SUNLIGHT AEROSPACE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 1, 2021

2019003900 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/462,167 08/18/2014 SERGEY V. FROLOV SP024 2407
54698 7590 01/01/2021
MOSER TABOADA
1030 BROAD STREET
SUITE 203
SHREWSBURY, NJ 07702
EXAMINER
BILGRAMI, ASGHAR H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2647
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/01/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@mtiplaw.com
llinardakis@mtiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SERGEY V. FROLOV, MICHAEL CYRUS,
ALLAN J. BRUCE, and JOHN PETER MOUSSOURIS

Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167
Technology Center 2600

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–30. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
“SUNLIGHT PHOTONICS INC.” Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention relates “to methods and apparatus for airborne
wireless communications, and in particular for enabling ground-based
wireless communications using unmanned airborne platforms.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of argued subject matter.
1. An airborne wireless service area, comprising:
an airborne fleet, comprised of [aircrafts]2, wherein the airborne
fleet is configured to transmit a plurality of first beams at a first
radio frequency (RF), wherein the plurality of first beams are
characterized by corresponding first frequency band, channel,
bandwidth, transmission format, uneven angular field intensity
distribution, and boundaries, wherein neighboring first beams
have an overlap region, and wherein the neighboring first
beams comprise at least one of a different frequency band,
channel, or transmission format;
a distributed communication payload, wherein a total
communication payload is subdivided into smaller
communication payload sections and at least one smaller
communication payload section is mounted on different ones of
the [aircrafts],
wherein the distributed communication payload comprises:
a plurality of antennas to transmit the plurality of first
beams and to transmit a reshaped plurality of first beams
on command, and
payload control electronics to manage operation of the
airborne wireless service area;
and

2 We use, herein, “aircrafts” to denote a plurality of aircraft (e.g., the
claimed plurality of aircraft). We do so to easily differentiate between a
singular aircraft and plurality of aircrafts. We understand, however,
“aircraft” is the established plural form of the term.
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

3
a plurality of first ground communication cells defined by
respective boundaries of the plurality of first beams,
wherein a size and shape of at least some of the first ground
communication cells are altered by transmitting the reshaped
plurality of first beams; and
wherein the payload control electronics include a controller
operative to centrally control a first communication payload
section of the distributed communication payload located on a
first aircraft of the airborne fleet and a second communication
payload section of the distributed communication payload
located on a second aircraft of the airborne fleet so as to operate
as a single network node.
Appeal Br., Claims Appendix.
Rejections
Claims 1, 20 and 21 stand rejected under the judicially-created
doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over
independent claims 1 and 12 of U.S. Patent Application No. 14/462403.
Final Act. 3–5.
Claims 1–25 and 27–30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Swensen (US 2004/0253949 A1; Dec. 16, 2004) and
Saegrov (US 2014/0105054 A1; Apr. 17, 2014). Final Act. 5–13.
Claim 26 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Swensen, Saegrov, and Bonawitz (US 8,874,356 B1; Oct. 28, 2014).
Final Act. 14–15.
OPINION
Double Patenting
Appellant does not contest the double-patenting rejection, but rather
states a terminal disclaimer will be filed to overcome the rejection if
claims 1, 20 and 21 are allowed via future prosecution. Appeal Br. 8.
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

4
Accordingly, we sustain the double-patenting rejection.
§ 103
All claims are rejected as obvious over Swensen and Saegrov.
Final Act. 5–15. Appellant addresses the obviousness rejections with
reference to claim 1. Appeal Br. 19–21. Before addressing Appellant’s
specific contentions, we present the applied teachings of Swensen
(see Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 4–8) and Saegrov (see Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 8–15).
Swensen teaches a fleet of aircrafts that generates an array of wireless
service cells and whereby each aircraft generates a respective cell. Swensen,
abst.; ¶¶ 75–89; Figs. 3–6. In addition to generating a respective cell, an
aircraft sectors the cell and allocates each sector a respective band of
communication frequencies. Id. ¶¶ 90–91; Fig. 8.
Both Swensen and Saegrov teach beam steering. Swensen ¶¶ 65–67;
Saegrov ¶¶ 13, 17–19, 31, 81, and 108. Swensen teaches that each aircraft
beam steers communications to the base stations and subscribers of the
wireless service. Swensen ¶¶ 65–67. Saegrov teaches a specific method and
system of beam steering whereby an aircraft beam steers communications to
generate a spatial sector/volume for receipt of the communications (i.e., to
generate a region where the communications can be reliably received).
Saegrov ¶¶ 13, 17–19, 31, 81, and 108.
In view of the above teachings, the Examiner concludes it would have
been obvious for Swensen’s aircrafts to shape their respective cell sectors
via beam steering. Final Act. 7; Ans. 15. The Examiner reads the at-issue
claim features on the resulting system as follows: the claimed “airborne
fleet” and its “first beams” are respectively read on Swensen’s aircraft fleet
and it communications that generate an array of service cells; the claimed
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

5
“total communication payload” and “smaller communication payload
sections” are respectively read on the communication equipment of
Swensen’s fleet and its comprised aircrafts; and the claimed “antennas . . . to
transmit . . . reshaped . . . first beams on command” are read on the addition
of Saegrov’s beam steering to Swensen’s aircrafts (which then accordingly
shape the cell sectors). See Final Act. 5–7; Ans. 4–15.
Appellant contends:
[Claim 1’s] distributed payload approach is distinctly different
from prior art (e.g., Swensen), where the conventional wisdom
has been to use a single [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)]
platform[.] . . . [The claimed invention] operate[s] smaller
UAVs that contain smaller communication payload sections[.]
. . . [This] increases system reliability . . . [because], if one
small UAV platform fails, the remaining platforms can fill in . .
. for the missing UAV[.]
. . . [T]he Examiner alleges . . . [Swensen’s] payload is
distributed among multiple aircrafts as claimed[.] . . .
[However,] Swensen depicts a plurality of aircraft each having
individual and complete communication payloads operating
independently of each other[.] . . . That is, . . . each aircraft
comprises a complete communication payload[.]
Appeal Br. 10–11 (citing Final Act. 16).
We are unpersuaded of error. Appellant’s argument is not
commensurate with claim 1’s scope. See In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[The] proffered facts . . . are not commensurate with
the claim scope and are therefore unpersuasive.”). Claim 1 does not recite
the aircrafts as carrying different respective subsets of a cell’s
communication equipment. For example, claim 1 does not recite the
distributed communication payload (herein “DCP”) as being the requisite
airborne equipment for a cell and the smaller communication payload
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

6
sections (herein “SCPSs”) as being constituent subsets that are varied so as
to collectively compose the entirety of such equipment. Rather, claim 1
recites the DCP as providing a “total communication payload” subdivided
into SCPSs and recites that “at least one” SCPS is “mounted on different
ones” of the aircrafts.3 There is no requirement for this “total
communication payload” to be the requisite airborne equipment for a cell,
i.e., such that the SCPSs would be necessarily varied so as to collectively
compose the equipment.4
Moreover, even assuming (arguendo) claim 1 somehow requires the
aircrafts to carry different respective subsets of a cell’s communication
equipment, Appellant does not provide sufficient evidence to show this
claim construction is required. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“After a prima facie case . . . has been established, the

3 Appellant also does not provide sufficient evidence to show: the DCP
comprises and distributes the total communication payload (TCP); the TCP
comprises the SCPSs; and the SCPSs comprise the “at least one” SCPS
“mounted on different ones” of the aircrafts. To decide the disputed issues
before us, we have presumed these relationships. However, because claim 1
does not require these relationships (e.g., via antecedent-basis), we merely
presume them.
4 Nor does claim 1 recite the first and second “communication payload
section[s]” of the DCP as being varied or as constituent subsets of a cell’s
requisite airborne equipment. Rather, claim 1 recites that “a controller [is]
operative to centrally control” the first and second communication payload
sections “so as to operate as a single network node.” Even assuming
(arguendo) a “node” and “cell” are synonymous, this claim language does
not preclude the first and second communication payload sections from
being identically comprised and operated so as to each generate a single
respective cell that is managed by a same controller. And, in any event, the
first and second communication payload sections are not argued by
Appellant.
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

7
burden of . . . [r]ebuttal is . . . a showing of facts supporting the opposite
conclusion.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); SHOW,
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“To make (facts, etc.) apparent or
clear by evidence; to prove”). Appellant also fails to provide sufficient
evidence of a reason to construe the claimed DCP as a set of communication
equipment (e.g., {A, B, C}) and the claimed SCPSs as different constituent
subsets thereof (e.g., {A, B} and {B, C}). Rather, Appellant quotes claim 1,
states the recited aircrafts do not “each hav[e] individual and complete
communication payloads operating independently of each other” (above
block quote), and merely contends (i.e., without explaining why) a
non-limiting embodiment of the invention compels this proffered
claim construction. Appeal Br. 10–11 (citing Spec. ¶ 76); see also
Spec. ¶ 55 (“[T]he embodiments disclosed are for exemplary purposes
only[.]”).
Appellant also contends: “[A] person having ordinary skill in the art
understands that distributed system control defines a system in which
autonomous controllers are distributed throughout the system.”
Appeal Br. 12. To the extent Appellant contends Swensen’s and Saegrov’s
aircrafts lack automation, we are unpersuaded for each of two reasons. First,
Appellant does not provide sufficient evidence to show claim 1 requires the
DCP (much less the SCPSs) to be automated. Second, even assuming
(arguendo) claim 1 requires automation, Appellant does not provide
sufficient evidence to show (nor even contend) the Swensen-Saegrov
combination lacks manual activity achieving the same result. In re Venner,
262 F.2d at 95 (“[I]t is well settled that it is not ‘invention’ to broadly
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

8
provide . . . automatic means to replace manual activity . . . accomplish[ing]
the same result.”).
Appellant also contends the Examiner fails to show Swensen and
Saegrov teach or suggest the following claim limitation: “[the aircrafts] . . .
configured to transmit a plurality of first beams . . . characterized by
corresponding first frequency band, channel, bandwidth, transmission
format, uneven angular field intensity distribution, and boundaries.”
Appeal Br. 13–14. Specifically, Appellant contends “Swensen [is] silent
regarding the [claimed] field intensity distribution of the plurality of first
beams” and “the Examiner concedes that Saegrov fails to teach or suggest”
the claimed characterizations of the first beams. Id. at 14.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. The Specification teaches
that an aircraft is “configured to transmit . . . first beams . . . characterized by
. . . uneven angular field intensity distribution” (claim 1) if configured to
shape a communication cell via beam steering. See e.g., Spec. ¶ 71 (“In
general, the RF field intensity distribution may be variable. For example, a
digital phased array antenna may be able to produce RF beams of various
shapes and sizes.”). Thus, the Examiner has presented a prima facie case of
obviousness for this feature by proposing a Swensen-Saegrov combination
that shapes a communication cell via beam steering. See supra 4–5 (applied
teaching of Swensen and Saegrov). Appellant fails to address this prima
facie case.
Appellant also contends Saegrov does not teach or suggest the
following claim limitations: “a plurality of antennas to transmit the plurality
of first beams and to transmit a reshaped plurality of first beams on
command, . . . wherein a size and shape of at least some of the first
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

9
communication cells are altered by transmitting the reshaped plurality of
first beams.” Appeal Br. 14–19. Specifically, Appellant contends:
Saegrov is directed toward optimizing point-to-point links
between independent peer nodes in the air and on the ground.
In Saegrov[,] each RF beam is focused and directed towards a
specific link target to optimize a single point-to-point link. . . .
In contrast . . . , the Appellant claims [recite] that a plurality of
first ground communication cells are defined by respective
boundaries of the plurality of first beams . . . transmitted by an
airborne fleet . . . of aircraft[s]. . . . That is, . . . the aircraft[s]
of the airborne fleet act as base stations and the size and shape
of at least some ground communication cells . . . are altered by
transmitting reshaped beams from [the] aircraft[s] of the
airborne fleet.
Appeal Br. 17.
We are unpersuaded of error. Appellant addresses only Saegrov,
whereas the Examiner has presented a prima facie case of obviousness for
the at-issue claim feature by proposing a Swensen-Saegrov combination that
shapes a cell into sectors in view of Swensen and generates the sectors via
beam steering in view of Saegrov. See supra 4–5 (applied teaching of
Swensen and Saegrov). For example, Appellant fails to contest that
Swensen shapes a cell into sectors, such sectoring achieves a “size and
shape” (claim 1) of communication cells, or the sectoring configurations
teach reshaping whereby “cells are altered” (claim 1). See Swensen Fig. 8
(three sectoring configurations). Nor does Appellant contest that Saegrov
shows it would have been obvious to shape a receiving sector of a
communication by beam steering the transmission. See Saegrov ¶ 108 (“The
antenna beam for transmission is adapted to apply power into the calculated
spatial volume.”); Fig. 4 (receiving sector).
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

10
Appellant also contends Saegrov cannot teach or suggest the
Swensen-Saegrov combination’s use of beam steering to shape a wireless
service cell because Saegrov uses beam steering to optimize a peer-to-peer
communication. Appeal Br. 17–18. We are unpersuaded of error.
Appellant does not explain why use of beam steering to shape a spatial
sector for receipt of a peer-to-peer communication (see supra 4–5 (applied
teachings of Saegrov)) fails to evidence an obviousness of beam steering to
shape a spatial sector for receipt of a wireless service communications by
subscribers. See KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007) (“[Obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed
to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim.”); EWP Corp. v.
Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“A reference
must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not
limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect.”
(Original emphasis)).
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the § 103
rejections and thus sustain them.
Appeal 2019-003900
Application 14/462,167

11
OVERALL CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–30.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 20, 21 obviousness-type double patenting
U.S. App. No.
14/462,403 1, 20, 21
1–25, 27–
30 § 103 Swensen, Saegrov
1–25,
27–30
26 § 103 Swensen, Saegrov, Bonawitz 26
Overall
Outcome 1–30

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED