01961614
12-15-1999
Tammera Schrahl, Complainant, v. Togo D. West, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
Tammera Schrahl, )
Complainant, )
v. ) Appeal No. 01961614
) Agency No. 94-1795
Togo D. West, ) Hearing No. 350-95-8018X
Secretary, )
Department of Veterans Affairs, )
Agency. )
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal to this Commission from a final
agency decision ("FAD") concerning her complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant
to the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.
The issue presented is the amount of compensatory damages which should
be awarded to complainant in light of the agency's finding that she was
subjected to sexual harassment. The agency accepted the EEO complaint
filed by complainant and complied with all procedural prerequisites.
Pursuant to complainant's request, the complaint was heard before an
EEOC Administrative Judge ("AJ"). After the hearing, the AJ issued a
recommended decision ("RD") finding discrimination.
Specifically, the AJ found that from December 12, 1993, to March 20,
1994, complainant was under the direct supervision of a male Health
Aide Supervisor (the "Supervisor"). On January 1, 1994, the Supervisor
sexually harassed one of complainant's coworkers when he took her into a
vacant office, put his arms around her, tried to kiss her and told her he
wanted to make love. The coworker refused and reported the incident in
early February 1994. The Supervisor denied the incident and the Chief
of Human Resources Management told the coworker that it was her word
against the Supervisor's word. The agency issued a memorandum to the
Supervisor telling him that he had been accused of sexual harassment and
reiterating the agency's zero tolerance policy on sexual harassment.
Shortly thereafter, the Supervisor was temporarily promoted to the
position of Housekeeping Aide Foreman of a different shift. Accordingly,
he was no longer complainant's (or the coworker's) immediate supervisor.
When told of this, the coworker chose not to pursue her complaint.
On March 28, 1994, the Supervisor approached complainant in the workplace
and stated: "You have nice t-ts, but I'm going to have to put a bag
over your head to [expletive deleted] you." After this statement,
complainant began to cry. She was shocked, upset and had nightmares for
about a week. After she complained about the incident, the Supervisor
denied it and complainant was also told that it was her word against the
Supervisor's word. The agency determined that the charge could not be
substantiated or corroborated and did nothing further at that time.
On April 1, 1994, the Supervisor made lewd and vulgar comments to a third
health aide. When she complained, her supervisor told her she would have
to pursue the matter because he could not. In October 1994, this aide
complained of another incident of sexual harassment by the Supervisor.
After this complaint, an investigation was conducted and a Board of
Inquiry convened to investigate the charges of sexual harassment against
the Supervisor. After the investigation, which complainant participated
in, the Supervisor was removed from Federal employment in April 1995.
The AJ held that complainant established that she had been subjected to
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. See Meritor Savings Bank
F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. � 1614.11(a).<1> The AJ was not persuaded
by complainant's allegation that the Supervisor had subjected her to
continuing and ongoing harassment by such matters as "undressing her
with his eyes," and instead found that she had been subjected to
only the single incident described above. Nonetheless, the AJ found
that this single incident was unusually severe, involving conduct
so extremely offensive that it would embarrass, humiliate, shock and
upset any reasonable person to the extent that her working conditions
would be changed and she would find working in the presence of such a
person intolerable. Accordingly, the AJ concluded that the incident
was sufficiently severe as to constitute harassment in violation of
Title VII. The AJ further found that the agency had failed to take
immediate and appropriate action to correct the harassing behavior or
to prevent it from recurring. The AJ noted that the agency's actions
consisted of promoting the Supervisor and that the complaints were not
taken seriously and investigated until the fourth incident was reported
in October 1994. The AJ found that the agency was unable to avoid
liability for the Supervisor's actions, as there was no showing that:
(1) the acts or conduct complained of did not occur; (2) the acts or
conduct complained of were not unwelcome; (3) the harassment was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment;
(4) immediate and appropriate corrective action was taken as soon as
the employer was put on notice; or (5) there was no basis for imputing
liability to the employer. See Meritor, supra.
As relief, the AJ recommended that the agency: (1) post a notice at the
applicable facility; (2) determine the appropriateness of maintaining
a permanent record of these findings for purpose of taking appropriate
personnel action against the Supervisor should he ever return or seek
to return to Federal employment; (3) review the matters giving rise to
the complaint to determine the appropriateness of taking disciplinary
action against the agency officials who failed to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action once they were placed on notice of the
Supervisor's harassing behavior; (4) take all appropriate actions to
ensure that neither complainant nor any other employee is retaliated
against for participating in this or any other EEO proceeding or opposing
unlawful employment discrimination; (5) train employees on the law
regarding sexual harassment in the workplace and the unacceptableness
of harassing behavior, whether verbal or physical; (6) conduct training
for all supervisory and managerial employees, for all persons involved
in employee relations, and for all persons involved in receiving,
investigating and processing complaints of sexual harassment at the
applicable facility, including all currently employed persons who were
in supervisory, managerial, employee relations, or EEO positions at
the facility in 1994; and (7) pay compensatory damages to complainant,
including damages for the emotional distress she suffered during the
week following the harassment incident of March 28, 1994.
With respect to pecuniary compensatory damages, the AJ reviewed
complainant's evidence and determined that there was no evidence to
support complainant's claims for such damages, and recommended against an
award of any past or future pecuniary compensatory damages. With respect
to nonpecuniary compensatory damages, the AJ found that complainant was
entitled to an award of such damages, but did not recommend a specific
amount. The AJ noted that the amount should be limited to the sum
necessary to compensate complainant for the actual harm caused by the
discrimination. The AJ found credible complainant's testimony that in
addition to crying after the incident, she had nightmares and replayed the
incident in her mind for a week. While complainant also testified that
she continued to experience headaches and other stress-related symptoms
as a result of the harassment, the AJ found that "most of her reported
emotional distress and related symptoms after the first week after the
harassment occurred stemmed from factors other than the harassment."
In its FAD, the agency adopted the RD with the following modifications:
(1) the facility was directed to notify the Supervisor in the event
that it decided to maintain a permanent record of the findings; (2)
the training recommended in the AJ's fifth recommendation was clarified
as pertaining to employees in the facility's Environment Management
Services; (3) the training recommended in the AJ's sixth recommendation
was clarified as pertaining to employees in the facility's Environment
Management Services, Supervisors in the Personnel Service and EEO Managers
or Specialists. In addition, the agency specified an award of $500.00
in compensatory damages.
On appeal, complainant's representative complains about the agency's
conduct during the processing of the complaint, but states that
complainant "will agree to resolve this issue if they ... modify
the nonpecuniary damages to $2,000 for Doctor's bills and for pain
and suffering," citing complainant's severe trauma and nightmares.
The representative further states that complainant has filed a second
EEO complaint alleging reprisal. In a letter subsequently sent by
complainant, she refers to a subsequent complaint and an appeal to the
Merit Systems Protection Board.
Legal Standards for Awarding Compensatory Damages
Section 102(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act ("CRA") authorizes an
award of compensatory damages for all post-Act pecuniary losses, and
for nonpecuniary losses, such as, but not limited to, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
injury to character and reputation, and loss of health. In West
v. Gibson, 119 S.Ct. 1906 (1999), the United States Supreme Court
found that Congress afforded the Commission the authority to award such
damages in the administrative process. The CRA authorizes an award of
compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for discrimination.
Section 1981a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory damages
that may be awarded each complaining party for future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, according to
the number of individuals employed by the respondent. The limit for a
respondent who has more than 500 employees is $300,000.
To receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant must
demonstrate that s/he has been harmed as a result of the agency's
discriminatory action; the extent, nature and severity of the harm; and
the duration or expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994), request for
reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995);
Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288
(April 18, 1996). Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002
at 11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992).
The Commission's July 1992 notice set forth guidelines for use in
establishing entitlement to compensatory damages. See id. at 8-14.
Such damages may be awarded for past pecuniary losses, future pecuniary
losses, and nonpecuniary losses directly or proximately caused by the
agency's discriminatory conduct. Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket
expenses incurred as a result of the employer's unlawful action,
including job-hunting expenses, moving expenses, medical expenses,
psychiatric expenses, physical therapy expenses, and other quantifiable
out-of-pocket expenses. Past pecuniary losses are pecuniary losses
that are incurred prior to the resolution of a complaint via a finding
of discrimination, the issuance of a full-relief offer, or a voluntary
settlement. Future pecuniary losses are losses that are likely to occur
after resolution of a complaint. Nonpecuniary losses are losses that
are not subject to precise quantification including emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation,
injury to credit standing, and loss of health.
"[C]ompensatory damage awards must be limited to the sums necessary
to compensate [a complainant] for actual harm, even if the harm is
intangible." Thus, a compensatory damages award should reimburse
a complainant for proven pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses,
and nonpecuniary losses. There are no precise formulas for determining
the amount of damages for nonpecuniary losses. Damages awards for
nonpecuniary losses that have been assessed by juries and courts have
varied significantly. An award of compensatory damages for nonpecuniary
losses, including emotional harm, should reflect, however, the extent
to which the respondent directly or proximately caused the harm and
the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. An award of
compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses should also reflect the
nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration
of the harm.
In Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5,
1993), the Commission described the type of objective evidence that an
agency may obtain when assessing the merits of a complainant's request
for emotional distress damages:
[E]vidence should have taken the form of a statement by [complainant]
describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both
on and off the job, describing the distress. To properly explain the
emotional distress, such statements should include detailed information
on physical or behavioral manifestations of the distress, information on
the duration of the distress, and examples of how the distress affected
[complainant] day to day, both on and off the job. In addition, the
agency should have asked [complainant] to provide objective and other
evidence linking . . . the distress to the unlawful discrimination . . . .
Evidence may include statements from the complainant concerning his/her
emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character
or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other
nonpecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory
conduct. Statements from others, including family members, friends,
and health care providers could address the outward manifestations or
physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness,
anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional
distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown.
Objective evidence also may include documents indicating a complainant's
actual out-of-pocket expenses related to medical treatment, counseling,
and so forth, related to the injury allegedly caused by discrimination.
In determining damages, the agency is only responsible for those damages
that are clearly shown to be caused by the alleged discriminatory conduct,
not for any and all damages in general.
In the instant case, AJ was not persuaded that complainant was entitled
to nonpecuniary damages she sought. In addition, the AJ, who had the
opportunity to hear complainant first hand, was not persuaded that
complainant continued to experience emotional distress attributable
to the incident of sexual harassment after a week. In general, to the
extent it is based on personal observation of the demeanor and conduct
of the witness at the hearing, the Commission will not disturb the
credibility determinations of an AJ. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951). While complainant proved that she suffered
emotional distress causally connected to incident, in determining the
amount of a compensatory damages award, we are guided by the principle
that a compensatory damages award is limited to the sums necessary to
compensate her for the actual harm caused by the agency's discriminatory
action and we must attempt to affix a reasonable dollar value to
compensate complainant for that portion of her emotional distress
and related symptoms that were caused by the agency's discrimination.
See EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 13 (July 14, 1992).
The Commission notes that damage awards for emotional harm are difficult
to determine and that there are no definitive rules governing the
amount to be awarded in given cases. In this regard, a proper award
must meet two goals: that it not be "monstrously excessive" standing
alone and that it be consistent with awards made in similar cases.
See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989).
We further note that jury and court awards for nonpecuniary damages
based on humiliation and embarrassment have varied considerably.
See, e.g., Kuntz v. City of New Haven, 3 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1590,
1592 (D.C. Conn.) ($500.00 award for emotional distress based on
plaintiff's testimony that he was "disappointed", "cranky" with
family and friends, "embarrassed" at not having been promoted, and
had many sleepless nights), aff'd without opinion, 29 F.3d 622 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994); Sassaman v. Heart City
Toyota, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1230, 1236 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(jury award of $2,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages appropriate in sexual
harassment case based on plaintiff's testimony concerning humiliating,
degrading, and embarrassing conduct of four male supervisory employees
and testimony of employer's medical expert that plaintiff likely would
suffer "daily pain" having to work in hostile environment); see also
Turic v. Hospitality House, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
($50,000.00 in sex and religion discrimination/termination case); EEOC
v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
($50,000.00 in disability/termination case); McAdams v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1489 (D. Minn. 1993) ($35,000.00 in
failure to accommodate case).
In Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288
(April 18, 1996), where the complainant was found to have suffered
sexual harassment for a short period of time in a situation similar
to complainant's, and where the agency also failed to take appropriate
action to promptly stop the harassment, the Commission awarded $3,000
in compensatory damages. Because in Lawrence, the complainant also
suffered defamation, which was not an issue in the instant case, we
believe complainant to be entitled to $1,500 in compensatory damages.
While complainant nowhere contends that the agency has not implemented
the relief directed in the FAD, the Commission will nonetheless order
the agency to provide such relief to the extent that the agency has not
yet done so. Therefore, if the agency has not provided such relief,
and does not comply with the Commission's Order, complainant may petition
the Commission for enforcement of the Order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a).
Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,
it is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the FAD's finding that
complainant was subjected to sexual harassment and to MODIFY the agency's
award of relief. Accordingly, the agency is directed to comply with
the following ORDER.
ORDER
To the extent it has not already done so, the agency is ordered to take
the following remedial actions:
(1) The agency shall issue a check to complainant for $1,500.00 within
sixty calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.
(2) The agency shall review the matters giving rise to the instant
complaint to determine the appropriateness of taking disciplinary
action against the agency officials who failed to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action once they were placed on notice of the
Supervisor's harassing behavior. The agency shall record the basis
for the decision whether to take disciplinary action and maintain such
records for at least three (3) years.
(3) The agency shall take all appropriate actions to ensure that
neither complainant nor any other employee is retaliated against in
any way for filing a charge or participating in this or any other EEO
proceeding or opposing unlawful discriminatory employment practices.
(4) The agency shall conduct training for employees of the Medical
Center staff of the applicable facility on the current state of the law
regarding sexual harassment in the workplace, placing special emphasis on
the unacceptableness of harassing behavior, whether verbal or physical.
(5) The agency shall conduct training for to its managers of the
Environment Management Services, supervisors of the Personnel Service and
the EEO Managers and Specialists at the applicable facility addressing
these employees' responsibilities to prevent and eliminate discrimination
in the Federal workplace and in their obligations under EEO law, again
placing special emphasis on the prevention and elimination of sexual
and sex-based harassment. The agency shall post copies of its sexual
harassment policy at the applicable facility.
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying
that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G1092)
The agency is ORDERED to post at its Phoenix Veterans' Administration
Medical Center copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice,
after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall
be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date
this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)
consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take
reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be
submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph
entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)
calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an
award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the
complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall
be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of
fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar
days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall
be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,
D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,
and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.
If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant
may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action
to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following
an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,
37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29
C.F.R. ��1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively,
the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File
A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to
the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the
complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the
complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you
have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some
jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner
suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your
civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN
THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision
or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,
you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR
DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your
appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME
AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY
HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME
AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.
Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the
Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in
which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR
THE
COMMISSION:
December 15, 1999
________________
___________________________
DATE
Frances M. Hart
Executive
Officer
Executive
Secretariat
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_________________________
_________________________
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.