Sunbeam Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 18, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 676 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sunbeam Corporation (Dumas Division) and Interna-
tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases 26-CA-4765
and 26-CA-4835
June 18, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On January 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas F. Maher issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and General
Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and
Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, with the following additions and modifica-
tions.
1. Respondent asserts that the Administrative
Law Judge's 8(a)(3) finding based on its discontin-
uance of employee Bates' paid breakfast break on
June 11, 1973, was defective because the Administra-
tive Law Judge relied on his "findings heretofore set
forth [establishing Bates] as an employee with whose
statutory rights Respondent had unlawfully inter-
fered," whereas scrutiny of the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision does not disclose any such "find-
ings heretofore set forth." Like Respondent, we
cannot ascertain that the Administrative Law Judge
has made such prior findings with respect to Bates.
The only incidents mentioned by the Administrative
Law Judge with regard to Bates , outside the context
of his 8(a)(3) finding, were the May 9 warning given
Bates by Supervisor Napier against talking too much
to employees, found not to have violated Section
8(a)(1), and the May 3 remark by Plant Manager
Ahlgrin to Bates deploring Bates ' wearing of a union
insignia, which is not set forth as an 8(a)(1)
violation,2 nor was this incident alleged as such in
the complaint. Taking note of the Administrative
Law Judge's reliance on his nonexistent earlier
findings, we nonetheless adopt his 8(a)(3) finding as
to Bates based on the supporting findings which he
i In the absence of exceptions , we adopt, pro forma, the Administrative
Law Judge's dismissal of certain 8(a)(1) and (3) allegations of the complaint.
The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to
enumerates, which we hereinafter articulate more
fully.
Bates was known by Respondent to be a leader in
the union campaign from his openly wearing a union
insignia, his solicitation of union memberships in the
plant, and his distributing union literature. Plant
Manager Ahlgrin had exhibited Respondent's oppo-
sition towards Bates activities by expressing his
disapproval of Bates' wearing such insignia. The paid
breakfast break had been extended to Bates by his
supervisor (Napier) some 3 years previously, and
Bates had exercised such privilege with Respondent's
knowledge and without its objection. It was not until
Ahlgrin pressured Napier to discontinue this privi-
lege that this was done. It is clear from the foregoing
that Ahlgrin's pressure resulted from his union
animus as exhibited earlier, at a time when the
Union's organizational campaign seemed to be
making some headway. As the motivation for
discontinuance of Bates' privilege was to discourage
union activities of employees, such action was
discriminatory and thus violative of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1), and we so find.
2. Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we
find that the preponderance of the record evidence
supports the General Counsel's allegation that
Respondent's transfer of employee Harrell, on June
7, was made to interfere with and discourage union
activities of its employees, and thus violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1). In our view, the transfer from the
plant area where Harrell had worked, to the
warehouse which was located at some distance, was
clearly intended to and did, in fact, diminish
Harrell's opportunities as a leading union adherent
to contact other employees in order to solicit their
union support. That this was at least partial motiva-
tion for the transfer is evident from the fact that on
May 9, 1973, Supervisor Everett had warned Harrell
to stay away from the Union and to "keep his nose
clean," and only 5 days before the transfer, Ahlgrin
had expressed his concern to employee Hare that
Harrell "was working for the Union and was trying
to get something going in the plant." We rely also on
Hare's uncontradicted testimony, not adverted to by
the Administrative Law Judge, that a few days after
the transfer, Everett told Hare that the reason for
Harrell's transfer was because Everett had all he
could stand of a union and it was in the best interest
of the Company. The Administrative Law Judge did
not discredit Hare in any respect and no other reason
appears for not accepting this testimony. In the
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
2 No exception is taken to the failure to find a violation by this conduct.
211 NLRB No. 75
SUNBEAM CORP. 677
context of other 8(a)(1) and (3) conduct which we are
finding, we construe Everett's remark as conveying
Respondent's belief that it was not in the Company's
interest to have a union, and its willingness to
commit unfair labor practices to accomplish this
objective. At any rate Everett's admission that one of
the reasons for Harrell's transfer was because of
Everett's union animus is sufficient to support the
finding that Harrell's talking was a pretext and his
transfer was an 8(a)(3) and (1) violation, and we so
find.3
3. We do not adopt the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by Ahlgrin's comment to employee Hare on
June 2, 1973, that Ahlgrin was told by some of the
girls working on the line that Harrell was attending
union meetings , and talking with them about the
Union. Harr ell's activities, which consisted of openly
wearing union buttons on his work attire and
attending meetings since the Union's organizational
drive began a month before, were overt and well
known throughout the plant. Ahlgrin's disclosure to
Hare of information of this sort about Harrell, and
saying that the information came from some of the
girls on the line, without more, did not suggest that
Respondent had engaged in spying on Harrell's
union activities. We find that Ahlgrin's comments,
under the circumstances, were not reasonably de-
signed to give the impression that Ahlgrin was
engaged in surveillance. Bryant Chucking Grinder
Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1546-47 (Massy) .4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Sunbeam Corporation (Dumas Division), Dumas,
Arkansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees with respect to their
union membership, interests, or activities or those of
their fellow employees.
(b) Promising its employees sick and bereavement
7 The Chairman , unlike his colleagues, would adopt the Administrative
Law Judge's explicit finding that Respondent was justified in transferring
Harrell to prevent him from continuing to violate Respondent 's admittedly
valid and impartially applied no-solicitation rule. In the Chairman's view,
the record is replete with instances of Harrell's violations of that rule, and
his transfer was a reasonable and temperate exercise of Respondent's right
to enforce that rule , even though it may have had some animus with respect
to Harrell's union activity generally. There is no evidence of disparate
application of this rule, and the Chairman is of the view that it is of dubious
propriety for his colleagues to ignore all of the record evidence carefully
considered by the Administrative Law Judge and to find an 8(a)(3) violation
based substantially on one piece of testimony which the Administrative Law
Judge apparently failed to refer to and which , for all we know , he might well
have discredited.
pay benefits in a context of soliciting opposition to
the Union.
(c) Interfering with employees' access to Board
processes by threatening employees with reprisals for
filing unfair labor practices charges.
(d) Making threats that it would close the plant or
move elsewhere, withdraw certain benefits from its
employees, or insist on bargaining from a minimum
wage base if the employees selected the Union as
their bargaining representative.
(e) Engaging in the surveillance of its employees'
union activities, soliciting employees to engage in
such surveillance, and creating the impression among
the employees that they are under such surveillance.
(f) Discouraging membership in International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor organization, by
withdrawing privileges customarily enjoyed by em-
ployees and by transferring employees to different
jobs.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it
is found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Reinstate the permission to Lamar Bates to
absent himself from the plant on early Monday
mornings for the period of a half hour for the
purpose of procuring breakfast and Sylvester Harrell
to his former job or, if it no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges.
(b) Post at its Dumas, Arkansas, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 26, after being duly signed by Respon-
dent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
4 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Supervisor
Hurst's threat to take reprisals against employee Knight because Knight had
filed charges with the Board was violative of Sec. 8(a)(1) because this
constituted interference with employees' freedom to avail themselves of
Board processes. However, we do not adopt his finding that such conduct
constituted discrimination within the meaning of Sec. 8(a)(4). At most, this
amounted merely to a threat to discriminate ; no action was taken against
Knight.
5 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, SUNBEAM CORPORATION
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply (DUMAS DIVISION)
herewith. (Employer)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations which have
not been found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our
employees concerning their union membership,
interests , or activities or those of their fellow
employees.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees that we
will give them sick and bereavement pay if they
oppose the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close or move our
plant , to withhold benefits , or to insist on
bargaining from minimum wage rates if the
Union is selected by our employees.
WE WILL NOT engage in the surveillance of our
employees' union activities , solicit others to do so
in our behalf, or give the impression to employees
that they are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT interfere with employees ' access
to Board processes by threatening them with
reprisals for filing unfair labor practice charges.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
Union, International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers , AFL-CIO-CLC, or any
other labor organization , by withdrawing privi-
leges customarily engaged in by employees or by
transferring employees to different jobs.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with , restrain , or coerce our employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL reinstitute permission to Lamar Bates
to absent himself from the plant on early Monday
mornings for the period of a half hour for the
purpose of procuring breakfast and Sylvester
Harrell to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges.
All of you , our employees , are free to remain,
withdraw from membership in, or become or refrain
from becoming members of International Union of
Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor organization.
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal Building,
Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis,
Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS F. MAHER, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges and amendments thereto filed on June 8, August
22, and July 13 and September 10 and 28, 1973,
respectively, by International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, against Sunbeam
Corporation (Dumas Division), Respondent herein, the
Regional Director for Region 26 of the National Labor
Relations Board , herein called the Board , issued a
complaint on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board
on October 4, 1973, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(29 U.S.C., § 151, et seq. ), herein called the Act. In its duly
filed answer Respondent , while admitting certain allega-
tions of the complaint, denied the commission of any
unfair labor practice.
Pursuant to notice a trial was held before me in Pine
Bluff, Arkansas , whereat all parties were present, repre-
sented by counsel, and afforded full opportunity to call
and cross-examine witnesses , to present oral argument, and
file briefs. Briefs were filed by counsel for the Respondent
and the General Counsel on December 5, 1973.
Upon consideration of the entire record, including the
briefs filed with me, and specifically upon consideration of
the testimony of each witness appearing before me, as well
as a consideration of his or her demeanor ,' I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is a corporation doing business in the State
of Arkansas with an office and factory located at Dumas,
Arkansas , where it is engaged in the manufacture of
electrical appliances . During the past 12 months, in the
course and conduct of its business operations , Respondent
purchased and received at its Dumas, Arkansas, location
products valued in excess of $50,000 from points located
I Bishop and Malco, Inc, 159 NLRB 1159,116 1.
SUNBEAM CORP. 679
outside the State of Arkansas , and during the same period
it sold and shipped from its Dumas , Arkansas , location
products valued in excess of $50 ,000 directly to points
located outside the State of Arkansas.
Upon the foregoing admitted facts I conclude and find
Respondent to be an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted and I accordingly conclude and find
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, to be a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Commencing in early April 1973 interest in self-orgam-
zation was generated among Respondent's employees. This
resulted largely through the efforts of the Union's business
representative, George Clark, Sr., assisted by a number of
employees who were designated as members of an
organizing committee. Among the employees actively
participating in the efforts of this group were Lamar Bates,
Verlene Hare , Sylvester Harrell, Jake Knight, and Glyn
Overton. These, with the admitted full knowledge of the
Respondent's officials and supervisors, distributed leaflets,
wore prominently displayed insignia , solicited employees
to join the Union, and publicized up-coming union
meetings.
1. Interference, restraint, and coercion
As this activity developed Respondent's officials and
supervisors initiated counteraction consistent with its
stated opposition to the Union and to the organizing of the
employees 2 that is alleged in the Complaint to constitute
interference , restraint and coercion with the employees and
their efforts to organize.
Employee Sylvester Harrell appears to have been the
first to have engaged in conversation about the Union with
any of the supervisors. Thus on May 9, a week after he had
begun wearing a union pocket pencil clip and after two
organizing meetings had been held, Harrell initiated a
conversation with Foreman Jimmy Everett asking him if
the supervisors had discussed the Union in their meeting.
Replying that they did Everett continued to tell Harrell
that he should stay away from the Union, that they
(unions) were no good, that he should try to keep his nose
clean . He then told Harrell that he had stuck his neck out
to get Harrell the job he had and he would hate to see him
mess it up.3
About the same time Employee Lamar Bates , one of the
organizing committee wearing a union insignia, was sought
2 Plant Manager Peter Ahlgrim testified that employees , including those
about to be hired, have been informed by him and other officials of the
Company that it is opposed to the Union and does not want it at Sunbeam.
This fact is confirmed by the testimony of Personnel Manager Diane
Daniels and stated as Company policy in a folio of instructions presently
distributed to newly hired employees.
3 The credited testimony of Harrell . Everett testified that he had had
such a conversation in which he voiced his opposition to the Union. No
out by Supervisor Larry Napier and told by him that he
was spending too much time talking to one of the
employees and that he was thus impeding that employee
from making production. Napier, when called to testify,
confirmed the contents of this conversation, explaining
that he had received a complaint from Supervisor Clarence
Hurst that Bates was spending an excessive amount of time
talking to his employees and he thereupon warned Bates.
Hurst confirmed this, testifying that an employee in his
section, naming her, when chided for poor production told
him that it was being caused by interruptions from Bates.
Whereupon Hurst reported the matter to Bates' supervisor,
Napier, who then gave Bates the warning complained of.
Significantly, Napier testified that he had first learned that
Bates was indulging in excessive talking sometime in April,
a month before he was spoken to. In fact, Napier stated,
"this had been going on for a good while."
About a month later, beginning on June 2, Respondent's
opposition to the Union intensified. Thus, on or about that
date Plant Manager Ahlgrim sought out Employee Verlene
Hare at her workplace and engaged her in a conversation
concerning the benefits that would be available to
employees without the assistance of the Union. Employee
Hare enumerated the benefits which they were not then
receiving, such as sick pay and bereavement pay. In reply
Ahlgrim assured her that a union would not be necessary
to get these and she should tell the other employees that
the Company was already working on a plan to institute
them.4
During this same conversation Hare and Ahlgrim
discussed Employee Sylvester Harrell and his interest in
the Union. It appears that at a recent company-employee
conference Harrell had asked Ahlgrim "Why there were no
blacks as foremen." Ahlgrim was reported to have replied
that none were qualified. In the conversation with Hare
Ahlgrim denied making such a statement and then asked
her what had motivated Harrell's question. When Hare
suggested it was curiosity Ahlgrim volunteered that he had
to ask the question because he "was working for the Union
and that he was trying to get something going in the plant."
This he knew, he stated, because he had been told by some
of the girls working on the line that Harrell had been
attending union meetings and talking about the Union
with them .5
Later in June, on or about the 22, Employee Hare went
to the office of Personnel Manager Diane Daniel to
complain about a faulty restroom door. In the course of the
conversation which followed Mrs. Daniel asked Employee
Hare if she had seen a recently distributed union handbill
in which the relative sizes of the office and plant restrooms
were criticized, the latter being compared to a privy. Hare
then asked Daniels "how she thought the Union was
getting along in the plant." Daniel replied that she had no
way of knowing but that she hoped that it was not coming
mention was made, however, of the caution not to "mess up."
4 Ahlgrim recalled the conversation and described it a rambling one, but
he did not recall saying anything about sick and bereavement pay and
denied having told Hare that the employees did not need a union to get it. I
find Hare to be a credible witness and do not credit Ahlgrim's denial of
testimony attributed to him by her.
5 The credited testimony of Employee Hare which Ahlgrim substantially
admits.
680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
along well because if it got into the plant the plant might
close and that would put all of them out of jobs and cause
much personal suffering among the employees .6 Several
days earlier , on June 19, a similar suggestion of plant
closure had been made to Employee William Smith by
Foreman Leon Chapman. Thus, according to Smith's
credited account, Chapman stated to him and to other
employees present that if the Union got in the plant would
probably close down or move, and that if this occurred
Chapman's newly purchased home could not be paid for.7
About the same time Employee Gene Love engaged in
conversations with both Foreman Don Nuckols and
Jimmy Everett. In the first one, with Nuckols, he pointed
to the union button Love was wearing and asked him why
he was wearing it. To which Love replied that it was
because he was for the Union. Later in the day Everett
approached Love near the assembly line and told him he
thought he was against the Union. Love replied that he had
some doubts but these have been resolved in the Union's
favor. Everett then asked him if this was a result of the
union meeting he had attended the night before. Everett
then went on to question Love as to what was wrong with
the Company, suggesting that if he had any complaints he
should bring them to him, and not get involved with the
Union. Everett also asked Love what he planned to do and
how he would manage if the Union called a strike.8
By late June, it is clear, the Union's campaign was in full
bloom. Periodic meetings were being held and Respon-
dent's supervisors were countering the Union's efforts in
the various ways heretofore described. The events sur-
rounding one of the meetings generated considerable
attention and significance. This one was held on the
evening of July 5, in a meeting room at the Delta Lodge,
the only motel in Dumas, Arkansas. Testimony on this
subject was ample; so much so, in fact, I saw fit to expedite
the hearing by making a finding on the record. On the
basis of all of the testimony I found that Supervisor Don
Nuckols was present on the Delta Lodge premises on July
5, at the time the union meeting was in progress, that he
observed the breaking up of the union meeting which he
knew to be such, and that he recognized certain individuals
in attendance , as he so testified at the hearing. All that
appears to have been in dispute was Nuckols' motive and
intent in being present at that particular time.
Nuckols credibly explained at the trial that he appeared
at the motel by prearrangement to meet a friend staying
there, with the intention of going on elsewhere with him.
He was seen on the premises by any number of employees,
and others, and he admittedly saw them, and he knew
them to be union members attending a union meeting.
Other facts also emerged. The Delta Lodge is the only
6 The credited testimony of Employee Hare . Mrs. Daniels corroborated
her testimony as to the conversation , excepting only the statement
concerning the closing of the plant . This she did not "remember" having
said ; to her "recollection " she said nothing like that . I do not credit this
half-hearted denial.
I I do not credit Foreman Chapman 's denial that this conversation took
place.
R The credited testimony of Employee Love . Everett's testimony
substantially agrees with it except that he does not recall anything being
said about strikes . Nuckols did not testify respecting the conversation
attributed to him by Love.
Two other conversations with supervisors at this time , one involving
motel in town, and maintains the town's only restaurant.
Here all the business people have lunch and have their
coffeebreaks, and many of them, including a number
testifying, frequent the restaurant weekly for dinner. The
union meeting was one of the weekly ones widely
publicized throughout the plant , some of the more active
members wearing placards announcing the time and place.
In essence therefore, Nuckols, in the usual course of his
affairs, happened upon something that was common
knowledge, and I so conclude and find. The complaint
alleges as follows:
Respondent, by its supervisors and agent, Don Nuck-
ols, on or about July 5, 1973, kept under surveillance
the meeting place of the Union at the Delta Lodge in
Dumas, Arkansas, and observed the employees in
attendance at the meeting.
Upon all of the foregoing findings I am satisfied that
Nuckols was not motivated in either keeping a meeting
under surveillance or observing who was there, particularly
since it was common knowledge in the first place. And,
parenthetically, it might be noted that in assessing this
incident its significance is farfetched. Even counsel for the
Respondent, by his own admission, could have been
charged with the same sort of surveillance, his assigned
motel room when in Dumas being located only several
doors away from the meeting room in question. On the
contrary, I know of no rule that proscribes company
supervisors and officials from frequenting public places
lest they be accused of surveillance; nor am I aware of a
rule that makes their presence unlawful surveillance, per se.
Although there appears to have been no evidence of
unlawful surveillance at the Delta Lodge, other incidents in
early and mid-August do suggest efforts of that nature. On
August 6 Employee Jake Knight, who was doing mainte-
nance work in the vicinity of Employee Overton's
workplace, observed that when Mrs. Overton left her place
to go to the restroom her supervisor, Dean Shields,
immediately went to where Employee Peacock was
working, tapped her on the shoulder, and pointed in the
direction of employee Overton who was then approaching
the restroom. Employee Peacock immediately followed her
into the restroom.9 Knight shortly thereafter told Mrs.
Overton she was being followed, and this, according to her
credited version of the incident, confirmed her own
suspicions of being spied upon. On the same day, she
further testified, Supervisor Shields came to Overton's
workstation and accused her of going around and talking
Union and harassing the employees when she was being
paid to work. When Mrs. Overton protested that she was
Employee Jake Knight and the other employee Glyn Overton, were
submitted as evidence of unlawful interrogation . Knight was party to a
conversation with Supervisor Dean Shields who made disparaging remarks
about unions in general and the Meatcutters Union in particular, and
concluded by saying "What do you think of that?" I put this statement in
the same rhetorical category as the expression, "How about that? " Similarly,
Overton was wearing a union placard on her shoulder, announcing the time
of the union meeting . Shields asked her, "What is that you are wearing
there?" In such a context I consider Shields ' remarks too innocuous to
constitute anything but a poor effort at ridicule , and nothing else.
9 The credited testimony of Employee Knight.
SUNBEAM CORP.
not doing what Shields had accused her of he replied,
"Well, I know I have a lot of sleepers in here, that I don't
know who are for the- Union and who are against it, but
one thing I do know is that you are for it because you wear
the button, organizing button." 10 -
Employee Sylvester Harrell, as will be evident hereafter,
was the most active of Respondent's employees in behalf
of the Union and a synthesis of all the testimony in the
record would support a conclusion that he was constantly
talking to people about the Union on his own, and
frequently on their working time, and was frequently
reprimanded for it. In addition, it is clear that he had
frequent conversations about the Union with the supervi-
sory personnel, sometimes on his own initiative, other
times on theirs. In the course of his union agitation it
appears that he frequently permitted his enthusiasm to run
away with itself. Thus, on at least one occasion he came to
work wearing various union insignia on all parts of his
wearing apparel, front, back, pant legs, sleeve, and
shoulders, and he even pasted a union sticker on his
forehead; all this by his own admission. When Harrell was
so adorned on July 18, Supervisor Nucklos came up to him
and in the presence of several employees told Harrell that,
decorated as he was, he "looked like a G- d- clown." 11
Harrell's description of himself covered with union
propaganda stickers certainly depicted a departure from
the orthodox, even for a heated campaign. Accordingly, I
fail to understand why fair comment on his bizzare
appearance would constitute, in and of itself, harassment
or derision. This is not a situation where a reference to the
Union was introduced into an incident and thus gave the
incident an antiunion flavor. Here, to be sure, the man was
covered with something more than mere buttons. They
were union buttons. But if he looked like a clown it was
quite obvious it was not so much for what was written on
the buttons, as for the way he looked. I accordingly
recommend the dismissal of so much of the complaint as
alleges comment on Harrell's appearance to be unlawful.
Later on the same day Harrell had another conversation
with Nuckols. On this occasion Nuckols came to him and
asked him what he was going to do if the Union did not get
in. To which Harrell replied, "I still plan to work." He then
asked Harrell if the Union were having a meeting on that
evening and at what time.12
Later, on August 20, Harrell was having another one of
his many conversations with supervisors. Present this time
were General Foreman Everett and Supervisors Nuckols
and Thurman, and a number of employees. As the
conversation progressed Supervisor Don Nuckols asked
Harrell, "What can the Union get me?" to which Harrell
replied, "better benefits." Whereupon Supervisor Thurman
contributed to this discussion by saying that, if the Union
got in , negotiations for everyone would start at $1.50 per
hour. Harrell disagreed, insisting that bargaining would
IU Following the incident involving Peacock 's surveillance of Overton in
the restroom on August 6, a number of employees , including Knight and
Overton, were discussing the incident on their coffee break In the course of
this conversation employee Knight quoted an employee , Outzs, as saying
that Supervisor Sherwood Blount `had come to her asking her to spy on
Overton as had Peacock . As Employee Outzs was never called as a witness I
am not disposed to accept this hearsay report of Blount's activity as
681
began at the present pay level. Thurman continued to
maintain this point of view vigorously.
Opposition to the Union appears also to have been
generated among many of the employees. This opposition
was manifest by the wearing of small signs and buttons
with the inscription "No Union." Plant Manager Ahlgrim
and Superintendent Delano Butcher vigorously disavowed
any responsibility on Respondent's part for this activity,
however, citing the action taken with respect to one of the
employees whom witnesses testifying at the trial had
singled out for her union activities-Elsie Tong.13 Superin-
tendent Butcher credibly described the reprimand he gave
to Employee Tong on June 27 for passing out anti-union
literature during working hours and produced for the
record a copy of a file memoranda reflecting this action. I
am accordingly satisfied that Respondent, contrary to the
allegation of the complaint, did not disparately enforce its
distribution rules.
In addition to the Tong incident there is credible
testimony that other employees actively supported a "no-
union" movement. Although employee Overton credibly
testified that on several different occasions Supervisors
Nuckols, Shields, or Blount were standing nearby when
such distribution of no-union material was taking place, I
find nothing in the record to support the allegation that
this was otherwise approved by Respondent. I do find,
however, as stated above, that on the one occasion referred
to by employee Overton-the Tong incident-Superinten-
dent Butcher did take appropriate remedial action.
Accordingly, I have not been persuaded by the overall
evidence, considering the constant barrage of distribution
and conversation in favor of the Union, that Respondent
gave either tacit or direct approval to the no-union activity.
Finally there are several episodes involving employee
Jake Knight prior to his assignment to other duties, to be
considered hereafter (infra ). As will be discussed in greater
detail later, Knight's alleged reassignment to other duties
resulted in the filing of a charge respecting an allegation in
this complaint, subsequently issued, stating as follows:
23. Respondent, on or about June 22, 1973, assigned
its Employee Jake Knight more arduous work.
On July 24, Knight was approached by Supervisor
Clarence Hurst who told him he had better stop talking
about the Union to employees on company time. He said
he had seen the charges that had been filed against the
Company and they included Knight's name as among
those being discriminated against, as well as the names of
Harrell and Bates . Hurst told employee Knight that for all
of Knight's union activity he (Hurst) had reason to file
charges against him, as well. To quote Hurst directly,
according to Knight, "If you don't stop talking union shop
probative evidence and would recommend the dismissal of so much of the
complaint as alleged Blount 's August 6 conduct as a violation of the Act
11 Nuckols' account of the incident substantially agrees with Harrell's
excepting only that he demed the vulgarity attributed to him
12 Nuckols did not testify with respect to this question attributed to him.
13 Employee Glyn Overton credibly described Employee Tong's distri-
bution of no-union buttons and placards.
682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to these people on Company time I 'll file charges against
you." 14
Shortly thereafter , on or about August 7, Knight was
engaged in a road-sweeping assignment together with two
other members of the maintenance department in anticipa-
tion of an expected visit of out-of -town officials . The work
detail was under the working supervision of Supervisor
Richard Fleming . The incident , it is to be noted, occurred
sometime after -the charge had been filed against Respon-
dent alleging that Knight had been assigned to "arduous
labor," supra . When some of the employees working inside
the plant looked out of the window and observed the
sweeping detail at work they observed that of the four
individuals involved Supervisor Fleming and two employ-
ees were busy at their sweeping , and the third employee,
Jake Knight , was simply standing by. This intrigued the
employees and in a short time everyone was at the window
observing Knight , still in a position of nonwork . Whereup-
on an unidentified employee took a photograph of the
scene , and inscribed the word "arduous labor" at the top of
the picture , with an arrow pointing at Knight. It was then
brought to the desk of Personnel Manager Daniel . Word of
the picture spread throughout the plant and numerous
employees came by to see it . By then so much interest had
developed over the picture that Mrs . Daniel , finding the
situation amusing, posted it on the cafeteria bulletin board
where it remained for several days.
2. Conclusions
Enumerated above in substantially chronological order
are a series of incidents relating to those of Respondent's
employees most active in the Union's effort to organize its
employees . It is claimed by counsel for the General
Counsel that these incidents , viewed against a backdrop of
Respondent's admitted antipathy to the Union, manifest
interference with, and restraint and coercion of, the
employees in their rights to self-organization.
A summary of these findings hardly seems necessary at
this juncture . But a reading of them discloses a variety of
categories which the Board and the courts have traditional-
ly found to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Thus between
April and August numerous employees were questioned by
supervisors , in some cases as part of a general conversa-
tion , in others by direct confrontation; frequently on a
minor point, other times on elements of union activity not
at all minor . Regardless of this variety, one common factor
emerges . Respondent , admittedly opposed to the unioniza-
tion of its employees, has thus constantly intruded itself
into the affairs of its individual employees by the action of
its supervisors , in an area in which it has no business;
namely , their union sentiments and activities and those of
their associates . Citation of authority is unnecessary to
establish such instances of interrogation as employee
interference , restraint , and coercion in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act and I so conclude and find.
Recounted earlier are conversations with the Respon-
dent's supervisory employees, Gill, Daniel, Everett, Chap-
man, and Thurman, wherein reference was made dire
consequences to the employees , or to themselves personal-
ly, should the Union get into the plant. These included
such things as possible plant closing , loss of benefits, and
commencement of wage negotiations from the minimum
allowable wage . It goes without saying that such statements
by supervisors, even though they be solicited by employees,
and however casual or friendly they may be, carry with
them the weight of authority and suggest employer
thinking on the subject. This has always been held to have
undue influence upon employees and as such constitutes
unlawful interference , restraint, and coercion. I according-
ly conclude and find the statements of supervisors which
constitute threats of unfavorable consequences if the
Union is selected by the employees to be further violations
of Section 8(aXl).
The same applies to alleged promises of benefit. Thus it
has been found that Plant Manager Ahlgrim in the course
of an extended and rambling general conversation, told
employee Hare that the sick and bereavement pay which
she insisted that was needed would be forthcoming and
that a Union would not be necessary to get it. It goes
without saying that a plant manager's assurance that fringe
pay benefits will be granted without union intercession
would certainly convince the employees that the Union
that they were seeking was actually not necessary. This is
the sort of interference consistently proscribed by Board
and courts and I conclude and find it to be a further
violation of Section 8(aXl).
Throughout the findings I have made there runs a thread
of curiosity on Respondent 's part that is inconsistent with
the employees' rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Thus, on three distinct occasions , Respondent 's representa-
tives sought to give , if they did not actually give, the
impression that a given employee 's activities had been
found out. Thus, Plant Manager Ahlgrim told employee
Hare of things he had learned about Sylvester Harrell's
union activities ; Supervisor Everett pointedly asked em-
ployee Love questions concerning the union meeting "he
had attended the night before"; and Supervisor Chapman
told Sylvester Harrell that it had been reported to him that
he had been talking union to the employees. In addition, is
the effort to enlist spying activity manifest when Employee
Peacock was "tapped" to follow Employee Overton to the
restroom.
All of the foregoing amply support the allegations in the
complaint directed to Respondent 's solicitation of an
employee to surveil the employees union activities and the
impressions it gave to other employees that surveillance
was being carried on. This is a well-recognized form of
employee interference , restraint, and coercion and I
conclude and find that it further violates Section 8(a)(l).15
One other incident noted in my findings merits com-
ment, the conversation between Supervisor Hurst and
employee Jake Knight where Knight's part in the filing of
charges against Respondent with the Board prompted
14 Hurst 's account of the conversation was substantially the same but 15 In such findings and conclusions relating to surveillances as I have
related Knight 's union activity to a recently reported solicitation of an made I do not include Nuckols' alleged surveillance at the Delta Lodge nor
employee , Hill, to him . Thus, "You have an unfair labor practice against us the hearsay evidence to the effect that Supervisor Blount solicited an
saying we broke the law . . . now you know that you are breaking it if you employee to surveil.
try to sign him [Hill I up during working hours."
SUNBEAM CORP. 683
Hurst to threaten Knight that he would, or should, file
charges against him. This is clearly an effort at reprisal
directed at Knight for whatever part he had in taking
action before the Board against Respondent, here in the
form of the filed charge. As this conduct clearly constitutes
threatened action "against an employee because he has
filed charges with the Board" I conclude and find that it
not only interferes with, restrains, and coerces the
employee in violation of Section 8(a)(1) but is discrimina-
tion in violation of Section 8(a)(4), as well.
In addition to the foregoing there are other incidents set
forth in my findings in which it has not, in my judgement,
been established that there is unlawful interference,
restraint, or coercion. Specifically, I reject the contention
that warning employee Lamar Bates not to talk to a stated
employee was a violation. The record abounds in testimo-
ny of solicitation of employees by other employees all over
the plant during working hours, and of Respondent's
efforts to control it. This incident I view to be such an
effort and I consider it permissible. Nor am I persuaded
that Respondent's efforts at enforcing its solicitation rule
was disparately applied. No evidence has been advanced to
show Respondent's support of the employees' no-union
campaign and, on the positive side, a reprimand was given
in the only specific incident mentioned in the record.
Finally I am not persuaded that the published photo of
employee Jake Knight in the company of his working
foreman and two associates nor the reference to employee
Sylvester Harrell as a clown when decorated with union
insignia constituted in either case a deprivation of their
respective statutory rights. It is quite conceivable that each
may have been embarassed, but I would suggest that in
each case the source of their embarassment was of their
own doing.
In summary, accordingly, I would recommend the
dismissal of the complaint, insofar as it alleges the
foregoing incidents to constitute violations of Act.
B. Respondent's Discrimination
1. Sylvester Harrell
Heretofore Sylvester Harrell's activities have been set
forth in considerable detail. Specifically, he was the leader
among the employees supporting the Union and spent
much of his spare time in soliciting among the employees
and distributing union literature. Nor can it be said that his
efforts in behalf of the Union were restricted to his and
respective listener's nonworking time. Indeed, the nature of
Harrell's job, a trucker or supplier to employees on the
assembly line, was such as would bring him in continuing
contact with the employees on the line as well as in the
supply areas and other production areas from which he
would transport materials to the line which he served.
Nothing in Harrell's testimony or elsewhere suggests him
to be the epitome of silence. On the contrary the record is
replete with evidence that Harrell was the living model of
Tennyson's brook during everyone's working time, includ-
ing his own. In his own testimony Harrell conceded that he
frequently talked to employees on the assembly line and
that he was reprimanded for it. But I do not accept as
credible, however, Harrell's qualification that not only was
this conversation on his breaktime, after he had wandered
back to the line, but on the breaktime of the line employees
as well. In summary, I conclude and find upon all of the
evidence, and particularly upon the testimony of each of
Respondent's supervisors who testified from first-hand
observation, that Sylvester Harrell was continually en-
gaged in talking with employees during his and/or their
working time from at least April 1973.
On June 7, 1973, Harrell was transferred from his job as
trucker in the production area, to an assignment in the
warehouse, located some distance from the plant. At this
new location Harrell did not, he testified, have the same
opportunities to visit with his fellow employees, but he did
travel back and forth between warehouse and plant in the
handling of supplies, and on his lunch breaks he likewise
visited in the plant. . I
According to Foreman Everett and to Plant Manager
Ahlgrim, who made the final decision, Harrell's transfer
was the culmination of a series of events. It was found that
he had been neglecting his work by failing to keep the aisle
at the assembly line clear of skids, by not keeping the floor
in the area clean, and by not cleaning up the conveyor belt.
And on one occasion close to the time of his transfer he
failed to clean an electric motor at the line, after having
been instructed to do so. All of this, according to Everett
and Ahlgrim, was in addition to Harrell's predisposition
towards conversation with the employees. In support of its
assigned reasons for transferring Harrell Respondent
introduced into the record memoranda prepared and filed
on various dates prior to his transfer and signed by
Supervisors Everett, Nuckols, and Blount, corroborating
the conditions which they had cited in support of the
transfer.
After reasonable evaluation of all the testimony relating
to Harrell's activities, including his own testimony, it
certainly cannot be denied that he was behaving in the
nature of a gadfly and was a source of confusion in the
production area. I am aware of nothing that requires an
employer to tolerate such interference with the orderly
operation of his plant simply because the individual
involved is a union leader or the subject matter of the
interruptions happens to be the Union. In other words,
Harrell had no special immunity. That is not to say that
Harrell's transfer could not have been effected specifically
to counter the Union. But although Respondent was
admittedly opposed to the Union this conclusion does not
necessarily follow. Until the beginning of the Union's
campaign Harrell was shown to have been a well-oriented
employee with potential for improvement. Thus it cannot
be said that his conversational habits had been previously
condoned. They were not. In fact, as soon as his activities
began to interrupt the work of others he was promptly
spoken to, as was Respondent's right. Accordingly, I am
persuaded that Respondent took the only course open to it,
transferring Harrell to a location where he would least
disturb the plant operations by his talking, be it union or
baseball. In a word, I conclude and find that as Harrell was
transferred, at no loss of pay incidentally, for interfering
with employees, among the other things noted above, and
as the subject matter, union talk, has not been shown to
have been the specific determinate of Respondent's
684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
decision , no discrimination has been visited upon him. As I
have thereby concluded that Sylvester Harrell was trans-
ferred for due cause shown on the record I will recommend
that the complaint be dismissed as to him.
talk to him and instruct him not to bother other people
while they were working.
2. Jake Knight
Employee Jake Knight was a journeyman electrician
assigned to the maintenance department and active in the
organization of the Union, as previously described.
Included among his duties was the repair of machinery
throughout the plant, frequently necessitating that he
consult with the operator-employees.16 It was this talking
with employees that generated the difficulties in which
Knight ultimately found himself. Knight admitted that he
had frequently talked with employees, and that he had
been spoken to about it by supervisors. Thus he described
a reprimand by Supervisor Fleming and the explanation he
(Knight) gave Fleming-that he was talking to the
employees about the problems involved in the machinery
he was fixing . But, Knight insisted , when he spoke to
employees in such situations it was "no more than
necessary to do my job," and he never stood around and
talked to them. I do not credit this limitation which Knight
places upon his conversations . His own testimony contra-
dicts him . Thus , for example , he stated that while installing
some burnishing valves he was talking to the operator-"I
was talking about his going back to school, going to
college." At this point in his testimony he was denying that
he was talking about the Union. Indeed it is almost
inconceivable that an employee as loquacious as Knight
appeared to me to be could be constantly in the presence
of other employees and fail to converse with them on
something other than the immediate job at hand. I
accordingly conclude and find, contrary to Knight's
denials , that during the period prior to June 22 he
frequently engaged employees in conversations and stood
by as he talked with them, as reported by Supervisor Hurst
to Superintendent Butcher, and as observed by Butcher
independently.
On June 22 Employee Knight was assigned to the roof of
the plant to scrape paint from an air-conditioning unit and
to otherwise prepare it for repainting. I have credited the
testimony of Superintendent Delano Butcher, whose
version of this incident follows:
A. I had received complaints about Jake not
working, that he was standing around talking to
employees while they were working, bothering them,
and couldn ' t we do something about it.
a s s s s
Q. From whom did you receive these reports?
A. Mr. Dean Shields, Clarence Hurst, I believe
Jimmy Everett, and after I had received several
complaints, I went to Richard Fleming and I told him
he was to put Jake to work, that he was to put in eight
hours a day like everyone else, and would he please go
Q. You had actual observation of him on your own
part, or were you relying exclusively on reports of
others?
A. I saw him on several occasions myself.
Q. What did you do?
A. I instructed Dick to talk to Jake and tell him not
to be bothering the people while they were at work.
Q. After you'd given these instructions and Mr.
Fleming had reported back to you on talking to Jake
Knight, what happened thereafter?
A. It appeared that Jake wasn 't going to quit his
talking to the employees to me, that was my personal
observation , and I told him Dick, I said "Send him up
on the roof and have him scrape those air-conditioning
units that we have been trying to paint for two years,
scrape them down and repaint them."
Furthermore , in my own independent assessment of the
alleged discrimination involved here , I have given consid-
eration to the following statement of Butcher which I
likewise credit:
A. From talking to Dick Fleming, Dick related to
me that Jake was definitely for the Union, trying to
push it.
Q. Now did this fact that he was for the Union
influence your decision to send him on the roof?
A. No sir. The very fact that he wasn't doing
anything and talking to the employees was the only
reason.
Q. Was there any report made to you of what he
was talking to the employees about?
A. I do not know the substance of these conversa-
tions.
Finally, I credit Butcher's testimony that Knight's assign-
ment was not entirely unusual; two other employees,
Johnson and Nichols , having spent most of the spring and
summer on the roof repairing air conditioners.
Upon consideration of all of the foregoing it is obvious,
of course , that Knight's enthusiasm for talking with the
employees , even after having been warned , was the sole
reason for his assignment to the roof . At the outset it must
be recognized that Knight enjoys no immunity from such
discipline, which I find it to be simply because he was a
known leader in the Union's campaign , or because he
happened to be talking about the Union . The simple facts
are that he was talking , that his talking was reasonably
deemed to be interruptive of production , that he was
warned to stop it , that he did not do so . I have no
alternative on these facts but to conclude and find as I do
that Knight's transfer to the roof was for just cause and not
for any discriminatory motive established on this record. I
will accordingly recommend that so much of the complaint
that relates to Knight 's transfer to the roof be dismissed.
16 Superintendent Delano Butcher credibly testified that Knight's
maintenance duties were not limited to those in the electrical field.
SUNBEAM CORP. 685
3. Lamar Bates
Findings set forth heretofore establish Lamar Bates as
one of the leaders of the Union's campaign and as an
employee with whose statutory rights Respondent had
unlawfully interfered. In addition, Bates became involved
in an incident alleged to have been unlawful discrimina-
tion.
Bates , an employee with 6 years' service with the
Company was employed in the plating department. His job
required his arrival at the plant on Monday mornings at 3
a.m. The purpose of this was to insure that the boilers and
air conditioners in the plating department be turned on
and raised to the required levels after having been
shutdown for the weekend; the nature of the operations of
this department being such as to require critical attention
to proper temperature control of the laboratory and of the
solutions being used.
After Bates had attended to these details on a typical
Monday morning it was his custom to leave the plant for a
period of a half hour, during which time he went home for
breakfast. This arrangement, according to Bates' credited
testimony, was made with Larry Napier 3 years previously,
shortly after Napier had assumed the duties of processing
engineer, and it continued until June 11, 1973. On that day,
a Monday morning, Bates appeared as usual at 3 a.m.,
turned on his boilers, and attended to the other routine
Monday morning details, and at 5 a.m. left for home. As
was his approved custom he did not clock out. Upon his
return at approximately 5:40 a.m.,17 he came upon Napier
in the cafeteria as he was passing through. Bates credibly
states that he does not recall Napier coming in early before
this time. Napier called him to his table and asked him if
he had clocked out. When he stated that he had not,
Napier then asked him if he were not aware that it was
contrary to the rules to leave the plant without clocking
out. Bates assured Napier that he was aware of this rule but
reminded him that he had been told by him (Napier) 3
years ago that he could go home for breakfast and he had
been doing it ever since; the reason for this permission
being that Bates could not keep food in the department
refrigerator as he had done before receiving the permission
to go home for breakfast. Napier told Bates that Plant
Manager Ahlgrim had put pressure on him and he had to
take the action he was taking; namely, enforcing the
clocking-out rule henceforth.
Reference to the findings made earlier indicates that
Bates was one of the ones singled out by Plant Manager
Ahlgrim on May 3, when, upon noticing his penholder in
his pocket, Ahlgrim told him that he was ashamed of him
and that he thought that he could depend upon him. On a
later occurrence Bates was told not to talk with employees
(supra) . Since the June 11 incident Bates has not been
permitted to follow his previous custom of going home on
Monday mornings for breakfast.
Supervisor Napier substantially confirms Bates' account
of the June 11 confrontation. He denies, however, that he
told Bates that he was being pressured from above or that
he otherwise suggested the action was being taken for
reasons of Bates' union activities or talking with employ-
ees. Similarly he denies that he ever gave Bates permission
to go home on Monday mornings-in -the first place.
I do not credit Napier's testimony. According to Bates,
this disputed permission was given when Supervisor Dean
Shields was in overall charge of his department and with
his knowledge. Since that time Clarence Hurst has replaced
Shields. Shields was never called to testify in denial of the
knowledge and tacit approval attributed to him, and Hurst
was not questioned on this subject, but only on the subject
of warning Bates against talking to employees. Bates, on
the other hand, testified that the Monday morning practice
had been going on for 3 years. It would seem, therefore,
that Napier was either woefully unfamiliar with what was
going on his department, not knowing of Bates practice, or
that he actually knew that Bates was going home for
breakfast. I find and conclude that he was aware of the
practice. Being aware of the practice, Napier's testimony
that he had learned of it from employee Jackson does not
make sense, if believed. Nor do I place credence upon
Napier's reliance upon the plant rules to justify to Bates at
the time, and to me at the trial, that Bates was a
wrongdoer. Rule 11 states as grounds for discipline:
Leaving Company premises during working hours,
except in the regular course of duty, without permission
of the supervisor.
Napier's efforts to relate this rule to Bates ' situation
completely begs the question; for, assuming Bates to have
had permission, which I do, the rule would have no
application to his case. When this interpretation was
presented to Napier at the trial, his explanation became
unintelligible. For all of the foregoing, including the
contradictory and confused nature of some of Napier's
replies, I do not accept his denials that Bates had absented
himself on June 11 under a longstanding arrangement to
which Napier had been a party.
Upon consideration of all that has been discussed herein,
and with particular reference to the earlier findings that
Bates ' union activities had been known to Respondent and
deplored, and that he had already been warned for talking
Union to employees, I am persuaded that the restrictions
placed upon him respecting his Monday breakfast was
done not for the reasons advanced by Respondent but in
reprisal for Bates' union activities . This I conclude and find
to constitute a discrimination against Lamar Bates in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and to unlawfully
interfere with, restrain, and coerce him and his fellow
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth herein have been
found to have occurred in connection with Respondent's
operations as described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
10 Nowhere does it appear in the record that Bates' extension of his
breakfast period by 10 minutes was a factor in the action that was thereafter
taken
686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
I have found that Respondent has interfered with,
restrained , and coerced its employees by interrogating
them with respect to their union membership , interests, and
activities and those of their fellow employees , by threaten-
ing the possible closure of the plant , the loss of benefits,
and the loss of present wages, if the Union were selected by
them , by making a promise of benefit in the form of fringe
pay if they do not select the Union , and by indulging in the
surveillance of employees' union activities , the solicitation
of an employee to engage in such surveillance, and by
creating the impression with individual employees that the
union activities are being under surveillance. I have
likewise found that Respondent has discriminated against
employee Jake Knight for having recourse to the Board's
processes and against Lamar Bates for his union activities.
I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist from
this conduct and from in any like or related manner
interfering with , restraining, or coercing its employees in
the exercise of their statutory rights.
Affirmatively, I shall recommend that Respondent
resume its practice of permitting employee Lamar Bates to
absent himself on early Monday mornings for a period of
half hour during which he may leave the plant for
breakfast, and that Respondent post notice of compliance
with such notice as the Board issues.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]