Steven Tedjamulia et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 19, 202012951592 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/951,592 11/22/2010 Steven Tedjamulia DC-18669 1038 160816 7590 10/19/2020 Terrile, Cannatti & Chambers, LLP - Dell P.O. Box 203518 Austin, TX 78720 EXAMINER ZARE, SCOTT A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3649 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/19/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@dockettrak.com tmunoz@tcciplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte STEVEN TEDJAMULIA, CHRISTOPHER CRAIG COLLINS, RONALD VINCENT ROSE, and MANISH C. MEHTA ____________ Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed May 20, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed September 20, 2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 23, 2019), Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.,” mailed February 20, 2019), and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed December 11, 2018). Appellant identifies Dell Products L.P. as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 1). Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The claimed invention “relate[s] generally to information handling systems” and, more specifically, to “a method and system for conducting electronic commerce within a social media environment” (Spec. ¶ 1). Claims 1, 7, and 13 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer-implementable method for conducting electronic commerce within a social media environment, the social media environment comprising a social customer relationship management system executing on a social customer relationship management server and interacting with a social data repository, a vendor ecommerce system executing on a vendor ecommerce server and interacting with a repository of ecommerce data provided by the vendor ecommerce system and a social media system executing on a social media server and a repository of social media member data, the method comprising: [(a)] receiving input data from a first user, wherein the input data comprises activity data associated with an activity performed by the first user at a social commerce site provided via the social media system, the social commerce site comprising a social commerce storefront embedded within a social media site, the social commerce storefront being provided via the vendor ecommerce system; [(b)] processing, via the social customer relationship management system the activity data to generate a social commerce activity value, the social commerce activity value comprising a subject tag activity value, the subject tag activity value comprising a quantitative value assigned to a subject tag activity, the subject tag activity comprising a social media activity performed in association with a subject tag, the social media activity being associated with the social media site; Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 3 [(c)] processing, via the social commerce relationship management system, the social commerce activity value with an existing social commerce reputation score associated with the first user to generate a current social commerce reputation score for the first user; and [(d)] displaying, via a vendor affiliate system, the current social commerce reputation score for the first user within a vendor affiliate social customer relationship management system user interface. REJECTION Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. ANALYSIS Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 4–6). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a claim is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 4 directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019 for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to 2 The USPTO issued an update on October 17, 2019 (the “October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility,” available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance in response to public comments. Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 5 whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner determined here that the claims are directed to “an abstract idea that may be categorized a[s] a method of organizing human activity (rating a user to determine a social commerce reputation score)” or as a “mental process[ ] (e.g., processing the activity data to generate a social commerce activity value, pricing the social commerce activity value with an existing social commerce reputations score to generate a currency social Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 6 commerce reputation score),” and that the claims do not include meaningful limitations that integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Adv. Act. 2).3 The Examiner also determined that the claims do not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (Final Act. 6–7). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 4–6; see also Reply Br. 1–3). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “SOCIAL REPUTATION,” and describes, in the Background section, that social commerce has emerged as a subset of 3 After the 2019 Revised Guidance was issued, which was after the Final Office Action was mailed, the Examiner, in the February 20, 2019 Advisory Action, reconsidered the claims under Step 2A of the new guidance, i.e., step one of the Mayo/Alice framework (Adv. Act. 2). Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 7 electronic commerce, i.e., “ecommerce,” and uses social interactions and user contributions to assist in the online buying and selling of products and services (Spec. ¶ 4). The Specification explains that “social commerce can be thought of as the use of social media in the context of ecommerce,” and includes “customer ratings and reviews, user recommendations and referrals, private and public forums and communities, and social advertising” (id.). Another form of social commerce is “user-generated advertorial content,” which provides online shoppers with advice from trusted individuals and assistance in finding recommended goods and services (Spec. ¶ 5). The Specification describes that this type of content, once restricted to ecommerce sites, is becoming available within social media environments; however, purchasing recommended goods and services typically requires leaving the social media environment and accessing the vendor’s ecommerce site, where users often are overwhelmed by the number of choices, which can lead to confusion, indecision, and abandoned shopping carts (id.). Therefore, according to the Specification, “there is a need to seamlessly extend social commerce to provide complete ecommerce functionality from within a social media environment” (id.). The present invention is intended to address this need by providing a method and system for conducting electronic commerce within a social media environment (Spec. ¶ 6). The Specification describes that, in various embodiments, a relationship management system (“RMS”) is implemented to manage social commerce reputation ratings associated with a user of a social commerce site (id.). In these embodiments, a social community member performs social media interactions (e.g., reading or posting comments, uploading photographs, etc.) and, in the course of performing Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 8 these media interactions, may elect to perform an activity associated with a social commerce site (id.). Once the user has performed the social commerce activity, its corresponding value is processed, with the user’s associated social commerce reputation data, to generate a social commerce reputation score for the user; this score is compared to the requirements for various social commerce reputation badges, and the reputation badge that matches the user’s reputation score is displayed as a graphical image within the social commerce site (id. ¶ 7). Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a method for conducting electronic commerce within a social media environment comprising: (1) receiving activity data from a first user regarding a social commerce activity that the user has been performed at a social commerce site, i.e., receiving input data from a first user, wherein the input data comprises activity data associated with an activity performed by the first user at a social commerce site provided via the social media system, the social commerce site comprising a social commerce storefront embedded within a social media site, the social commerce storefront being provided via the vendor ecommerce system (step (a)); (2) determining a value for the performed activity, and adding the activity value to the user’s existing social commerce reputation score to generate a current social commerce reputation score for the user, i.e., processing, via the social customer relationship management system, the activity data to generate a social commerce activity value, the social commerce activity value comprising a subject tag activity value, the subject tag activity value comprising a quantitative value assigned to a subject tag activity, the subject tag activity comprising a social media activity performed in association with a subject tag, the social media activity being associated with the social media site; [and] Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 9 processing, via the social commerce relationship management system, the social commerce activity value with an existing social commerce reputation score associated with the first user to generate a current social commerce reputation score for the first user (steps (b) and (c)); and (3) displaying the user’s current social commerce reputation score, i.e., “displaying, via a vendor affiliate system, the current social commerce reputation score for the first user within a vendor affiliate social customer relationship management system user interface” (step (d)). Appellant notes that “[u]nder the 2019 Guidance, mental processes or steps are concepts that can be practically performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” (Appeal Br. 4).4 And Appellant argues that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea at least because the steps, as recited in claim 1, cannot be practically performed in the human mind (id. at 5–6). Reproducing the claim language, including the preamble, Appellant argues that “[h]umans do not practically conduct electronic commerce within a social media environment,” and that humans in their minds cannot “practically provide a social commerce site via a social media”; “practically provide a social commerce storefront embedded within the social media site and provided via a vendor ecommerce system”; “practically process activity data to generate a social activity data to generate a social commerce activity 4 In describing the 2019 Revised Guidance, Appellant acknowledges that the groupings of abstract ideas include methods of organizing human activity, and Appellant characterizes “methods of organizing human activity” as including mental processes (Appeal Br. 4). In fact, as the Examiner points out, the 2019 Revised Guidance lists certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes as two distinct groupings (Ans. 3). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 10 value where the social media activity is associated with a social media site”; or “display a social commerce reputation score within a vendor affiliate social commerce relationship system user interface” (Appeal Br. 5–6). Yet, as the Examiner observes, although the preamble recites conducting electronic commerce within a social media environment comprising a social customer relationship management system executing on a social customer relationship management server and interacting with a social data repository, as well as a vendor ecommerce system and a social media system, the processing steps only recite that the steps are performed “via the social commerce relationship management system” (Ans. 4). Thus, although the vendor ecommerce system and social media system describe a social media environment in the preamble of the claim, those elements are not positively recited in the method steps, and none of the method steps actually involves conducting electronic commerce or requires the specific structure recited in the preamble in order to be performed (id.). Referencing step (a) of claim 1, Appellant argues, for example, that “[h]umans in their minds cannot practically provide a social commerce site via social media system” and additionally “cannot practically provide a social commerce storefront embedded within the social media site and provided via a vendor ecommerce system” (Appeal Br. 5). Yet, step (a), i.e., “receiving input data from a first user,” does not require providing a social commerce site or social media system; instead, the social commerce site and social media system only describe the activity with which the input data are associated (Ans. 4–5). In other words, the step only requires receiving input data comprising activity data from a first user — something that a human can perform in his or her mind. Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 11 Specifically referencing steps (b) and (c), recited in claim 1, Appellant further argues that “[t]he processing being performed via a social customer relationship system makes clear” that neither of these elements is a mental step (Appeal. Br. 5–6). We, however, agree with the Examiner that, except for the social customer relationship management system, i.e., a generic computer system, there is nothing in either of steps (b) and (c) that forecloses them from being performed by a human mentally or using pen and paper (Ans. 5–6). Step (b) merely requires evaluating social activity data to determine a social commerce activity value associated with an activity performed by a user — a determination that requires no more than human observation and evaluation (Ans. 5 (citing Spec. ¶ 62 (“[T]he subject tag activity ‘write a blog’ may have a value of ’10 points.’”))). And step (c), i.e., “processing . . . the social commerce activity value with an existing social commerce reputation score . . . to generate a current social commerce reputation score for the first user,” requires nothing more than adding a point value for a given activity to an existing reputation score for the user (id. at 6 (citing Spec. ¶ 76)) — a step that clearly also can be performed in the human mind. In sum, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., a concept performed in the human mind, including an evaluation or judgment, and therefore, an abstract idea.5 See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 5 We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 also can be interpreted reasonably as reciting “a method of organizing human activity (i.e.[,] updating a user’s rating based on the user performing a particular actions), and . . . a mathematical concept (i.e.[,] current reputation score + awarded points = new reputation score)” (Ans. 6). Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 12 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). See also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Federal Circuit treats “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed. Circ. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose[s] them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent- ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”). We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception, i.e., the recited abstract idea, into a practical application under Step 2A, Prong Two (Appeal Br. 6). The 2019 Revised Guidance references MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/MPEP/E9_R-08.2017.) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated the recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. The Guidance, thus, describes that an additional element may have Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 13 integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if, for example, the additional element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field; (2) implements the judicial exception with, or uses the judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture integral to the claim; or (3) effects a transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra- solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appellant argues that, even if the claims recite an abstract idea under Step 2A, Prong One, “the steps of the claims[,] as a whole[,] result in the practical application of displaying, via a vendor affiliate system, a current social commerce reputation score for a user within a vendor affiliate social customer relationship management system user interface” such that the claims, are “[patent] eligible under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Guidance” (Appeal Br. 6). But, that argument is not persuasive at least because, as the Examiner observes and we agree, displaying data, i.e., a user’s current social reputation score, within a user interface, as recited in claim 1, amounts to insignificant extra-solution activity (Ans. 6–7), which, as described above, the 2019 Revised Guidance makes clear is insufficient to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 14 We also are not persuaded of Examiner error to the extent that Appellant argues that claim 1 is patent eligible because the claim “as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [judicial] exception” (Reply Br. 2–3). Although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, which is not integrated into a practical application. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 15 exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appellant argues for the first time in its Reply Brief that even if claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, the claim is nonetheless patent eligible under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance (Reply Br. 3). Appellant notes that “[i]n the [D]ecision on Appeal dated January 25, 2018, the claims as a whole were found to distinguish over the cited art” (id.). And Appellant argues “[t]hus, the claims are directed to an inventive concept and should be found to be eligible under step 2B of the revised guidelines” (id.). Appellant’s argument is untimely, and is waived here in the absence of any showing of good cause why the argument could not have been timely presented in Appellant’s Appeal Brief. See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that an argument not first raised in the brief to the Board is waived on appeal); Ex parte Nakashima, 93 USPQ2d 1834, 1837 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (explaining that arguments and evidence not timely presented in the Principal Brief, will not be considered when filed in a Reply Brief, absent a showing of good cause explaining why the argument could not have been presented in the Principal Brief); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1477 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (“Properly interpreted, the Rules do not require the Board to take up a belated argument that has not been addressed by the Examiner, absent a showing of good cause.”). However, even if the argument were not waived, it is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 16 Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness determination automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citation omitted). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non- obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–20, which fall with claim 1. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20 Appeal 2019-006857 Application 12/951,592 17 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation