Suvarna, Harish K.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 4, 2020

14056246 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/056,246 10/17/2013 Harish K. Suvarna AD01.3169US01 8912
111003 7590 02/04/2020
Adobe / Finch & Maloney PLLC
50 Commercial Street
Manchester, NH 03101
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, NGA B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@finchmaloney.com
nmaloney@finchmaloney.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte HARISH K. SUVARNA
____________

Appeal 2019-000833
Application 14/056,246
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–13, 15–20, and 23. Claims 14, 21, and 22 are
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Adobe Systems Incorporated as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention relates “to the evaluation
of content generated via social networks, and more specifically to methods
for filtering and analyzing social network content so that consumer
sentiment can be gauged more accurately and efficiently.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1 and 10 are illustrative of the claimed invention and reads as
follows:
1. A computer-implemented content filtration method
for performing a classification of content that is generated via an
online social network and upon which a sentiment analysis is
based, the method comprising:
receiving, by a sentiment analysis server having a
processor, a plurality of social network content items from a
social network server, wherein each of the plurality of content
items are classifiable as at least one of a plurality of content
types, the plurality of content types including sentiment bearing
social network content and spam content;
evaluating, by the processor, a particular one of the
plurality of content items with respect to each of a plurality of
features;
generating, by the processor, a feature vector
corresponding to the particular content item, the feature vector
representing a subset of the plurality of features which are
evaluated as being applicable to the particular content item;
receiving, by the sentiment analysis server, input
identifying a particular content type toward which the
classification will be biased;
identifying a particular one of the plurality of features
based on the received input, wherein the identified feature is
ranked as having (a) a relatively high correlation with a content
type other than that identified by the received input, and (b) a
relatively low correlation with the particular content type
identified by the received input;
masking, by the processor, the identified feature; and
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classifying, by the processor, the particular content item as
at least one of the plurality of content types based on unmasked
features in the feature vector, wherein classification of the
particular content item is biased toward the particular content
type.

10. A computer-implemented method for evaluating
sentiment in content generated via an online social network, the
method comprising:
receiving, by a sentiment analysis server, a corpus of
social network content that comprises a plurality of social
network content items;
using a content filter executing on the sentiment analysis
server to filter the received corpus of social network content and
extract a subset of the social network content items from the
received corpus, the subset of extracted social network content
items including a plurality of neutral content items and a plurality
of sentiment bearing content items;
using a sentiment engine executing on the sentiment
analysis server to perform a sentiment analysis on those social
network content items that were extracted from the received
corpus by the content filter; and
using a sentiment browser to display results of the
sentiment analysis, at least a portion of the neutral content items,
and at least a portion of the sentiment bearing content items,
wherein the results of the sentiment analysis are displayed in
response to receiving the corpus of social network content.

REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1–13, 15–20, and 23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5–10.

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ANALYSIS
THE 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that the Examiner
erred in concluding that claims 1–13, 15–20, and 23 are directed to patent
ineligible subject matter.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
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determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
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the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of section
101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed., rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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Claim 1-5, 7-9, 17-19, and 23
Revised Step 2A
Under the Memorandum, in prong one of step 2A we look to whether
the claims recite a judicial exception. Claim 1 recites “evaluating. . . a
particular one of the plurality of content items with respect to each of a
plurality of features;” “generating. . . a feature vector corresponding to the
particular content item, the feature vector representing a subset of the
plurality of features which are evaluated as being applicable to the particular
content item;” “identifying a particular one of the plurality of features”
based on certain rankings correlating to the received input; “masking. . . the
identified feature;” and “classifying. . . the particular content item as at least
one of the plurality of content types based on unmasked features. . . .”
In other words, claim 1 evaluates content items with features,
generates a feature vector, identifies particular features, masks certain
features, and classifies the content item based on unmasked features. These
steps, namely evaluating, identifying, masking or discounting, and
classifying, can be performed within a human mind and, thus, are mental
processes. Additionally, generating a feature vector can be practically
performed in the human mind with the aid of pen and paper. As such, the
claimed invention recites mental processes, which are an abstract idea. See
Elec. Power Grp, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (noting that the
Federal Circuit has “treated analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (holding that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the
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human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an
“unpatentable mental process[]”); see also Final Act. 4 (finding that claim 1
is simply “receiving, evaluating, generating, receiving, identifying, masking,
and classifying data which can be performed in a computer and is similar to
the kind of ‘organizing human activity’ and is an idea of itself” and noting
that the claimed invention is similar to concepts found to be abstract in
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015), Elec. Power Grp., LLC 830 F.3d 1350, and Digitech Image Techs.,
LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Under prong two of revised step 2A, we determine whether the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception
by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the
claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application.
Claim 1 additionally recites a processor, a social network server, and a
network, as well as receiving a plurality of content items and receiving an
input. See also Final Act. 4 (noting that the claim additional includes a
computer, processor, and other software modules). Here, the additional
limitations recited beyond the judicial exception itself, alone or in
combination, fail to integrate the exception into a practical application.
More particularly, and contrary to Appellant’s unsupported assertions, the
claimed invention is not: (i) an improvement to the functionality of a
computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a));
(ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different
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thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful
limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appellant argues that the claimed invention is not “directed to” an
abstract idea because it “provides a non-abstract improvement to existing
technology.” Appeal Br. 11. For example, according to Appellant, “the
Specification [] clearly identifies a technical problem associated with
existing content classification techniques, and further explains the details of
an unconventional technical solution to that problem.” Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant maintains that the receiving, identifying, masking, and classifying
steps
make[] clear that the classification is based on the correlations
between particular features and particular content types. Such
correlations will change over time as language usage patterns
change. This makes clear that a technological improvement that
provides more accurate content classification is actually reflected
in Claim 1, and therefore that Claim 1 is not directed to an
abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 12. See also Appeal Br. 12–13 (arguing that the claimed
invention is analogous to the claims in McRO because the claimed invention
“describes a specific way of solving problems associated with content item
classification. Claim 1 does not merely claim the idea of a solution or
outcome.”).
We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. Appellant may
describe an improved method of classifying content, but has not persuasively
shown that this method is a “technological improvement.” For example,
receiving an input to consider dynamically changing vocabulary is not a
technical problem. Instead, the claimed invention is an improved mental
process. As discussed above, a person, through a mental process, can
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receive a bias input, identify content features, mask or disregard certain
content features, and then classify the content based on the non-masked
features. Appellant fails to describe sufficiently how the claimed invention
provides a technical improvement to the functioning of the computer or the
prior art process. Rather, we agree with the Examiner, “the recitation of the
computer limitations amounts to mere instructions to implement the abstract
idea on a computer.” Final Act. 5. See also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Servs., LLC
v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (“[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.”)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F.
App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims
purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error,
we have held that speed and accuracy increases and accuracy increases
stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-purpose computer do[ ]
not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’”).
We further note that the additional steps of receiving content and
receiving an input are insignificant extra-solution activity. See Ans. 7–8;
MPEP § 2106.05(g); see also, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(“That a computer receives and sends the
information over a network—with no further specification—is not even
arguably inventive.”). As such, we determine that the additional limitations,
alone or in combination, do not integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application.
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Step 2B
Under step 2B, we determine that the claimed additional limitations,
alone or in combination, do not add significantly more to the abstract idea.
Appellant argues the claimed identifying and masking limitations are not
generic. Appeal Br. 16–17. According to Appellant, these limitations
provide significantly more than the claimed abstract idea. Id.
We disagree. Notably, as discussed above, the claimed identifying
features of the content based on data, ranking the features, and masking or
disregarding certain features are steps performed in the human mind. As
such, these are recited mental steps. As the Examiner points out, the
claimed processor “perform[s] purely generic computer functions” namely
“to receive, evaluate, generate, receive, identify, mask, and classify data.”
Final Act. 5. The Examiner relies on paragraphs 19-21 of the Specification
to show that the network server and network are well-known, routine, and
conventional. Ans. 9; see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 20 (describing the network and
network server may “such as those typically associated with social network
services like Facebook, Google+ and Twitter.”); Spec. ¶ 21 (noting that the
processor “can be any suitable processor, and may include one or more
coprocessors or controllers, such as an audio processor or a graphics
processing unit. . . ” ).
Moreover, as noted above, the additional steps of receiving content
and receiving an input are insignificant extra-solution activity. See Ans. 7–
8; MPEP § 2106.05(g); see also, e.g., buySAFE, Inc., 765 F.3d at 1355
(“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with
no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). As such, we are
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not persuaded that the combined use adds significantly more to the claimed
judicial exception.

Claims 6 and 20
With respect to claims 6 and 20, Appellant additionally argues
using a naive Bayes classifier and a support vector machine learning
model, as recited in Claim 6, represents an inventive concept that is
significantly more than any abstract idea to which Claim 6 might be
directed. In particular, the combined use of such models goes beyond
what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field of
content filtering and sentiment analysis.
Appeal Br. 18.
We find these arguments unpersuasive. Claim 6 merely adds that the
received input “is based on a naïve Bayes probability distribution” and the
classification “is based on a prediction generated by a support vector
machine learning model.” In other words, claim 6 merely adds using a
computer to perform well-known and generic calculations. See, e.g., Ans.
9–11. See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 711 F. App’x at 1017.
As such, we are not persuaded that the combined use adds significantly more
to the claimed judicial exception.

Claims 10–13 and 16
Revised Step 2A
Under the Memorandum, in prong one of step 2A we look to whether
the claims recite a judicial exception. Claim 10 recites “using a content
filter. . . to filter the received corpus of social network content and extract a
subset of the social network content items from the received corpus”
including neutral content items and sentiment bearing content items” and
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“using a sentiment engine. . . to perform a sentiment analysis” on the
extracted content items. In other words, claim 10 filters a subset of data and
performs a sentiment analysis on the data. Filtering, selecting a subset of
content items, and evaluating sentiment of content items can be performed
within a human mind alone or with the help of pen and paper. Claim 10,
therefore, recites a mental process, which is an abstract idea. See also Final
Act. 7 “receiving, filtering, extracting, performing, receiving, and displaying
data which can be performed in a computer and is an idea of itself.”);
Bascom Global Internet Services V. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting generally “that filtering content is an abstract
idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing human
behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be abstract.”); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(finding abstract the claimed method of filtering emails).
Under prong two of revised step 2A, we determine whether the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception
by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the
claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application.
Claim 10 additionally recites a sentiment analysis server and a
sentiment browser, as well as receiving a plurality of content items and
displaying results. Here, the additional limitations recited beyond the
judicial exception itself, alone or in combination, fail to integrate the
exception into a practical application. More particularly, and contrary to
Appellant’s unsupported assertions, the claimed invention is not: (i) an
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improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or
technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply
or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular
transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appellant argues that the claimed invention is not “directed to” an
abstract idea because it “provides a non-abstract improvement to existing
technology.” Appeal Br. 20–21. Appellant, in particular, argues that the
claimed filtering prior to sentiment analysis
reduces the extent to which data that is irrelevant to the sentiment
analysis-such as spam content or unintelligible foreign language
content-is submitted to the sentiment engine. As pointed out in
the Specification, this can reduce bandwidth requirements,
reduce sentiment analysis latency, reduce the cost associated
with sentiment analysis, and increase the accuracy of the
sentiment analysis.
Appeal Br. 22 (citing Spec. ¶ 13). However, as discussed above, the Federal
Circuit has found filtering to be abstract. See, e.g., Bascom Global Internet
Services, 827 F.3d at 1348 (noting generally “that filtering content is an
abstract idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing
human behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be abstract.”);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 838 F.3d at 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“filtering
files/e-mail—is an abstract idea.”). The claimed invention here merely
applies a judicial exception using generic computers “to the particular
technological environment of the Internet.” DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.2d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Final Act.
7–8.
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We further note that the additional steps of receiving content and
displaying results are insignificant extra-solution activity. See Ans. 7–8;
MPEP § 2106.05(g); see also, e.g., buySAFE, Inc.., 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That
a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC, 830 F.3d at 1354–55 (“merely presenting the results of abstract
processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more . . . is
abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.”). As such, we
determine that the additional limitations, alone or in combination, do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Step 2B
Under step 2B, we determine that the claimed additional limitations,
alone or in combination, do not add significantly more to the abstract idea.
According to Appellant, “by specifying that the sentiment analysis is
performed ‘on those social network content items that were extracted from
the received corpus by the content filter,’ Claim 10 specifies use of a
filtering tool at a specific location-that is, before sentiment analysis is
performed.” Appeal Br. 26. Thus, Appellant argues that “an inventive
concept can be found in the nonconventional and non-generic arrangement
of the ‘receiving’, ‘using ... to filter’, ‘using ... to perform a sentiment
analysis’, and ‘using ... to display results’ actions defined in the claim.” Id.
We find this argument unpersuasive. As the Examiner explains,
considering the additional elements individually and in combination, “the
claimed computer components at each step . . . perform purely generic
computer functions.” Ans. 17. Further, we agree with the Examiner “[t]here
is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning
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of a computer/computer networks themselves,” instead “[t]heir collective
functions merely provide conventional computer implementation.” Id.
Moreover, the Examiner relies on paragraphs 19-21 of the
Specification to show that the network server and network are well known,
routine, and conventional. Ans. 9; see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 20 (describing that the
network and network server may a network server “such as those typically
associated with social network services like Facebook, Google+ and
Twitter.”); Spec. ¶ 21 (noting that the processor “can be any suitable
processor, and may include one or more coprocessors or controllers, such as
an audio processor or a graphics processing unit. . .”). As such, we are not
persuaded that the combined use adds significantly more to the claimed
judicial exception.
Claim 15
Appellant argue that the claimed sentiment analysis on multiple
languages is an inventive concept that is significantly more than the claimed
judicial exception. Appeal Br. 27. According to Appellant, “the combined
extraction and analysis of multilingual content, combined with display of
sentiment analysis results for multilingual content, goes beyond what is
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field of content
filtering and sentiment analysis.” Id. We disagree. Notably, as the
Examiner identifies, the limitations of claim 15 merely limit the scope of the
analyzed data, namely foreign language content items instead of only
content items. See Final Act. 9. As discussed above, performing a
sentiment analysis on content, including foreign language content items, is a
mental process, which is an abstract idea. Therefore, we find Appellant’s
argument unpersuasive.
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Accordingly, based on the record before us, we affirm the rejection of
claims 1–13, 15–20, and 23 as directed to patent ineligible subject matter.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–13, 15–
20, and 23
101 Eligibility 1–13, 15–
20, 23

AFFIRMED