Sylvain Maitrejean et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 31, 201914575329 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/575,329 12/18/2014 Sylvain MAITREJEAN 446247US41 7712 22850 7590 07/31/2019 OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 EXAMINER PARENDO, KEVIN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2819 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/31/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OBLONPAT@OBLON.COM iahmadi@oblon.com patentdocket@oblon.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SYLVAIN MAITREJEAN, SHAY REBOH, and ROMAIN WACQUEZ ____________ Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, MONTÉ T. SQUIRE, and MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 requests our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1–4, 7–10 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over at least the basic combination of Bedell et al. (US 2012/0068267 A1, published Mar. 22, 2012) (“Bedell”) and Joo et al. (US 6,187,282 B1, 1Appellant is the applicant, “COMMISSARIAT A L’ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES ALTERNATIVES”, which is also stated to be the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 2 issued Feb. 13, 2001) (“Joo”), Son (US 6,348,715 B1, issued Feb. 19, 2002) (“Son”).2,3 We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Independent claim 1 is illustrative (emphasis added to highlight key disputed limitation): 1. A method for modifying a strain state of a block of a semiconducting material having a crystalline structure, comprising steps in the following order: a) forming an amorphous lower region in the block of semiconducting material resting on a substrate, while maintaining the crystalline structure of an upper region of the block, which is in contact with the amorphous lower region; b) performing at least one creep annealing of the block with a suitable duration and temperature so that creep occurs in the amorphous lower region and without recrystallizing the semiconducting material of the amorphous lower region; and c) performing at least one recrystallization annealing of the amorphous lower region of the block. 2 The Examiner applied additional prior art to dependent claim 4 (Final Action 13). 3 The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 of claim 7 has been withdrawn (Ans. 2). Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 3 ANALYSIS We review the appealed § 103 rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections”)). After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s contentions, we are not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error, and we affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 1, 3, 4, and 7–9 for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action and the Answer but reverse the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 2, 10 and 12 for the reasons expressed in the Appeal and Reply Briefs. We add the following primarily for emphasis. First, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s interpretation of the recited “creep annealing” step is unreasonable (Appeal Br. 22–27). Appellant contends that Joo’s preheating step does not constitute the claimed creep annealing, especially since Joo aims to prevent deformation of the glass substrate (Appeal Br. 28–31). Finally, Appellant urges that the Examiner’s reason to combine Joo with Bedell so as to result in the recited steps is insufficient, especially since Joo teaches to prevent deformation (Appeal Br. 32–33). Appellant reiterates these arguments in the Reply Brief. It has been established that “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 4 Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Likewise, it is also well settled that a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992). These arguments are not persuasive of error in the Examiner’s rejection. As aptly pointed out by the Examiner, Joo is relied upon to exemplify that a pre-heating step before an annealing step for recrystallization of amorphous silicon is known in the art of preparing a semiconductor material, and improves recrystallization while shortening the thermal annealing time (Final Action 6, Ans. 4, 5; Joo col. 5, ll. 8–13, col. 2 ll. 50–56). Appellant’s argument that there is no glass substrate in Bedell as in Joo (Reply Br. 5) is not persuasive because, as Appellant recognizes, Bedell has an insulator substrate (id; Bedell ¶ 15). One of ordinary skill in the art would appreciate that a glass substrate is indeed an insulator. Appellant has not provided any persuasive reasoning or credible evidence to refute the Examiner’s determination that one of ordinary skill in the art, using no more than ordinary creativity, would have performed a preheating annealing step before the recrystallization annealing step of Bedell. It is well established that “the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad interpretation.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “[A]s applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” Id. Notably, we do not find—and Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 5 Appellant has not directed our attention to—any limiting definitions in the Specification, nor does Appellant provide any persuasive reasoning or credible evidence to establish that the Examiner’s interpretation of the “creep annealing” language of claim 1 or claim 9 is unreasonable. Appellant’s arguments that no creep would have occurred if one had subjected the semiconductor material of Bedell to a preheating step as exemplified in Joo are also unpersuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection. As the Examiner aptly points out, Appellant has not provided any explicit guidance in the claim or Specification as to the degree of creep which must occur (Ans. 3). Appellant’s argument that the Specification states that the “thermal budget” is “sufficiently high to enable relaxation” and a stress variation “of at least 300Mpa” (Appeal Br. 26; Spec. 5:28 to Spec. 6:2) does not define over the “thermal budget” reasonably envisioned for use in the Bedell/Joo combination. Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s position that some creep would have occurred in the Bedell/Joo combination since the same temperature and material are used in the preheating step of the Bedell/Joo combination as in Appellant’s Specification (Ans. 4–6). Appellant’s argument that Joo is silent as to the preheating time (Appeal Br. 5) is not persuasive given that Appellant’s Specification describes that the preheating step may last, for example only, “several tens of seconds” at a temperature of 300° to 400°C (Spec. 7:15–17). Joo uses a temperature of “e.g., 400° C” (Joo, col. 5, ll. 8–10). Furthermore, preheating is a well known engineering expedient for many reasons, and thus to provide an appropriate preheating time in Bedell would have been within the level of ordinary skill. Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 6 It has been held that when the Examiner establishes a reasonable basis that the products (or processes) claimed by the applicant and disclosed in the prior art appear to be the same or substantially similar, the burden is properly shifted to the applicant to show that they are not. See In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254–56 (CCPA 1977). Cf. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also In Re Dillion, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (a prima facie case of obviousness does not require both structural similarity and a suggestion in or expectation from the prior art that the claimed compound will have the same or a similar usefulness as the applicants newly discovered compound; exactly what amounts to a prima facie case varies from case to case.) Here, the Examiner’s determination that the resultant product from a Bedell/Joo process appears to be the same or substantially similar to those as claimed and disclosed is reasonable. Appellant fails to adequately show that such a process would not have resulted in some degree of “creep deformation.” Technical assertions unsupported by factual evidence are not persuasive. In re Geisler, 116 F. 3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Circ. 1997). It has long been established that attorney’s arguments in a brief cannot take the place of evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Appellant’s arguments thus do not point out reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, 7, and 9, and a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s obviousness determination. With respect to dependent claims 2 and 10, Appellant argues that the Examiner has not shown that the block of semiconductor material worked on is “a strained semiconducting block” (Appeal Br. 35; Reply Br. 6). The Examiner’s position is that the block may be strained at any time (Ans. 8). Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 7 However, we agree with Appellant that as a matter of claim interpretation, dependent claim 2 requires the starting material of claim 1 to be a block of strained semiconducting material before step a) (Reply Br. 6). Thus, we reverse the rejection of dependent claims 2 and 10. Likewise, with respect to dependent claim 12, the Examiner has not directed us to any evidence or reasoning that the starting block is a strained block whose strain is reduced by at least 300 MPa (Appeal Br. 39, 40).4 However, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s determination that Bedell exemplifies the material recited in claim 3 for reasons explained by the Examiner (Ans. 8, 9). With respect to dependent claim 7, Appellant’s remarks are not persuasive for reasons set out by the Examiner (Ans. 9, 10). Appellant does not provide any specific separate arguments for any of the remaining dependent claims, including claim 4 separately rejected; the remarks rely on arguments already made with respect to claims 1 and 9 (see generally Appeal Br.). Accordingly, the Examiner’s § 103 rejections are affirmed with respect to claims 1, 3, 4, and 7–9 on appeal, and reversed as to claims 2, 10 and 12. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). 4 We agree with Appellant that claim 12 requires reducing the strain in the block of strained semiconducting material by at least 300 Mpa (Appeal Br. 40). Appeal 2018-008620 Application 14/575,329 8 ORDER AFFIRMED-IN-PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation