Sven Ziegenspeck et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 18, 2019

14297663 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 18, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/297,663 06/06/2014 Sven Ziegenspeck MAG04-P2301-423724 5157
153508 7590 07/18/2019
Honigman LLP/Magna
650 Trade Centre Way
Suite 200
KALAMAZOO, MI 49002-0402
EXAMINER
NOH, JAE NAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2481
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
asytsma@honigman.com
patent@honigman.com
tflory@honigman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SVEN ZIEGENSPECK and PIRMIN BADER
____________________

Appeal 2018-0070791
Application 14/297,663
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 Magna Electronics Inc. is identified as the real party in interest. App. Br.
2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to an imaging or vision system for a
vehicle that “provides for the transfer of some or all data (such as image data
captured by a camera and camera control data for use by the camera) over
just one coaxial line (cable),” and “[o]ptionally, . . . DC power for powering
the camera may be carried over the same coaxial line.” Spec. ¶ 5. Claims 1–
20 are pending; of these, claims 1, 12, and 18 are independent. App. Br. 24–
29. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (emphasis added):
1. A vision system for a vehicle, said vision system
comprising:
a camera disposed at a vehicle equipped with said vision
system, wherein said camera, when disposed at the vehicle, has
a field of view exterior of the vehicle, said camera capturing
image data;
a control comprising an image processor;
a single coaxial cable connecting said camera with said
control;
wherein said single coaxial cable comprises a single core
wire, an inner shielding layer and an outer shielding layer;
wherein said inner shielding layer circumscribes said
single core wire and said outer shielding layer circumscribes said
inner shielding layer, and wherein said outer shielding layer is
electrically isolated from said inner shielding layer and said inner
shielding layer is electrically isolated from said single core wire;
wherein said single coaxial cable carries (i) image data
from said camera to said control, (ii) camera control data from
said control to said camera and (iii) electrical voltage for
powering said camera;
wherein said image processor is operable to process image
data captured by said camera and carried to said control via said
single coaxial cable;
wherein electrical voltage for powering said camera is
carried by said inner and outer shielding layers, and wherein one
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of said inner and outer shielding layers is electrically connected
to negative voltage or ground and the other of said inner and
outer shielding layers is electrically connected to positive
voltage; and
wherein said control receiving image data carried thereto
via said single coaxial cable comprises a phase lock loop locking
to a signal carrier frequency carried by said single coaxial cable.

References and Rejections
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Aschwanden US 4,443,769 Apr. 17, 1984
Baker US 6,115,159 Sept. 5, 2000
Avudainayagam US 2011/0286544 A1 Nov. 24, 2011
Ahrentorp US 2013/0134964 A1 May 30, 2013
De Wind US 8,908,039 B2 Dec. 9, 2014

Claims 1–6 and 8–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over De Wind, Baker, Ahrentorp, and Aschwanden. Final
Act. 3.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over De Wind, Baker, Ahrentorp, Aschwanden, and Avudainayagam. Final
Act. 24.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments. Any other arguments Appellants could have made but chose not
to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)
(1) (iv) (2012). We highlight and address specific findings and arguments
for emphasis as follows.
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A. Independent Claim 1
Appellants argue the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 is in error,
because “[t]here is no disclosure or suggestion in De Wind, Baker,
Ahrentorp, or Aschwanden (alone or in combination) of a vision system with
a single coaxial cable connecting a camera and a control, as claimed
(collectively, and in combination with other claim elements).” App. Br. 7.
Appellants contend one of ordinary skill would not combine the references
in the manner claimed: “De Wind not only fails to disclose using a single
cable (coaxial or otherwise), but explicitly teaches away from such a
limitation” (App. Br. 14); “Baker, on the other hand, is directed toward
increasing the one kilometer distance limitation when transmitting broadcast
programming” (App. Br. 15); and “Ahrentorp is not analogous art” as
“Ahrentorp discloses a winding that is used to measure the dynamic
magnetic properties of a material . . . [and] has no basis in vehicles, vision
systems, or cameras” (App. Br. 16–17).
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding the claim
limitations are taught or suggested by the combination of cited references.
See Ans. 28–30. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner for the rejection of claim 1. De Wind, as cited by the
Examiner, discloses a vehicle imaging system in which the “signal from the
camera or image data may be communicated to the control via various
communication links or video transmission medium, such as wires or cables
(such as a CAT-3 shielded twisted pair wire or a CAT-5 coaxial cable or the
like).” De Wind 29:1–5; Final Act. 4. We do not reach the issue of whether
De Wind directly teaches a “coaxial cable” as claimed (see App. Br. 13),
because we agree with the Examiner that such a coaxial cable is taught or
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suggested by Baker. See Ans. 29 (“In any case, Baker teaches use of a
single ‘coaxial’ cable which is being combined with the teachings of De
Wind as stated in the final rejection.”); Final Act. 5; Baker 1:10–13 (“The
triaxial cable is a shielded coaxial cable designed to simultaneously transmit
various bi-directional information and/or control signals and provide power
from the CCU [(camera control unit)] to the camera.”).
We agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill would use
Baker’s coaxial cable—for transmitting images, control signals, and
power—in the system of De Wind, in order to “simplify the connection
between the camera and the controller in De Wind as taught by Baker.”
Final Act. 6. De Wind does not teach away from the combination because
De Wind, although disclosing multi-wire cables, does not discourage
investigation into using a coaxial cable that can accomplish the desired
transmissions.2 See Ans. 29; De Wind 29:1–5 (listing Ethernet cables
merely as example forms of a potential communication medium). Similarly,
the Examiner does not err in relying on Baker’s coaxial cable teachings:
Baker has additional teachings of using fiber optics for long distance
transmissions (see, e.g., Baker 1:49–55; 2:32–35); however, one of ordinary
skill would look to Baker’s background section teachings of using “one
physical [coaxial] cable” (Baker 1:20) when designing systems for shorter
distances, as claimed. See Ans. 30; Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Neither is the practitioner in reading

2 See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reference does not teach away, however, if it
merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does
not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the
invention claimed.”) (citations omitted).
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the [cited reference] compelled to adopt every single aspect of its teaching
without the exercise of independent judgment.”).
Nor are we persuaded the Examiner errs in finding the ordinarily
skilled artisan would consider the teachings of Ahrentorp in this instance.
See Final Act. 6–7. Ahrentorp is analogous art, because both the reference
and the claims are from the same field of endeavor of using coaxial cables.
See Ans. 31; Abstract; Ahrentorp Fig. 3; see also In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656,
658–659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Further, Baker discloses that power is transmitted
over a shielded coaxial cable (also known as a triaxial cable). Baker 1:10–
20. The Examiner correctly finds “it would have been expected that
[Baker’s] two shields would be used to provide power given the ordinary
knowledge of [] one skilled in the art” as evidenced by Ahrentorp’s
teachings of providing power through the shielding layers of a coaxial cable.
Ans. 31; Ahrentorp ¶ 25. Appellants have not shown the Examiner errs in
finding that claim 1 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention. See Ans. 31.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 1 is in error.

B. Dependent Claim 11
Appellants argue the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 is in error,
because “De Wind discloses, for example at the cited section, receiving data
from one or more cameras.” App. Br. 18; De Wind 10:1–4. Appellants
contend that, in contrast to De Wind, a “multi-camera surround view vision
system is claimed” which “requires substantially more than just multiple
cameras.” App. Br. 18.
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“The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification is . . . an interpretation that
corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the
specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the
specification.’” In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (citations omitted). Here, claim 11 recites a “multi-camera surround
view vision system.” We agree with the Examiner that De Wind teaches the
“multi-camera” portion of the recitation. See Final Act. 12; De Wind 10:1–4
(“a signal received from one or more cameras or image sensors of the
vehicle”).
We are persuaded, however, that the Examiner errs in finding the
claim term “surround view vision system” is taught or suggested by the cited
references. Appellants’ Specification describes a “surround view” as
referring to a particular type of display, which shows the environment “at or
around or at least partially surrounding the subject or equipped vehicle.”
Spec. ¶ 5; see also App. Br. 18. De Wind, although disclosing multiple
cameras, is not cited as teaching a system for showing such a display formed
from more than one camera. See Final Act. 12; De Wind 10:1–4. Nor does
the Examiner provide reasoning sufficient to show one of ordinary skill
would have used the disclosed system to create a “surround view vision
system” as claimed. See Ans. 32; KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418, (2007) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
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reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness”).
Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of dependent claim 11 is in error.

C. Dependent Claim 7
Appellants argue the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 is in error,
because “Avudainayagam’s disclosure (alone or in combination with the
other applied art) does not disclose that camera control data carried on the
single coaxial cable has a frequency that has a sufficient Shannon distance
from a frequency of signals carrying image data on the single coaxial cable,
as claimed.” App. Br. 21. Particularly, Appellants contend the following:
Avudainayagam discloses using the Shannon capacity, not the
Shannon distance. The Shannon capacity, as disclosed in
Avudainayagam, is the upper bound on the rate at which
information can be reliably transmitted over a communications
channel. The Shannon distance (or Nyquist distance), as claimed,
is the sampling frequency necessary to accurately reproduce an
analog signal from discrete samples. While both related to the
Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, they do not disclose the
same concepts.
Id.
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. We adopt
as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner for the
rejection of claim 7. Appellants’ Specification states the carrier wave has a
“sufficient” Shannon distance (or Nyquist distance) from the frequency of
another signal, but otherwise provides no narrowing definition of the
disputed claim term. Spec. ¶ 29; see also Spec ¶ 39. Avudainayagam, as
cited by the Examiner, teaches a carrier wave can be based on a metric that
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maximizes a “relative distance of the spectral efficiency for the modulation-
code rate pair from the Shannon Capacity.” Avudainayagam ¶ 81; Ans. 33.
Consistent with the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that the
claimed Shannon distance is taught or suggested by Avudainayagam’s
relative distance from the Shannon Capacity. See Final Act. 24–25. In
contrast, Appellants provide insufficient evidence or technical reasoning to
persuade us the Examiner’s finding is in error. See App. Br. 21; see also In
re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a
brief cannot take the place of evidence.”).
Accordingly, Appellants fail to persuade us the Examiner errs in
finding claim 11 is taught by the cited references.

CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and
dependent claim 7, and claims 2–6 and 8–10 which are not separately
argued. See App. Br. 18.
We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 11, of
independent claims 12 and 18 which recite limitations commensurate in
scope, or the claims dependent thereon. See App. Br. 19–20.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–10 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 11–20 is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART