transactions, whether through face-to-face encounters,
telephone, company mail or e-mail, are always off limits (even
during meal and break periods) if they are:
For personal profit
For commercial purposes
For a charitable organization that isn’t part of the Target
Community Relations program and isn’t designed to enhance the
company’s goodwill and business.
Because Target supports the United Way, Target Volunteers and
non-profit grant partners, some of these organizations may be
eligible to distribute information or conduct annual drives without
violating the No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy; however,
Employees relations must approve the activity.
On the day before the election, more than 10 Union organizers and about 3 off-duty
employees walked through the store wearing “Target Change” t-shirts, including employee
Williams who stated that none of the Union’s demonstrators gave any literature to the workers
present that day.
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Employee Antonia Smaine stated that she saw employee Green, at the end of her shift,
change from her work shirt into a “Target Change” t-shirt and then walk around the store
wearing that shirt.
Executive team leader for human resources Karrien Stone testified that from April, 2011
to June, 2011, she saw two employees wearing a Target Change shirt – one which was worn
backwards under the worker’s vest while he was working. She did not say anything to the
worker wearing the shirt. She noted that no one asked her for permission to wear Union
paraphernalia at work, and she did not tell any worker that they could not wear such union garb.
Employee Sonia Williams testified that she gave out Union cards and literature in the
break room on several occasions to employees who were on their break. She also gave cards
to employees in the Target parking lot and left union literature in the bathroom. Union organizers
distributed flyers in the lot.
Manager Casolino stated that, prior to the election, he saw union literature in the break
room and bathrooms.
Employee Bracey stated that Pena and supervisor Kevin approached her and employee
Tashawna Green when they were distributing leaflets and speaking to employees about the
union in the parking lot near the employee entrance. The two managers told them “no soliciting.
You have to leave. Oh, no you can’t talk to them.” Pena denied speaking with Bracey or any
other employee in the parking lot regarding soliciting others.
Supervisor of asset protection Jason Jones testified that during his tenure at the store
from January, 2011 to January, 2012, neither he nor the other guards prohibited any employee
from distributing literature in the store or in the parking lot. He observed “literature” in the break
room and at the employee entrance to the store.
Jones affirmed that Target property, for the purpose of his enforcement of the no-
solicitation no-distribution polices includes the Target building itself, its property up to the gate
on Sunrise Highway, the parking lot, and the adjacent parking lot across the road near Sunrise
Highway.
Manager Casolino stated that non-employee solicitors such as the Girl Scouts, people
selling candy for school events have been evicted from the store’s premises.
Tashawna Green testified that on June 9, she stood outside the employee entrance to
the store speaking to another employee. She asked the worker how he felt about “everything
that has been going on.” The co-worker asked Green about union dues and union procedures.
She replied that she does not pay union dues. At that point, admitted supervisor Karrien Stone
approached her with store security guard Kyle Bennetier. According to Green, Stone said “you
are soliciting on Target’s property and they do not tolerate (allow that) soliciting on Target’s
property.” Green then left the area and walked to the mall entrance.
Stone testified that she was walking past the Target employee entrance when one or two
employees complained to her that Green was “blocking” them, “bothering” them, and preventing
them from entering the building. Stone asked Bennetier to accompany her. As Stone
approached Green she did not notice that Green was with any other employees.
Stone then told Green that she could not stand in front of the entrance because she was
blocking employees from entering. Stone described Green as being so close to the entrance
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door that when she (Stone) opened the door, she hit Green’s back. Stone denied telling Green
that she could not solicit on the property, and suggested that she could stand at the cart corral
nearby.
As set forth above, employee Sonia Williams testified that she was asked to report to
Pena’s office, where she was told “Sonya, I know we’re in the midst of a campaign, but it has
been brought to my attention that you are soliciting team members for the union.”
Williams replied that “you know where I stand with the union and if I speak to a team
member, I’m speaking to them off the clock.” Pena answered that “we’re not supposed to do it in
Target premises” whereupon Williams asked “in the break room, on my break time?” Pena
replied “not on Target’s premises.” Williams asked “in the parking lot?” Pena said “no.” Williams
then asked whether she could solicit in the “adjoining parking lot” and Pena said that she would
have to research that, but did not contact Williams with the answer. Pena concluded the
meeting by asking “are we clear on that?” Williams agreed.
Pena denied that she met with Williams in her office with Stone on April 28, but admitted
that she and Stone met with Williams in response to her learning that she had been “soliciting”
employees while they were working. Also, Pena had received a report that several employees
claimed that they were being “bothered” by her – being asked by her to speak about
“something.” Pena stated that one of her leaders saw Williams speak to an employee. Pena
testified that she told Williams that she could solicit other workers but not while either she or
those employees were on the clock. Pena denied telling Williams that she could not solicit on
Target’s property. Pena acknowledged that Williams asked if she could solicit in the second
parking lot, and she replied that she was not certain, but she or Stone would respond to that
question.
Stone denied meeting with Pena and Williams on April 28, and similarly denied any
meeting in which Williams was told not to solicit on Target’s property. She further denied
prohibiting any employee from soliciting when they were not on duty.
I credit Williams’ testimony that Pena said that she could not solicit on Target’s
premises. This prompted an admitted response from Pena that she would check to see if
solicitation could take place in the Respondent’s second parking lot. Clearly, the emphasis of
the conversation was on the location of the solicitation, not the work-time of the conversants.
Thus, Williams credibly testified that, in response to Pena’s telling her that she could not
solicit anywhere on Target premises, she asked whether such activity could take place in the
break room or one of the parking lots. Corroborating Williams, Pena admitted that Williams
asked if solicitation could take place in the second parking lot and Pena replied that she did not
know but would find out.
4. The “Dress Code”
Paragraph 8(c) of the complaint alleges, as unlawful, a “dress code” policy prohibiting its
employees while at work from wearing any buttons or logos on their clothing unless approved by
a team leader.
The Handbook, G.C. 8, p. 21, states, in relevant part:
Dress Code.
Don’t wear:
Any buttons or logos on your clothing (unless approved by your
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team leader).
The Handbook also prohibits the wearing of various items of clothing
including jeans, tank tops, halter tops, flip flops, open-toed shoes, beat-up tennis
shoes, lycra pants, and sheer or revealing clothing.
Employees must wear a red shirt and, preferably, khaki colored pants. The shirts that
they wear are not provided by Target. Therefore, the workers wear shirts with the
manufacturer’s logo imprinted thereon, such as “Polo”, “Tommy Hilfiger”, “Nike”, “Ralph Lauren”,
sports themes, team logos and others. The logos are usually woven into the shirt and do not
extend above the shirt’s surface. In addition, employees wear pins and buttons including
seasonal items such as a tiny Christmas tree, an angel, and insignia and pins advertising their
support of people with AIDS or breast cancer.
Employee team leader Lance King stated that he was not prohibited from wearing shirts
with logos or buttons. However, he was not told that he could wear such logos on his shirts.
Manager Casolino stated that he has seen employees wear small logos on their shirts
such as a “Nike” emblem, and small pins and badges, noting that as long as they are wearing
red and khaki, they can wear those items.
Employee Bracey testified that she heard supervisors tell employees that they could not
wear any logo on their uniforms, and that if they wore such ornamentation they had to turn it
inside out so that it was not visible, or cover it with their identification badge. There was no
evidence that any employee was disciplined for wearing a shirt with a logo.
Employee Sonia Williams testified that, about one or two weeks before the election, she
and other employees were off-duty and not working. They stood outside the store wearing the
“Target Change” t-shirt. They then entered the store and spoke with Pena who told them “as
long as you don’t wear it with your uniform.” She also told them that they could wear those shirts
outside the store but not inside the store.
During the campaign, employees wore, while working, a red, rubber bracelet with a
union logo. Pena conceded seeing employees wearing the Union bracelet and the Target
Change shirt in the store during their off hours, and denied telling Williams or any other worker
that they could not wear union garments with logos. She conceded that no one asked for
permission to wear union items.
On the other hand, employees were not told that they were permitted to wear union
buttons or logos at work. Similarly, human resources official Stone testified that she did not tell
any workers that they were permitted to wear union logos or buttons at work.
Human resource director Major testified that the dress code is not strictly enforced at the
store. She stated that upon her visits to the store she heard from her team that “there’s flexibility
in our dress code guidelines.” Specifically, she noted that the Respondent permits employees to
wear pins supporting breast cancer awareness, and other similar causes “that are important to
them” as long as the pin is not too large, or offensive or vulgar, and does not interfere with the
employee’s name badge or with the person being identified as a team member. Major said that
the Respondent permits logos, such as “Ralph Lauren” or other designer emblems on shirts as
long as the logo is not offensive and the shirt is red.
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Major was unaware of any instance in any store in which an employee was told not to
wear a union logo, or was disciplined for wearing one. She stated that she was not aware that
any employee requested permission to wear union items in the store, although she is aware that
certain union items have been worn. She further stated that she did not know whether
employees were told that they were permitted to wear union buttons or other union logos.
5. The “Parking Lot” Policy
Paragraph 8(d) of the complaint alleges, as unlawful, “a parking policy directing its
employees to report anyone they do not know that is loitering in Respondent’s parking lot.”
The Handbook, G.C. 8, p. 21, states, in relevant part:
Parking
Park in the area of the lot for team members.
Always lock your car.
Use the “buddy system” or walk in pairs when you leave at night.
It’ll make leaving safer.
After the store closes, you may be asked to move your car closer
to the store for safety.
If you see people you don’t know loitering around the team
member parking area, notify Assets Protection or your leader on
duty immediately.
(Target is not responsible if your car is damaged or stolen while in
the parking lot.)
Supervisor of asset protection Jason Jones stated that during his tenure
at the store, there was a fire in a dumpster, bomb threats, disputes among
customers in the lot concerning parking spots, vehicle crashes, break ins of cars,
and propane tanks being left in the lot. He did not know whether any of these
incidents were caused by employees. Manager Casolino stated that there have
been stabbings and beatings, however, he never heard that any store employees
were involved in those incidents.
The Respondent’s official Major conceded that with about 200 employees, some workers
may not know each other, particularly since they work during various shifts, and some work
overnight and some during the day.
Supervisor of asset protection Jason Jones stated that off-duty
employees are permitted in the parking lot at all times, and that there are no
restrictions regarding whether an off-duty employee can enter the store.
Casolino stated that if the store was closed and employees are not
scheduled to work, they cannot be in the store. He noted that employees are
permitted in the store parking lot at any time.
IV. Analysis and Discussion Concerning the Alleged Unlawful Handbook Rules
The Board’s standard in evaluating work rules is set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646 (2004):
The Board has held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1)
when it maintains a work rule that reasonably tends to chill
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employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In determining whether a
challenged rule is unlawful the Board must, however, give the rule
a reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular
phrases in isolation and it must not presume improper interference
with employee rights. Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry
into whether the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful
begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly restricts
activities protected by Section 7. If it does, we will find the rule
unlawful.
If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section
7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the
following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language
to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent has promulgated and since then has
maintained in its 2009 Team Member Handbook, and in its 2011 Handbook certain unlawful
rules concerning solicitation, distribution of literature, release of confidential information,
discussion of confidential information, reporting of unauthorized or misuse of confidential
information, an after-hours policy, a dress code policy, a parking lot policy, and threats of
discipline for violating its policy on confidential information.
The 2009 Handbook was given to employees at their hire during their orientation session
for which employees signed a receipt. The 2011 Handbook was made available to employees
after the election, but not distributed to the then-employed workers. Instead, they were told that
it was available upon their request. The 2009 Handbook was not rescinded upon the issuance
of the 2011 version.
It was stipulated that the 2009 Handbook was the only handbook applicable to
employees from July, 2009 to at least the last week of June, 2011.
A. The Information Security Policies
The complaint alleges that the Information Security rules broadly prohibit employees
from releasing confidential guest, team member, or company information, sharing confidential
information with other employees, directs them to ask their supervisors if they are unsure
regarding sharing confidential information, and prohibits its employees from speaking about
confidential information in the break room, at home or in open areas and public places, directs
its employees to report unauthorized access or misuse of such information to the Respondent
and threatens them with discipline and criminal prosecution if they violate that policy.
The General Counsel alleges that these prohibitions necessarily restrict employees from
sharing with other workers information regarding their wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.
“Confidential information” is defined in the Handbook as including all Target information
that is not public, including employee “personnel records.” The Respondent argues that
“personnel records” do not include such information as employee wages and benefits. However,
the term “confidential information” is broadly defined as any information that is not public.
Clearly, employees’ wages and benefits are not made public. Accordingly, they constitute
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confidential information which is subject to the Handbook’s rules on maintaining their
confidentiality.
As such, according to the rule, employees are prohibited from sharing such information
as to their wages and benefits with other workers. The Handbook provides that employees are
prohibited from releasing confidential information and sharing such information with another
worker “unless they have a need to know the information to do their job,” and they cannot
discuss confidential information at home or in public areas.
It is without dispute that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss their wages, hours
and working conditions with their colleagues. In Cintas Corp., 344 NLRB 943, 943, 946 (2005),
enf. 482 F.3d 463, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the Board found that an employer violated the Act by
broadly stating that it “recognizes and protects the confidentiality of any information concerning”
its employees and that unauthorized release of confidential information could subject the
employee to disciplinary action. The Board found that prohibiting the release of “any
information” regarding its employees “could be reasonably construed by employees to restrict
discussion of wages and other terms and conditions of employment with their fellow employees
and with the union.”
Applying the Respondent’s rule above, I find that the Information Security rules explicitly
restrict activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. The discussion of an employee’s wages,
hours and working conditions is protected by the Act. By prohibiting their discussion, the
Respondent explicitly restricted that right. In addition, I find that employees would reasonably
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity. I further find that Respondent's ambiguous
rule prohibits the dissemination of “personnel information and documents” and because
Respondent does not clarify the term, Respondent's rule reasonably tends to chill protected
activity.
By including the wording “personnel information” in the listing of confidential documents,
Respondent leaves to employees the task of determining what entails “personnel information”
and requires them to speculate as to what kind of information disclosure may trigger their
discipline. Accordingly, I find that the rule is overly broad and has language that employees may
reasonably construe as restricting the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
The cases cited by the Respondent, Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1989),
and Super K-Mart, 330 NLRB 263 (1999), are easily distinguishable. In both cases, the
employers prohibited exclusively company documents from disclosure – “hotel-private
information” and “company business and documents.” The Board found that an employee could
not reasonably construe the prohibition to include discussions about wages, hours and working
conditions, since neither prohibition specifically implicated employee information. The court in
Cintas specifically noted that the employer’s rule “did not by its terms include employee wages
or working conditions and made no reference to employee information.” 482 F.3rd at 470.
Here, in contrast, the Handbook specifically prohibits the disclosure of employee-related
information - “confidential … team member information” and defines confidential information as
anything that is not public, including “team member personnel records.” Certainly, wages and
benefits are not public information, and accordingly, an employee would reasonably construe
the rule as prohibiting discussion of employee related wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment.
The Respondent argues that it is only “personnel records” and not personnel
“information” that is prohibited from disclosure. I do not see the distinction. By definition,
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personnel records must necessarily include personnel information.
In IRIS U.S.A., 336 NLRB 1013 (2001), the Board dealt with confidentiality language
that was similar to that found in the instant case. Specifically, in IRIS, the employer prohibited
disclosure of confidential information including financial information, leases, licenses,
agreements, sales figures, business plans, and proprietary information. As with the
confidentiality language in the instant case, it was apparent that the employer sought to prevent
the disclosure of information that might give unfair advantage to competitors or adversely affect
its ability to compete in its industry. But, as here, the employer also included “personnel records”
as confidential and limited their disclosure only to the named employee and senior
management. In determining whether the employer's confidentiality rule was lawful, the judge
noted that “personnel records” contain various kinds of information about employees; including
their wages. The Board found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining that
confidentiality provision. 336 NLRB at 1014 fn. 1.
I accordingly find and conclude that employees would reasonably construe the language
of the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity, speaking to their co-workers about their wages and
terms and conditions of employment. I accordingly find and conclude that the maintenance of
the “after hours” would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
I further find that, inasmuch as the rule directs its employees to report unauthorized
access to confidential information or misuse of confidential information to the Respondent, and
threatens its employees with corrective action, including termination and criminal prosecution,
for a violation of the policy on confidential information, such part of the rule violates the Act by
threatening employees for violating an unlawful rule.
The Respondent cites Security Walls, LLC, 356 NLRB No. 87 (2011) for the proposition
that a confidentiality provision precluding the copying or disclosing of information in, among
other documents, the payroll or personnel records of employees was lawful. It must be noted,
however, that in finding no violation in the provision, the Board observed that no exceptions
were taken to the judge’s decision. 356 NLRB No. 87, at fn. 1.
B. The No Solicitation – No Distribution Policy
The allegedly improper Handbook rule provides that employees are prohibited at all
times on Target premises from soliciting and distributing literature if these activities are for
personal profit, commercial purposes or any charitable organization that is not part of the
Respondent’s Community Relations program.
The Handbook defines “Target premises” as including all buildings, grounds and parking
areas Target uses to conduct its business.
The General Counsel argues, and I agree, that the above rule broadly prohibits the
distribution of literature anywhere on Target property if such an activity is for “commercial
purposes.”
An employer may lawfully impose some restrictions on employees' statutory rights to
engage in union solicitation and distribution. Such restrictions, however, must be clearly limited
in scope so as not to interfere with employees' right to solicit their coworkers on their own time
or to distribute literature on their own time in non-work areas. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945); Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB
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615, 621 (1962).
On its face, the Respondent’s rule prohibits solicitation and distribution on its premises at
any time on its premises. Such a rule violates the principles in Republic Aviation which
establishes that employees have the right to distribute items on their own time in non-work
areas.
The rule prohibits such distribution if it is for a “commercial purpose….” The General
Counsel argues, and I find, that there is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that
the Respondent regarded the Union as a “business” and communicated that understanding to
its employees. Thus, at the first meeting at which the video “Think Hard Protect Your Signature”
was shown to the employees, store manager Pena testified that the script that she read to the
employees portrayed the Union as a business, and an actor in the video states that “a union is a
business. And like any other business, it has to bring in money to survive. But it doesn’t have
any products to sell. Instead, it sells memberships. The more memberships it sells, the bigger
the business.” The Respondent’s flyer, signed by Pena, states that “like any other failing
business the union needs to increase revenue to stay in business. Taking dues from new
members is the only way for them to get more money.”
Williams stated that Pena told her three or four times that there was “no soliciting on the
premises.” Williams further testified that when she gave out flyers in the break room during her
break, her supervisor Peta Chen told her “you can’t distribute those in here. No soliciting.”
Williams protested that she was on her break, and Chen replied “I don’t care; you can’t pass
anything out in the break room or on the premises.” Bracey also handed out a flyer in the break
room and Chen told her “you can’t do that in the break room. Stop handing out stuff in the break
room.” Bracey also stated that when she was in the parking lot with other employees and Union
agents, Pena approached and said “no soliciting. Not even in the parking lot. Get away from
here. You can’t be there.”8
I further find that the Respondent enforced its unlawful rule when, on June 9,
Respondent’s official Stone told employee Green that she could not solicit on Target’s property.
At the time, Green was outside the employee entrance and was off duty. Green credibly testified
that she spoke to one other employee outside the store about the union. At the time, Green was
a known union advocate. It would make no sense for Green to bother or block employees from
entering, as Stone testified, when she was attempting to interest them in the Union. Nor would it
make sense for Green to stand in a place where she would be subjected to being hit by the
door.
I also credit Williams’ testimony that Pena said that she could not solicit on Target’s
premises. This prompted an admitted response from Pena that she would check to see if
solicitation could take place in the Respondent’s second parking lot. Clearly, the emphasis of
the conversation was on the location of the solicitation, not the work-time of the conversants.
Thus, Williams credibly testified that, in response to Pena’s telling her that she could not
solicit anywhere on Target premises, she asked whether such activity could take place in the
break room or one of the parking lots. Corroborating Williams, Pena admitted that Williams
asked if solicitation could take place in the second parking lot and Pena replied that she did not

8 Bracey conceded that her pre-trial affidavit did not mention that she was prevented from
distributing literature in the break room. She testified that the Board agent did not ask her
whether she was prohibited from doing so.
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know but would find out. I accordingly find and conclude that Pena’s advice to Williams that
solicitation was not permitted on the Respondent’s property violated the Act.
The Respondent’s reliance on Register-Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007) is misplaced. In
that case, the Board held that employees do not have a statutory right to use the employer's e-
mail system for Section 7 purposes. The Board stated that “an employer may draw a line
between charitable solicitations, between solicitations of a personal nature—and solicitations for
the commercial sale of a product—and between business-related use and non-business related
use.” 351 at 1118. Therefore, an employer's policy prohibiting the use of a system for “non-job
related” purposes would not by itself violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Register-Guard involved
the disparate enforcement, not the maintenance, of an allegedly unlawful rule. The Respondent
argues that if an employer may permissibly disparately enforce such a rule it may also validly
maintain such a rule.
However, in Register-Guard the Board noted that employees had the full right to engage
in oral solicitation and distribution pursuant to Republic Aviation. As set forth above, here they
did not have that right. The question in Register-Guard, not present here, was whether the
employer could prohibit employees’ use of company equipment to engage in modern forms of
communication.
In addition, there is no evidence that the rule here was actually communicated to
employees in such a way as to convey intent clearly to permit solicitation in nonworking areas
when employees were not actively at work. Accordingly, the rule at issue here is overly broad
and discriminatory on its face.
Under the standard set forth in Lutheran Heritage, I find that the rule explicitly restricts
activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. The distribution of union literature is protected by
Section 7, and the rule impermissibly prohibits such distribution at all times on its premises. In
addition, I find that employees would reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity.
Thus, by labeling the Union a “business” engaged in “sell[ing] memberships,” employees would
reasonably believe that the rule prohibits the “commercial purpose” of selling memberships in
the union by the solicitation of membership and the distribution of literature on its premises.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that this rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I further find that employees would reasonably construe the language of the rule to
prohibit Section 7 activity. I accordingly find and conclude that the maintenance of the rule
would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
I further find that by showing its employees a video in which it was stated that “you can
rely on us to enforce all solicitation, distribution, and harassment policies” the Respondent
affirmed its intent to unlawfully enforce the impermissible no-solicitation, no-distribution rules
alleged in the complaint.
C. The “After Hours” Policy
The Handbook rule provides that “team members must leave the premises after hours.
You should only be on company property during your scheduled work hours or for other
authorized company business.”
In TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 333 NLRB 402 (2001), the Board found that a rule prohibiting
“unauthorized presence on the premises while off duty” violated the Act. It stated that “a no-
access rule for off-duty employees is valid only if it limits their access solely with respect to the
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interior of the plant premises and other working areas; it is clearly disseminated to all
employees; and it applies to off-duty employees seeking access to the plant for any purpose
and not just those employees engaging in union activity. In addition, a rule denying off-duty
employees access to parking lots, gates, and other outside nonworking areas is invalid unless
sufficiently justified by business reasons.” Tri-County Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976).
Similarly, in Lafayette Park Hotel, above at 828, the Board found that a rule requiring
employees to leave the premises immediately after the completion of their shift, and not return
until their next scheduled shift, violated the Act.
The Respondent’s rule broadly prohibits employees from being on its premises, which
has been defined as its building, grounds and parking lots, during their non-scheduled work
hours or for other authorized company business. It does not limit access to the interior of the
store as required by Tele Tech, above.
There was testimony that there have been various incidents, including crimes,
committed in the parking lot, but there was no evidence that any employees were involved in
such incidents. Accordingly, the Respondent has not established any business reason for
excluding employees from being in its parking lot during their off hours.
There was evidence that large numbers of employees routinely return to the store after
their work hours to shop, to engage in company functions, to pick up a pay check or visit the
human resources department. However, those instances where employees return to the store
after their work hours are consistent with the rule that permits them to be on the premises for
“authorized company business.”
The rule clearly would prohibit employee visits to the store’s parking lot to solicit co-
workers for membership in the Union, or to distribute literature in its behalf. Indeed, there was
evidence that employees who were not on work time engaged in such solicitation and
distribution in the parking lot.
The Respondent argues that the rule has not been enforced, citing testimony that
employees have engaged in solicitation and distribution in the parking lot while off duty.
However, although employees have engaged in such activities, nevertheless, the rule has been
maintained. I find that employees would reasonably construe the language of the rule to prohibit
Section 7 activity. I accordingly find and conclude that the maintenance of the “after hours”
would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
The Respondent cites its “visitors” rule as evidence that its “after hours” rule is lawful.
The “visitors” rule provides, in part, that “if you are not scheduled to work, please do not visit the
non-public areas of the store except for authorized company business such as picking up your
paycheck.”
I find that, inasmuch as the “visitors” rule permits off-duty employees to return to the
non-public parts of the store for authorized company business, it is essentially the same rule as
the “after hours” rule. However, although the “visitors” rule permits visits to the non-public areas
of the store, it is silent as to the public areas, including the parking lot. In contrast, the “after-
hours” rule requires employees to leave the “premises” after their work shift, and permits access
to the premises only during authorized company business. Thus, as stated above, the “after
hours” rule prohibits employees from being in the parking lot at times other than their working
hours or when they are engaged in authorized company business. Such a rule restricts the right
of employees to engage in union activities in the parking lot while they are off duty.
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I find that employees would reasonably construe the language of the rule to prohibit
Section 7 activity. I accordingly find and conclude that the maintenance of the rule would
reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
D. The “Parking Lot” Policy
I agree with the Respondent that the Parking Lot policy is clearly intended to ensure the
safety of the employees in the store’s parking lot. The rule provides, inter alia, that employees
should lock their car, and use the “buddy system.”
However, it also provides that if the employee sees people he does not know “loitering”
around the parking lot, the worker should notify a security guard or a supervisor immediately.
Although the rule is not primarily intended to limit employee access to the Respondent’s
non-work areas, it has that effect and it has been maintained. In Lutheran Heritage, above, at fn.
16, the Board found that the respondent’s “loitering rule” violated the Act since “employees
could reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit them from lingering on the respondent’s premises
after the end of a shift in order to engage in Sec. 7 activities, such as the discussion of
workplace concerns.”
Here, although the rule does not specifically prohibit “employees” from loitering, it
provides broadly that the worker should report anyone who he does not know who he sees
loitering in the lot. As set forth above, the fact that there are over 200 employees working in the
store with round the clock shifts, it is possible that not all the workers know each other.
According to the rule, an employee is required to report anyone, even a fellow worker who he
does not know, who is loitering in the parking lot.
I further find that the requirement that employees report to the asset protection
department or to their supervisor anyone who they do not know who is loitering in the parking
lot, violates the Act because it requires the workers to inform the Respondent of anyone who
might be engaging in union activities in the lot.
E. The “Dress Code” Policy
The Respondent’s dress code policy prohibits its employees from wearing various items
of clothing and “any buttons or logos on your clothing (unless approved by your team leader).”
In Republic Aviation, above, the Supreme Court held that employees have a protected
right to wear union buttons at work. This right has been extended to articles of clothing. Medco
Health Solutions of Las Vegas, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 25, slip op. at 10 (2011). This right is
balanced against the employer's right to maintain order, productivity and discipline. The Board
has struck this balance by permitting employers to prohibit employees from wearing union
insignia where “special circumstances” exist. 324 U.S. at 797-798. See Sam’s Club, 349 NLRB
1007, 1010 (2007). “The Board has found special circumstances justifying the proscription of
union insignia when its display may jeopardize employee safety, damage machinery or
products, exacerbate employee dissention, or unreasonably interfere with a public image which
the employer has established as part of its business plan, through appearance rules for its
employees.” United Parcel Service, 312 NLRB 596, 597 (1993). A rule based upon special
circumstances must be narrowly drawn to restrict the wearing of union insignia only in areas or
under circumstances which justify the rule. Sunland Construction Co., 307 NLRB 1036 (1992).
Customer exposure to insignia is not, by itself, a special circumstance, nor is the requirement
that an employee wear a uniform. United Parcel Service, above.
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The Respondent argues in its brief that because its established brand is “red and khaki”
which permits the employee to be identified as a team member, any button or logo which
detracts from that identification unreasonably interferes with its carefully crafted public image
and business plan of “red and khaki.” In Stabilus, Inc., 355 NLRB No. 161 (2010), the Board
stated that “an employer cannot avoid the “special circumstances” test simply by requiring its
employees to wear uniforms or other designated clothing, thereby precluding the wearing of
clothing bearing union insignia. The same would apply here. The ban on wearing union insignia
is complete and not limited to areas which would justify the rule. For example, the rule also
applies to the overnight employees who work when the store is closed to the public.
I find that the prohibition of all buttons or logos does not unreasonably interfere with the
Respondent’s public image, particularly since the Respondent has permitted employees to wear
pins and buttons of all kinds, including health-related and holiday appropriate pins. There has
been no showing that the wearing of any insignia would interfere with the Respondent’s “red
and khaki brand.”
In its brief, the Respondent asserts that it has demonstrated the ‘special circumstances’
permitting the prohibition of buttons or logos because “the display of any button or logo, not just
limited to union support, unreasonably interferes with Target’s carefully crafted public image and
business plan of ‘red and khaki.’” Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that employees
routinely wear pins showing their support for health-related causes, or in celebration of holidays,
on their uniforms.
The wearing of union insignia is protected by Section 7, and the Respondent’s rule
impermissibly prohibits the wearing of any buttons or logos at all times on its premises. Under
the standard set forth in Lutheran Heritage, I find that employees would reasonably construe the
language of the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity. I accordingly find and conclude that the
maintenance of the rule would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights. I accordingly find that this rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The fact that employees, according to the rule, had to obtain their supervisor’s approval,
is contrary to the freedom accorded to workers pursuant to Republic Aviation, above. As the
Board pointed out in Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795 (1987), any rule that requires
employees to secure permission from their employer as a precondition to engaging in protected
concerted activity on an employee's free time and in non-work areas is unlawful.
F. The Respondent’s Defenses to the Handbook Rules
In its brief, the Respondent argues that the Handbook rules were not known to the
employees, and it is “highly unlikely that employees have ever seen these policies in writing”
and thus it was as if they “did not exist.” I cannot agree. Each employee signed an “orientation
completion form” upon the completion of the orientation program which stated that the worker
“received and read” the Handbook. Further, the Handbook states that the employee should use
it “as a guide to find out about your training, pay, schedule and time off, as well as company
policies, guidelines and expectations.” In addition, supervisors and officials Bharat, Casolino,
Jones, Major, and Pena all testified that the no-solicitation no-distribution rules were in effect,
and stated their understanding of those rules.
The Respondent first argues that the rules set forth in the Handbooks are lawful. It
contends, further, that even if the rules are unlawful, they have not been enforced. In answer to
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the complaint’s allegations that the mere maintenance of the rules, even without evidence that
they were enforced, violates the Act, the Respondent asserts that maintenance of an unlawful
rule does not constitute a violation of the Act.
I do not agree. As set forth above, the rules discussed above are invalid because they
reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, and employees
would reasonably construe their language to prohibit Section 7 activity. Lutheran Heritage,
above.
The Respondent further argues that the rules were not enforced, or were loosely
enforced, blaming its “poor leadership” at the store. The Respondent’s officials and supervisors
testified that the Handbook rules were “loosely enforced” or not enforced at all. For example,
executive team leader Stone stated that her job is to enforce the Employer’s policies, however
she noted that the Handbook served as a “loose guide” or “template” to the Employer’s policies.
Similarly, executive team leader Michael Casolino stated that it is his job to “loosely enforce” the
Handbook’s guidelines, which are not followed “line by line.”
However, Casolino conceded that he was not instructed in writing or orally by Pena to
loosely enforce the guidelines, or not to enforce the dress code, and he was not aware of any
changes to the Handbook’s policies as written. He similarly did not issue anything in writing to
the workers advising that the Handbook’s rules were only loosely enforced.
The Respondent’s human resources official Dawn Major denied that some policies are
not enforced. She stated that the administration looks at each situation to determine the facts
and the course of action required on a case-by-case basis, stating that the guidelines are just
guidelines. Major was not aware of any of the rules in the Handbook being changed or
rescinded prior to the election. Pena testified that the Respondent’s headquarters did not tell her
not to follow the Handbook’s policies, adding that “we just don’t enforce every single policy
maybe as well as we should have.”
The Respondent argues that the rules were not enforced, relying on testimony in which
employees solicited other workers to join the union, distributed union literature, freely discussed
their wages with each other, returned to the facility when they were not on duty in order to shop
and perform other activities, and wore pins, shirts with logos and union bracelets in apparent
violation of the dress code. The Respondent argues that this evidence excuses it from a finding
of violation for maintaining unlawful rules.9
Despite such testimony of “loose enforcement” of the rules, there was evidence that the
rules were, indeed, enforced. Thus, at one of the Employer meetings, an actor in the video
shown to employees stated that “you can rely on us to enforce all solicitation, distribution, and
harassment policies.” Further, Handbook, page 44, asks employees to “please follow and help
enforce the Target No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy.” In addition, asset protection
supervisor Jones stated that it is his job to enforce the Employer’s no-solicitation no-distribution
polices in the Target building itself, its property and parking lots.
Further, as set forth above, I have credited employees Green and Williams’ testimony
that they were told that they could not solicit on Target’s property. Accordingly, I find that the

9 The Union’s request that I reconsider my ruling permitting the Respondent to adduce
evidence that employees engaged in union activities in apparent contravention of the rules,
including my receipt in evidence of union campaign literature, is denied.
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rules against solicitation and distribution were, in fact, enforced.
However, even if the rules were not enforced, the Respondent remains responsible for
their maintenance. A rule is unlawful even if not enforced. Radisson Place Minneapolis, 307
NLRB 94, 94 (1992). The D.C. Circuit in Cintas, above, dealt with the arguments that the
Respondent raises, finding that even though there was no evidence that any employee actually
interpreted the rules to prohibit their lawful discussion of Section 7 matters, “no such evidence is
required to support the Board’s conclusion that the rule is overly broad and thus unlawful. The
Board is merely required to determine whether employees would reasonably construe the
[disputed] language to prohibit Section 7 activity.” The court also answered the employer’s
argument that it never applied the rules in the manner asserted by the union. It stated that “the
mere maintenance of a rule likely to chill Section 7 activity, whether explicitly or through
reasonable interpretation, can amount to an unfair labor practice ‘even absent evidence of
enforcement.’ If the Board concludes that employees would reasonably construe the company’s
confidentiality language to restrict discussion of their wages and other terms and conditions of
employment with each other, the Board is under no obligation to consider whether the disputed
restriction has ever been enforced against employees exercising their section 7 rights.” 482
F.3d at 467-468.
There is no evidence that any employee has been disciplined for acting in contravention
of these rules. However, there is also no evidence that the rules have been rescinded, that store
management has been given permission to loosely enforce or not enforce those rules, or that
the workers have been told that they are not bound by those rules. Accordingly, the rules remain
in effect and have been maintained. As alleged in the complaint, the maintenance of the rules
violates the Act even if they have not been enforced.
III. The Representation Case
A. The Objections to the Election
1. Relevant Principles
When an objection is filed asserting that the “laboratory conditions” of an election were
violated by a party to an election, the decisional standard is whether “the conduct reasonably
tends to interfere with the employees’ free and uncoerced choice in the election. Baja’s Place,
Inc., 268 NLRB 868, 868 (1984). As the objecting party, the union has the burden of proving
interference with the election. See Jensen Pre-Cast, 290 NLRB 547 (1988). The test, an
objective one, is whether the employer’s conduct has the tendency to interfere with the
employees’ freedom of choice. See Taylor Wharton Division, 336 NLRB 157, 158 (2001).
2. Conclusions as to the Representation Case
The Report on Objections directed that the following objections, set forth in Objections
Nos. 1(a) through (e); 1(g), 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 be merged with the complaint. They include
the Respondent’s access policy; the dress code policy; the no distribution no solicitation policy;
the information security policy and the social media policy which prohibit the discussion by
employees of their terms and conditions of employment with others; the rule which requires
employees to report co-workers’ union activity; threats of unspecified reprisals; creation of the
impression of surveillance; the announcement and enforcement of an overly broad no
solicitation policy; interrogation of employees; and threats to close the store.
In Dal-Tex Optical Co., above, the Board held that Section 8(a)(1) conduct occurring
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during the critical period is “a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and
untrammeled choice in an election.” However, the Board noted that an exception to that rule
does not require the setting aside of an election where the “conduct is so minimal or isolated
that it is virtually impossible to conclude that the misconduct could have affected the election
results.”
The Respondent, citing Longs Drug Stores California, 347 NLRB 500, 501(2006), and
Delta Brands, Inc., 344 NLRB 252, 253 (2005), argues that the election should not be set aside
even if the Handbook’s confidentiality rules are found to be unfair labor practices.
In Longs, the Board held that the maintenance of a handbook provision that considered
employee wage rates to be confidential information which must not be disclosed, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board nevertheless did not find that the election’s results should
be overturned. In refusing to overrule the election results, the Board stated that the
confidentiality provisions were not adopted in response to the union’s’ organizing campaign, the
handbook at issue was only distributed to five unit employees, there was no evidence that the
employer called employees’ attention to other confidentiality provisions in the handbook, and
there was no evidence that those provisions were ever enforced. Rather, there was evidence
that employees openly discussed wages and other terms and conditions of employment during
the critical period, and the election was lost by a wide margin. The Board concluded that it was
impossible to conclude that the confidentiality provisions could have had an effect on the results
of the election.
Similarly, in Delta Brands and Safeway, Inc., 338 NLRB 525 (2002), the Board held that
the mere maintenance of an invalid rule was not sufficient to overturn the election results.
However, in Jurys Boston Hotel, 356 NLRB No. 114 (2011), a representation case, the
Board held that “the mere maintenance of an overbroad rule can affect the election results
because employees could reasonably construe the provision as a directive from their employer
that they refrain from engaging in permissible Section 7 activity.” Pacific Beach Hotel, 342 NLRB
372, 373-374 (2004) (setting aside election, based on a handbook policy prohibiting solicitation
on company property), citing Freund Baking, 336 NLRB 847 fn. 5 (2001). The Board noted, in
Jurys Boston, that, neither in Delta Brands or in Safeway, did the Board hold that objecting
parties in all cases must prove than an objectively overbroad rule was enforced or that it actually
deterred employees from engaging in Section 7 activity.” S.T.A.R., Inc., 347 NLRB 82, 84 fn. 7
(2006).
In Jurys Boston, the Board found that three of the Employer's handbook rules - no
solicitation or distribution on hotel property, the prohibition against being in an unauthorized
area and/or loitering inside or around the hotel without permission, and the rule prohibiting the
wearing of emblems, badges, and buttons—were objectionable since they reasonably tended to
interfere with employee free choice. The Board held that those rules had a reasonable tendency
to chill or otherwise interfere with the prounion campaign activities of employees during the
election period, and could reasonably be construed by employees as precluding them from
communicating with each other about the Union and their wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment at their workplace, “the one place where [employees] clearly share
common interests and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters
affecting their union organizational life and other matters related to their status as employees.”
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978), quoting Gale Products, 142 NLRB 1246, 1249
(1963).
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In answer to the Respondent’s argument that in Jurys Boston the union lost the election
by only one vote, and that here the Union lost the election by a wide margin, the Board noted in
Freund Baking, fn. 5, above, that although the margin of victory in that case was substantial,
“the objectionable conduct affected all the employees in the unit because the employer required
each employee to receive and review a handbook. In these circumstances, we find that the
employer’s objectionable conduct may have directly accounted for the petitioner’s margin of
defeat. In any event, the Board has consistently held that whether an election should be
invalidated based on alleged misconduct does not turn on election results but rather upon an
analysis of the character and circumstances of the alleged objectionable conduct.”
As set forth above, In the video shown to employees, the Employer stated that it would
enforce its no-solicitation no-distribution rules, and such rules were enforced against employees
Green and Williams. Even assuming that the Handbook rules were not enforced, nevertheless,
they were maintained, they were not rescinded, and employees, who certified that they received
and read the Handbook, were not told that they were not bound by them.
In addition, the objectionable conduct was disseminated to the entire bargaining unit by
the distribution to all employees upon their hire the Handbook containing the unlawful rules, the
advice in the Handbook that they “follow and help enforce the Target No Solicitation/No
Distribution Policy,” and by the video that they were shown which warned employees that “you
can rely on us to enforce all solicitation, distribution, and harassment policies.”
Inasmuch as I have found that all the objectionable conduct set forth above constitute
unfair labor practices, I recommend that those objections be sustained. Dal-Tex Optical Co.,
137 NLRB 1782, 1786-1787 (1962), I will therefore recommend that the election held on June
17 be set aside, and that the representation proceeding be remanded to the Regional Director
for the purpose of conducting a second election.
Conclusions of Law
1. By, in its Team Member Handbook, revised in July, 2009, promulgating and since
then maintaining the following rules, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
a. In its Team member Handbook, revised in July, 2009, by promulgating and
since then maintaining, the following rules:
i. A no-distribution rule that prohibits its employees from distributing any
literature at any time on Respondent’s premises, which includes non-work areas;
ii. A “Use technology Appropriately” policy prohibiting its employees from
releasing confidential guest, team member, or company information;
iii. A. “Communicating Confidential Information” policy which prohibits its
employees from sharing confidential information with other employees; directs its employees to
talk to their supervisors if they are unsure regarding sharing confidential information; and
prohibits its employees from having discussions regarding confidential information in the
breakroom, at home or in open areas and public places.
b. An “Unauthorized access to confidential information” policy which directs its
employees to report unauthorized access to confidential information or misuse of confidential
information to the Respondent; and threatens its employees with corrective action, including
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termination and criminal prosecution, for a violation of the policy on confidential information.
2. By, in its Team Member Handbook, revised in July, 2009 and February, 2011,
promulgating and since then maintaining the following rules, the Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
a. An “After Hours” rule prohibiting its employees from returning to its premises,
which includes non-work areas, during their off hours.
b. A No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy prohibiting solicitation or distribution of
literature by its employees, at all times on Respondent’s premises, which includes non-work
areas;
c. A “Dress Code” policy prohibiting its employees while at work from wearing
any buttons or logos on their clothing unless approved by a team leader.
d. A Parking Lot policy directing its employees to report anyone they do not know
who is loitering in Respondent’s parking lot.
3. By threatening employees with discipline for engaging in activities on behalf of the
Union, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By distributing a leaflet to its employees in which it threatened its employees that its
Valley Stream facility would close if employees chose the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By showing its employees a video which states that Respondent will enforce its
solicitation and distribution policies, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By enforcing its no-solicitation policy by directing its employees not to solicit for the
Union on Respondent’s property, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By interrogating its employees regarding their activities on behalf of the Union, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The Respondent has not violated the Act, as set forth in paragraphs 14(a) and 14(b)
of the complaint, by threatening its employees that the Valley Stream store would close if they
chose the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
9. The Respondent has not violated the Act, as set forth in paragraph 18 of the
complaint, by threatening its employees that if they chose the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative and there was a strike, Respondent’s Valley Stream facility would
close.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Inasmuch as I have found the Respondent has maintained unlawful rules in its
Handbook, I shall recommend that it be ordered to rescind those rules, remove them from the
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Team Member Handbook, and advise its employees in writing that these rules are no longer
being maintained or enforced.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Target Corporation, Valley Stream, NY, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and enforcing the following rules in its Team Member Handbook:
A no-distribution rule that prohibits its employees from distributing any literature at any
time on its Valley Stream premises, which includes non-work areas.
A “Use Technology Appropriately” policy prohibiting its employees from releasing
confidential guest, team member, or company information.
A “Communicating Confidential Information” policy which prohibits its employees from
sharing confidential information with other employees; directs its employees to talk to their
supervisors if they are unsure regarding sharing confidential information; and prohibits its
employees from having discussions regarding confidential information in the breakroom, at
home or in open areas and public places.
An “Unauthorized access to confidential information” policy which directs its employees
to report unauthorized access to confidential information or misuse of confidential information to
the Respondent; and threatens its employees with corrective action, including termination and
criminal prosecution, for a violation of the policy on confidential information.
An “After Hours” rule prohibiting its employees from returning to its premises, which
includes non-work areas, during their off hours.
A No Solicitation/No Distribution Policy prohibiting solicitation or distribution of literature
by its employees, at all times at the Valley Stream facility and premises, which includes non-
work areas.
A “Dress Code” policy prohibiting its employees while at work from wearing any buttons
or logos on their clothing unless approved by a team leader.
A Parking Lot policy directing its employees to report anyone they do not know who is
loitering in its Valley Stream parking lot.
(b)Threatening employees with discipline for engaging in activities on behalf of the

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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Union.
(c) Distributing leaflets to its employees in which it threatened its employees that its
Valley Stream facility would close if employees chose the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative.
(d) Showing its employees a video which states that it will enforce its solicitation and
distribution policies.
(e) Enforcing its no-solicitation policy by directing its employees not to solicit for the
Union on its property.
(f) Interrogating its employees regarding their activities on behalf of the Union.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rules set forth above, remove them from the Team Member Handbook,
and advise its employees in writing that the rules are no longer being maintained or enforced.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Valley Stream, NY,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
March 1, 2011.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
(d) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case No. 29-RC-12058 is severed from the
consolidated complaint cases, that the election conducted therein is set aside, and that Case
29-CA-12058 is remanded to the Regional Director for Region 29 to conduct a second election.
A second election by secret ballot shall be held among the employees in the unit found
appropriate, whenever the Regional Director deems appropriate. The Regional Director shall
direct and supervise the election, subject to the Board's Rules and Regulations. Eligible to vote
are those employed during the payroll period ending immediately before the date of the Notice
of Second Election, including employees who did not work during that period because they were

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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ill, on vacation, or temporarily laid off. Also eligible are employees engaged in an economic
strike that began less than 12 months before the election date and who retained their employee
status during the eligibility period and their replacements. Those in the military services may
vote if they appear in person at the polls. Ineligible to vote are employees who have quit or been
discharged for cause since the payroll period, striking employees who have been discharged for
cause since the strike began and who have not been rehired or reinstated before the election
date, and employees engaged in an economic strike that began more than 12 months before
the election date and who have been permanently replaced. Those eligible shall vote whether
they desire to be represented for collective bargaining by the United Food and Commercial
Workers Local 1500. To ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to be informed of the
issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all parties to the election should have
access to a list of voters and their addresses that may be used to communicate with them.
Excelsior Underwear, 156 NLRB 1236 (1966); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969). Accordingly, it is directed that an eligibility list containing the full names and addresses
of all the eligible voters must be filed by the Employer with the Regional Director within 7 days
from the date of the Notice of Second Election. North Macon Health Care Facility, 315 NLRB
359 (1994). The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election. No
extension of time to file the list shall be granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary
circumstances. Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the
election whenever proper objections are filed.
Dated, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2012.
____________________
Steven Davis
Administrative Law Judge
JD(NY)-16-12
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce the following rules in our Team Member Handbook:
A no-distribution rule that prohibits you from distributing any literature at any time on our
Valley Stream premises, which includes non-work areas.
A “Use Technology Appropriately” policy prohibiting you from releasing confidential
guest, team member, or company information.
A “Communicating Confidential Information” policy which prohibits you from sharing
confidential information with other employees; directs you to talk to your supervisors if you are
unsure regarding sharing confidential information; and prohibits you from having discussions
regarding confidential information in the breakroom, at home or in open areas and public places.
An “Unauthorized access to confidential information” policy which directs you to report
unauthorized access to confidential information or misuse of confidential information to the
Respondent; and threatens its employees with corrective action, including termination and
criminal prosecution, for a violation of the policy on confidential information.
An “After Hours” rule prohibiting you from returning to our premises, which includes non-
work areas, during your off hours.
A no solicitation/no distribution policy prohibiting solicitation or distribution of literature by
you, at all times at the Valley Stream facility and premises, which includes non-work areas;
A “Dress Code” policy prohibiting you while at work from wearing any buttons or logos
on your clothing unless approved by a team leader.
A Parking Lot policy directing you to report anyone you do not know who is loitering in
our Valley Stream parking lot.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discipline for engaging in activities on behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT give you leaflets in which we threaten you that our Valley Stream facility would
close if you choose the Union as your collective-bargaining representative.
JD(NY)-16-12
WE WILL NOT show you a video which states that we will enforce our unlawful solicitation and
distribution policies.
WE WILL NOT enforce our no-solicitation policy by directing you not to solicit for the Union on
our property.
WE WILL NOT question you about your activities on behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the unlawful rules set forth above, remove them from the Team Member
Handbook, and advise you in writing that the rules are no longer being maintained or enforced.
TARGET CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
One MetroTech Center (North), Jay Street and Myrtle Avenue, 10th Floor
Brooklyn, New York 11201-4201
Hours: 9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
718-330-7713.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 718-330-2862.