Stephen P. Poitra & Eugene J. Ryan, Complainants,v.Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, (Indian Health Service) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 6, 2011
0120093756_and_0120093748 (E.E.O.C. May. 6, 2011)

0120093756_and_0120093748

05-06-2011

Stephen P. Poitra & Eugene J. Ryan, Complainants, v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, (Indian Health Service) Agency.


Stephen P. Poitra & Eugene J. Ryan,

Complainants,

v.

Kathleen Sebelius,

Secretary,

Department of Health and Human Services,

(Indian Health Service)

Agency.

Appeal Nos. 0120093748 & 0120093756

Agency Nos. HHS-IHS-0239-2007 & HHS-IHS-0240-2007

DECISION

Complainant 1 and Complainant 2 filed timely appeals with this Commission

from their final decision (FAD) by the Agency dated August 12, 2009

and August 14, 2009, finding that it was in compliance with the terms

of the settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

We consolidate these appeals for joint processing pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.606.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, both Complainants

worked as District Engineer Technicians at the California Area Indian

Health Service in Sacramento, California.

Believing that the Agency subjected them to unlawful discrimination,

both Complainants contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO

complaint process. On March 7, 2003, Complainant 1, Complainant 2, and

the Agency entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the matter.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

All parties are attempting to remove current adverse action in

[Complainant 1's] file. [A specific supervisor (Supervisor)] will directly

supervise [Complainant 1] and [Complainant 2]. [Supervisor] has also

agreed that they will be in charge of [their] own scattered projects.

[Supervisor] will be responsible for all aspects of the program

in the Redding District, input by the Director only when necessary.

When technicians face a difficult problem with a contractors' attitude

or poor craftsmanship, [Supervisor] will intervene and be responsible for

effectively resolving the problem. PD's through GS-9 will [be] clarified

and finalized. [The Agency] will provide all financial support which

allows technicians to qualify. Includes coursework, instruction, tuition

fees, and transportation and all necessary supplies. It is agreed that

if schooling causes overtime, according to Agency policy no pay will be

compensated for overtime.

On January 18, 2007, the Complainants contacted the EEO Director

in writing to inform her that the settlement agreement was breached.

Specifically, they indicated that the Agency moved the Supervisor so that

he did not directly supervise Complainant 1 or 2.1 The record reveals

that the EEO Director did not specifically address their concerns, and

instead referred them to an EEO Counselor. In complaints dated June

20, 2007, Complainants 1 and 2 each filed separate formal complaints of

discrimination, as directed by the EEO Counselor.

The Agency dismissed the complaints of Complainant 1 and 2 separately.

Both Complainants filed appeals to the Commission. The Commission in

separate decisions in EEOC Appeal Nos. 0120073725 and 0120073719 (January

26, 2009), found that the Agency improperly handled the Complainants'

claim of breach of the settlement agreement. As such, among other

things, the Commission reversed the Agency's decision and remanded the

Complainants' claim of breach of the March 7, 2003 settlement agreement

for further processing pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504.

The Agency issued determination decisions to Complainants 1 and 2, dated

August 12, 2009 and August 14, 2009, respectively. In these decisions,

the Agency concluded that it did not breach the settlement agreement at

issue. The Agency indicated in its determinations that the Supervisor

is a member of the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service and

has been deployed to operations in Saipan in the Marianas Islands chain

in the Pacific Ocean. The Agency noted that it would be unreasonable

to expect the Supervisor to remain Complainant 1 and 2's supervisor

in perpetuity. The Agency noted that such an idea was not part of the

settlement agreement. Therefore, it concluded in both determinations

that it did not breach the settlement agreement.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant 1 appealed asserting that the settlement agreement was

breached and that any changes to the terms of the agreement required

modification by the parties in writing. Complainant 1 claimed that this

did not occur, so the reassignment of the Supervisor was a breach of

the settlement agreement. Complainant 1 also noted that he has since

been issued an appraisal of "Minimally Successful" and transferred from

his office causing great hardship. Complainant 2 appealed arguing that

the settlement agreement was breached when the Supervisor was moved.

Further, Complainant 2 stated that he did not reach the GS-9 level

until he informed the Agency that he should have been assigned to that

level. Complainant 2 also requested that the Commission find that the

Agency breached the settlement agreement based on the transfer of the

Supervisor.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As noted above, the Commission has consolidated the appeals of

Complainants 1 and 2, namely EEOC Appeals 0120093748 & 0120093756.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC

Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August

23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the

terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on

the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing

appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be

determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, both Complainants 1 and 2 allege that the Agency

breached their March 7, 2003 settlement agreement when the Supervisor

was moved from their chain of command. The Commission has held that

where an individual bargains for a position without any specific

terms as to the length of service, it would be improper to interpret

the reasonable intentions of the parties to include employment in that

exact position ad infinitum. See Holley v. Dep't. of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Papac v. Dep't. of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05910808 (December 12, 1991); see

also Parker v. Dep't. of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05910576 (August

30, 1991). Similarly, the Commission finds that it would be improper

to interpret the terms of the instant settlement agreement that the

Supervisor would continue to supervise Complainants 1 and 2 forever.

Here, the record indicates that the Supervisor was the Complainants'

superior from 2003 through 2007. We find that this period of over

three years was sufficient time to establish good faith compliance by

the Agency with the terms of the settlement agreement.

Further, to the extent Complainant 1 and 2 alleged that they were

subsequently subjected to retaliatory harassment, the Commission notes

that these new claims of discrimination should first be raised with the

Agency's EEO Office, not the Commission.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Agency's determinations finding no breach were proper

and are hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 6, 2011

__________________

Date

1 The record indicated that Complainant 1 and Complainant 2 also raised

new claims of retaliatory harassment which became new complaints and

are not subject of the instant appeals.

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2

0120093756

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

5

0120093748 & 0120093756