Stefan Sch¿tzl

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 25, 2020

12801141 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/801,141 05/25/2010 Stefan Schätzl PTB-4750-97 5897
23117 7590 03/25/2020
NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
BLOCH, MICHAEL RYAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3791
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/25/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte STEFAN SCHÄTZL
____________________

Appeal 2018-008002
Application 12/801,141
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before JOHN C. KERINS, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.

PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Decision rejecting claims 11–17, 19–22, 24, 26–36, 38–41, 43,
45–48, and 53–60. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 The term “Appellant” is used herein to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies RESMED R&D GERMANY GMBH as
the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 11, 24, 30, and 43 are independent. Claim 11 is illustrative,
and is reproduced below:
11. An apparatus for identifying different indications of a
patient, the apparatus comprising:

a sensor configured to sense a parameter of a patient’s breathing
and generate a signal based on the sensed parameter;

a first A/D converter in communication with the sensor via a first
channel and the first A/D converter configured to generate a flow
channel signal based on the signal from the sensor;

a second A/D converter in communication with the sensor via a
second channel and the second A/D converter configured to
generate a snore channel signal based on the signal from the
sensor;

a processor in communication with the first A/D converter and
the second A/D converter and said processor configured to
process the flow channel signal and/or the snore channel signal
to calculate at least two from the group consisting of:

a snoring index based on the flow channel signal from the
first A/D converter and the snore channel signal from the
second A/D converter, the snoring index being calculated
by comparing a number of snoring events to a preset
internal time base or threshold with a timer or a counter,

an apnea/hypopnea index (AHI) based on a start and/or a
stop of an apnea, hypopnea, and/or hyperventilation that is
based on an envelope of the flow channel signal from the
first A/D converter, and

a periodic breathing index comprising:

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a periodicity index based on an average hypopnea
length, an average hypopnea pause, and/or a
hyperventilation length, and/or

a Cheyne Stokes (CS) index based on the envelope
of the flow channel signal from the first A/D
converter; and

a display in communication with the processor, said display
configured to display results of calculating at least two of the
group consisting of: the snoring index, the AHI, and the periodic
breathing index.

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects:
(i) claims 11–17, 19–22, 24, 26–36, 38–41, 43, 45–48, and 53–60
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to ineligible subject matter;
(ii) claims 11, 14–17, 22, 30, 33–36, 41, 53, 55, 57, and 59 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Stasz (US 6,702,755 B1, issued
Mar. 9, 2004) in view of Hadas (US 6,368,287 B1, issued Apr. 9, 2002),
Berthon-Jones (US 5,704,345, issued Jan. 6, 1998), Sullivan (US 5,245,995,
issued Sept. 21, 1993), Kitajima (US 2007/0118028 A1, published May 24,
2007), Sierra (US 2007/0282212 A1, published Dec. 6, 2007), and
Krausman (US 2006/0212273 A1, published Sept. 21, 2006);
(iii) claims 12, 13, 31, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan, Kitajima,
Sierra, Krausman, and Griebel (US 4,982,738, issued Jan. 8, 1991);
(iv) claims 19–21 and 38–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan, Kitajima,
Sierra, Krausman, and Axe (US 5,203,343, issued Apr. 20, 1993);
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(v) claims 24, 27–29, 43, 46–48, 54, 56, 58, and 60 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones,
Sullivan, Kitajima, Sierra, Krausman, and Griebel; and
(vi) claims 26 and 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan, Kitajima, Sierra,
Krausman, Griebel, and Axe.
OPINION
Claims 11–17, 19–22, 24, 26–36, 38–41, 43, 45–48 and 53–60--§ 101
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of all pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is
in error. Appeal Br. 12–23; Reply Br. 1–5. Appellant does not present
separate arguments directed specifically to any individual claims, but
references independent claim 11 in several instances. We take claim 11 as
representative of the group, and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim
11.
We address the rejection by applying the USPTO’s Revised Guidance,
informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
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attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
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internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

C. ANALYSIS
Step 1 – Statutory Category
Claim 11, as an apparatus, is a machine or manufacture, and thus
recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35
U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue before us is whether claim 11 is directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that claim 11 is directed to calculating
indices for snoring, apnea/hypopnea, periodic breathing, and/or Cheyne
Stokes (CS), which the Examiner determines to be mathematical algorithms
using mathematical relationships and equations. Final Act. 2. The 2019
Revised Guidance instructs that mathematical concepts are a form of
abstract idea, which is one of the categories of judicial exceptions. 2019
Revised Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appellant acknowledges that the
claims on appeal, including claim 11, utilize mathematical concepts. Appeal
Br. 15. Therefore, claim 11 recites a judicial exception in the form of an
abstract idea.
Appellant argues that the claims on appeal, including claim 11, “do
not merely limit mathematical relationship and equations to a particular
technological environment nor are they merely accompanied by
‘insignificant post-solution activity.’” Appeal Br. 14–15. Appellant
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maintains that the claimed “mathematical concepts are implemented and
applied in a specific structure and/or process,” and that claim 11 “includes a
specific operational arrangement of a sensor, a first A/D converter, a second
A/D converter, and a processor configure[d] to process flow channel signal
and/or the snore channel signal to calculate specific values.” Id. at 15.
Appellant does not, however, argue that claim 11 does not recite an
abstract idea in some form. Appellant’s above arguments are more in the
nature of asserting that, even though the claims involve an abstract idea,
other limitations are present that are directed to a non-conventional
application of that abstract idea. We thus find that the claims recite a
judicial exception in the form of an abstract idea. Appellant’s arguments are
more appropriately addressed under the second prong of Step 2A, below.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
Since claim 11 recites a judicial exception, as we conclude above, we
proceed to the “practical application” inquiry in Step 2A(ii), in which we
determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
In other words, we evaluate claim 11 to determine whether it not only recites
a judicial exception, but also whether it is directed to that judicial exception,
or, alternatively, is directed to some technological implementation or
application of, the judicial exception.
Appellant argues, as noted above, that claim 11 “includes a specific
operational arrangement of a sensor, a first A/D converter, a second A/D
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converter, and a processor configure[d] to process flow channel signal
and/or the snore channel signal to calculate specific values.” Appeal Br. 15;
Reply Br. 2. Appellant states that “the claimed features provide for an
apparatus which is simple enough to fit into a low cost processor but still
reliable and good enough to have sufficient sensitivity and specificity
required for a screening device.” Id.
In addition to, as well as aside from, the provision of a generically-
recited processor to calculate a snoring index, an AHI, and a periodic
breathing index, claim 11 includes a broad recitation of a sensor that is
capable of sensing an unspecified breathing parameter of a patient, two A/D
converters, and a display for displaying the results of the calculation(s). See
claim 11, supra. This collection of data, processing of the data, and
effectuating a display of results from the processing, is quite similar to the
concepts of “selecting certain information, analyzing it using mathematical
techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of the analysis,” that were
at issue and found to be patent-ineligible in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant argues that other Federal Circuit case law compels a
different result, i.e., that claim 11 is patent-eligible. Appeal Br. 15–18.
Appellant first cites to Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States,4 in which the
court held that claims directed to “systems and methods that use inertial
sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors in measuring the
relative position and orientation of a moving object on a moving reference
frame” were patent-eligible. Appeal Br. 15. Appellant attempts to liken the
claims on appeal to those in Thales, contending that claim 11 on appeal is

4 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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not merely directed to mathematical equations, and repeats the argument
regarding the recitation in the claims of specific apparatuses and methods,
and a specific operational arrangement of the structural components. Id. at
16.
The argument is not persuasive. In Thales, the claims involved
positioning inertial sensors in different specific locations relative to an
object and a moving reference frame, and then based on signals received
from the sensors, determining an orientation of the object relative to the
moving reference frame. Thales, 850 F.3d at 1345–46 (reproducing claim
22). The court found that this involved, and was directed to, the use of
“inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner” to reduce measurement
errors. Id. at 1348–49. Appellant’s Specification evidences that the sensor
invoked by claim 11, and the manner in which it is used, are purely
conventional, in that the disclosure is highly generalized to the point that the
sensor is not even shown in the accompanying drawings. Spec. 5:2–5. The
description entails a generic recitation that the sensor may be “a pressure
sensor, a differential pressure sensor, and or a flow sensor,” and is devoid of
any suggestion that there is anything non-conventional about the sensor or
its use in “sensing signals indicative of a patient’s breathing.” Id. We thus
view Thales, if anything, as distinguishing between the claims on appeal
therein (non-conventional use of sensors, patent-eligible) and the type of
claim presented in this appeal (conventional use of sensors, patent-
ineligible).
Appellant additionally attempts to liken the claims here on appeal to
the situation presented in Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.5 Appellant

5 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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points out that Finjan cites to Enfish,6 as distinguishing between patent-
eligible claims which focus on a “specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities,” from patent-ineligible claims that focus on “a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” Appeal Br. 18, citing Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1303.
Appellant asserts that the claims on appeal “are specifically directed
to an improvement in ‘computer functionality’ and not on ‘economic or
other tasks’ for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id.
Appellant argues, without pointing to evidence in support, that its
“technology relates to a system that can, among other aspects, provide
reduced processing requirements.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellant again
notes that claim 11 recites “a specific operational arrangement of a sensor, a
first A/D converter, a second A/D converter, and a processor.” Id.
However, this operational arrangement is nothing more than having a
breathing property sensor at a position where the breathing property may be
sensed, outputting analog signals to A/D converters to convert the signals to
digital ones, such that the processor can recognize and process the signals in
order to generate the claimed indices. No part of this system evidences any
reduction in processing requirements.
We conclude that claim 11 is directed to achieving the result of
obtaining various indices related to a patient’s breathing patterns, via
processing, using certain mathematical relationships and data gathered from
the patient, and displaying results. This amounts to the recitation of
applying mathematical relationships to data acquired in a conventional

6 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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manner. Claim 11 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept”/“Significantly More”?
The next aspect of the inquiry is whether claim 11 provides an
inventive concept because the additional elements beyond the recited
judicial exception provide significantly more than that judicial exception.
Appellant reiterates the belief that the “specific operational
arrangement of a sensor, a first A/D converter, a second A/D converter, and
a processor” provide significantly more than the recited abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 19. Appellant criticizes the Examiner’s findings that the recited
elements are conventional and routine in the art, and argues that the findings
lack the evidentiary support required by Berkheimer.7 Id. at 20. Appellant
argues that the Examiner’s analysis falls short of the analysis performed in
Bascom8 because it fails to consider the combination of elements set forth in
claim 11. Appeal Br. 22. Appellant, in this regard, points to the inclusion in
claim 11 of first and second A/D converters receiving data from a sensor and
being configured to generate specific signals. Id. Appellant avers that, even
if the elements recited in the claims are considered to be conventional, the
specific arrangement and operation of the components is non-conventional
and non-generic, for the reasons set forth in arguments directed to the prior
art rejections on appeal. Id. Although Appellant, for the most part, simply
reiterates the limitations set forth in claim 11, it appears that Appellant
wishes to emphasize the lack of disclosure of a second A/D converter in the

7 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
8 Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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evidence relied on by the Examiner as being indicative of error. Reply Br. 4
(“Because the Examiner merely shows a conventional A/D converter
connected to a processor . . . all claimed limitations of claim 11 were clearly
not considered.”).
We are of the opinion that, in both the Final Action and the Answer,
the Examiner has adequately analyzed claim 11, taking the elements of
claim 11 separately, and considered collectively, to determine whether claim
11 provides significantly more than the judicial exception set forth in the
claim. That the Examiner has not pointed to evidence of the use of both first
and second A/D converters does not change our opinion. The use of two
conventional A/D converters in a conventional manner, as in claim 11, is
simply in furtherance of obtaining or collecting the necessary data as to a
patient’s breathing in order to provide the ability to generate the various
indices recited in claim 11 that are defined by mathematical relationships or
abstract ideas. “It is clear from Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be
the abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous
cases from this court which have held claims ineligible because the only
alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.” Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at
1374 (Moore, J., concurring).
Appellant additionally argues that claim 11 does not preempt the
judicial exception. Appeal Br. 22–23. However, as our reviewing court has
explained, “the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial
exceptions to patentability,” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption
are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 573
U.S. at 216). Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
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matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Id. Moreover, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to
disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the [Alice/Mayo] framework
. . . , preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id.; see also
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”). Appellant’s argument as to absence of preemption does
not apprise us of error in the rejection.
Therefore, analysis of claim 11, as a whole, with its limitations
considered both individually and as ordered combination, confirms the
Examiner’s conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea without
significantly more.
Conclusion
The rejection of independent claim 11 is sustained. Claims 12–17,
19–22, 24, 26–36, 38–41, 43, 45–48, and 53–60 fall with claim 11.

Claims 11, 14–17, 22, 30, 33–36, 41, 53, 55, 57, and 59--§ 103(a)--
Stasz/Hadas/Berthon-Jones/Sullivan/Kitajima/Sierra/Krausman
The Examiner does not find, in the combined teachings of these
references, a first A/D converter in communication with a sensor via a first
channel and configured to generate a flow channel signal, together with a
second A/D converter in communication with the same sensor via a second
channel and configured to generate a snore channel signal. Final Act. 5–12.
The Examiner instead concludes that, in combining the Hadas A/D converter
with Stasz, “constructing a formerly integral structure in various elements
(A/D converter to A/D converters) involves only routine skill in the art, and
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since it has been held that mere duplication of the essential working parts of
a device (A/D converter to A/D converters) involves only routine skill in the
art.” Ans. 11.
Appellant is correct that the provision of two A/D converters, where
previously only one was present, is not modifying a previously integral
structure into a structure having more than one component. Reply Br. 7
(“the Examiner is attempting to duplicate instead of separating a single
component into two components”).
The Examiner’s proposed provision of first and second A/D
converters in order to meet the limitations of claim 11 and the other
independent claims is also not seen as a mere duplication of parts having no
patentable significance. As noted by Appellant, “[t]he arrangements and
results provided by the first A/D converter and the second A/D converter[]
are not the same in the quoted claim language.” Reply Br. 7–8. In other
words, a mere duplication would result in two elements performing the same
function, whereas, in claim 11, the first and second A/D converters perform
different functions.
As such, the Examiner’s proposed modification to provide first and
second A/D converters as claimed is not supported by relevant case law, and
lacks rational underpinnings in the record. The rejection of claims 11, 14–
17, 22, 30, 33–36, 41, 53, 55, 57, and 59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Stasz, Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan, Kitajima, Sierra,
and Krausman is not sustained.

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Claims 12, 13, 31, and 32--§ 103(a)--Stasz/Hadas/Berthon-Jones/Sullivan/
Kitajima/Sierra/Krausman/Griebel
Claims 19–21 and 38–40--§ 103(a)--Stasz/Hadas/Berthon-Jones/Sullivan/
Kitajima/Sierra/Krausman/Axe
Claims 24, 27–29, 43, 46–48, 54, 56, 58, 60--§ 103(a)--Stasz/Hadas/
Berthon-Jones/Sullivan/Kitajima/Sierra/Krausman/Griebel
Claims 26 and 45--§ 103(a)--Stasz/Hadas/Berthon-Jones/Sullivan/Kitajima
Sierra/Krausman/Griebel/Axe
These rejections suffer from the same deficiencies noted in the
previous section, and the rejections are not sustained.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 11–17, 19–22, 24, 26–36, 38–41, 43, 45–48
and 53–60 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to ineligible subject
matter, is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 11, 14–17, 22, 30, 33–36, 41, 53, 55, 57, and
59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Stasz in view of
Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan, Kitajima, Sierra, and Krausman is reversed.
The rejection of claims 12, 13, 31, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra, Krausman, and Griebel is reversed.
The rejection of claims 19–21 and 38–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra, Krausman, and Axe is reversed.
The rejection of claims 24, 27–29, 43, 46–48, 54, 56, 58, and 60 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas,
Berthon-Jones, Sullivan, Kitajima, Sierra, Krausman, and Griebel is
reversed.
Appeal 2018-008002
Application 12/801,141

18
The rejection of claims 26 and 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Stasz in view of Hadas, Berthon-Jones, Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra, Krausman, Griebel, and Axe is reversed.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Bas
is
Affirmed Reversed
11–17, 19–
22, 24, 26–
36, 38–41,
43, 45–48,
53–60
101 Eligibility 11–17, 19–
22, 24, 26–
36, 38–41,
43, 45–48,
53–60

11, 14–17,
22, 30, 33–
36, 41, 53,
55, 57, 59
103(a) Stasz, Hadas,
Berthon-Jones,
Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra,
Krausman
11, 14–17, 22,
30, 33–36, 41,
53, 55, 57, 59
12, 13, 31,
32
103(a) Stasz, Hadas,
Berthon-Jones,
Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra,
Krausman
12, 13, 31, 32
19–21, 38–
40
103(a) Stasz, Hadas,
Berthon-Jones,
Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra,
Krausman, Axe
19–21, 38–40
24, 27–29,
43, 46–48,
54, 56, 58,
60
103(a) Stasz, Hadas,
Berthon-Jones,
Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra,
Krausman,
Griebel
24, 27–29, 43,
46–48, 54, 56,
58, 60
26, 45 103(a) Stasz, Hadas,
Berthon-Jones,
26, 45
Appeal 2018-008002
Application 12/801,141

19
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Bas
is
Affirmed Reversed
Sullivan,
Kitajima, Sierra,
Krausman,
Griebel, Axe
Overall
Outcome

11–17, 19–
22, 24, 26–
36, 38–41,
43, 45–48,
53–60

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED