Stueven, Uwe et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 29, 2020

14266367 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/266,367 04/30/2014 Uwe Stueven 29827/44435A 1091
4743 7590 01/29/2020
MARSHALL, GERSTEIN & BORUN LLP
233 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE
6300 WILLIS TOWER
CHICAGO, IL 60606-6357
EXAMINER
KRYLOVA, IRINA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1764
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mgbdocket@marshallip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte UWE STUEVEN, MATTHIAS WEISMANTEL,
WILFRIED HEIDE, MARCO KRÜGER, VOLKER SEIDL,
STEFAN BLEI, DENNIS LÖSCH, RÜDIGER FUNK,
and ANNEMARIE HILLEBRECHT
Appeal 2019-000424
Application 14/266,367
Technology Center 1700
BEFORE MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, LILAN REN, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.
REN, Administrative Patent Judge.

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DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 2–11 and 22–32. Act.2 3–44. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method for producing water-absorbent
polymer particles with a higher permeability by polymerizing droplets of a
monomer solution. Spec. 1:1–5. Claim 25, reproduced below, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
25. A process for preparing water-absorbing polymer beads by
polymerizing droplets of a monomer solution, the process
comprising:
i) forming the monomer solution comprising
a) at least one ethylenically unsaturated monomer,
b) at least one crosslinker,
c) at least one initiator, and
d) water,
wherein a water-insoluble inorganic salt is suspended in
the monomer solution; and
ii) dropletizing the monomer solution of i) into a
dropletization tower via a dropletization plate having at least one
bore, wherein the monomer solution enters the at least one bore
from the top of the bore and the pressure drop over the bore is
less than 2.5 bar, and polymerizing the resulting droplets in the

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “BASF
SE (BASF), Ludwigshafen, Germany.” Appeal Br. 4.
2 We refer to the Non-Final Action dated February 2, 2018 as “Act.”
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dropletization tower in a carrier gas phase surrounding the
droplets
to form water-absorbing polymer beads having a mean
diameter of at least 150 μm, wherein the contents of the
dropletization tower consist essentially of the droplets, the carrier
gas, and the water-absorbing polymer beads,
wherein the process is performed in the absence of
hydrophobic inert solvents.
Claims Appendix (Appeal Br. A-2).
REFERENCES3
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:
Anderson
Hennig
Kimura
Levendis
Chinh
Nishioka
Bruhns
Riegel
Losch 658
US 4,954,562
US 5,010,150
US 5,026,800
US 5,269,980
US 5,541,270
US 6,033,780
US 7,727,586 B2
US 7,947,771 B2
US 7,968,658 B2
Sept. 4, 1990
Apr. 23, 1991
June 25, 1991
Dec. 14, 1993
July 30, 1996
Mar. 7, 2000
June 1, 2010
May 24, 2011
June 28, 2011
Losch 624 US 2008/0045624 A1 Feb. 21, 2008
REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejects claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Chinh,
and Bruhns. Act. 3.

3 The Examiner relies on Losch 658, Bruhns 586, and Riegel 771 as the
English equivalents of the references applied by the Examiner, namely (WO
2006/024369 A1 to Losch (published March 9, 2006), WO 2006/079631 A1
to Bruhns (published August 3, 2006), and WO 2006/058683 A2 to Riegel
(published June 8, 2006), respectively. Act. 3. For the purpose of this
opinion, we also refer to noted English equivalents.
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2. The Examiner rejects claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Chinh, Bruhns, and
Nishioka. Act. 14.
3. The Examiner rejects claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–30 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, and
Chinh. Act. 16.
4. The Examiner rejects claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, Chinh,
Schnmid, and Bruhns. Act. 27.
5. The Examiner rejects claims 7–9 and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, Chinh, Losch
624, and Bruhns. Act. 29.
6. The Examiner rejects claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, and
Bruhns. Act. 31.
7. The Examiner rejects claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Bruhns, and
Nishioka. Act. 42.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues that
Appellant identifies and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Cf. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to
identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”)). After having
considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s
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contentions (including those raised under Section J4 of the Appeal Brief), ,
we are not persuaded that Appellant has identified reversible error, and we
affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejections for the reasons expressed in the Non-
Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following primarily for
emphasis.
1. Rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 22, 23, and 25–32 over Levendis, Losch
658, Riegel, Chinh, and Bruhns
Appellant argues against the rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 22, 23, and
25–32 over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Chinh, and Bruhns as a group.
Appeal Br. 14–19. We select independent claim 25 as representative for the
analysis. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Limitation: a “pressure drop over the bore is less than 2.5 bar”
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding that the prior art
teaches a “pressure drop over the bore is less than 2.5 bar” as recited in
claim 25. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant, however, does not elaborate on the
argument. Nor does Appellant address the Examiner’s findings in support of
the rejection. Compare id., with Act. 8–9. For example, Appellant does not
address the Examiner’s finding that Losch 658 and Bruhns show that the
prior art processes take place under the same condition of laminar flow as
the process recited in claim 25 and, therefore, would result in the same
pressure drop as recited in claim 25. Compare Appeal Br. 17, with Act. 8–9.
We further note that Appellant acknowledges the Examiner’s finding
that Chinh describes a polymerization process with a pressure drop between
2–7 bar across a nozzle. Compare Appeal Br. 15, with Act. 12–13 (finding

4 Section J does not specify the limitation or the claim to its contentions are
directed.
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that Chinh teaches that the “size of the droplet is influenced by the pressure
drop in the nozzle” and a skilled artisan would have known to vary the
pressure drop in relation to droplet size).5 An Appellant must support an
argument that the process the prior art discloses is distinguishable from the
claimed process with more than “bare assertion.” In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427,
1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The record does not support Appellant’s attorney
argument and does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s
factual findings. See Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“Attorneys’ argument is no substitute for evidence.”).
Appellant’s argument that Chinh teaches a horizontal pressure drop
rather than a vertical drop recited in claim 25 is also not persuasive of
reversible error. As the Examiner points out, Chinh describes “both vertical
and horizontal arrangements of introduction of liquid into the fluidized bed.”
Ans. 14. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding but, instead,
argues that Chinh teaches a fluidized bed process distinguishable from the
recited process. Compare id., with Reply Br. 2–3; see Appeal Br. 17–18, 38–
39. Whereas the Examiner explains, based on specific operational details of
Chinh’s process, that Chinh teaches a polymerization process “by droplet

5 Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Chinh teaches the
pressure drop is a result effective variable, but argues that “the pressure drop
conditions of [Chinh] do not even apply to the claimed invention.” Appeal
Br. 39 (arguing that “the present claims do not encompass a fluidized bed
polymerization [disclosed in Chinh] and do not add the monomer solution
droplets horizontally, but rather vertically”). This argument is not persuasive
because Appellant’s argument does not show that the effect of pressure drop
on particle size is limited to the particular polymerization apparatus used in
Chinh. To the extent this argument relates to a rationale to combine the
references, we address the issue infra.
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polymerization, wherein the droplets are formed by spray nozzles
comprising plurality of outlets vertically disposed, and the size of the outlets
is preferably such that there is little pressure drop through the outlets but
sufficient to break the liquid into small droplets” (Act. 12), Appellant merely
repeats that Chinh’s polymerization process uses a fluidized bed instead of a
dropletization apparatus. Appeal Br. 18, 19, 37–39. Appellant, however,
does not structurally distinguish Chinh’s apparatus from the apparatus used
in claim 25 (“dropletization tower” and “dropletization plate”). Id. Appellant
also does not explain sufficiently how Chinh’s process is operationally or
otherwise different (other than the name of the apparatus used in Chinh)
from the process recited in claim 25. Id. Appellant’s argument based solely
on the assertion that Chinh’s process is not called a dropletization process is
not persuasive. It is well established that a reference need not disclose a
claim limitation in haec verba to satisfy that limitation for purposes of
anticipation or obviousness. Cf. In re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, 660 (CCPA 1977)
(holding that although anticipation requires disclosure of each and every
element of the claim at issue in a single prior art reference, the disclosure
need not be in haec verba).
Appellant’s argument is also unpersuasive as it attacks Chinh
individually in isolation from all other cited references rather than
considering what the combined references would have suggested to the
person of ordinary skill in the art. “Non-obviousness cannot be established
by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner cites Chinh for the teaching of
the pressure drop along with Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, and Bruhns for
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the recited process steps. Appellant’s argument does not take into account
the combined prior art teachings that form the basis of the rejection and,
therefore, is unpersuasive.
Combining the References
Appellant next argues that the Examiner reversibly erred in combining
the references because Levendis teaches a spray polymerization process and
the “present claims exclude a spray polymerization.” Appeal Br. 17–18.
Claim 25, however, recites a “process . . . comprising,” and, thus, is an open
ended claim that does not exclude spray polymerization. Appellant further
argues that the prior art spray polymerization is distinguishable from a
dropletization process, but does not specify the particular step recited in
claim 25 missing from the prior art teachings. For example, the Examiner
finds that “the process of making droplets from the monomer solution into
the dilution gas using the multi-orifice plate of Levendis et al appears to
correspond to the step of dropletization as claimed in instant invention.” Act.
4–5. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that use of the multi-
orifice in Levendis’ polymerization teaches or suggests the recited
“dropletizing . . . via a dropletization plate” step. Appeal Br. 18, 36
(asserting Levindis’ process is differentwithout sufficiently explaining why
it is different). Appellant has not identified reversible error here.
Appellant also argues that the skilled artisan would not have had a
reasonable expectation of success in combining the spray polymerization
described in Levendis and Losch 658 to arrive at the recited dropletization
polymerization process. Appeal Br. 18. As we note supra, Appellant does
not specify any particular recited step that the prior art fails to teach or
suggest. Appellant’s argument is based solely on the distinction that
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Levendis and Losch 658 do not use the term “dropletization” to describe the
prior art processes. We again emphasize that a reference need not disclose a
claim limitation in haec verba in order to satisfy that limitation for purposes
of anticipation or obviousness. See Bode, 550 F.2d at 660.
Appellant also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have
had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the prior art teachings
based on the various differences among the references. Appeal Br. 18. For
example, Appellant argues that a skilled artisan would not have combined
Levendis with Losch 658, which requires the use of a hydrophobic solvent,
to arrive at a process that “is performed in the absence of hydrophobic inert
solvents” as recited in claim 25. Appellant also argues that Riegel describes
using a metal sulfate in a polymerization process, which would clog the
spray apparatus in Levendis and Losch 658. Id. These arguments are not
persuasive. First, Appellant fails to support the argument with factual
evidence. Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1581 (“Attorneys’ argument is no substitute
for evidence.”). Further, Appellant’s arguments fail to consider the
Examiner’s proposed combination, which does not incorporate all of the
features of the secondary references. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that “the skilled artisan is
not compelled to blindly follow the teaching of one prior art reference over
the other without the exercise of independent judgment”). The Examiner’s
obviousness analysis shows that all the recited steps were known and that
the combination of these known steps, according to known purposes, would
have resulted in a predictable result. Act. 3–9; Ans. 6–15; see KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar
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elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results.”).
Appellant’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have combined Levendis, Losch 658, and Riegel to arrive at a process in
which “a water-insoluble inorganic salt is suspended in the monomer
solution” as recited in claim 25 (Appeal Br. 18) also lacks evidentiary
support and, therefore, is unpersuasive. Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1581. The
argument also does not address the Examiner’s reasoning in support of the
finding and rationale to combine the references. Compare Appeal Br. 18,
with Act. 10–12 (providing a detailed finding of the limitation, as well as a
rationale to combine).
Appellant lastly argues that a skilled artisan would not have combined
Chinh with the other cited references because Chinh describes a fluidized
bed polymerization instead of a dropletization polymerization. Appeal Br.
18, 37–38. As noted earlier, Appellant’s sole distinction is that Chihn does
not use the phrase “dropletization” to describe its process. Open-ended claim
25 does not exclude a particular polymerization method.
Limitation: an “absence of hydrophobic inert solvents”
Appellant next argues that Levendis “fails to exclude a hydrophobic
solvent” and, therefore, does not teach or suggest the process which “is
performed in the absence of hydrophobic inert solvents” as recited in claim
25. Appeal Br. 18, 37. As the Examiner points out, however, Levendis does
not require the use of hydrophobic solvents and describes an example
solution in which no hydrophobic solvents were used. Act. 6. The Examiner
finds that Levendis teaches using both hydrophobic and hydrophilic
solvents. Ans. 9. Appellant does not dispute these findings and, in fact,
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acknowledges that Levendis broadly “suggests the use of a solvent.” Id. at
18, 37; see also Reply Br. 2 (repeating the argument that Levendis teaches
hydrophobic solvents). Appellant’s remaining argument that Losch 658
requires the use of a hydrophobic solvent (Appeal Br. 18) likewise does not
address the Examiner’s findings with regard to Levendis. Appellant’s
arguments, therefore, do not persuade us of reversible error in this aspect of
the obviousness analysis.

The Examiner has shown that all the recited steps are known and
“[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 22, 23, and
25–32 over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Chinh, and Bruhns. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
2. Rejection of claim 24 over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Chinh,
Bruhns, and Nishioka
Appellant’s sole argument for claim 24 is that Nishioka “does not
overcome the deficiencies of the four other cited references.” Appeal Br. 20.
We sustain the rejection of claim 24 over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel,
Chinh, Bruhns, and Nishioka for the reasons provided supra with regard to
claim 25. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
3. Rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, and Chinh
Appellant argues against the rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–
30 over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, and Chinh as a group. Appeal Br. 21–
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31. We select independent claim 25 as representative for the analysis. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Reference Henning
Appellant argues that Hennig teaches a powder bed polymerization
process that differs from the recited method. Appeal Br. 23. Appellant,
however, does not specify the particular step recited in claim 25 missing
from the prior art teachings. For example, the Examiner finds that Hennig
describes the use of orifices, as well as the use of a kettle/autoclave
apparatus for polymerization, both of which correspond to the recited
“dropletizing . . . via a dropletization plate” step. Act. 18–19. Appellant
asserts that “the powder bed apparatus” is not a dropletization apparatus, but
fails to provide any structural distinction between the apparatus or
distinction between the processes. Appeal Br. 23–31, 39. Appellant supports
its argument that the prior art process is distinguishable from claimed
process with only a “bare assertion.” Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1430. Appellant,
therefore, does not identify reversible error here.
Appellant also distinguishes Hennig by arguing that claim 25
“excludes a powder bed.” Appeal Br. 24. As noted earlier, claim 25 reciting
a “process . . . comprising,” is an open ended claim and does not exclude a
powder bed polymerization. Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
reversibly erred in “eliminat[ing]” the powder bedis not based on the
Examiner’s obviousness analysis, and, therefore, not persuasive. Id. at 24–
25. We note that Appellant incorrectly reads claim 25 to require a method
“consisting essentially of” the recited steps. Id. at 28. The plain language of
claim 25, however, recites a “processing . . . comprising.” The recitation that
“the contents of the dropletization tower consisting essentially of the
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droplets, the carrier gas, and the water-absorbing beads” does not apply to
the process steps.
Appellant’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive because they are
not based on the claim language. For example, Appellant argues that Hennig
does not teach a process where “each drop form[s] one particle,” “[e]ach
droplet is formed individually,” or a process that “conducts a polymerization
of droplets of the monomer solution solely in a gas phase as the droplets
pass through a gas-filled dropletization tower.” Id. at 23, 24, 25; see also id.
at 26–28, 30 (raising various other arguments not commensurate in scope
with claim 25). Claim 25 does not recite these limitations and the arguments,
therefore, are unpersuasive of reversible error.
Reference Kimura
Appellant next argues that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding
that Kimura teaches “the use of calcium sulfate as a crosslinker.” Appeal Br.
28. Appellant cites to “Exhibit A” supporting the notion that calcium sulfate
cannot perform as a crosslinker. Id. From the outset, the Evidence Appendix
includes “A-5” and “A-7” and Appellant does not specify the particular
piece of evidence in support of the argument or provide any pinpoint
citation. See id. The argument, therefore, is unpersuasive as lacking factual
support. Moreover, Appellant’s argument mischaracterizes and does not
address the Examiner’s findings in support of the rejection. Specifically, the
Examiner finds that Kimura “discloses water-absorbent resins having
particle diameter of 100-600 micron, prepared by polymerizing an aqueous
solution of water-soluble ethylenically unsaturated monomers, followed by
cross-linking the produced water absorbent powder.” Act. 23. In any event,
Appellant acknowledges that calcium sulfate may be used as a crosslinker –
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only that it provides “no reasonable expectation of sufficiently crosslinking a
monomer solution to form water-absorbing polymer beads of any practical
use.” Appeal Br. 31. Given that Appellant fails to direct us to evidence
supporting this argument and given that process claim 25 does not require
any such practical use of the resultant polymer beads, the argument is not
persuasive of reversible error.
Reference Chinh
Appellant repeats its arguments with regard to Chinh (e.g., Chinh does
not use the phrase “dropletization,” etc.) (Appeal Br. 29–30), which we have
addressed supra and do not repeat here. Appellant’s arguments with regard
to the Examiner’s rationale to combine the references (e.g., Hennig describes
a powder bed polymerization, whereas Chinh describes a fluidized bed
polymerization) (Appeal Br. 29–31) are similar to those addressed with
regard to rejection 1 supra. That is, the arguments attack the references
individually and Appellant fails to support them with evidence. For example,
Appellant’s argument that “[b]y simply dispersing small particles of a water-
soluble inorganic salt in a monomer solution, polymerization would not
yield the particle size [Chinh] desire[s]” is unsupported by evidence. Appeal
Br. 31. This argument also does not address the combined teachings of the
references but, instead, attacks Chinh individually. See id. Moreover, as with
rejection 1, Appellant’s arguments do not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s finding that all the recited steps are known and that one skilled
in the art would have been combined to yield a predictable result. KSR, 550
U.S. at 416.
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–
30 over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, and Chinh is sustained. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
4. Rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, Chinh, Schmid,
and Bruhns
Appellant’s arguments here are solely directed to Schmid and are
unpersuasive for reasons similar to the arguments addressed supra. More
specifically, Appellant argues that Schmid describes a spray polymerization
and that Schmid dos not teach or suggest a water-insoluble inorganic salt.
Appeal Br. 32. Appellant’s arguments do not address the Examiner’s
findings with regard to Schmid in support of the rejection. Compare id., with
Act. 25–26 (citing Schmid, for example, for the teaching of a polymerization
process producing droplets of diameters of 50–100 microns and the use of
inert gas in the process). We also note that Appellant’s arguments are not
persuasive because the arguments attack the references individually and fail
to provide supporting evidence. For example, Appellant argues, without
addressing the combined prior art teachings and without factual support, that
“a person skilled in the art would avoid adding a solid, water-insoluble salt
to a monomer solution in a spray polymerization because the aerosol
generator would be clogged by the solid particles.” Appeal Br. 32.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–32
over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, Chinh, Schmid, and Bruhns.
5. Rejection of claims 7–9 and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Hennig, Anderson, Kimura, Chinh, Losch 624, and
Bruhns
Appellant’s arguments here are directed solely to Losch 624 and are
unpersuasive for reasons similar to the arguments addressed supra. More
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specifically, Appellant acknowledges that Losch 624 describes “droplet
formation through laminar jet disintegration.” Appeal Br. 34 (emphasis
removed). Appellant asserts, without elaboration or evidentiary support, that
this teaching “differs from a low-pressure drop over a bore.” Id. Such a
conclusory statement lacking factual support is not persuasive of reversible
error. We also note that Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because
they attack the references individually.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 7–9 and 25–32 over Hennig,
Anderson, Kimura, Chinh, Losch 624, and Bruhns.
6. Rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, and Bruhns
Appellant’s arguments here are directed to references addressed supra
in rejection 1 and are unpersuasive for the same reasons. For example,
Appellant repeats the argument that “Levendis is directed to a spray
polymerization,” while acknowledging that Bruhns “is directed to a
dropletization polymerization.” Appeal Br. 35. Appellant also repeats the
argument that Lenvendis “provides no apparent reason to modify the
reference from a spray polymerization to a dropletization polymerization.”
Id. The obviousness analysis, however, requires no more than a showing that
there is “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418. In
this particular rejection, as well as the Examiner’s other rejections, the
Examiner has shown that the prior art teaches familiar elements that the
ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined using known methods to
yield predictable results. Id. at 416.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 2–11, 22, 23, and 25–
32 over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, and Bruhns.
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7. Rejection of claim 24 over Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Bruhns, and
Nishioka

Appellant do not argue separately for the rejection of claim 24 over
Levendis, Losch 658, Riegel, Bruhns, and Nishioka. Appeal Br. 36. We,
therefore, sustain the rejection of claim 24 over Levendis, Losch 658,
Riegel, Bruhns, and Nishioka for the reasons provided supra. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
More specifically,
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
2–11, 22,
23, 25–32
103 Levendis, Losch 658,
Riegel, Chinh, Bruhns
2–11, 22,
23, 25–32

24 103 Levendis, Losch 658,
Riegel, Chinh, Bruhns,
Nishioka
24
2–11, 22,
23, 25–30
103 Hennig, Anderson,
Kimura, Chinh
2–11, 22,
23, 25–30

2–11, 22,
23, 25–32
103 Hennig, Anderson,
Kimura, Chinh,
Schnmid, Bruhns
2–11, 22,
23, 25–32

7–9, 25–32 103 Hennig, Anderson,
Kimura, Chinh, Losch
624, Bruhns
7–9, 25–32
2–11, 22,
23, 25–32
103 Levendis, Losch 658,
Riegel, Bruhns
2–11, 22,
23, 25–32

Appeal 2019-000424
Application 14/266,367

18
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
24 103 Levendis, Losch 658,
Riegel, Bruhns,
Nishioka
24
Overall
Outcome:

2–11, 22–
32

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED