Steven Sounyoung. Yu

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 29, 2019

14696466 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/696,466 04/26/2015 Steven Sounyoung Yu MedHMD-11 2003
65881 7590 08/29/2019
STEVEN YU
9810 Cresence Way
Fairfax, VA 22032
EXAMINER
YANG, YI-SHAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3793
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/29/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte STEVEN SOUNYOUNG YU
____________________

Appeal 2018-007416
Application 14/696,466
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
JILL D. HILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Steven Sounyoung Yu (“Appellant”)1 appeals under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 13,
14, 17, and 21–32.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellant is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 3, 5–9, 12, 15, 16, and 18–20 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 19–20
(Claims App.).
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1, the sole independent claim, is reproduced below and is
representative of the claimed subject matter.
1. A method of performing an ultrasound-guided needle or catheter
procedure on a patient’s body, comprising:
wearing a head-mounted image display apparatus that is in
communication with an ultrasound apparatus, wherein the head-
mounted image display apparatus provides real-time video
images from the ultrasound apparatus;
positioning a needle or catheter at a skin site on the
patient’s body;
advancing the needle or catheter into the patient’s body
through the skin site while simultaneously, directly viewing the
needle or catheter procedure and viewing the real-time video
images from the ultrasound apparatus to guide the needle or
catheter into the patient’s body.

EVIDENCE
The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:

Yoshikazu Tsuno, Shimadzu Lightweight Head Mount Display
Dataglass 2, Yoshikazu Tsuno/AFP/Getty Images (2003) (“Yoshikazu”)
Luigi Lugmayr, Shimadzu Dataglass 3/A HMD is for Modern Day
Pirates, News/Portable Devices (July 17, 2007) (“Lugmayr”)
Hiroshi Sekiyama et al., Design and Evaluation of a Head-Mounted
Display System for Ultrasound Guided Regional Anesthesia, Proceedings of
the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Society Anesthesiologists, A933
(Oct. 19, 2009) (“Sekiyama”)
Frederic Lardinois, Move Over 1024x768: The Most Popular Screen
Resolution On The Web Is Now 1366x768, http://techcrunch.com (Apr. 11,
2012) (“Lardinois”)
Patacsil
Poland
US 6,132,379
US 2010/0168576 A1
Oct. 17, 2000
July 1, 2010
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THE REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Sekiyama. Final Act. 3–4.3
II. Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Sekiyama and Patacsil. Id. at 4–5.
III. Claims 10, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama and Poland. Id. at 5–6.
IV. Claims 11, 13, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, and Yoshikazu. Id. at 6–7.
V. Claims 14 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, and Lugmayr. Id.
at 7–10.
VI. Claims 24 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Yoshikazu, and Patacsil. Id.
at 10–11.
VII. Claims 25–28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, and Patacsil. Id. at 11–12.

3 Even though the Examiner included claims 10 and 14 in the heading for
this rejection (Final Act. 2), the Examiner failed to make reference to claims
10 and 14 within the body of the rejection and instead included separate
rejections, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, of claim 10 as unpatentable over
Sekiyama and Poland (id. at 5–6) and claim 14 as unpatentable over
Sekiyama, Poland, and Lardinois (id. at 7–9). Inclusion of claims 10 and 14
in the heading is considered to be a typographical error, and it does not
appear that claims 10 and 14 are subject to a ground of rejection based only
on Sekiyama. Accordingly, we do not list claims 10 and 14 in this ground of
rejection.
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VIII. Claim 30 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, and Patacsil. Id. at
12–13.
IX. Claim 31 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, and Yoshikazu. Id.
at 13.
X. Claim 32 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, Yoshikazu, and
Patacsil. Id. at 13–14.

OPINION
Rejection I
The Examiner finds, among other things, that Sekiyama discloses a
head-mounted image display apparatus that provides real-time video images
from medical imaging equipment. Final Act. 3. Appellant argues that one
of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the claim term “real-time
video images” to encompass video images suffering from a “time-lag of
approximately 1s” as is the case in Sekiyama. Appeal Br. 6–7 (quoting
Sekiyama ¶ 3). Appellant asserts that “[f]or clinical ultrasound imaging to
be considered ‘real-time,’ the latency must be less than 300 ms
(milliseconds) . . . [a]nd most preferably, less than 30 ms.” Id. at 7.
The words of a claim are given their ordinary and customary meaning
as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the
context of the Specification and prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also In re Am.
Acad. of Sci Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the scope of
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the claims in patent applications is determined not solely on the basis of the
claim language, but upon giving claims “their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification” and “in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.”).
As pointed out by the Examiner, “[t]he [S]pecification does not further
define ‘real-time’ other than to state that the user must be able to view the
images while viewing the procedure” and “[t]he [S]pecification does not
specify or mention at all any information in regard to any acceptable time
scale in order to achieve such a simultaneous viewing.” Ans. 15. More
particularly, the Examiner points out that “[t]he [S]pecification does not
explicitly or inherently disclose[] or infer in any way that such a real-time
video imaging display cannot be achieved with any particular time latency.”
Id.
Because the Specification does not provide a lexicographic definition
of “real-time,” Appellants turn to extrinsic evidence in support of their claim
interpretation of “real-time.” In support of “real-time video images”
meaning video images in which the latency is less than 300 ms, and
preferably less than 30 ms (Appeal Br. 7), Appellant submits evidence in the
form of (1) R. S. H. Istepanian and N. Philip, Optimisation Issues of High
Throughput Medical Data and Video Streaming Traffic in 3G Wireless
Environments, Medical and Care Compunetics 2 (L. Bos et al. (Eds.)) (2005)
(hereinafter “Istepanian”); 2) Richard J. Tobias, Wireless communication of
real-time ultrasound data and control, Medical Imaging 2015: Ultrasonic
Imaging and Tomography (Johan G. Bosch, Neb Duric (Eds.), Vol. 9419
(2015) (hereinafter “Tobias”); and (3) a Declaration of Gabriel M. Kim,
MD, MSE Under Rule 132 (hereinafter “Declaration” or “Decl.”)
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Istepanian discusses a medical robotic system –OTELO (mObile Tele-
Echography using an ultra-Light rObot) that “comprises a fully portable tele-
operated robot allowing a specialist sonographer to perform a real-time
robotized tele-echography to remote patients.” Istepanian 125. Istepanian
discloses that “[f]or the purpose of OTELO’s ultrasound image streaming,
expert evaluation has shown that [a] minimum requirement[] for an efficient
diagnosis” is that “[t]he delay of the received images should be less than 300
ms.” Id. at 129. Although Istepanian discloses that a latency of 300 ms is
one requirement for an efficient diagnosis (id.), we do not view Istepanian as
supporting that a longer latency would exclude its system from performing
“real-time robotized tele-echography” (id. at 129) or otherwise suggesting
that the term “real-time” excludes images having a latency greater than 300
ms.
Tobias discloses that, in the context of “an ultrasound server
wirelessly (or over any network connected to multiple lightweight clients on
devices like . . . Google Glass,” “[b]y keeping the latency less than 30ms, the
operator will feel like the data he sees on the wireless connected devices is
running in real-time with the operator.” Tobias 1. Tobias reiterates that
“[l]atency is within the human reaction time of <30ms; thus moving a probe,
the imaging is shown to the user as in real-time.” Id. at 7. Tobias, thus,
suggests that a latency less than 30 ms is within human reaction and will not
be perceptible to a human user. We, however, do not view Tobias as
suggesting that a longer latency would exclude its system from being
considered a “real-time” system. In particular, Tobias states that its
ultrasound server was “running various clinical ultrasound imaging modes in
real-time with minimum latency ([<]30ms).” Id. at 8. In our view, this
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suggests that “real-time” encompasses more than a minimum latency of
<30 ms.
The Declaration indicates that “[f]or guidance in needle procedures,
ultrasound video images are considered to be in ‘real-time’ if the image of
the needle in relation to the anatomy is perceived by the operating clinician
to represent the actual position of the needle at that moment” and “any
latency in the video images needs to be so brief as to be imperceptible or
nearly imperceptible to the operating clinician.” Decl. ¶¶ 13. The
Declaration further indicates that “ultrasound video images would not be
considered ‘real-time’ if the image of the needle in relation to the anatomy
fails to be perceived by the operating clinician as representing the actual
position of the needle at that moment.” Id. ¶ 14. The Declaration further
indicates that Sekiyama’s “one-second delay in the video images would
easily be perceived by the operating clinician, an therefore[,] the clinician
would not trust those video images as representing the actual position of the
needle at that moment” and “Sekiyama’s one-second latency is not ‘real-
time’ in the context of an ultrasound-guided needle procedure.” Id. ¶ 15.
According to Appellant, Dr. Kim’s Declaration testimony supports that
“‘real-time’ is judged according to the ordinary human-observed perception
of the operating clinician; and any latency in the video images must be so
brief as to be imperceptible or nearly imperceptible to the operating
clinician.” Appeal Br. 10.
In our view, the Declaration (coupled with Istepanian and Tobias)
does not support by a preponderance of the evidence that Sekiyama’s video
images having a latency of one second do not suffice to meet the claim
limitation of “real-time video images,” even in the context of needle
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procedures. More specifically, although we cannot dispute that a one second
latency would be perceived by a physician (as Sekiyama itself evidences
this), simply that a latency of a video-image is perceptible is not enough to
exclude that video image as a “real-time” video image. As pointed out by
the Examiner, “time latency always exists in data streaming, and such a term
of ‘real-time’ does not have one single definition in terms of its time-scale.”
Ans. 16 (quoting Adv. Act (Feb. 15, 2018), 2). The Examiner also points
out that “a time scale [indicative of whether a video image qualifies as ‘real-
time’] evolves as technology advances and is highly dependent on the
performance of the peripheral hardware.” Id. at 16–17. Significantly, the
Declaration never explicitly states that the meaning it ascribes to “real-time”
is that which it would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention.
The Examiner also provides evidence that real-time streaming
encompasses a spectrum of time latency and that “[t]he highest time latency
associated with the real-time streaming as presented is above 0.7 second[s],
which is approximately 1 second and is in the same scale of what’s
presented in Sekiyama.” Id. at 17 (citing Medhi Ahmadi et al., A Real-Time
Remote Video Streaming Platform for Ultrasound Imaging (2016), Fig. 3
(hereinafter “Ahmadi’)). The Examiner also points out that “the proposed
system for real-time video streaming” (Ahmadi 4383) comprises an
ultrasound unit to obtain the ultrasound video stream and a frame grabber
that delivers the video to a computer, where the frame grabber supports “an
open-source software toolkit for ultrasound guide intervention systems” (id.
at 4384 (emphasis added)).
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We have considered the extrinsic evidence supplied by Appellant, but
we are not persuaded that the extrinsic evidence establishes that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted “real-time video images” for
interventional ultrasound to exclude video images having a perceptible
latency (e.g., such as the perceptible one second time lag of Sekiyama). In
the absence of a more narrow lexicographical definition of “real-time” in the
Specification, that there may be a perceptible latency in a video image does
not exclude it from being a real-time video image so long as the video image
is provided simultaneously with a process using the video images so as to be
useful to the process. See Dictionary.com, available at
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/real-time?s=t (last visited Aug. 22,
2019) (defining “real-time” as “of or relating to applications in which the
computer must respond as rapidly as required by the user or necessitated by
the process being controlled); Cambridge Dictionary, available at
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/real-time (last visited
Aug. 22, 2019) (defining “real-time” as “used to describe the way in which a
computer system receives data and then communicates it or makes it
available immediately”).
The Examiner explains that “[t]he one second time latency that
Sekiyama discloses does not prevent the users from simultaneous viewing
[of the video images and the needle manipulation], as Sekiyama explicitly
teaches that (1) there were no significant differences between the needle
visualization time of the conventional group and the HMD [head-mounted
display] group . . . and (2) . . . the HMD system may not encumber the
manipulations of the USNB [ultrasound-guided nerve block].” Ans. 15
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner continues that “[i]n other words, the
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time-lag may at most be not optimal as the users ‘dislike’ it, yet the results
still demonstrated that simultaneous perception was achieved.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner’s finding that Sekiyama’s video images
having a one second latency suffice to meet the limitation of “real-time
videos” is supported by a preponderance of the evidence when the term is
given its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the plain and
ordinary meaning and the Specification.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1, and claim 2 depending therefrom and for which
Appellant relies on the same arguments and reasoning as independent
claim 1, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Sekiyama.
Rejection II
Dependent claim 4 recites that “the needle or catheter procedure is a
percutaneous ultrasound-guided needle procedure.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims
App.). The Examiner finds that Patacsil teaches a percutaneous ultrasound-
guided catheterization procedure and concludes that it would have been
obvious to employ Patacsil’s procedure in the methodology that Sekiyama
teaches because “[t]he combination of Sekiyama and Patacsil expands the
clinical utility of the invention as taught in Sekiyama.” Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that “using Sekiyama’s system to perform Patacsil’s
ultrasound-guided venous catheterization would require a drastic change in
Patacsil’s principles of operation that relies on ‘real-time’ imaging.” Appeal
Br. 15 (citing Patacsil 2:62, 9:25–32). This argument is not persuasive
because it does not address the rejection as articulated by the Examiner
which is based on the modification of Sekiyama with the teachings of
Patacsil, not on the modification of Patacsil with the teachings of Sekiyama.
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Thus, arguments regarding any purported change in the principles of
operation of Patacsil are not persuasive of unobviousness in that the
Examiner is not modifying the secondary reference of Patacsil.
Appellant also argues that “in the proposal combining Patacsil with
Sekiyama, the resulting combination would not result in the user ‘viewing
the real-time video images from the ultrasound apparatus’ as claimed”
because “Sekiyama’s head-mounted display system is deficient in this
feature.” Appeal Br. 15–16. For the reasons described above in connection
with Rejection I, we do not find Sekiyama’s head-mounted display system
(even acknowledging its latency of approximately one second) to fail to
disclose “real-time video images” as claimed.4

4 Although the Examiner notes that Patacsil was not relied upon “for the
teaching of real-time, wh[ere] [the] Examiner[] consider[s] that Sekiyama
has provided sufficient teaching” (Adv. Act. (Oct. 27, 2017), 2), Appellant’s
arguments appear to concede that Patacsil has a “requirement for ‘real-time’
ultrasound imaging in performing a venous catheterization procedure”
(Appeal Br. 15). In our view, Patacsil’s teaching of the desirability of “real
time imaging of the vascular anatomy” (Patacsil 2:62; see also, e.g., id. at
3:13–17, 4:4–7) would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to improve
the methodology of Sekiyama so as to provide for real-time imaging having
a reduced time lag, especially in light of Sekiyama’s indication itself of a
need to “further improve[] the hardware” (Sekiyama 1). As indicated by
Appellant’s Specification, “[a] variety of such types of apparatuses
[wearable, head-mounted image display apparatuses] are available or have
been proposed, and can be used in my invention so long as it is capable of
displaying real-time video images from the medical imaging equipment to
the user while also simultaneously allowing the user to have a direct view of
the real world environment.” Spec. 2:24–28. In light of this disclosure in
the Specification, we do not view Appellant as claiming to have invented the
technology that allows for such wearable, head-mounted image display
apparatus to provide real time video images, but rather, a method that
combines the use of existing display technology with specific medical
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For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama and Patacsil.
Rejection III
Dependent claim 10 recites that “the ultrasound apparatus is a fully
self-contained wireless handheld ultrasound probe without any attached
display screen.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). Claim 21 specifies that the
probe “weighs less than one pound,” and claim 22 specifies that the probe
“weighs less than 13.5 ounces.” Id. at 20. The Examiner acknowledges that
Sekiyama does not teach such a probe (Final Act. 5), but finds that Poland
teaches such a probe (id. at 5–6). The Examiner concludes that it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have substituted
Poland’s probe for Sekiyama’s ultrasound system “as the substitution of one
known type of ultrasound probe with another yields predictable results to
one of ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of procedure guidance.” Id.
at 6. The Examiner also concludes that Poland’s probe has the advantages
of being light in weight and convenient to use. Id. (citing Poland ¶ 5).
Appellant argues that because “Poland teaches that surgeons need
stationary images of the surgical site, changing it to video images would

procedures. Sekiyama at least discloses the wearing of a head-mounted
image display apparatus in communication with an ultrasound apparatus
when positioning a needle at a skin site on the patient’s body, and advancing
the needle into the patient’s body while viewing the video images from the
ultrasound apparatus on the head-mounted image display. To the extent that
Sekiyama does not teach that such images have an imperceptible latency (or
a latency of less than 300 ms or preferably 30 ms as advanced by Appellant),
Patacsil’s teaching of the desirability of real-time imaging would have led
one of ordinary skill in the art to identify and select existing head-mounted
image display apparatus capable of providing such video images to achieve
such desired capabilities.
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violate Poland’s principle of operation for its ultrasound probe.” Appeal
Br. 17 (citing Poland ¶ 59). This argument is not persuasive because it does
not address the rejection as articulated by the Examiner which is based on
the modification of Sekiyama with the teachings of Poland, not on the
modification of Poland with the teachings of Sekiyama. Thus, arguments
regarding any purported change in the principles of operation of Poland are
not persuasive of unobviousness in that the Examiner is not modifying the
secondary reference of Poland.
Appellant also argues that “the combination would not result in ‘real-
time video’ imaging, as required by the claims . . . [because] the surgeon
would follow Poland’s instructions on how to properly use its handheld
probe in surgery.” Appeal Br. 17–18. The Examiner responds that “Poland
explicitly teaches in [paragraphs] [0030] and [0036] [its] fully self-contained
handheld unit provides acceptable real time imaging and acceptable real
time imaging frame rates.” Ans. 18. The Examiner also responds that
Poland “merely indicates that there is an option of having a lower frame rate
should the surgeon want to look at a relatively stationary ultrasound image”
and “[t]here is no teaching of Poland to show that video image cannot be
displayed.” Id. at 19; see also Poland ¶ 59 (emphasis added) (“Such an
image does not have to have a high real time frame rate”). We agree with
the Examiner that the modification of Sekiyama so as to use Poland’s
handheld probe does not require the use of stationary images instead of
video images. The Examiner’s rejection as articulated relies on the video
images of Sekiyama, and again, for the reasons described above in
connection with Rejection I, we do not find Sekiyama’s head-mounted
display system (even acknowledging its latency of approximately one
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second) to fail to disclose “real-time video images” as claimed. Thus, the
combination would result in real-time video imaging, as required by the
claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 10, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama
and Poland.
Rejections IV–X
Appellant relies on the same arguments and reasoning we found
unpersuasive in connection with Rejections I–III as the basis for seeking
reversal of Rejections IV–X. Accordingly, we also sustain the rejections,
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, of: claims 11, 13, and 23 as unpatentable over
Sekiyama, Poland, and Yoshikazu; claims 14 and 17 as unpatentable over
Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, and Lugmayr; claims 24 and 29 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Yoshikazu, and Patacsil; claims 25–28
as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, and Patacsil; claim 30 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, and Patacsil;
claim 31 as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, and
Yoshikazu; and claim 32 as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois,
Lugmayr, Yoshikazu, and Patacsil.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 2 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Sekiyama is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama and Patacsil is affirmed.
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The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 10, 21, and 22 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama and Poland is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 11, 13, and 23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, and Yoshikazu is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 14 and 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, and Lugmayr is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 24 and 29 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Yoshikazu, and Patacsil is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25–28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, and Patacsil is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, and Patacsil is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, and Yoshikazu is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sekiyama, Poland, Lardinois, Lugmayr, Yoshikazu, and
Patacsil is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED