Sterling Precision Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 22, 1961

131 N.L.R.B. 1229 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1229
Accordingly, we find that the following employees at the Em-
ployer's milling operation at Laws, California, and at its mining opera-
tions in the Bishop-Laws, California, area, constitute an appropriate
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (b) of the Act :
All production and maintenance employees, including all mining
employees, the laboratory technician, and Gene Hawkins, but exclud-
ing all office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined in the Act .4
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
4 There are no employees holding the classifications of warehousing and transportation
employees , as requested by the Petitioner . This work is done as an incidental duty of
one of the classifications included in the appropriate unit . We therefore do not include
the warehousing and transportation classifications in the unit description.
Sterling Precision Corp ., Instrument Division and Michele J.
Marzullo
Sterling Precision Corp ., Instrument Division and Michele J.
Marzullo and Local 463, International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers , AFL-.CIO, Party to the Contract.
Cases Not. 2-CAS?98'and 2-CA'-6501. June 22, 1961
DECISION- AND ORDER
On March 28,1960, Trial Examiner Sidney S. Asher, Jr., issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. He also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and
recommended dismissal of the complaint with respect to such allega-
tions. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed ex-
ceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the exceptions and modifi-
cations set forth hereinafter.2
1 The Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record , exceptions,
and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties
2 In view of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Local 357,
.International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
131 NLRB No. 155.
1230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons set forth in
the Intermediate Report, that the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act by threatening employee Michele J. Marzullo and
other employees with discharge unless they signed checkoffs author-
izing the Respondent to deduct the union dues. or initiation fees from
their wages and remit such funds to the Union.'
. The Respondent contends that the threatened discharge of employ-
ees for failure to sign such authorization cards is not violative of Sec-
tion 8(a) (1) of the Act since the matter of checkoff authorizations is-
dealt with exclusively under Section 302 of the Act and the Board is
given no jurisdiction under the latter section to redress or correct vio-
lations thereof. We find no merit in this contention, for it is well
established that conduct which coerces or attempts to coerce employees
into accepting a checkoff is a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.'
ORDER
Upon the entire record in these cases, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Sterling Pre-
cision Corp., Instrument Division, Port Washington, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening its employees with discharge or other economic
reprisal if they refuse to authorize the Respondent to deduct dues or
initiation fees from their wages and remit such funds to Local 463,
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO.
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization , to form, join, or assist labor organizations , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- -
gaining or other material aid or protection, or to refrain from any
or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be
America ( Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express ) v. N.L R.B., 365 U.S. 667 , we adopt, with-
out passing on the Trial Examiner 's rationale , his conclusion that the hiring hall provi-
sions in the parties' 1958 contract were not violative of the Act.
As no exceptions were filed to the Trial Examiner 's finding that the union - security
clause in said contract was not illegal , we adopt such finding pro forma
8 We find on the basis of the record as a whole that Personnel and Sales Manager
Hannon possessed and exercised the authority to discharge employees and that he was a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
4 American Screw Company, 122 NLRB 485 ; Federal Stores Division of Spiegel, Inc ,
91 NLRB 647
We deem it unnecessary to pass on the 'Trial Examiner ' s finding that the Respondent's
said conduct was, in the circumstances of this case , also a violation of Section 8(a) (2) ,
our order herein enjoining the Respondent from engaging in such conduct is adequate to
meet any such violation.
STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1231
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a union as a con-
dition of employment as permitted in Section 3 (a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Port Washington, New York, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Second Region, shall,
after being,duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted
by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that these notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to
comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges
that the Respondent violated the Act by entering into or enforcing
the contract between the Respondent and the Union, described above,
or engaged in discriminatory or illegal hiring practices, be and the
same is , hereby dismissed.
CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH and MEMBER RODGERS took no part in the
consideration of the above Decision and Order.
5 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, you are notified that :
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with economic reprisals
if they refuse to authorize us to deduct dues or initiation fees
from their wages and pay such funds to Local 463, International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
1232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a union as a condition of employment, as permitted in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
STERLING PRECISION CORP.,
INSTRUMENT DIVISION,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
CONSOLIDATED INTERMEDIATE REPORT
These cases involve allegations that Sterling Precision Corp., Instrument Division,'
Port Washington, New York, herein called the Respondent, on or about December
2, 1958, threatened to discharge some of its employees if they did not sign cards
authorizing the Respondent to deduct union dues and initiation fees from their
wages and remit the same to Local 463, International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Party to the Contract, herein called the Union; that
on or about December 4, 1958, the Respondent entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union, effective as of November 3, 1958, which contained a
provision requiring the Respondent's employees, as a condition of employment, to
apply for membership in and join the Union within 30 days following the beginning
of their employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, and
to remain in.good standing thereafter; and that the agreement described above con-
tained an exclusive referral provision requiring that the Respondent hire employees
recommended by the Union, except where the Union failed to furnish satisfactory
employees within 72 hours after being requested to do so, without incorporating
therein provisions respecting the nondiscriminatory basis of selection of applicants
for referral, and the proper posting of notices relating to the functioning of exclu-
sive referral agreements. It is alleged that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1),
(2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136),
herein called the Act. After the consolidation of the cases and the issuance of a
consolidated amended complaint and notice of hearing by the General Counsel 2 and
the filing of an answer by the Respondent, a consolidated hearing was held before
Sydney S. Asher, Jr., the duly designated Trial Examiner, between October 26 and
November 17, 1959, both dates inclusive, at New York, New York. The General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union were represented and participated fully in
the hearing. After the close of the hearing, the Respondent filed a brief which has
been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in these cases,2 and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
There is no dispute, and it is found, that the Respondent is, and at all material
times has been, engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and its opera-
tions meet the Board's jurisdictional standards,4 and that the Union is, and at all
material times has been, a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
1 The captions of these cases were amended at the hearing to reflect the Respondent's
correct name.
2 The designation General Counsel refers to the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board and his representative at the hearing.
9 On March 11, 1960, the transcript of testimony was corrected in six specific respects
4 The Respondent Is a Delaware corporation with its principal office in New York,
New York, and a plant at Port Washington, New York, and is engaged in the manu-
STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1233
A. Preliminary events -
As the result of a stipulated election held on September 12, 1958, the Board on
September 22, 1958, certified the Union as the bargaining representative of the Re-
spondent's production and maintenance employees at its Port Washington, New
York, plant (Case No. 2-RC-9465, not published in NLRB volumes). Before the
formal certification issued, the Union and the Respondent began bargaining for a
collective-bargaining agreement covering the employees in the certified unit. Nego-
tiations continued through November 1.5
Early in November the Respondent employed from 40 to 50 nonsupervisory em-
ployees on its day shift, and from 10 to 12 nonsupervisory employees on its night
shift. By November 3 all employees in the certified unit had signed cards applying
for membership in the Union.
During November and December, Joseph Richards was the Respondent's night
foreman, Arthur Chirkis was its wiring supervisor, and Patrick E. Sabatini was its
,day foreman. The parties stipulated, and it is found, that during these months these
individuals were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. From at least Novem-
ber 1958 to mid-September 1959, H. J. Hannon was the Respondent's personnel
and sales manager. During this period Norma Lawrence was the Respondent's
assistant personnel manager and Martin Hoffman was its assistant comptroller.
Joseph Flynn, the Respondent's comptroller, assumed the additional duties of per-
sonnel director when Hannon left the Respondent's employ in mid-September 1959.
B. Threats to discharge employees who refused to authorize dues checkoifs
1. Facts
During November James Tracy,6 a precision grinder employed by the Respondent
and the Union's shop chairman at the Respondent's plant, passed out to the em-
ployees blank cards authorizing the Respondent to deduct dues and initiation fees
from their wages and to remit such funds to the Union. Tracy requested the em-
ployees to sign these cards and return them to him. Late in November Hannon
discussed with Guy Caputo, a business agent of the Union, the fact that some em-
ployees had declined to sign these checkoff • authorizations. Hannon remarked:
"That will cause a lot of extra bookkeeping. I will see if I can get those people
to sign checkoff authorization cards." By December 2 all employees in the unit
had complied with Tracy's request except Michele J. Marzullo (the Charging Party
herein), Nat Cappadoro, and Harry Nenner, all employes on the night shift?
On December 2 or 3, Hannon instructed Richards, the immediate supervisor of
Marzullo, Cappadoro, and Nenner, to inform them that if they failed to sign the
authorization cards they would be subject to dismissal .8 Richards then asked Mar-
zullo, Cappadoro, and Nenner collectively to sign the authorizations, pointing out
that overwise the Respondent would be inconvenienced.9 The record is not clear as
to what they replied.10 Richards reported back to Hannon. Cappadoro and Nenner
appointed Marzullo their spokesman. Marzullo then conferred with Hannon in
'Hannon's office, with Richards present. During this conversation, Hannon stated
facture, sale, and distribution of electronic and machine shop products and related prod-
ucts During the 12-month period immediately preceding the hearing, the Respondent
shipped products valued at In excess of $250,000 directly to points outside the State of
New York.
6 All dates herein refer to the year 1958, unless otherwise noted.
6 Sometimes spelled "Tracey" on the record
7 Marzullo testified that on December 3 Hoffman Informed Marzullo and Cappadoro that
they would have to sign checkoff authorizations or be discharged Hoffman admitted that
he asked them to do so, but denied threatening them with discharge if they refused.
I deem It unnecessary to resolve this conflict, particularly because the record does not
convince me that Hoffman was, at that time, a supervisor or agent of the Respondent act-
ing within the scope of his authority so as to make the Respondent accountable for his
actions
8 This finding Is based upon Richards' testimony and the admission of the Respondent's
counsel at oral argument and In his brief Hannon did not testify
O The finding regarding this conversation is based upon Richards' testimony. Neither
-Cappadoro nor Nenner testified
10 According to Marzullo, the employees answered that they would not sign ; according
to Richards, they responded that they would sign eventually, but not just then. I deem
It unnecessary to resolve this conflict
599198-62-vol. 131-79
1234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the refusal of some employees to sign the checkoff authorizations caused the
Respondent inconvenience and that it was the Respondent's policy that all employees
would have to sign checkoff cards.ll Either later that day or the next day, Richards
told Marzullo and Cappadoro collectively that he was instructed by Hannon to in-
form them that if they persisted in their refusal to sign dues checkoff authoriza-
tions they would be subject to discharge. Richards emphasized that this was Han-
non's order, not his. He added that "Hannon is blowing his horn. He has no
right to dictate these things to my men, so you don't have to sorry [sicl about that,
but I would like you to sign it in order to get me off the hook." Finally, Richards
assured Marzullo and Cappadoro that he "would be on their side . . . would fight
for them." 12
Marzullo, Cappadoro, and Nenner never signed the checkoff authorizations. Mar-
zullo was discharged on Hannon's orders on December 5, 1958.13 Nenner was
discharged by Richards in December for incompetence. Cappadoro was laid off
on December 31, 1958, with the remainder of the night shift, for economic reasons.
The General Counsel does not contend that any of these separations violated the
-Act.14
The Union filed a grievance with respect to Marzullo's discharge, which eventu-
ally resulted in arbitration. The arbitrator found that "there was not just cause
for" Marzullo's discharge, awarded him backpay from December 4 to 31, and
directed that he be reinstated on the seniority list. He returned to the Respondent's
employ on October 1, 1959.
2. Contentions of the parties
The consolidated amended complaint alleges that on or about December 2 Mar-
zullo and other employees were threatened with discharge if they refused to sign
checkoff authorizations. The General Counsel contends that such threats con-
stitute interference, restraint, and coercion of employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and also the contribution of illegal support to
the Union. The original answer admitted "that certain employees, including .. .
Marzullo, were informed that if they did not sign [checkoff authorization] cards .. .
[they] would be subject to dismissal." This was later amended to deny any threats.
3. Conclusions
Based on the facts described above, and the admission originally contained in the
Respondent's answer,15 I conclude that on December 2 or 3 Hannon told Marzullo
that it was the Respondent's policy that all employees must sign checkoff authori-
zations, and that Richards told Marzullo and Cappadoro that their refusal to sign
such authorizations would render them subject to dismissal. It is further found
that in making these statements Hannon and Richards, who were supervisors within
the meaning of the Act,16 acted within the scope of their respective authorities, and
thereby bound the Respondent. It is also found that the employees' right to refrain
from signing the authorizations (a right protected by Section 7 of the Act) 17 was
"The finding that Hannon made this "policy" statement directly to Marzullo is based
upon Richards' testimony.
11 The findings regarding this conversation are based upon Richards' testimony and the
admission of the Respondent's counsel at oral argument and in his brief.
13 The General Counsel maintains that the reason for Marzullo's discharge is immaterial,
but that if it is material, the reason was his refusal to sign a checkoff authorization. The
Respondent contends that the discharge was for security reasons unrelated to the checkoff
authorization. I consider it unnecessary to determine the reason for Marzullo's discharge.
14 In making findings of fact regarding the threats made to employees, I have not
drawn any presumptions from the failure of either the General Counsel or the Respondent
to call as witnesses Cappadoro, Nenner, or Hannon
is The amendment of an answer does not have the effect of stripping the original from
the record for all purposes ; it may still be used as an admission against interest Inter-
national Association of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers Lodge No 35 v. N L R.B , 110
F. 2d 29, 39 (CAD,C.) ; Texas Natural Gasoline Corporation, 116 NLRB 405, 412,
enforcement denied 253 F. 2d 322 (CA. 5) ; and 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 61,
sec 1067. This is particularly true here where the affiant, Hannon, never personally
repudiated the admission he made in the original answer
16 Although the parties did not stipulate that Hannon was a supervisor, it is clear
that he had the authority to discharge, for lie caused Marzullo to be dismissed.
17 American Screw Company, 122 NLRB 485, 489
STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1235
abridged both by the "company policy" statement of Hannon 18 and by the "subject
to dismissal" statement of Richards.19
The Respondent contends, however, that it-had a right to threaten as it did because
the employees involved (1) were already union members, (2) never signed the
checkoff authorizations, and (3) never were disciplined for failing to do so. As to
(1),'it is true that membership in a union carries with it the obligation to pay dues
and initiation fees. But the Act permits employees freedom to choose the method
of payment, either by checkoff or by direct payments to the Union. An employer
may not interfere with this freedom of choice. As to (2), the fact that the threat
was not effective in bringing about the desired result is no defense. And as to (3),
the threat alone constitutes the violation of the Act, regardless of whether or not
it was ultimately carried out.
The Respondent further urges that the threats, if any, "are merged in the award"
which Marzullo received as the result of the arbitration of his grievance resulting
from his discharge, and therefore the Board "should not take jurisdiction . . . over
any charge arising out of the alleged threat to . discharge." I cannot agree.
Section 10 of the Act specifically provides that the Board's power to remedy unfair
labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or preven-
tion that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise."
Finally, the Respondent's counsel vigorously and ably urges that Richards' addi-
tional statement to Marzullo and Cappadoro that Hannon "was blowing his horn"
and had no authority to discharge them for failing to sign dues authorizations, in
connection with Richards' assurance that he would fight for them, deprived the
alleged threat of all coercive force. The Respondent contends that, under the cir-
cumstances here present, no reasonable man would have been coerced or would
have felt any apprehension. On the contrary, maintains the Respondent, a reason-
able man would have been aware that Hannon lacked authority to carry out his
threat, that the threat was an empty one, and that there was no possibility of it
being effected. In support of this contention, the Respondent maintains that in
fact Hannon's authority to discharge shop employees was limited strictly to matters
of personnel and security, and the failure to sign checkoff authorizations was not
such a matter. The evidence, however, leaves the actual extent of Hannon's author-
ity over the matter in issue in somewhat of a fog of uncertainty. Thus, with com-
mendable candor, Richards admitted that he "did not know whether he [Hannon]
was within his rights or not." And when Marzullo asked pointblank whether or not
the Respondent could enforce a mandatory checkoff policy, Richards responded:
"I don't have the slightest idea." Surely if Richards, who at that time had over
5 years' service with the Respondent, was in the dark as to the exact extent of
Hannon's authority, how can Marzullo, a novice in the Respondent's plant with but
2 months' employment, be expected to entertain a certainty? I conclude that 'the
alleged limitation on Hannon's authority, if indeed it existed at all,2° was not so
pellucid and well known to the employees as -to afford them any comfort. It follows,
and I find, that despite Richards' assurances that Hannon lacked authority to carry
out his threat, and Richards' promise to fight for the rights of his men, a reasonable
man in the shoes of Marzullo land Cappadoro would have been apprehensive and
intimidated by Hannon's threat, as relayed by Richards.
In view of the foregoing, it is found that by the threats described above the Re-
spondent interfered with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
It .is further found that, by this conduct, the Respondent contributed illegal support
and assistance to the Union, in violation of Section 8(a) (2) of the Act.21
18 In my opinion, when a personnel manager defines the company's policy to an employee,
he implies that employees run the risk of having economic sanctions imposed if they
disregard that policy
1•4 The Respondent would apparently distinguish between a threat to discharge an em-
ployee for engaging in protected activities, and a threat that engaging in such conduct
would make the employee subject to dismissal I am of the opinion, however, that both
types of threats are violative of the Act
20 In this connection I note in passing that it was on Hannon's orders that Marzullo
was discharged on December 5.
v In my opinion, the validity of these findings Is not affected by the existence or
absence of a collective-bargaining contract between the Union and the Respondent con-
taining a valid provision for the checkoff of union dues and initiation fees.
1236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Legality of the union-security clause
1. Facts
The bargaining between the Respondent and the Union commenced with the
Union's submission of its demands ( the "standard contract") in mimeographed form.
As negotiations progressed handwritten changes were made, either in the form of
insertions and deletions in the mimeographed document , or the addition of various
yellow sheets of paper. Every change was initialed by a representative of each of
the parties.22 At the end of the meeting of November 1 Mr. Solari , vice president
and general manager of the Respondent and one of its negotiators , stated that the
contract would become effective upon ratification by the employees . Caputo, one
of the Union 's representatives , assented . It was agreed that the Respondent would
have clean copies reproduced for signature and distribution . The representatives of
both sides then shook hands and (according to Tracy who was present ) "agreed that
this was our contract." 23
On November 3 the Union held a meeting which was attended by about 50 of the
Respondent 's employees . The contract was read to them clause by clause and ex-
plained.24 Those present then voted unanimously to ratify the agreement. On
November 4 , Tracy informed Solari and Hannon that the employees had ratified the
contract on November 3, and that it was in effect.
Early in November , Solari handed the sheaf of papers to Lawrence and instructed
her to have them dittoed . Lawrence first prepared a typed draft , which was checked
by Tracy. Grammatical errors, punctuation , obvious typographical errors, and mis-
spellings were corrected , and from the corrected draft dittoed copies were prepared.
On December 4,25 representatives of both parties affixed their signatures to the dittoed
copies. They were then assembled and distributed.
The dittoed document recites that it was entered into on November 3, 1958, and is
to be effective from that date until November 3, 1960 , and thereafter from year to
year unless terminated on 60 days ' notice. It contains the following clause:
ARTICLE II-UNION MEMBERSHIP
After the Union conforms with Taft-Hartley Act, as amended , the following
union security clause shall be effective.
All present and future employees of Port Washington operation shall make
application for membership and join in Local No. 463 within thirty days follow-
ing the beginning of their employment or the effective date of this agreement,
whichever is later, and shall remain in good standing as a condition of
employment.
This contract is still in effect.
2. Contentions of the parties
The consolidated amended complaint , as further amended at the hearing , alleges
that on or about December 4 the Respondent and the Union entered into a
collective-bargaining agreement , effective November 3, and have since maintained
it in effect and enforced it. It is further alleged that this agreement requires the Re-
spondent 's employees , as a condition of employment , to join the Union within 30
days of hire or the effective date of the contract , whichever is later, and to remain
in good standing thereafter . The General Counsel's theory is that negotiations of
terms continued , and full agreement was not reached , until December 4,26 but the
22 According to 'Caputo , a witness for the Union , the initialing was done by both parties
on a single set of sheets of paper . According to Tracy , another witness for the Union,
two identical sets of sheets of paper were maintained for initialing purposes, and each
side counterinitialed the set in the other 's possession I deem it unnecessary to resolve
this conflict.
23 According to Caputo , at the end of this meeting, "we signed each page " According to
Tracy, "nothing was signed at that meeting ." I deem it unnecessary to resolve this
conflict.
24 According to Caputo , he borrowed the sheaf of papers from Solari on November 1 for
this purpose and returned it to Solari about November 5
25 Twice during November Caputo inquired of Solari when he was going to have the
copies ready for signature . During the same period Tracy asked Lawrence several times
if Solari had signed yet.
20 The General Counsel stated at oral argument that he had "no idea, what part [of
the contract ] was actually agreed upon in final form" on November 1.
STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1237
contract was made retroactive to November 3, thus depriving old employees of the
prescribed 30-day grace period. Hence, urges the General Counsel, the clause on
its face violates Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. The answer admits that
on December 4 the Respondent and the Union entered into a written agreement
containing the terms described above, but denies its illegality. In defense of the
clause's validity, the Respondent contends that complete and final agreement on
all terms was reached on November 1, that the contract became effective upon
ratification on November 3, and that therefore no retroactivity was involved. Thus,
this issue boils down to the earliest date upon which the contract was complete and
effective-whether on November 3, as contended by the Respondent, or not until
December 4, as the General Counsel maintains.
3. Conclusions
In view of the fact that on November 1 representatives of both sides shook hands
(a gesture normally associated with agreement) and voiced their understanding
that the contract was final, subject only to ratification by the employees, it is diffi-
cult to escape the conclusion that on November 3, when ratification was perfected,
the contract became fully effective. Indeed, Caputo testified that on November 1
the parties had "exact agreement" on the language, and Tracy similarly testified that
"at that time we had an oral agreement . . . we were very sure of what our agree-
ment was." It is true that a clean draft was not actually signed until December 4,
but the testimony is undisputed that the dittoed copies were identical with the
original sheaf of papers initialed on November 1, except for minor matters, such
as grammar, punctuation, obvious typographical errors,-and misspellings 27 That
this purely mechanical act of typing, reproducing, signing, and distributing clean
copies remained to be done in nowise detracts from the finality of the agreement
reached earlier.28 Other conduct of the parties during the period from November 1
to December 4 lends support to this conclusion, and effectively negates the General
Counsel's contention that parts of the agreement were still being negotiated during
this period:
1. The ratification meeting of November 3: Logically, employees would be asked
to ratify a contract only after it had been completed. Had negotiations still been
underway, it would seem that ratification would have been premature.29 Moreover,
if final agreement was not ultimately reached until December 4, as the General
Counsel contends, there is no valid explanation for the Union's failure to hold a
final ratification meeting thereafter. Yet that was not done.
2. The failure of the parties to hold further negotiating meetings after No-
vember 1: Thus Tracy described the November 1 session as "our last meeting with
management."
3. The wage increase: Article XXVII of the contract provides for a general wage
raise of 10 cents per hour. The paychecks distributed to all employees on Novem-
ber 13 contained an increase of 10 cents per hour, retroactive to November 3. Had
this factor stood alone, perhaps it might not have been decisive. But viewed in the
context of other conduct described herein, I consider it highly significant.
4. Grievances: Article XXIV of the contract establishes a grievance system.
Tracy testified without contradiction that "right after the ratification" the Union
processed a grievance concerning alleged improper ventilation.30
In support of his contention that the contract was not complete until December 4,
the General Counsel relies on (1) the Union's failure to secure a dues checkoff
for the month of November; (2) the fact that there was an "intervening document,"
the typed rough draft, between the sheaf of papers used in the negotiations and the
dittoed draft; and (3) Tracy's testimony indicating that, between November 1 and
27 The original sheaf of papers, not being available at the time of the hearing, is not in
evidence. But I am satisfied from Caputo's testimony that the dittoed document signed
on December 4 did not vary in any material respect from the agreement the parties
reached on November 1, which was ratified by the employees on November 3.
28 Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers
Union, 193 F. 2d 209, 213-214 (CA 6).
' The undenied testimony of Caputo is that on November 3 he told the employees the
contract would take effect on the same day they ratified it.
80 Respondent also contends that there are other facts indicating that a final agreement
had been reached on November 3, such as the contract's terminal date, the granting of
a holiday on the day after Thanksgiving, and the payment to the Union's welfare fund for
the month of November. In concluding that a contract was reached on November 3, I have
not relied on these additional factors.
1238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
December 4, the parties negotiated regarding "a classification system" and perhaps
the seniority clause.
As to (1), the Union's constitution requires members to pay dues for any month
during which they are employed in a shop under contract with the Union for 5 or
more days. However, the Union did not receive a dues checkoff for November.
The first dues checkoff was effected in December. The General Counsel would
infer from this that no contract was in effect in November. Caputo explained that
the November dues checkoff was omitted because the Union "wanted to make
a concession to the employees ." Hoffman explained that the Respondent could
not, of course, make deductions from wages without the written authorizations of
the individual employees, and these were not delivered to the Respondent until
"very close to the end of November or the beginning of December." I conclude
that the failure to checkoff dues for the month of November, although it may tend
to indicate that no contract was in effect for more than 5 days in November, is,
standing alone , rather unconvincing proof of that fact, insufficient to overcome the
cogent evidence, described above, that the contract was effective in all respects
on November 3.
As to (2), the "intervening document" referred to was merely a rough draft typed
by Lawrence from- the sheaf of papers, in preparation for making a dittoed draft.
I cannot impute to this act-which seems a normal and eminently sensible method
of proceeding-the sinister significance which the General Counsel would attribute
to it . In my opinion , such conduct falls far short of indicating that substantive
changes were made in the contract's provisions after November 3.
As to (3) Tracy testified as follows:
Q. Subsequent to November 4th when you informed Mr. Solari and Mr.
Hannon that the agreement had been ratified , did you have occasion to meet
with the company?
A. Yes. We consistently met with the company because from that point
on we were going into a job evaluation plan and the classification program.
So we met with them quite consistently , whenever we could , because they were
two busy men and they were usually traveling around quite a deal. We had
many, many meetings with them.
Q. During the course of these meetings , were any grievances of the union
discussed?
A. Oh, yes. We brought grievances to them. Only, in one area we had a
gentlemen 's agreement . Due to the fact that we were sitting down on job
evaluation and classification of the employees, we agreed that we would not
take up any grievances that pertained to money or raises, as such. We would
wait until after classification was over. Then, if the people weren't satisfied
with the classification, they could bring up a grievance on it. Anything outside
of money was handled in grievance procedure with different steps. Actually,
we took one up and went to arbitration during that period.
Q. When did you actually conclude your job evaluation and classification?
A. It took a long time, because I had a job to do first of writing up the
descriptions of every job in the plant, every occupation within the bargaining
unit. I believe there were something like seventy occupations and I wrote job
descriptions of these occupations in longhand. It took an awful long time.
So, it took some months , a few months.
Article XXVII of the contract provides, in part:
C. In the event the Employer shall wish to create new or additional classifica-
tions of work . . . the question of whether such new classifications shall be
established and the rate ranges that shall apply shall be negotiated with
the Union .. .
It is reasonable to assume that the discussion regarding "the classification pro-
gram," which took "a few months" to complete, was not the negotiation of contract
terms, but something of an entirely different nature , namely, negotiations under
article XXVII of the contract resulting from the Respondent's desire to establish new
work classifications. To interpret this testimony otherwise, as the General Counsel
would have us do, would produce the incongruous result that the parties negotiated
for "a few months" after November 1, although, as all parties agree, they signed the
dittoed copies of the contract on December 4. Moreover, such an interpretation
would disregard Tracy's description of the November 1 bargaining, session as "our
last meeting with management."
STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1239
For the above reasons I am convinced, and find, that the parties had reached a
full, complete, and final agreement (whether oral 31 or written) on November 1,
subject only to ratification by the employees, and that this contract became effective
when the employees ratified it on November 3. It follows that the union-security
clause was not illegal on its face.32
D. Legality of the hiring clause
1. Facts
The contract contains the following clauses:
ARTICLE XII-HIRING OF NEW EMPLOYEES
The Company shall notify the Union in writing of its intention to hire new
employees. During a period of seventy-two (72) hours after said notification
to the Union of its intention to hire more employees, the Company will not
hire any or engage any new employees until the Union shall within such period
have had an opportunity to recommend to the Company any available em-
ployees. The Company shall have the sole right to hire any employees as
they desire. If within such seventy-two (72) hours the Union fails to furnish
or supply such employees satisfactory to the Company, the Company then may
at the expiration of such period, seek its employees from the open market.
The Company shall have the right to hire temporary employees during this pe-
riod. Promptly upon the hiring of any new employees, notice of such hiring
shall be given to the Union; such notice shall contain the names and classifica-
tions and rates of pay of such employees.
ARTICLE XVIII-ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
There shall be no discrimination against any employee either in hiring, pro-
moting, advancement or assigning of jobs, or with respect to any other terms
or conditions of employment, because of such employee's Union membership
or activity, age, sex, race, creed, color or religious affiliations or national origin.
ARTICLE XXXV-MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
. . . The Company shall have the right, subject to the terms of this Agree-
ment, to hire, classify, assign work to, promote, demote, transfer, discipline,
suspend, discharge for just cause, layoff employees for lack of work, and to
recall employees when increasing the work force. Management shall have the
sole right to hire new employees as they determine.
In March 1959 the Respondent and the Union executed a further document,
which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the Company and the Union are parties to a current and subsisting
Collective Bargaining Agreement, and
WHEREAS, recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board have ren-
dered unlawful certain provisions of the said Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED, That the said Agreement be and the same
hereby is amended to provide as follows:
"ARTICLE XII-HIRING OF NEW EMPLOYEES
The Company shall notify the Union in writing of its intention of hiring new
employees . During a period of seventy-two (72) hours after said notification
to the Union of its intention to hire more employees , the Company will not
hire any or engage any new employees until the Union shall within such period
31 See United Fruit Company, 12 NLRB 404, holding valid an oral closed-shop contract
33 Pointing out that all employees in the unit were members of the Union before
November 3, the Respondent contends that, even had no final contract been reached until
December 4, the clause would have been legal . Citing Charles A. Krause Milling Co.,
97 NLRB 530, the Respondent maintains that the 30-day grace period need not be accorded
employees who are union members at the time an agreement is signed In view of my
finding that the agreement here was reached on' November 3, I shall not pass upon this
contention.
1240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have had an opportunity to recommend to the Company any available job
applicants.
The Union 's recommendation of job applicants and their selection or rejection
by the Company , shall be conducted in a non-discriminatory manner, and shall
not be based upon or in any way affected by the Union membership , by-laws,
rules, regulations , constitutional provisions , or any other aspect or obligation
of Union membership policies or requirements.
If within such seventy-two ( 72) hours the Union fails to furnish or supply
job applicants satisfactory to the Company, the Company then may at the
expiration of such period, hire the necessary employees from the open market.
Promptly upon the hiring of any new employees , notice of such hiring shall
be given to the Union ; such notice shall contain the names and classifications,
date of hire, and rates of pay of such employees.
The Union and the Company shall respectively post the foregoing provisions
of this Article in appropriate places in the plant and at the Union offices."
Late in November or early in December 1958, before this amendment had been
executed , Caputo had posted on the bulletin board at the Union 's office a document
identical to the amendment quoted above , except that the name of the company,
the date, and the article number were left blank . This remained posted "about a
month ." Thus it was no longer posted when the amendment was executed by the
Respondent and the Union . In the early part of 1959 Tracy posted on the bulletin
board at the Respondent 's plant a copy of the amendment quoted above, presumably
containing the factors left blank in the earlier posting at the Union 's offices. This
document remained posted at the Respondent 's plant for approximately 1 or 2
months.
The contract , as amended in March 1959 , is still in effect.
2. Contentions of the parties
The consolidated amended complaint alleges that the agreement requires the
Respondent to hire exclusively employees recommended by the Union, except
when the Union does not furnish satisfactory employees within 72 hours after being
requested to do so. It further alleges that the agreement fails to incorporate certain
required standards,33 and is therefore violative of Section 8(a)(I), (2), and (3) of
the Act. The General Counsel's attack in this respect is double-pronged; he main-
tains that the contract is illegal on its face, and he further urges that, regardless of
the legality or illegality of the contract itself, the actual hiring practices engaged in
by the Respondent were in fact discriminatory and illegal. The answer apparently
admits the execution of the contract, but denies its illegality. The Respondent main-
tains that (1) the contract on its face does not set up any type of hiring hall, but
leaves the Respondent free to hire from any source; (2) even if the contract sets
up a hiring hall, it is surrounded by the required safeguards and therefore is a legal
hiring hall, and (3) in any event, whatever defects might have existed in the original
contract were cured by the amendment of March 1959. By way of rebutting this
last point, the General Counsel argues that the amendment cured nothing because
its posting did not continue during the contract's entire life. The Union takes the
position "that there is . substantial conflict between the various provisions of
this contract . . . [which] obviously raises an ambiguity" regarding whether or not
it establishes an exclusive hiring hall and that therefore it is necessary to consider
"evidence as to what the parties intended."
3. Conclusions regarding the contract itself
Pointing to the second and fourth sentences of article XII, the General Counsel
contends that they clearly establish an exclusive hiring hall or referral system,
albeit for a limited period of time. He would construe the third sentence, sand-
wiched in between, as doing no more than merely permitting the Respondent dis-
cretion to refuse to hire unsatisfactory applicants referred by the Union. The
Respondent interprets the third sentence in a much broader manner, that is, as
according the Respondent complete and untrammeled freedom in seeking appli-
cants from any source. The General Counsel's narrower interpretation, says the
Respondent, does not make sense, for if this were the sentence's true import the
words "employees satisfactory to the Company" in the next sentence become re-
33Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, Inc.; et at., 119
NLRB 883, remanded 270 F. 2d 425 (C.A. 9).
STERLING PRECISION CORP., INSTRUMENT DIVISION 1241
dundant. The General Counsel's rejoiner is that the Respondent's interpretation
renders the second and fourth sentences completely nugatory.
The Respondent considers its position further strengthened by article XVIII,
which it maintains is a promise by both parties to refrain from discrimination in
hiring and thus forbids the Union to discriminate in referring applicants. The
General Counsel disagrees. He views the article as a promise by the Respondent
only, and therefore as referring only to the Respondent's engaging new employees,
as distinguished from the Union's function of merely referring applicants.
The Respondent also points to the second quoted sentence in article XXXV,
similar in tenor to the third sentence in article XII, and argues that this iteration of
the Respondent's right to hire from any source should lay to rest any lingering
doubts about the parties' intent. On the other hand, the General Counsel argues
that this must be considered as limited by the phrase in the previous sentence, "sub-
ject to the terms of this Agreement," and that therefore it cannot overcome the
force of the second and fourth sentences of article XII.
Finally, the General Counsel contends that the second "whereas" clause in the
amendment executed in March 1959 constitutes an admission by the parties that
the original contract set up an illegal hiring hall. The Respondent replies that,
in signing the amendment, the parties merely acted in an abundance of caution. It
should be noted in passing that the amendment furnished no guidepost to applicants
and employees who read the original contract during the months it was in effect
before the amendment was executed and posted on the Respondent's bulletin board 34
After careful study of the contract's confusing terms and consideration of these
arguments, I am convinced that a reasonable employee or applicant reading the
contract would be left in considerable doubt as to whether or not any hiring hall was
established. In sum, I find the contract, on its face, ambiguous and obscure on this
subject. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to examine the actual hiring
practices of the parties pursuant to the contract 35
4. Conclusions regarding the hiring practices actually followed
There was a great deal of testimony regarding the actual hiring practices fol-
lowed by the parties after the contract became effective, much of which is con-
fusing and at times conflicting. Without unduly burdening this report with a detailed
analysis of the the testimony of each of the witnesses on this subject, it is found from
all the evidence produced that:
a. Shortly after the contract went into effect, Harlon issued orders that, in hiring
new employees, the Union first had to be contacted to ascertain wherther it could
supply personnel, and that only after the Union had failed to refer satisfactory
applicants for 72 hours could other sources be utilized36 This finding is based upon
Lawrence's credited testimony, the prehearing affidavit of Sabatini,37 and the testi-
mony of Chirkis -that Lawrence informed him "that before I obtain help, one of her
steps was to contact the Union to see first if they can supply help for me, and after
that period she will take other steps to obtain me that help." To the extent that there
is contrary testimony by any witness, such contrary testimony is not credited.
b. In several instances, these orders were followed. Thus, Lawrence testified that
after the contract was executed she telephoned to the Union "about twice" concerning
the Respondent's employment needs, and after the Union failed to refer any appli-
cants for "about two days," placed ads in newspapers or contacted employment
agencies. And Caputo testified that after the agreement was signed the Union re-
3s The earlier posting at the Union's offices was valueless in this respect because it
contained no reference to the Respondent
35 Utah Construction Co, 95 NLRB 196; and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation,
98 NLRB 753 This does not, however, mean that it is pertinent to inquire into the
conduct of the parties before the contract became effective.
3a Hannon apparently did not direct that the initial request to the Union be made in
writing. See the first sentence of article XII of the contract.
"'At the time Sabatini executed this affidavit he was foreman of the Respondent's
machine shop. Accordingly his statement is an admission against interest binding on the
Respondent, and constitutes probative evidence of the facts contained therein County
Electric Co., Inc., et al, 116 NLRB 1080. Sabatini in effect repudiated his affidavit on
the stand. I do not credit this part of his oral testimony because (1) his attempted
explanation for signing the affidavit struck me as singularly flimsy, (2) the facts related
in his affidavit regarding hiring methods find corroborative support in Lawrence's testi-
mony, and (3) the affidavit was obtained when the events in question were relatively fresh
in his mind . See Trafford Coach Lines, 99 NLRB 399.
1242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ceived requests for personnel from the Respondent , but was unable to furnish em-
ployees: Moreover, Chirkis testified: "I checked with the Union only to see if they
had no personnel available to fill the bill before I tried other sources."
c. On a number of occasions, employees were obtained from other sources with-
out affording the Union prior notice or an opportunity to refer applicants. This
took place both before and after the amendment of March 1959. In this connection,
Sabatini testified that in December he hired "3 or 4" employees without first calling
the Union. Tracy testified that three employees were hired by the Respondent in
February 1959, without prior notice to the Union. And Flynn testified that since
mid-September 1959, the Respondent has hired employees "more than once" through
newspaper advertisements or employment agencies without first communicating
with the Union.
d. Although the Union was aware that the Respondent had hired employees with-
out prior communication with the Union , it made no protest . Indeed , sometime after
December 4, Caputo informed Hannon that if Hannon "hired anybody from the out-
side in accordance with his past practices , it is definitely all right with us, that we
had no objection to it."
e. The Union 's hiring hall facilities at all material times were open to members
and nonmembers alike. In filling the needs of an employer, the main consideration
was to refer the applicant who most nearly met the prospective employer's require-
ments; the Union "often" referred nonmembers in preference to members. Where
two or more applicants met the employer 's requirements, the one who had been un-
employed the longest was referred, regardles of his membership in the Union. The
fact that the hiring hall operated in a nondiscriminatory manner was made known
to the Respondent 's employees by posting on the Respondent's bulletin board a
letter from the Union to that effect. This letter was first posted by Tracy "around the
beginning of the year [1959]" and eventually removed from the bulletin board
sometime prior to the hearing.
f. The record is barren of any evidence that any applicant was refused employ-
ment because he had not been referred by the Union, or had not obtained clearance
from the Union, or was not a member of the Union.
The above facts clear up any ambiguity existing in the contract itself. While the
Respondent may have on occasion given the Union the first opportunity to supply
its employment needs, the conduct of both parties after the contract became effec-
tive clearly indicates that neither of them considered the agreement as establishing
an exclusive union referral system , even for a 72-hour period. It follows, and I
find, that the contract itself , as well as the conduct of the parties after it was signed,
was not violative of the Act.
THE REMEDY
In order to remedy the unfair labor practices found above, it will be recommended
that the Respondent cease and desist from threatening its employees with economic
reprisals if they refuse to sign dues checkoff authorizations , contributing illegal sup-
port or assistance to the Union , or any other labor organization , and from in any
like or related manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing its employees in the
exercise of rights protected by the Act, and post appropriate notices. As the only
violations found were not sufficiently serious to indicate any intent to defeat the
purposes of the Act, and as the individual primarily responsible for these unfair
labor practices is no longer a member of the Respondent's managerial staff, it is
found that no danger of the commission of other unrelated unfair labor practices
can reasonably be anticipated from the Respondent 's past conduct. Therefore, it
will not be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from the commission
of any other unrelated unfair labor practices.
In view of the illegal aid and assistance rendered to the Union by the Respondent,
the General Counsel requests that the Respondent also be required to withdraw and
withhold all recognition from the Union as the representative of its employees, unless
and until the Union demonstrates its majority status in a Board-conducted election,
and that the contract between the Respondent and the Union be set aside . Thus, in
effect , the General Counsel seeks the revocation of the Union's certification. How-
ever , I do not deem the Respondent 's unfair labor practices of a nature serious
enough to warrant such a drastic remedy. Moreover, the unfair labor practices
were committed after the certification had issued and after all employees in the unit
had joined the Union. And finally such a remedy would penalize the Union, which
was innocent of any wrongdoing. The General Counsel 's request for such a remedy
is therefore declined.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and upon the entire record in these
cases, I make the following:
PLUMBERS UNION OF NASSAU COUNTY, LOCAL 457 1243
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Sterling Precision Corp., Instrument Division , is, and at all material times has
been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
2. Local 463, International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, is, and at all material times has been , a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By threatening its employees with economic reprisals if they refuse to authorize
the Respondent to deduct dues or intitiation fees from their wages and remit such
funds to Local 463, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, thereby contributing illegal assistance and support to the said labor
organization , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (2) of the Act.
4. By the conduct described above, thereby interfering with, restraining, and
coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranted in Section 7 of the Act,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. The above-described unfair labor practices tend to lead to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce , and constitute unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
6. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the Respondent violated the Act by entering into or enforcing the
contract between the Respondent and the above -named labor organization, de-
scribed above, or by engaging in discriminatory or illegal hiring practices.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Plumbers Union of Nassau County, Local 457, United Associa-
tion of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL -
CIO and Jerry Bady, d/b/a Bomat Plumbing and Heating.,
Case No. 2-CC-557. June 22, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 30, 1960, Trial Examiner Charles W. Schneider issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices and recom-
mending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth
in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter
the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and briefs in support thereof; the Respondent
filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case,' and finds merit in certain of the exceptions. Accordingly,
the Board adopts the findings of the Trial Examiner only to the ex-
tent that they are consistent with the following :
1 The Respondent has requested oral argument . The request is denied as the record,
including the exceptions and briefs , adequately presents the issues and the positions of
the parties.
131 NLRB No. 151.