Steeltec Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 15, 1991

302 N.L.R.B. 980 (N.L.R.B. 1991)

980
302 NLRB No. 163
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 On February 19, 1991, the Respondent, by its representative, filed a re-
quest for an extension of time for filing an answer in order to enable the Re-
spondent to obtain substitute representation. The Regional Director issued an
order February 20, 1991, granting the extension of time to file an answer until
March 1, 1991.
Because Respondent’s president, Keith R. Gansner, filed the March 1, 1991
answer himself, it appears that the Respondent is not represented by counsel
in this proceeding.
2 Sec. 102.20 of the Rules and Regulations provides:
The respondent shall, within 14 days from the service of the complaint,
file an answer thereto. The respondent shall specifically admit, deny, or
explain each of the facts alleged in the complaint, unless the respondent
is without knowledge, in which case the respondent shall so state, such
statement operating as a denial. All allegations in the complaint, if no an-
swer is filed, or any allegation in the complaint not specifically denied
or explained in an answer filed, unless the respondent shall state in the
answer that he is without knowledge, shall be deemed to be admitted to
be true and shall be so found by the Board, unless good cause to the con-
trary is shown.
Steeltec Incorporated and International Association
of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, AFL–CIO, Shopmen’s Local Union
No. 518. Case 14–CA–21170
May 15, 1991
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REMANDING
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND OVIATT
Upon a charge filed by International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers,
AFL–CIO, Shopmen’s Local Union No. 518, the
Union, December 18, 1990, and amended January 10,
and February 4, 1991, the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board issued a complaint Feb-
ruary 8, 1991, against Steeltec Incorporated, the Re-
spondent, alleging that it has violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Copies of
the charge, amended charges, and complaint were
properly served on the Respondent. On March 1, 1991,
the Respondent filed a letter purporting to be an an-
swer to the complaint.1
On March 12, 1991, the General Counsel filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment, with exhibits attached.
On March 15, 1991, the Board issued an order trans-
ferring the proceeding to the Board and a Notice to
Show Cause why the motion should not be granted.
The Respondent filed no response. The allegations in
the motion are therefore undisputed.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
According to the Motion for Summary Judgment, on
receiving the Respondent’s answer March 1, 1991,
counsel for the General Counsel met personally on the
same day with the Respondent’s president to inform
him that the answer was insufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements for answers to complaints, as set forth in
Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations.2
On the same day, counsel for the General Counsel also
sent the Respondent a letter by certified mail, as well
as an identical letter by regular mail, informing the Re-
spondent of the answer’s insufficiency and setting
forth the requirements of Section 102.20 of the Rules
and Regulations. The General Counsel’s letters further
informed the Respondent that if a sufficient answer
was not filed by March 6, 1991, a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment could be filed. The Respondent did not
file a further answer.
The General Counsel, although acknowledging the
Respondent’s March 1, 1991 answer, nonetheless as-
serts that the answer fails to admit, deny, or explain
specifically each of the facts alleged in the complaint
and the General Counsel moves that ‘‘the Board strike
Respondent’s answer, deem all the allegations con-
tained in the General Counsel’s Complaint and Notice
of Hearing to be admitted and enter an order providing
for an appropriate remedy, without the holding of a
hearing and without taking evidence in support of said
allegations.’’
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing since
July 23, 1990, to execute a written collective-bar-
gaining agreement embodying the terms of the agree-
ment reached between the Respondent and the Union
on November 6, 1989. The complaint further alleges
that the Respondent has repudiated the November 6,
1989 agreement since July 23, 1990, by failing to
apply the terms of the agreement to the unit employ-
ees, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). In its an-
swer, the Respondent, inter alia, ‘‘denies that its offi-
cers, agents and representatives since Monday July 23,
1990, have failed and refused to bargain collectively
and in good faith with the International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Local
518 by refusing to execute an agreed upon collective
bargaining agreement and by failing to apply the terms
of such agreement to its employees and by repudiating
such agreement.’’ Additionally, the answer specifically
admits some of the complaint’s factual allegations and
asserts that the parties never reached agreement on
contract terms including, but not limited to, the effec-
tive date and termination date of the contract.
The Board, having duly considered the matter, finds
that summary judgment is not appropriate here. The
Respondent’s March 1, 1991 letter specifically denies
that the Respondent engaged in the conduct alleged to
violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Despite the
General Counsel’s characterization of the answer as ‘‘a
rambling narrative which only generally alludes to the
substance of some of the complaint allegations,’’ we
note that the answer, in addition to the specific denials,
contains an explanation of the Respondent’s conduct.
We note that the answer does not address each fact al-
leged in the complaint; however, even if those
unaddressed facts were deemed to be admitted to be
981STEELTEC INC.
3 See M. J. McNally, Inc., 302 NLRB 120 (1991). Chairman Stephens, who
dissented in McNally, finds that the Respondent’s pro se answer in this case,
unlike that in McNally, clearly raises factual issues that warrant a hearing.
true, the Respondent’s specific denial of the substance
of the complaint has raised substantial and material
issues of fact and law warranting a hearing before an
administrative law judge.3 Thus, we conclude that the
Respondent’s March 1, 1991 answer to the complaint
is sufficient under Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations.
Accordingly, the General Counsel’s Motion for
Summary Judgment shall be denied.
ORDER
It is ordered that the General Counsel’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding is re-
manded to the Regional Director for Region 14 for fur-
ther appropriate action.