Target Brands, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 13, 2020

2020004447 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/712,878 09/22/2017 Adam M. Laskowitz 201702575 1220
67260 7590 11/13/2020
TARGET BRANDS, INC.
1000 NICOLLET MALL, TPS-3165
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55403
EXAMINER
YANG, ELISA H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/13/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO.MAIL@TARGET.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ADAM M. LASKOWITZ, AADIL RHAZI,
YESHWANTH M. GOWDA, CHRISTIAN P. KNUETTER,
FAITH J. HUTCHINSON, PATRICIA S. ADLER, and
MATTHIAS C. MARGUSH
____________

Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed January 20, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed
February 14, 2020) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September
23, 2019). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Target Brands,
Inc.” Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

2
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims generally relate to “[a]n auto replenishment system
[that] includes an auto replenishment service.” Spec. ¶ 4.
Claims 1, 9, and 17 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, with bracketed matter, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. An auto replenishment system comprising:
[a] a smart consumer device configured to use a
consumable and provide consumption events related to the use
of the consumable, wherein the smart consumer device is a type
of a plurality of smart consumer device types and wherein the
consumption events are categorized as non-deterministic, semi-
deterministic or deterministic;
[b] an auto replenishment service that registers the smart
consumer device with an account holder and is in Internet
communication with the smart consumer device to monitor
consumption of the consumable by the smart consumer device
for the account holder, wherein the auto replenishment service is
configured to receive and process consumption events from any
of the plurality of smart consumer device types and any of the
categories of consumption events including nondeterministic,
semi-deterministic and deterministic events to automatically
request orders for the consumable on behalf of the account holder
from a retail fulfillment service over the Internet, the auto
replenishment service comprises:
[c] an event processor that recalculates a remaining
amount of the consumable associated with the registered smart
consumer device based on the consumption events received from
the smart consumer device;
[d] a prediction engine configured to run on one or more
computers or servers and configured to determine, based on
historical use of the consumable by the smart consumer device,
based on the remaining amount of the consumable determined by
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

3
the event processor and based on the category of the consumption
event including the categories of non-deterministic, semi-
deterministic or deterministic, whether the consumable needs to
be restocked; and
[e] an order management component that is configured to
run on one or more computers or servers and is configured to
send a notification to the retail fulfillment service requesting a
reorder of the consumable for the smart consumer device.

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
2. Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite
for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
that the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1–20 as a group. Appeal Br. 6–11. We
select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or
fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

4
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

5
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

6
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:

2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, “[a] claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 54.
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

7
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and
Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54, the
Examiner determines that exemplary independent claim 1 broadly “recite[s]
the concept of facilitating the replenishment of a consumable.” Final Act. 6.
More particularly, the Examiner identifies that:
claim 1 recites at least the following limitations that are believed
to recite an abstract idea:
 using a consumable and providing consumption events
related to the use of the consumable, wherein the
consumption events are categorized as non-deterministic,
semi-deterministic or deterministic;
 a replenishment service that registers an account holder
and monitors consumption of the consumable for the
account holder, wherein the replenishment service
receives and processes consumption events from any of
the categories of consumption events including non-
deterministic, semi-deterministic and deterministic events
to request orders for the consumable on behalf of the
account holder from a retail fulfillment service and
comprises:
o recalculating a remaining amount of the
consumable based on the consumption events
received;
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

8
o determining, based on historical use of the
consumable, based on the remaining amount of
consumable determined and based on the category
of consumption event including the category of
non-deterministic, semideterministic or
deterministic, whether the consumable needs to be
restocked; and
o sending a notification to the retail fulfillment
service requesting a reorder of the consumable.
Id. at 4–5. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner determines that
independent claim 1 falls under the category of “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity,” and more specifically determines that claim 1
“recite[s] commercial interactions (including sales activities/behaviors).” Id.
at 5; Reply Br. 3; see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
In response, Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in identifying
claim 1 as falling under the category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing
human activity” because the limitations of claim 1 are not properly
considered to be “commercial actions.” Appeal Br. 6–8. Instead, Appellant
argues that claim 1 relates to the “technological field of smart consumable
devices” (id. at 7), and the limitations recited by claim 1 “are all in service to
making a determination if an account holder or user of a consumable and
smart consumer device needs more consumable to consume and so they need
not keep track of the correct amount of consumable to have on hand.” Id.
at 8.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that
independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

9
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks
whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In making this determination, we note that the Specification is titled
“AUTO REPLENISHMENT OF CONSUMABLES FOR SMART
DEVICES,” and states that the disclosure generally relates to “[a]n auto
replenishment system [that] includes an auto replenishment service.” Spec.
¶ 4. According to the Specification,
[s]mart devices can be sensed and controlled remotely across
existing network infrastructure using an associated application
(i.e., an app) downloaded on a mobile device and, thereby,
creating opportunities for the integration of the physical world
with computing systems and resulting in improved efficiency,
accuracy and economic benefit. Oftentimes smart devices use
consumables, which need to be replenished over time.
Id. ¶ 2. In this context, the claimed invention provides auto replenishment
service that monitors the consumption of consumables by the smart device
for an account holder determines whether the consumable needs to be
reordered. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23, 30, 40–45.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 1 recites “[a]n auto
replenishment system” comprising “a smart consumer device,” “an auto
replenishment service,” “an event processor,” “a prediction engine,” and “an
order management component.” The system includes processes that
(1) “receive and process consumption events” from a consumer’s device
(limitations [a] and [b]), (2) calculate a remaining amount of the consumable
based on the received consumption event (limitation [c]); (3) determine
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

10
whether the consumable needs to be restocked based on historical usage, the
amount remaining, the category of the consumption event (limitation [d]);
and (4) send requests for reorder. In other words, independent claim 1
recites a “replenishment system” that reorders a consumable by receiving,
calculating, determining, and sending data.
Upon reviewing the Specification and independent claim 1, as
summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 1
recites broadly “the concept of facilitating the replenishment of a
consumable” (Final Act. 5), which can be characterized as a certain method
of organizing human activity. “[F]acilitating the replenishment of a
consumable” is similar to the concepts of “graphing (or displaying) bids and
offers to assist a trader to make an order” in Trading Technologies
International, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(“Trading Techs. I”), of “providing information to traders in a way that helps
them process information more quickly” in Trading Technologies
International, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(“Trading Techs. II”), of “entering, transmitting, locating, compressing,
storing, and displaying data (including text and image data) to facilitate the
buying and selling of items” in Voit Technologies, LLC v. Del-Ton, Inc., 757
F. App’x 1000, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and of customizing information based
on known user information and navigation data in Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Therefore, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, independent claim 1
falls under the category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity”
including commercial interactions in the form of “contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

11
relations” (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52), and thus an
abstract idea.
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance
and determine whether the claim integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the judicial exception. Here we look to see if,
for example, any additional elements of the claim (i) reflect an improvement
in the functioning of a computer or to another technological field,
(ii) implement the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine,
(iii) effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing, or (iv) use the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55;
see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, the additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract
idea are “an auto replenishment system,” “a smart consumer device,” “a
processor,” “an engine” and “a component.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner
finds that these “additional elements are described at a high level in
Applicant’s [S]pecification without any meaningful detail about their
structure or configuration” and concludes that “these computer-related
limitations are not found to be sufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application.” Id.
In response, Appellant argues that the identified elements “recite
meaningful detail about their structure or configuration and are sufficient to
integrate the claims into a practical application.” Appeal Br. 8. However,
we agree with the Examiner that the additional elements are recited at a high
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

12
level of generality and described in the Specification as generic computer
components. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant
direct us to any indication (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 3–4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22–25,
32–34, 41–43, Figs. 1, 2)) that the operations recited in claim 1 require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, invoke any assertedly inventive programming, or
that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Appellant argues that “the elements provide detail[s] that improve a
technology, but also improve[ ] the functioning of, efficiency of and
accuracy of a computer or computer network in making predictions on when
a consumable needs to be restocked.” Appeal Br. 10. The difficulty with
Appellant’s position, however, is that these are not technological
improvements or improvements to a technological area. The alleged
improvement lies in the abstract idea itself, not to any technological
improvement. See BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2018). And, as discussed above, there is no further
description of a particular technological manner for performing the steps.
Appellant argues that
these elements focus on addressing the problems arising from a
replenishment service that receives different types of
consumption events and consumption data from a plurality of
different third party smart consumer devices that may or may not
be informative and yet still being able to make accurate
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

13
predictions of use and when consumables need to be replenished
for each user of a smart consumer device.
Appeal Br. 9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 21, 28). However, other than asserting that the
replenishment service receives different types of data “that may or not be
informative” “to make accurate predictions of use,” Appellant does not
direct our attention to anything in the Specification to indicate that the
invention provides a technical improvement in associating data or
calculating predictions similar to the improvement in “the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory” in Enfish (822 F.3d at 1339) or in a
physical or logical technological structure. Any improvement in “mak[ing]
accurate predictions of use and when consumables need to be replenished for
each user of a smart consumer device” (Appeal Br. 9) is not a technical or
technological improvement; but rather a business improvement. Cf. OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(holding that claims are directed to “the abstract idea of offer-based price
optimization”); Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336 (focusing on whether the claim is
“an improvement to [the] computer functionality itself, not on economic or
other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity”).
Based on the above, we conclude that independent claim 1 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional elements recited in the claim are no more than generic
components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they
do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is
not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

14
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that
independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or
combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in
the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, we find supported the Examiner’s determination that the
limitations of claim 1, taken individually and as an ordered combination, do
not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Final Act. 6–8;
see also Reply Br. 6 (“The examiner indicated that use of a computer or
other machinery in its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to
receive, store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer
or computer components after the fact to an abstract idea does not provide
significantly more.”); Cf. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer
required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic
function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not
impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”); buySAFE, Inc. v.
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

15
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer
receives and sends the information over a network — with no further
specification — is not even arguably inventive.”).
To the extent Appellant maintains that the claimed invention is patent
eligible, i.e., that claim 1 amounts to “significantly more” than an abstract
idea, because “the evidence, alone or in combination, neither anticipate,
reasonably teach, nor render obvious claims 1–20 and contain allowable
subject matter” (Appeal Br. 11), Appellant misapprehends the controlling
precedent.
Neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness determination
automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is
patent eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is
termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation
of novelty or non-obviousness, but, rather, a search for “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non-obvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of
any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
Appeal 2020-004447
Application 15/712,878

16
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and claims 2–20,
which fall with independent claim 1.
Indefiniteness
Claim 2
The Examiner rejects claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) because
“[c]laim 2 recites the limitation ‘the additional amount of the consumable’
(see line 5) which lacks sufficient antecedent basis.” Final Act. 3.
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b). See generally Appeal Br.
Therefore, the rejection is summarily sustained.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
2 112(b) Indefiniteness 2
Overall
Outcome
1–20
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED