Stefan Heigl et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2019

14499322 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/499,322 09/29/2014 Stefan Heigl TRW(AS)023843-ORD 2732
26294 7590 10/01/2019
TAROLLI, SUNDHEIM, COVELL & TUMMINO L.L.P.
1300 EAST NINTH STREET, SUITE 1700
CLEVELAND, OH 44114
EXAMINER
BERGIN, JAMES S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3641
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@tarolli.com
rkline@tarolli.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte STEFAN HEIGL, JOHANN HINKOFER,
CHRISTOPH KNOLLHUBER, CHRISTOPH MOCKER, and
ANDREAS SEIDEL
____________________

Appeal 2018-004111
Application 14/499,322
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
BRENT M. DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judges.

WOOD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of
claims 1–3, 5–8, and 12–15. Final Act. 1 (summary). Claims 4 and 9–11
are withdrawn. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as TRW Airbag
Systems GMBH. App. Br. 2.
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Application 14/499,322
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THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to an igniting unit, especially for an airbag
inflator. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. An igniting unit (10) comprising:
an electric igniter (11) including a first inner cap (12)
which forms a space (14) filled with a booster propellant charge
with a second outer cap (13), wherein
the second outer cap (13) is in the form of an electrically
non-conductive insulating cap.

REFERENCES
Whang
Matsuda
US 6,009,809
US 7,343,859 B2
Jan. 4, 2000
Mar. 18, 2008
REJECTION
Claims 1–3, 5, 6–8 and 12–15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Matsuda and Whang.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the patentability of independent claim 1, and relies
on the patentability of claim 1 to support the patentability of claims 2, 3, 5,
6–8, and 12–15. See App. Br. 3, 6–12. Therefore, we treat claim 1 as
representative of the appealed claims, and decide the appeal of this rejection
on the basis of claim 1 alone. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Having
considered all of Appellant’s arguments and evidence of record, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as unpatentable over
Matsuda and Whang.
The Examiner finds, and Appellant does not dispute, that Matsuda’s
Figure 4 discloses an igniting unit as recited in claim 1, except that
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Application 14/499,322
3
Matsuda’s second cap 42 is made of metal rather than an electrically non-
conductive material. Final Act. 2. The Examiner therefore relies on Whang
to teach an igniting unit with an outer cap made from an insulating material,
e.g., plastic. Id. at 2–3. The Examiner determines that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to form
Matsuda’s outer cup 42 from an insulating material, as taught by Whang, “so
as to protect the igniting unit from stray aberrant currents.” Id. at 3.
Appellant first argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
combined the teachings of Matsuda and Whang in a different manner than
that proposed by the Examiner. App. Br. 7–8. Appellant asserts that
Matsuda’s outer cap 42 is analogous to Whang’s output cup 34 rather than to
Whang’s insulating cup 38, because both are “tasked with exerting pressure
upon the respective propellant contained therein,” and both “directly
encapsulate[]” and “exert[] pressure” on propellant contained in the igniting
unit. Id. at 8. Thus, according to Appellant, “the combined teachings of
Matsuda and Whang would have lead one of ordinary skill in the art to
arrange the insulating cup 38 of Whang over the metallic outer cap 42 of
Matsuda in order to provide for electrical insulation of an assembly, as
taught by Whang,” instead of changing the material used to make Matsuda’s
outer cap 42. Id.
This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. Assuming
Appellant is correct that one of ordinary skill in the art might have combined
Matsuda and Whang in the manner that Appellant contends, this does not
mean that there cannot be additional obvious ways that one of ordinary skill
in the art would have combined the references, including that proposed by
the Examiner. Implicit in Appellant’s argument is the notion that Matsuda’s
outer cap 42 must be made of metal to be able to “directly encapsulate[]”
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Application 14/499,322
4
and “exert pressure upon” propellant. See id. at 8–9. But Appellant does not
provide any evidence in the record that one of ordinary skill in the art would
not have been able to form an outer cap from an insulating material such as
plastic that is able to fulfill these functions.
Appellant also argues that the proposed modification would change
the principle of operation of Matsuda. App. Br. 10. Appellant asserts that
“one principle of Matsuda is to have a metallic outer cap 42 that is secured
to the metallic inner cap 41 by welding,” but “[i]f the outer cap 42 were
changed to a plastic material as proposed by the Examiner, it would no
longer be possible to weld the outer cap 42 to the inner cap 41 as explicitly
called for in Matsuda, thereby changing the principle of operation of
Matsuda.” Id. (citing Matsuda, 8:11–12, 65–67, 9:5–9).
This argument is also unpersuasive. In particular, we are not
persuaded that welding an outer cap to an inner cap is a principle of
operation of Matsuda. Matsuda teaches that inner cap 41 and outer cap 42
can be “mutually connected together by, for example, laser welding or the
like.” Matsuda, 8:9–12 (emphasis added). This indicates that non-welding
methods of connecting the caps together are contemplated, including
methods that can be used to connect a metal cap to a plastic cap.
Finally, Appellant takes issue with the Examiner’s reason to combine
Matsuda with Whang, i.e., “to protect the igniting unit from stray aberrant
currents.” Reply Br. 2 (quoting Ans. 3). Appellant asserts that “there is no
discussion in either Matsuda or Whang of igniting units being negatively
affected by ‘stray aberrant currents.’” Id.
As a preliminary matter, this argument was raised for the first time in
the Reply Brief. Appellant has not explained why this argument was not
first raised in the Appeal Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). In any event,
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Application 14/499,322
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this argument is unpersuasive. Whang teaches providing electrical
insulation to the exterior of an airbag igniting unit. Whang, 2:9–11. Indeed,
Appellant does not dispute that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
provided electrical insulation to Matsuda’s igniting unit in light of Whang.
See App. Br. 7–8 (“the combined teachings of Matsuda and Whang would
have lead one of ordinary skill in the art to arrange the insulating cup 38 of
Whang over the metallic outer cap 42 of Matsuda in order to provide for
electrical insulating of an assembly, as taught by Whang”) (emphasis
added). Electrically insulating Matsuda’s igniting unit would have protected
it from “stray aberrant currents.”
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5–8, and 12–15 § 103, Matsuda
and Whang 
1–3, 5–8, and
12–15

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED