Station Casinos

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 2, 2012

28-CA-023436 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 2, 2012)

JD(SF)–05-12
Las Vegas, NV
1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
STATION CASINOS, INC., ALIANTE GAMING, LLC,
BOULDER STATION, INC., d/b/a BOULDER STATION
HOTEL & CASINO, PALACE STATION HOTEL &
CASINO, INC., d/b/a PALACE STATION HOTEL & CASINO,
a single employer,
and Cases 28–CA–23436
28–CA–62437
LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF LAS VEGAS,
CULINARY WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 226 AND BARTENDERS
UNION, LOCAL 165, affiliated with UNITE HERE, AFL-CIO
Pablo Godoy and Larry Smith, Esqs.
for the Acting General Counsel.
Harriet Lipkin, Esq., of Washington, D.C. and Dianne LaRocca, Esq.
of New York, New York, for the Respondent.
Richard McCracken, Esq. of San Francisco, CA,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gerald M. Etchingham, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Las Vegas,
Nevada on October 18-20, 2011. The Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary
Workers Union, Local 226 and Bartenders Union, Local 165, affiliated with UNITE HERE,
AFL-CIO (the Charging Party or the Union) filed the charge in Case 28–CA–023436 on April 6,
2011,1 and an initial charge in Case 28–CA–062437 on August 10, which was later amended on
September 19. The Acting Regional Director for Region 28 issued the consolidated complaint
(the complaint) on September 26. The complaint alleges that the Respondent Station Casinos,
Inc. (Respondent or Station Casinos) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act) on three separate occasions through threats of discharge and unlawful interrogation
of its employees for their Union and concerted activities.

1 All dates are in 2011, unless otherwise indicated.
JD(SF)–05-12
2
The complaint further alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
creating an impression among its employees that their Union and concerted activities were under 5
surveillance by the Respondent. Respondent filed an answer denying the essential allegations of
these three claims.
As the trial commenced, the Acting General Counsel sought and I granted leave to make
further clarifying allegation amendments to paragraphs 4-6 of the complaint without opposition 10
which were further denied by Respondent. (Tr.2 8-10; GC Exh. 1(r).)
Unless otherwise explained, findings of fact herein are based on party admissions,
stipulations, and uncontroverted testimony regarding events occurring during the period of time
relevant to these proceedings. On the entire record,3 including my observation of the demeanor 15
of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the Acting General Counsel and
Respondent on December 23, I find the following events occurred in the circumstances described
below during the period relevant to these proceedings:
I. Findings of Fact20
A. Background Facts and Procedural Matters
This case follows on the heels of another trial involving Respondent that was conducted
by Administrative Law Judge Geoffrey Carter. See Station Casinos, Inc., Cases 28–CA–22918, 25
28–CA–23089, 28–CA–23224 and 28–CA–23434, slip op. (September 22, 2011)(the earlier
decision). Although my analysis does not depend on the findings that Judge Carter made in the
earlier decision (which is still pending before the Board), I have incorporated portions of Judge
Carter’s findings at Section II of his decision below because the parties stipulated they provide
efficiency and economy and some useful background for the complaint allegations that are at 30
issue in this case. (Tr. 13-27; GC Exhs. 1(p), 1(q), and 2.)
Uncertain as to the identity and role of the parties’ witnesses as trial commenced, I took
administrative notice of other factual findings beyond Section II in the earlier decision, and
advised the parties that they could make further arguments in their posttrial briefs seeking my 35

2 For ease of reference, testimonial evidence cited herein will be referred to as “Tr.” (Transcript) followed
by the page number(s); documentary evidence is referred to either as “GC Exh.” for a General Counsel
exhibit, “R. Exh.” for a Respondent exhibit, “CP Exh.” For Charging Party exhibit, and “Jt Exh.” for a
joint exhibit between General Counsel and Respondent, followed by the exhibit number(s); reference to
the posttrial briefs shall be “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief, and “R Br.” For Respondent’s brief,
followed by the applicable page numbers. Charging Party did not timely file a posttrial brief.
3 I hereby correct the transcript as follows: Tr. 240, line 7: “Coolern” should be “Cullen;” Tr. 283, line 14:
“resent” should be “present;” Tr. 365, lines 5-6: “Their schedule is 8:00 to 4:00 and they leave about 5:00
‘til 4:00” should be “Their schedule is 8:00 to 4:00 and they leave about 5 [minutes un] til 4:00 [3:55
p.m.];” Tr. 397, lines 13-14: “No way because they work the day shift and married to the huddle on swing
shift” should be “No way because they work the day shift and Margy [Margarito] does the huddle on the
swing shift.”
JD(SF)–05-12
3
reconsideration of taking notice of portions of Judge Carter’s factual findings beyond those
stipulated by the parties.4 (See Tr. 13-27; GC Exhs. 1(p), 1(q), and 2.)
After further consideration, I amend my oral rulings before the end of testimony and find 5
that the witnesses involved in the earlier decision and found by Judge Carter to be involved in
unfair labor practices were not the same witnesses involved in this case. Thus, any further factual
findings from the earlier decision beyond the above-referenced preliminary and background facts
in Section II, are irrelevant to this proceeding and I do not take any further administrative notice.
Accordingly, other than taking notice of Section II Background and Preliminary Findings of Fact 10
from the earlier decision at pages 3-5, I arrive at my own factual findings and legal
determinations solely on the basis of the current record without further reliance on the earlier
decision. See Sunland Construction Co., Inc., 307 NLRB 1036, 1037 (1992)(No notice taken
where no factual showing that key management witness in earlier case whose actions gave rise to
an unfair labor practice was the same individual involved in the subsequent matter.) In sum, no 15
issues herein are dependent upon the earlier decision which is pending before the Board.
B. Jurisdiction
The Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent, a Nevada corporation, owns and 20
operates various hotels and casinos in the metropolitan area of Las Vegas, Nevada, where in the
12 months ending April 6, it derived gross revenue in excess of $500,000 and purchased and
received goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside of the State of
Nevada. (Jt Exh. 1 at 1; GC Exh. 1(m) at 2-5; GC Exh. 1(o) at 2-3; GC Exh. 1(p) at 2, 5-6.) The
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning 25
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.5 (Id.)
C. Labor Organization Status
Respondent admits, and I also find that the Union is a labor organization within the 30
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. (Id.)
D. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices — Overview6
Station Casinos operates 18 casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada, two of which, the Boulder 35
Station Hotel & Casino (Boulder) and the Palace Station Hotel & Casino (Palace), are the subject
of this case. (GC Exh. 1(m) at 5-7.) The Respondent’s casinos each offer some or all of the
following services: hotel accommodations, food and beverage services, spa services, and

4 I find that the motion for me to take administrative notice of the earlier decision was not ripe until
testimony concluded in the instant matter to fully determine whether any relevant overlap of facts and
issues came into evidence in both matters.
5 The Respondent admitted to a similar factual predicate for jurisdiction that covers Case 28–CA–
062437. See GC Exhs. 1(o), 2-3.
6 This case involves 2 casino locations, each of which has a distinct set of allegations and supporting
evidence. I have only provided background facts in this section to offer some context for the case as a
whole. The specific facts for each allegation in the complaint (organized by casino location and alleged
unfair labor practice) are addressed by claim.
JD(SF)–05-12
4
gambling opportunities. (Jt Exh. 1 at 2.) Respondent and its casinos constitute a “single
employer” under the Act in that they share: (1) common ownership; (2) common management;
(3) interrelation of operations; and (4) centralized control of labor relations. (Jt Exh. 1 at 2.)
Moreover, Respondent admits and I further find that Respondent and its casinos: (1) maintain 5
and share centralized payroll, human resources, employment, recruiting, advertising, and
marketing functions; (2) issue a single “Station Casino Team Member Handbook,” issue the
same employment and operational policies, and adopt and follow the same employment and
operational practices and procedures; (3) employee who transfer from one entity to another
among the group; (4) employees who retain their seniority and benefits in the event of transfer; 10
(5) employees who may be assigned to work at one entity in order to prepare to work at another
entity; and (6) employees who interact with one another among the group of entity employees.
(Jt Exh. 1 at 2-3.)
Unlike the employees at many casinos in Las Vegas (particularly those located on the Las 15
Vegas “strip”), Station Casinos’ employees are not represented by a union, and do not work
under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. On February 18, 2010, the Charging Party
set out to change that fact by kicking off a “Now or Never” union campaign to organize the
workers at Station Casinos.7 In connection with that effort, the Charging Party held organizing
meetings and enlisted Station Casinos’ employees to serve as Union committee leaders. Union 20
committee leaders generally were expected to encourage their coworkers to sign Union cards by
speaking to coworkers (at permissible times such as employee mealtimes and breaks) about the
potential benefits of joining the Union. Beginning on February 19, 2010, Union committee
leaders wore their Union buttons to work to express their support for the Union and to identify
themselves to coworkers who might have questions about the Union or the organizing campaign.25
(GC Exh. 2 at 4.)
Station Casinos decided to respond to the Charging Party’s organizing campaign with its
own campaign to oppose the Union. As one component of its responsive campaign, Station
Casinos began issuing flyers, or “Sound Bytes,” to its managers to express the company’s views 30
about the Charging Party’s organizing campaign and the disadvantages (in the company’s view)
of union representation. Managers were expected to read the Sound Bytes at employee meetings
(called “huddles,” “pre-shift meetings” or “Que Pasa meetings,” depending on the location), and
also posted the Sound Bytes on bulletin boards for employees to read. Sound Bytes generally
were available in both English and Spanish, but occasionally managers verbally translated the 35
English versions of certain Sound Bytes into Spanish when a company-provided translation was
not available. Station Casinos also encouraged its managers to provide facts, opinions and
examples about the disadvantages of joining a union, but did not provide any specific guidelines
or parameters to managers about the types of remarks that would be appropriate. (GC Exh. 2 at
4.)40
Once implemented, Station Casinos’ response to the union organizing campaign
produced a variety of outcomes. First, the content of some Sound Bytes prompted some
employees to object or respond during staff meetings, at times leading to prolonged and
sometimes heated exchanges between managers and employees (or between employees 45

7 Station Casinos received official word about the Charging Party’s organizing committee petition on
February 19, 2010. GC Exh. 2 at 4.
JD(SF)–05-12
5
themselves) about the merits of union membership. In response, some Station Casinos managers
prohibited certain employees from speaking at staff meetings, while other managers prohibited
all employees from speaking at staff meetings, regardless of the topic.8 Second, managers
handled the Sound Bytes in different ways, including paraphrasing or translating the Sound Byte 5
in ways that communicated a different meaning than the written statement, and adding ad-libbed
comments about the Union after reading the Sound Byte. (GC Exh. 2 at 4.)
At the same time, some employees who began wearing Union committee leader buttons
(as well as others who engaged in union activity but did not wear a Union button) began 10
reporting a variety of alleged unfair labor practices to the Charging Party. The alleged violations
in Judge Carter’s case included, but were not limited to: directions to take off their Union buttons
while in the workplace; interrogation about their union beliefs or activities; directions to stop
engaging in union activities (such as leafleting or speaking to coworkers about supporting the
Union), even while on break or off duty; orders not to speak at employee meetings because of 15
their union activities; threats of reprisal for engaging in union activity; and disciplinary action
because of their union activities. See GC Exh. 2 at 4-59. In this case, what follows are the
specific factual findings at issue from the Palace and Boulder facilities.
E. Subpoena Issues20
I ruled on Charging Party’s petition to revoke the August 25 subpoena duces tecum and
the September 28 supplemental subpoena duces tecum10 granting the petition as to request
categories 1-5 and denying the petition as to request category 6. (Tr. 34-69.) With respect to
request number 6, I ordered the Union to produce photographs, postings, posters and other 25
documents concerning any allegations of the Complaint, but excluding any Jencks statements,
interview notes and investigatory notes from Acting General Counsel. I ruled that the Charging
Party’s 10-12 non-Jencks statements were to be produced immediately in response to the
subpoenas due to the fact that the subpoenaed documents are limited to production to
Respondent’s counsel who agreed not to share their contents which takes away the risk of 30
violating the witness’ Section 7 rights or chilling their ability to be truthful. See Smithfield
Packing Company, 334 NLRB 34-35 (2001); Delta Mechanical, Inc., 323 NLRB 76, 77 (1997);
and Caterpillar, Inc., 313 NLRB 626 , 626 (1994). I also ruled that the videotaped material was
irrelevant to this matter. (Tr. 49-50.)
35
F. The October 7, 2010 Palace Station Incident between Respondent,
through Supervisor Phillips, and Its Employees
As stated above, on February 18, 2010, the Charging Party set out its union organizing
efforts at Respondent. In connection with those efforts, the Charging Party held organizing 40

8 Before communication in staff meetings was limited during the union organizing campaign, it was
fairly common for employees to speak at staff meetings to, among other things, ask questions about work
assignments or clarify the nature of new policies or casino promotions that were announced at the
meeting. GC Exh. 2. fn 9 at 4.
9 ALJ Carter sustained many but not all of the alleged unfair labor claims in the earlier decision.
10 The two subpoenas were identical to the subpoenas drafted for use in the earlier decision. As such, the
requested documents pre-dated the events at issue in this case by almost a year.
JD(SF)–05-12
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meetings and enlisted Station Casinos’ employees to serve as Union committee leaders. At
about the same time, Union committee leaders wore their Union buttons to work to express their
support for the Union and to identify themselves to coworkers who might have questions about
the Union or the organizing campaign. (GC Exh. 2 at 4.)5
On October 7, 2010, Assistant Room Chef Walter Phillips (Phillips) hosted a regular
huddle or meeting with swing shift employees at approximately 4:15 p.m. (Tr. 242.)
Approximately 10 to 12 employees attended this meeting, including main kitchen cook Adolfo
Gaspar (Gaspar), kitchen runner Maria Susana Lopez (Lopez), and kitchen runner Martha James 10
(James). (Tr. 242-43, 272, 296-97, 299.) Gaspar, a Union committee leader, wore his union
button on the chest of his uniform on October 7, 2010. (Tr. 240-242; GC Exh. 17.)
During the meeting, Phillips discussed a number of different issues related to the job
duties of the employees in attendance in a variety of job functions. (Tr. 242-43, 297-98.) After he 15
concluded his discussion, Phillips asked employees if they had any comments or questions. (Tr.
243.)
In response, Gaspar asked Phillips when “they” meaning Respondent was going to
replace two departed cooks - a cook that had been terminated (Ovidio Aquino (Aquino)) and 20
another cook and Union leader who was transferred to another department. (Tr. 243.) Gaspar’s
question came about because his kitchen was short-handed two cooks yet the remaining three
cooks were required to maintain the same level of work as had been produced by 5 cooks prior to
the departure of the two referenced above. (Tr. 243-44.)
25
In response to Gaspar’s questions, Phillips warned him to be quiet and that if he would
not, Gaspar could be the next cook to follow Aquino, a Union committee leader previously
discharged by Respondent. (Tr. 244, 275-76, 298-99.) Following this discussion, no other
employees asked questions or made comments. (Tr. 244-45, 299.)
30
G. The February 14-15, 2011 Boulder Station Alleged Incidents
On or about February 5, 2010, prior to the commencement of the Union’s organizing
campaign, Sanitation Department day shift employee Gerardo Arroyo (Arroyo) became a Union
committee leader. (Tr. 312.) Arroyo has worked for Respondent for 14 years. On becoming a 35
Union committee leader, Arroyo was given a Union button (worn on his work uniform each day)
and began organizing employees in support of the Union. (Tr. 311-13.) Arroyo’s activities in
support of the Union continued through the date of trial. (Tr. 314.)
On February 14, Arroyo and two other Sanitation Department day shift employees 40
Norma Rivera (Rivera) and Daniel Sarmon (Sarmon) allegedly attended an employee pre-shift
huddle held by swing shift Sanitation Department Supervisor Margarito Garcia (Garcia) in the
dish room. (Tr. 314-15.) The meeting was conducted in Spanish. (Tr. 315.) Garcia, who arrived
to the meeting holding a schedule, opened the meeting by asking employees if they had any
questions or comments. 45
In response, Arroyo claims he raised his hand and asked Garcia why he did not schedule
more employees to work when there were only 3 employees present instead of 12 employees
JD(SF)–05-12
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who should have been scheduled. (Tr. 315-16.) Garcia allegedly responded to Arroyo’s question
by replying that he could not do anything and this was the responsibility of Sanitation
Department Director Victor Favela (Favela). (Tr. 316.) Arroyo says he responded by asking
Garcia why he had the employees running around while warning them not to run because they 5
could have an accident. (Tr. 317.)
Allegedly angered by Arroyo’s further questioning, Garcia purportedly slammed his hand
to the table while continuing to hold onto the schedule. (Tr. 317.) Also at the meeting, Rivera
then asked Garcia why he was getting upset when they were only responding to his request for 10
comments and questions and repeated the earlier expression that the department was functioning
at an insufficient staffing level. (Tr. 318-19.) Garcia is alleged to have responded by stating that
it was Favela’s fault. (Tr. 319.)
The following day, February 15, while Arroyo was working in the main kitchen taking 15
out the garbage, he was approached by Favela. Favela allegedly began the conversation by
asking Arroyo why he was talking behind his back and by telling Arroyo that if he wanted to say
something, to say it in front of him. (Tr. 319-20.) When Arroyo responded that he did not
mention Favela and that Garcia had asked them for questions and comments, Favela angrily
answered back that he worked his “ass off” too. (Tr. 320.) Arroyo responded that other 20
departments had a lot of people to work in them while the Sanitation Department did not. (Tr.
320.) Favela continued by telling Arroyo that Favela could bring in more employees and could
get rid of those employees currently working one-by-one. When Arroyo asked Favela if he was
threatening him, Favela addressed Arroyo using a pejorative Spanish term and responded by
telling Arroyo that he could take it like he wanted and that if he did not like it, they could go 25
outside and fight. (Tr. 320-23.)
Garcia and Favela deny having any discussions with Arroyo on February 14 or 15 as
described by Arroyo. Garcia worked the swing shift and Arroyo worked the day shift and their
pre-shift huddles did not overlap. (Tr. 364-400; R Exhs. 8-9.)30
H. The February 18, 2011 Palace Station Alleged Incident between Martin
Rubio and Casiano Corpus
On February 17, the Union held a rally in front of Respondent’s Palace Station facility, 35
(Tr. 162, 201.) Casiano Corpus (Corpus) participated in the rally by carrying picket signs on the
sidewalks and parking lot. (Tr. 162.) Later that evening after the rally, Corpus reported to work
at 11:00 p.m. to begin his graveyard shift as a porter. (Tr. 183.) Later that night at midnight (Feb.
18) Martin Rubio (“Rubio”) reported to work as a relief supervisor over Corpus filling in for Ron
Grannis (Grannis), Rubio’s regular supervisor. 40
During his shift, while Corpus was working in his assigned area in the Feast Buffet, he
was approached by Rubio. Rubio called Corpus into the lobby, an area outside Corpus’ work
area, (tr. 168-70.) When Corpus joined Rubio in the lobby, Rubio questioned Corpus if he had
gone to the rally and whether he had gone to jail. (Tr. 170.) Rubio answered back that 45
“somebody” had told him that the next time team members pass out flyers inside Station
Casinos, they will be immediately fired. (Tr. 170.) When Corpus asked Rubio who had told him
this, Rubio walked away without answering. (Tr. 170.)
JD(SF)–05-12
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Of relevant interest here, Respondent hired Rubio as a porter, cleaning Respondent’s
facilities, and also as a relief supervisor. In February 2011, Rubio worked as a relief supervisor
two graveyard shifts per week and as a porter the remainder of his workweek. (Tr. 73, 85-86, 5
110-11, 163.) Rubio worked as a relief supervisor to replace regular supervisors on their
scheduled days off. (Id.) When working as a relief supervisor, Respondent paid him at an
additional premium of 35 cents per hour. (Tr. 151.) Thus, Rubio was an hourly, dual-rate
employee, and was still required to sign in and out on sign-in sheets like other hourly,
nonsupervisory team members. (Tr. 138-40, 151, 207-08; GC Exhs. 7(e), 8(e).) 10
As a relief supervisor, Rubio’s duties were limited. He did not hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, discipline, responsibly direct, or adjust grievances. (Tr. 124-25,
152.) Rubio did not hold team member huddles, attend supervisor meetings, sign job
descriptions for supervisor and relief supervisors, inspect work, authorize overtime, and have 15
access to company e-mail. (Tr. 98, 113, 117, 125, 136; GC Exh. 12.) Rubio did, however,
complete schedules of where team members were stationed. (Tr. 79; GC Exh. 9(a).) Rubio
assigned part-time team members to tasks that needed to be completed, and when necessary, he
assigned team members to perform tasks that went beyond their typical assignments. (Tr. 84,
119, 134, 173.) Rubio completed, distributed, and collected task sheets, and also distributed and 20
collected keys and radios at the beginning of his shift. (Tr. 74, 77, 79-80, 84-85, 87-91, 99-102,
107-11, 124, 156-58, 164, 172, 176-77; GC Exh. 9(a)-(v); GC Exh. 10(a)-(v).) During his shift,
Rubio responded to calls from other departments reporting broken glass or other biohazard spills
by radioing the team member assigned to (or nearest to) the affected area to clean up the spill.
(Tr. 74-75, 84-85, 94.) At the conclusion of his shift, as stated above, Rubio collected task 25
sheets from each team member, which indicated the completed assignments for the graveyard
shift. (Tr. 85, 109, 176-77; GC Exh. 9(b)-(v); GC Exh. 10(b)-(v).)
As a graveyard relief supervisor, Rubio was the highest-ranking, on-site employee in the
internal management department. (Tr. 111, 163.) However, Rubio was not in charge of the 30
casino’s entire operation, the pit boss was in charge; and Rubio received instruction from and
reported issues to him. (Tr. 111, 130, 153-54.) Nonetheless, Rubio wore a different uniform
(e.g., a polo shirt) than the porters (e.g., a Station Casinos t-shirt), and team members notified
Rubio when they called off sick (or left early) from their shifts, which he recorded in a log book.
(Tr. 98-99, 106, 134, 142-47, 151, 165, 185; Jt. Exh. 2; GC Exh. 14.) Rubio often times 35
rewarded team members with Star Cards to recognize their job performance. (Tr. 125, 131-33.)
Star Cards can be used to redeem items, which must be authorized by a supervisor’s signature to
be redeemed. (Id.) Rubio issued about ten or fewer Star Cards to team members in the internal
management department in the entire year and ten months he worked as a relief supervisor. (Tr.
131.) Although Rubio admitted that he was never given the authority to issue Star Cards, he was 40
never disciplined for using them. (Tr. 125, 131-33.)
II. Analysis
A. Credibility45
The key aspects of my factual findings above with respect to the three alleged incidents
and meetings between Respondent’s director and supervisors and its employees incorporate the
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credibility determinations I have made after carefully considering the record in its entirety. The
testimony concerning the two events on October 7, 2010, and February 14-15, 2011 contain
sharp conflicts.11 Evidence contradicting the findings, particularly unsupported testimony from
Phillips and Arroyo, has been considered but has not been credited.5
My credibility resolutions have been formed by my consideration of a witness’
opportunity to be familiar with the subjects covered by the testimony given; established or
admitted facts; the impact of bias on the witness’ testimony; the quality of the witness’
recollection; testimonial consistency; the presence or absence of corroboration; the strength of 10
rebuttal evidence, if any; the weight of the evidence; and witness demeanor while testifying.
More detailed discussions of specific credibility resolutions appear herein in those situations that
I perceived to be of particular significance.
I found Gaspar to be a credible witness as his demeanor at trial was impressive as he 15
appeared confident and testified without hesitation. Gaspar has worked at Respondent for 7 years
and since February 2010, has been a known union committee leader who always wore his union
button at work and was supervised or managed by Chef Phillips, Chef Candace Cullen (Cullen),
and Chef Tony Tillman (Tillman) in October 2010. (Tr. 240.) Gaspar’s chronology of events and
detailed recollection of the October 7, 2010 huddle and interaction with Phillips was quite 20
credible especially when corroborated by testimony from subpoenaed employees Lopez, a two-
year Respondent employee, and James, a four-year Respondent employee. I also find employees
Gaspar’s, Lopez’s, and James’ testimony particularly credible12, despite language difficulty,13
over Supervisor Phillips’ testimony given the fact that each of the three non-supervisor
employees testified against their own interests as they were employed at Respondent at the time 25
of trial and must continue to face Supervisor Phillips as one of their immediate supervisors after
trial.14 See S.E. Nichols, Inc., 284 NLRB 556 fn. 2 (1987) (Current respondent employee’s
testimony more reliable because it is given against his interest to remain employed by
Respondent.).
30
Moreover, I find that the testimony given by one of Respondent’s principal witnesses,
Phillips, that he did not run or speak at the October 7, 2010 swing shift huddle directly conflicts
with the testimony of the three non-supervisory witnesses referenced above. Thus. I reject
Phillips’ testimony as it is outweighed by the corroborated non-supervisor testimony referenced

11 As to the February 17-18, 2011 event, there is no factual dispute and I credit Corpus’ and Rubio’s
factual accounts, but find them of no benefit in establishing Rubio’s supervisory status or agent authority
as discussed herein.
12 I disregard only James’ statement on cross-examination that she agreed that at all times when Phillips
and Cullen worked together that Cullen would run the pre-shift huddle. See Tr. 306. The weight of the
evidence shows that at least on October 7, 2010, Phillips conducted and ran the pre-shift huddle.
13 Gaspar was most believable when he opined that he understood English well but needed an interpreter
at hearing to communicate his responses to questions.
14 I note that Respondent points out that the recollection from Gaspar, Lopez, and James differed as to
specific statements made by Chef Phillips before Gaspar asked him his staffing question. I find this
inconsistency to be immaterial and most likely due to the fact that not all employees worked in exactly the
same job tasks and probably focused more on Phillips’ statements that had a direct effect on the
employee’s work duties. The testimony was consistent, however, as to Gaspar’s question and Phillips’
response.
JD(SF)–05-12
10
above and it is unworthy of belief especially when unsubstantiated by Cullen whom Phillips
swore ran the October 7 huddle and spoke to Gaspar in his place.15 (Tr. 403-07.)
I further find that the testimony of Garcia and Favela is much more believable than that 5
of Arroyo alone after weighing the evidence, observing them testify, and reviewing the
corroborating work schedules and sign-in sheet evidence. See R Exhs. 8 and 9. I find that on
February 14, Arroyo worked the day shift and Garcia did not. (Tr. 364-66, 397-98; R Exh. 8.)
Garcia was not physically present at Respondent to conduct a pre-shift huddle at 8:15 a.m. as
represented only by Arroyo. 10
Most telling is that Garcia works the swing shift from 4 p.m.-12 a.m. and not the day shift
from 8 a.m.-4 p.m. like Arroyo, Rivera, and Sarmon. This includes Garcia’s schedule on
February 14. Garcia’s convincing testimony that on February 14 he conducted the pre-shift
huddle meeting in Spanish at his usual time of 4:15 p.m. before approximately 10 employees, not15
including Arroyo, Rivera, or Sarmon, wholly contradicts Arroyo’s unsupported testimony that
Garcia conducted a pre-shift huddle meeting before Arroyo and his two co-workers at 8:15 a.m.
in the morning. I draw an adverse inference from the fact that neither Rivera nor Sarmon testified
to corroborate Arroyo’s version of the facts. See Douglas Aircraft Co., 308 NLRB 1217 (1992)
(failure to call a witness “who may reasonably be assumed to be favorably disposed to the party, 20
[supports] an adverse inference . . . regarding any factual question on which the witness is likely
to have knowledge”). Moreover, if Arroyo disputed the characterization of his and his fellow
workers’ work schedules as compared to Garcia, he could easily have returned to hearing for re-
direct rebuttal testimony if work schedules on February 14 remained an issue. For these reasons,
I credit Garcia and Favela’s testimony and I reject Arroyo’s testimony. 25
B. The Respondent, through Supervisor Phillips, Threatened Its Employees
with Discharge if They Continued to Engage in Concerted Activities16
Paragraph 6 (b) of the complaint alleges that on or about October 7, 2010, the 30
Respondent, by Walter Phillips threatened it employees with discharge if they continued to
engage in concerted activities.
As to the merits of the complaint allegation, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it
threatens employees with job loss if they engage in union activity. Trump Marina Hotel 35
Casino,353 NLRB 921 (2009). The test for interference, restraint, or coercion is an objective
one, and depends on whether “the employer engaged in conduct which would reasonably have a
tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.” Santa Barbara
New-Press, 357 NLRB No. 51, slip op. at 25 (2011); Multi-Ad Services, Inc., 331 NLRB 1226,
1227-1228 (2000); Westwood Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 935, 949 (2000).40
Moreover, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) if it communicates to employees that
they will jeopardize their job security, wages, or other working conditions if they support the

15 Though Phillips testified that Cullen no longer worked at Respondent at the time of trial (Tr. 407), there
was no evidence presented by Respondent showing that her whereabouts at the time of trial were
unknown and that she could not be subpoenaed to testify with reasonable effort.
16 This allegation is listed under pars. 4(b), 6(a) and (b), and 7 of the complaint.
JD(SF)–05-12
11
union. Metro One Loss Prevention Services, 356 NLRB No. 20, slip op. at 1 (2010). I have
credited Gaspar’s testimony over Phillips’ and described above how Phillips warned Gaspar, a
known union committee leader, to be quiet about work conditions and staffing shortage
complaints or he might end up being discharged like Aquino, another union committee leader 5
who was discharged previously. I have also described above Aquino’s involvement with the
Union and other workplace issues. I infer, in context, that Gaspar would reasonably understand
Phillips’ comments to mean that he should remain quiet and not involve himself in workplace
issues and the Union. By threatening an employee that he risked losing his job if he engaged in
union or other protected concerted activities concerning work conditions, Respondent violated 10
Section 8(a)(1).
C. The Respondent, by Victor Favela, did not interrogate or threaten its
employees about their union and concerted activities or threaten its employees with
discharge if they continued to engage in union and concerted activities.15
It is alleged in paragraphs 5(a) and (b) of the complaint that on or about February 15,
Respondent, by Victor Favela “interrogated its employees about their union and concerted
activities” and “threatened its employees with discharge if they continued to engage in union and
concerted activities.” (GC Exh. 1(r) at 2.) 20
As stated above in my Credibility analysis, I credited the testimony of Favela and Garcia
and rejected the testimony of Arroyo. By my crediting the denials of Favela and Garcia over
Arroyo’s version of facts from February 14-15, and the fact that Acting General Counsel did not
call any other employee to corroborate Arroyo’s account of the alleged events of February 14 or 25
15, I am finding that Acting General Counsel failed to meet its burden of proof regarding the
allegations and I reject the alleged interrogation and threatening conduct claims in the complaint.
Accordingly I recommend that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed.
D. Relief Supervisor Martin Rubio Was Not a Supervisor or Agent When He Met 30
with Casiano Corpus on February 18, 2011.
1. Rubio was Not a Supervisor on February 18
The Act excludes supervisors from the ambit of its protections. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3)35
(West 2012). The Act defines a “supervisor” as:
[A[ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively 40
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
(Id.; § 152(11).) The traditional three-part test for determining supervisory status is: (1) whether 45
the employee holds the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 listed supervisory functions in §
152(11); (2) whether the exercise of such authority requires the use of independent judgment;
and (3) whether the employee holds such authority in the interest of the employer. NLRB. v.
JD(SF)–05-12
12
Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706, 712-13 (2001) (quoting NLRB v. Health Care
& Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994)); accord Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348
N.L.R.B. 686, 687 (2006).
5
The statutory functions listed in § 152(11) must be exercised with “independent
judgment.” Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 687. “[T]o exercise ‘independent judgment’ an
individual must at a minimum act . . . free of control of others and form an opinion or evaluation
by discerning and comparing data,” with a certain degree of discretion that rises above “the
routine or clerical.” (Id. at 692-93.) Once the individual exercises the function with the requisite 10
“independent judgment,” the Board will accord supervisory status to the putative supervisor.
Furthermore, when an individual is engaged a part of the time as a supervisor and the rest
of the time as a unit employee, the legal standard for a supervisory determination is whether the
individual spends a regular and substantial portion of his/her work time performing supervisory 15
functions. (Id. at 694.) “Regular means according to a pattern or schedule, as opposed to
sporadic substitution. (Id.)
The burden of proving supervisory authority is on the party asserting it. Kentucky River,
532 U.S. at 711-12; accord American River Transp. Co., 347 N.L.R.B. 925, 927 (2006). 20
Here, the Acting General Counsel must satisfy this burden to prevail and argues that
Rubio meets the statutory definition of a supervisor under two statutory indicia of
supervisor status: “assign” and “reward.” (See GC Br. at 24-27.)
(a). Rubio Was Not a Supervisor as He Did Not Exercise Independent 25
Judgment when He Assigned Tasks to Team Members.
The Board has “construe[d] the term ‘assign’ to refer to the act of designating an
employee to a place (such as location, department, or wing), appointing an employee to a time
(such as a shift or overtime period), or giving significant overall duties, i.e., tasks, to an 30
employee.” Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 689. The assignment of an employee to a certain
department, or to a certain significant overall task would qualify as “assign” within the Board’s
construction. (Id.) During the relevant time period, Rubio completed, distributed, and collected
assignment and tasks sheets. Furthermore, Rubio was the highest-ranking Internal Maintenance
supervisor during the graveyard shift, thus, he responded to calls from other departments 35
reporting biohazard spills, broken glass, etc. by calling the team member assigned to (or nearest
to) the affected area to address the spill. However, it is questionable whether he exercised the
requisite independent judgment in assigning such tasks.
Rubio assigned team members to a specific work area, which falls within the definition of 40
“assign” for purposes of the Act. See e.g., Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 695 (charge nurses’
assignment of nurses to specific geographic locations within the emergency room fall within the
definition of “assign” for purposes of the Act). However, Rubio did so by distributing
assignment sheets that were dictated by the team members’ bidded shifts and instructions left by
Rubio’s supervisors and department manager. (Tr. 77, 80, 156-158; G.C. Exhs. 9(a), 10(a).) 45
Thus, Rubio’s judgment with respect to this assignment duty was hardly independent or
“free of control” when he acted according to a plan. See Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 693
JD(SF)–05-12
13
(judgment is not independent if it is dictated or controlled by detailed instructions). Furthermore,
when Rubio assigned keys and radios to team members, or responded to the occasional spill by
radioing the team member at or near the affected area to clean it, there is no evidence suggesting
that Rubio’s direction involved other than routine aspects of internal maintenance, such as 5
promptly cleaning the spill or directing someone to do it. See e.g., Loyalhanna Health Care
Associates, 332 N.L.R.B. 933, 935 (2000) (“There is no evidence showing that nurses' direction
of aides involves other than routine aspects of patient care, such as taking residents' vital signs,
assisting residents with tasks of daily living, and ensuring that care plans are followed.”); see
also Shaw Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 354, 356 (2007) (“Rotating essentially unskilled and routine duties 10
among available crewmembers . . . does not involve the use of independent judgment . . . .”);
Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 693 (“If there is only one obvious and self-evident choice, . . . or if
the assignment is made solely on the basis of equalizing workloads, then the assignment is
routine or clerical in nature and does not implicate independent judgment, . . .”). I find that
Acting General Counsel has failed to meet its burden of proving that Rubio acted with the 15
requisite independent judgment in exercise of his supervisor duties.
(b). Rubio Was Not a Supervisor Under the Indicia of Reward.
“Section 2(11) requires only the possession of authority to carry out the operation of an 20
enumerated supervisory function, not its actual exercise[;][thus], the evidence must suffice to
show that such authority actually exists and that its exercise requires the use of independent
judgment.” Barstow Community Hosp., 352 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1053 (2008) (citing Avante at
Wilson, 348 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1057 (2006)).
25
It is uncontested that Rubio rewarded team members with Star Cards. (Tr. 125, 131-33.)
Rubio testified that he issued Star Cards to team members who had not been recognized by a
supervisor, even though Respondent never gave Rubio the authority to do so, and Rubio knew
that he did not have such authority. Id. Merely because Rubio exercised the authority to issue
Star Cards, does not necessarily entail that he possessed it, especially when Respondent has 30
shown that he did not. Moreover, I find that Rubio having issued only about ten or fewer
unauthorized Star Cards in the entire year in the ten months he worked as a relief supervisor is
too isolated and insufficient to establish that he possessed the supervisory authority to reward
employees. See Commercial Fleet Wash, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 326,326 (1971) (“[W]e do not
consider these few isolated instances, in view of the record as a whole, to be sufficient to 35
establish that they possess the supervisory authority contemplated by Section 2(11) of the Act.”)
Lastly, Rubio testified that he only issued Star Cards to team members who were not recognized
by supervisors; that is, Rubio rewarded team members pursuant to a “routine or mechanical”
criterion instead of an actual evaluation and comparison of the team member’s overall job
performance. Thus, Rubio has demonstrated that he did not use independent judgment to reward 40
team members. Consequently, Rubio does not meet the statutory definition of supervisor under
the indicia of “rewards.”
(c). Secondary Indicia of Supervisory Status Are Insufficient to
Establish Supervisory Status.45
The Board has held that secondary indicia of supervisory status are not dispositive
without evidence of at least one statutory indicator of such status. Juniper Industries, 311
JD(SF)–05-12
14
N.L.R.B. 109, 1010 (1993). Assuming, arguendo, that the issues of whether Rubio possessed the
authority to “assign” or “reward” were closer, there still is a lack of sufficient secondary indicia
of supervisory status to establish such status. First, even as a relief supervisor, Rubio was
required to sign in and out like other hourly employees. Furthermore, Rubio never held 5
supervisory huddles, disciplined employees, authorized overtime, inspected other team members’
work, or performed regular porter duties in addition to responding to calls. Lastly, even though
Rubio was the only on-site internal management supervisor during the graveyard shift, the pit
boss was in charge of the operations of Respondent’s business during the graveyard shift and
Rubio would receive instructions from him and occasionally go to him with issues as they arose. 10
(Tr. 111, 130, 153-54.) Consequently, these factors outweigh other secondary indicia, including
the indicia that Rubio wore a different uniform when working as a relief supervisor (though not a
full-time supervisor’s uniform), or that he held a supervisor’s title, or that he logged employees’
absences in a log book (which is merely clerical work). See Victoria Partners, 327 N.L.R.B. 54,
61 (1998) (“status of a supervisor under the Act is determined by an individual’s duties, not by 15
his title or job classification.”) Consequently, the secondary indicia are insufficient to establish
supervisory status in the absence of one of the enumerated functions. E.g., In re Palagonia
Bakery Co. Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 515, 535 (2003).
2. Rubio Was Not an Agent Within the Meaning of the Act.20
An employer can be held liable for the acts of its agents even if the alleged agent is not a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act. E.g., Solvay Iron Works, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 208, 210
(2004). Employers are responsible for the actions of their agents according to common law
agency principles. In re D&F Indus, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 618, 619 (2003). “If the employee acted 25
with the apparent authority of the employer with respect to the alleged unlawful conduct, the
employer is responsible for the conduct.” (Id.) Apparent authority is found when employer
manifests to a third party “‘a reasonable basis for the latter to believe that the [employer] has
authorized the alleged agent to perform the acts in question.’” (Id.) (quoting Cooper Industries,
328 N.L.R.B. 145 (1999)). The test is “whether, under all the circumstances, the employee 30
would reasonably believe that the alleged agent ‘was reflecting company policy and speaking
and acting for management.’” (Id.) “The burden of proving an agency relationship exists is on
the party asserting its existence.” In re Cornell Forge Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 733, 733 (2003).
Furthermore, “[t]he agency must be established with regard to the specific conduct that is alleged
to be unlawful.” (Id.) 35
“The Board considers the position of the employee in addition to the context in which the
behavior occurred” to determine whether the alleged agent had the apparent authority to make
the act in question. Pessoa Construction Co., 356 NLRB No. 157 at 3 (2011)(quoting Jules V.
Lane, 262 NLRB 118, 119 (1982)). Here, the alleged conduct occurred when Rubio was acting 40
as a relief supervisor. Rubio was the sole supervisor in the Internal Management Department,
overseeing sixteen other team members. He also wore a distinct uniform from the porters, even
though he also performed half of his shift doing duties of porters alongside team members.
However, Rubio never held supervisory huddles with team members, attended supervisor and/or
management meetings, inspected other team members’ work, authorized overtime, or disciplined45
or terminated team members when he was the relief supervisor, those two days per week.
Compare D&F Industries, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. at 619 (employees represented themselves as
agents of management because they administered the employer’s policies regarding overtime and
JD(SF)–05-12
15
time off, enforced rules concerning restroom time, talking, and tardiness, employee’s relayed
management information and decisions pertaining to the production and work rules to employees
on a daily basis). Under these circumstances, an employee could not reasonably perceive that
Rubio was an agent of management, instead Rubio could have been perceived as a non-statutory 5
supervisor overseeing the routine and clerical aspects of the internal management supervisor
position, two nights per week, when the other supervisors and managers were on their days off.
Although Rubio was Respondent’s agent for many purposes, such as passing out work
assignments, Rubio was not Respondent’s agent when he allegedly threatened Corpus with 10
termination for his union activities. See Pessoa Construction Co., 356 NLRB at 3-4 (finding that
an employee was the employer’s agent for many purposes, but not for the alleged unlawful
conduct). Acting General Counsel failed to meet its burden in proving that Respondent either
authorized Rubio to make such interrogation and/or threat, or that Respondent created such a
belief among its employees. When Rubio allegedly told Corpus that “somebody told him that 15
next time we hand out flyers inside the Station Casinos, we will immediately get fired[,]” (Tr.
168, 170.), Rubio never identified that the “somebody” was management. The alleged threat is
vague and was not linked to Respondent in any way or any of Respondent’s manifestations
authorizing Rubio to make such statements. Instead, Rubio could have simply been satisfying his
own curiosity and/or reiterating rumors shared among other employees. Secondly, aside from 20
this isolated incident, Rubio has not engaged in Respondent’s alleged anti-union campaign to
give rise to a reasonable belief that he was the agent of management in such unlawful conduct.
In conclusion, Rubio was not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Although he
assigned tasks and rewarded team members, Acting General Counsel has failed to prove that 25
Rubio exercised independent judgment in doing so. Furthermore, Rubio was not Respondent’s
agent when he allegedly interrogated and threatened Corpus with termination for participating in
union activities. Under all of the circumstances, Rubio’s lack of, inter alia, disciplinary power,
inability to authorize overtime, and lead supervisory huddles, do not give rise to a reasonable
belief that he had the apparent authority to engage in such conduct. 30
Accordingly I recommend that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed.
III. Conclusions of Law
35
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
40
3. By threatening Adolfo Gaspar on October 7, 2010 with discharge if he continued to
complain about his work conditions and did not remain quiet, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening an employee that he risked losing his job if he engaged in union
and other protected concerted activities.
45
4. Respondent’s unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
JD(SF)–05-12
16
5. The above violation is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Act.
6. The Respondent did not also violate the Act as further alleged in the Complaint.
5
IV. REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice, I find that it
must be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in such conduct in the future and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. To remedy the 10
Respondent’s violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent post
and abide by the attached notice to employees.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended.1715
ORDER
The Respondent, Station Casinos, Inc., Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:20
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) threatening employees with discharge if they engage in union or other protected concerted
activities. 25
(b) Unlawfully in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of their rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. 30
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this order, post at its facilities in and around Las Vegas,
Nevada, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix”18 in both English and Spanish.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and 35
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on

17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD(SF)–05-12
17
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means.19 In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the 5
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since October 7, 2010.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.10
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of
the Act not specifically found.
Dated: at Washington, D.C. February 2, 201215
Gerald M. Etchingham
Administrative Law Judge

19 The notice posting language provided herein (specifically regarding distributing notices electronically)
is consistent with the Board’s recent decision in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9 (2010).
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
ï‚· Form, join, or assist a union;
ï‚· Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf;
ï‚· Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection;
ï‚· Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. More particularly:
WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce any rule which limits your right to engage in activities
protected under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten to fire or discharge employees for making concerted complaints about
their working conditions.
WE WILL NOT threaten to fire or discharge employees if they engage in union activities.
STATION CASINOS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
Charging Party representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and
Charging Parties. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election
petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You
may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
600 Las Vegas Blvd. South, Suite 400
Las Vegas, NV 899101-6637
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
702-388-6012.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, 702-388-6012.