St. Louis Auto Parts Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 12, 1994

315 N.L.R.B. 717 (N.L.R.B. 1994)

717
315 NLRB No. 105
ST. LOUIS AUTO PARTS CO.
1 The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge’s credibil-
ity findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
We agree with the judge that the 8(a)(1) interrogation of applicant
for employment David Sparks was an isolated incident which did not
contribute to the circulation of the decertification petition. There is
no evidence that unit employees were aware of this incident. See
Choctawhatchee Electric, 274 NLRB 595 fn. 2 (1985).
The Charging Party’s exceptions assert that Richard Sigmund is a
supervisor. The Charging Party relies on Carla O’Brien’s testimony
that ‘‘Richard’’ hired an employee. The Respondent filed a motion
to reopen the record to introduce an affidavit to show that the
‘‘Richard’’ to which O’Brien’s testimony refers is not Richard Sig-
mund. The Charging Party’s exception is, at best, speculation, un-
supported by any other evidence in the record. Inasmuch as we find
the clarification the Respondent seeks unnecessary, we shall deny the
motion to reopen the record.
1 The following include a composite of the credited testimony of
the witnesses at the hearing. All dates are in 1993 unless otherwise
stated.
Slapco, Inc., d/b/a St. Louis Auto Parts Co. and
Automotive, Petroleum and Allied Industries
Employees Union, Local 618 affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO. Cases 14–CA–22580 and 14–CA–22592
December 12, 1994
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS STEPHENS
AND BROWNING
On June 17, 1994, Administrative Law Judge Law-
rence W. Cullen issued the attached decision. The
Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief
and the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the rulings, findings,1 and conclusions
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Slapco, Inc., d/b/a St.
Louis Auto Parts Co., St. Louis, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
Kathleen C. Fothergill, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas G. Bearden, Esq. (Bearden, Breckenridge, Mattern
& Perdue), of St. Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LAWRENCE W. CULLEN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard before me on October 27, 1993, at St. Louis,
Missouri. The consolidated complaint in this case was filed
by the Acting Regional Director for Region 14 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) on October 26,
1993, and is based on a charge and an amended charge filed
by the Automotive, Petroleum and Allied Industries Employ-
ees Union, Local 618 affiliated with the International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (the Union or the Charging
Party) in Case 14–CA–22580 on July 7, 1993, and August
20, 1993, respectively, and a charge and an amended charge
filed by the Union in Case 14–CA–22592 on July 14 and
August 20, 1993, respectively. The complaint as amended at
the hearing alleges that Slapco, Inc., d/b/a St. Louis Auto
Parts Co. (the Respondent) engaged in unlawful interrogation
of a job applicant; interfered with employees’ picketing by
removing a picket sign that was posted on public property;
packed the collective-bargaining unit by hiring eight employ-
ees to replace four striking employees and a fifth employee
who quit on the day the strike began; and unlawfully with-
drew recognition from the Union. The Respondent has by its
answer to the complaint as amended at the hearing denied
the commission of any violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act).
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing including
the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received at
the hearing and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the follow-
ing1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material, the Respondent has been a Missouri
corporation with an office and place of business located in
St. Louis, Missouri, where it is engaged in the retail and
nonretail sale and distribution of automobile parts, that dur-
ing the 12-month period ending July 31, 1993, Respondent,
in conducting its business operations, purchased and received
at its St. Louis facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly from points outside the State of Missouri, and that Re-
spondent has been at all times material, engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
718 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material, the Union has been a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material, the following employees of Respondent
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All employees excluding executives, superintendents,
actual (non-working) foremen in supervisory capacity
or members of the clerical staff or outside sales force
of the Respondent.
It is further alleged in the complaint and admitted by Re-
spondent that since about 1947 and at all material times
thereafter until the Respondent withdrew recognition from
the Union on July 13, 1993, the Union has been the des-
ignated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
unit and has been recognized as such by Respondent.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondent and the Union have had an ongoing col-
lective-bargaining relationship since 1947. The most recent
collective-bargaining agreement was effective from March 1,
1990, to February 28, 1993, and was subsequently extended
to March 8, 1993. Respondent’s president and majority
stockholder who owns 17,000 shares of stock is Richard
Proetz. Proetz’ daughter, Carla O’Brien, is corporate vice
president and owns one share of stock. On Thursday, April
29, 1993, after the parties were unsuccessful in reaching a
collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent presented its
final proposal to the Union. Union representatives advised
they would present the proposal to the employees, but in-
formed the Respondent they did not believe the employees
would accept the proposal and that they could go on strike.
The final proposal was presented by the Union to the em-
ployees at a meeting held in O’Brien’s office on the same
afternoon of April 29 and was rejected by the employees
who also voted to go on strike. Respondent was not informed
of either the rejection of its proposal or the outcome of the
strike vote. At the time there were four full-time employees
and one part-time employee in the unit.
On Monday, May 3, O’Brien arrived at the Respondent’s
facility at 8 a.m., as usual, unaware that the employees had
decided to strike. On her arrival she saw employee and bar-
gaining unit member Linda Foreman who normally met her
and helped out on the parts counter until the regular parts
counter employees, Ray Fehrman and Ray Cattaneo, arrived
at 9 a.m. to assume their duties. James Littlejohn was a part-
time driver and helper who sometimes helped at the parts
counter. Foreman’s work primarily consisted of checking in
and inventorying new parts received. She also worked in the
office processing billing of customers, mixed paint, and oc-
casionally drove the delivery vehicle to deliver parts.
Fehrman was the senior employee of all employees and
worked primarily as a counterman as did Cattaneo, who also
dispatched the delivery truck as required. Shortly after open-
ing up that morning, O’Brien noticed that Foreman had not
followed her in and upon looking outside, she discovered
that Foreman was walking in front of the building carrying
a picket sign which was her first awareness that the employ-
ees were on strike. She immediately called her father, Rich-
ard Proetz, and told him to get there as soon as he could to
help her. She also contacted her brother-in-law, Glen Curtis,
who had previously worked for Respondent as a counterman,
but who then had a full-time job elsewhere and asked him
to give her as much help as he could. Curtis who worked
full time at another job on the night shift agreed to work 3
days a week. He eventually cut this back to 1 day as he was
unable to carry the load of 3 days in addition to his full-time
employment. She also called her son Richard Sigmund and
her daughter Carol Sigmund, who had both worked pre-
viously for Respondent. At the same time Richard Sigmund
was employed full time elsewhere. He agreed to come in
part-time and eventually quit his other job and became full-
time until he quit to take another job in October. O’Brien’s
daughter, Carol Sigmund, was working less than full-time at
another job and agreed to come in 3 days per week. She
eventually became full-time, but then reduced her hours to
1 day a week when she obtained another full-time job. Nei-
ther Richard nor Carol Sigmund was experienced at counter
work and they were used primarily to do stock work and
make deliveries in the case of Richard Sigmund and to help
in the office and check in parts in the case of Carol Sig-
mund. Respondent also hired three full-time counterpersons
in May to replace the full-time counterpersons. They were
Chris Buehre, a friend of Richard Sigmund, David Bruce
Millenger who had been laid off from his job at Philco Auto-
motive where he had sold auto parts to Respondent, and Don
Bushdiecker who had previous auto parts experience. She
also hired David Sparks as a full-time delivery man. She had
previously interviewed Sparks the preceding Thursday as a
possible replacement to part-time delivery man Daryl Ander-
son who she had planned to terminate. Anderson quit his em-
ployment at the end of the day of the strike. Sparks was un-
able to start on May 3, because of problems with his auto-
mobile, but started on the next day on May 4. In addition
Richard Tash was hired for 8 hours per week to receive parts
off site as trucks would not deliver to Respondent as a result
of the Union’s picket line. The General Counsel produced
evidence which showed that after the advent of the strike Re-
spondent’s sales and purchases were significantly reduced.
Thus while Respondent had sales of $87,761.96 in April
1993, in May 1993 it had sales of $62,827.76 as compared
to sales of $66,969.61 in May 1992. In June 1993 it had
sales of $63,312.88 as compared to $80,578.43 in June 1992.
In July 1993 it had sales of $62,838.48 as compared to sales
of $82,035.75 in July 1992. In August 1993 it had sales of
$66,572.22 as compared to sales of $81,468.59 in August
1992. In September 1993 it had sales of $65,882.57 as com-
pared to sales of $82,501.99 in September 1992. Correspond-
ingly Respondent’s purchases were reduced significantly
after the advent of the strike. Whereas in April 1993 Re-
spondent made purchases of $59,014.81, in May 1993 Re-
spondent made purchases of $46,402.63 as compared to pur-
chases of $66,281.79 in May 1992. In June 1993 Respondent
made purchases of $34,941.66 as compared to $48,484.94 in
June 1992. In July 1993 Respondent made purchases of
$49,207.22 as compared to purchases of $55,301.94 in July
1992. In August 1993 it made purchases of $54,347.81 as
719ST. LOUIS AUTO PARTS CO.
compared to purchases of $58,669.78 in August 1992. In
September 1993 it made purchases of $40,036.63 as com-
pared to purchases of $62,388.12 in September 1992. From
these figures and the elimination of the Sunday store hours,
the General Counsel argues that there should been no in-
crease in the number of employees as occurred in this case
as with the significantly reduced sales and purchases and
fewer hours of operation there should have been less work
to perform. The General Counsel also relies on the
unrebutted testimony of employees Linda Foreman and
Fehrman that they and other employees worked very little
overtime prior to the strike. Additionally, Ray Fehrman testi-
fied that his work as a counterman was easily learned and
could be learned in 2 weeks. He did acknowledge on cross-
examination, however, that a new employee could not do the
job as fast as he could because of his long-time experience
of 9 years as a counterman. Linda Foreman testified also that
the work of mixing paint and inventory and office work were
also easily learned (i.e., paint mixing could be learned in 2
hours). The General Counsel also points to the
uncontroverted evidence that all but two of the replacement
employees were experienced and had worked for Respondent
before. From the foregoing, the General Counsel contends
that the Respondent hired excess employees to pack the bar-
gaining unit in order to rid itself of the Union as it ultimately
withdrew recognition from the Union on the basis of a peti-
tion sponsored by Richard Sigmund.
The Respondent countered through the testimony of Carla
O’Brien that the replacement employees were hired and nec-
essary in order to keep the business going. Her brother-in-
law who had worked for Respondent several years prior
thereto was employed full time elsewhere and was only able
to work 3 days a week which he eventually reduced to 1 day
per week because of the workload of his full-time job. His
daughter initially only worked part-time, later became full-
time and subsequently obtained another full-time job else-
where. O’Brien testified further that it takes months rather
than weeks to learn how to be an effective counterperson.
There are over 2000 parts stocked and several suppliers from
whom to purchase. It is necessary to purchase from the least
expensive supplier first and the most expensive only as a last
resort. The counterperson must know the suppliers and which
one to go to in order of their cost and availability of parts.
In addition, when regular purchasers of parts such as auto
mechanic shops call, they expect the counterperson to recog-
nize their voice. In addition the parts are listed in the com-
puter and the counterperson must be knowledgeable concern-
ing its operations and the various code and stock numbers.
As she hired replacement employees O’Brien and Proetz
were required to work alongside them to train them. Al-
though the total number of employees replaced was small,
they represented the entire work force.
A. The Alleged Packing of the Unit
Analysis
I find the General Counsel has failed to prove that the Re-
spondent engaged in unlawful packing of the unit. Assuming
arguendo that the General Counsel presented a prima facie
case of this violation, I am persuaded by the countervailing
evidence and arguments presented by the Respondent and
find that the prima facie case of a violation has been rebutted
by the preponderance of the evidence. Initially, I credit the
testimony of O’Brien that although she had been told by the
Union that the employees might strike, on the Thursday prior
to the strike, I also credit her testimony that she had not been
apprised of the outcome of the strike vote and was unaware
of the eminence of the strike until she observed Foreman
picketing in front of the store the following Monday morn-
ing. I also credit her testimony that at that point she called
her father, Richard Proetz, and subsequently her son, her
daughter, her brother-in-law, and others who she was able to
obtain in order to operate the business. I credit her testimony
that Sparks was hired as a full-time employee to replace part-
time driver Anderson as Sparks had expressed a preference
for full-time employment and subscribe no unlawful motiva-
tion to this decision. I also credit the testimony of O’Brien
that several employees (ultimately eight consisting of full-
time and part-time employees) were hired in order to keep
the business in operation and that a greater number of em-
ployees were required to handle the work than the four full-
time employees who went on strike and part-time driver An-
derson who quit on the day of the strike. I credit the testi-
mony of O’Brien that more employees were required to oper-
ate the business as a result of loss of the long-time experi-
enced employees by reason of the strike, particularly the
countermen who by reason of their experience could work
significantly faster than the new hires because of their greater
familiarity with the parts and the optimum suppliers from
whom to purchase to obtain the better prices, and with the
regular customers who called for parts. I do not find that the
decline in sales and purchases after the advent of the strike
compels the conclusion that an excessive number of replace-
ment employees were hired to pack the unit for purposes of
decertifying the Union. Rather, I am convinced that the Re-
spondent was scrambling to operate its business and to over-
come the loss of the experienced employees as a result of
the strike by hiring sufficient personnel to operate and serve
its customers. Accordingly, I shall recommend the dismissal
of this allegation.
B. The Interrogation of David Sparks
Analysis
Sparks testified that at the time of his interview by
O’Brien on the Friday preceding the strike the following con-
versation occurred:
O’Brien: We are Union. There are fees, does that
bother you?
Sparks: No.
O’Brien: There may be a possibility that certain peo-
ple may go on strike. If so, would you stay or would
you go?
Sparks: I would stay.
I credit Sparks’ testimony in this regard which stands
unrebutted on the record as O’Brien was not questioned con-
cerning it although she was called to testify by both the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Respondent. I find that O’Brien’s in-
quiry of Sparks as to whether he would stay if the employees
went on strike constituted unlawful interrogation concerning
Sparks’ union sentiments with the implied threat that Sparks
would not be hired if he answered that he would not stay
720 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 Respondent has also asserted that Ray Fehrman is a supervisor
and is not protected by the Act. Based on the evidence presented
at this hearing I find that Fehrman is a rank-and-file employee ac-
corded the full protection of the Act and is not a supervisor as con-
tended by Respondent. Fehrman has been a long-time bargaining
unit member and had the longest tenure of any of the bargaining unit
employees. He had never disciplined an employee, had never hired
an employee, and was in charge of the store only for brief periods
when Proetz and O’Brien went to lunch and for limited vacations
or business absence by both Proetz and O’Brien. I find he was at
most an experienced employee utilized as a leadman, but with no
supervisory duties.
if the employees went on strike. This was not a situation
where a strike was ongoing. Although O’Brien had been ad-
vised that the employees might strike, she testified she was
unaware of the outcome of the strike vote. By said interroga-
tion Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is
clear that such interrogation was inherently coercive because
of its tendency to coerce by the implication that Sparks
would not be hired if he answered that he would not stay
if the employees went on strike. Sparks’ subjective reaction
to the interrogation is not determinative here. Rather it is the
tendency of the interrogation to be coercive rather that its ac-
tual effect which determines the violation. See Challenge-
Cooke Bros., 288 NLRB 287, 396, 397 (1988); Freemont
Food, 289 NLRB 1790 (1988); International Metal Co., 286
NLRB 1106, 1109 (1987). I further find that the inquiry as
to whether the unionized status of the employees and the
possibility of union fees bothered Sparks was also violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as it was inquiring into his
union sentiments or sympathies and was thus inherently coer-
cive in the context of a job interview as the clear implication
of said questioning was that if Sparks was bothered by the
unionized status of the employees or the payment of union
fees, that he might not be hired. O’Brien’s subjective intent
in asking the question or Spark’s subjective reaction to it are
not determinative here. Rather it is the coercive tendency of
the inquiry which determines this violation also, see Chal-
lenge-Cooke Bros., supra at 396.
C. The Removal of the Picket Signs
It is undisputed that Respondent’s owner and president
Richard Proetz removed the employees picket sign from a
utility pole and attempted to remove another from a traffic
signal near his business and called the police to enforce their
removal from the aforesaid public property. There is a dis-
pute between the version given by witnesses Ray Fehrman
and Linda Foreman on this as opposed to the version given
by Proetz as to whether the signs were removed over a 2-
day period or 1 day, but there is no dispute that Proetz at
least attempted to remove one of the signs and threatened to
remove the signs and to call the police if any more were put
up on public property and did call the police who arrived
shortly thereafter and told Fehrman and Foreman that the
signs could not be put on public property. Proetz testified
without rebuttal that there were signs on the striking employ-
ees’ cars parked in front of the premises and that he took
no action to remove them, Proetz testified he objected to the
placement of signs on public property as they bore his Com-
pany’s name. The signs did in fact bear his Company’s
name, but did not purport to be put up on behalf of or spon-
sored by Respondent. Proetz testified that his concern was
prompted by an incident wherein a tenant of his at another
property had put up a sign and he (Proetz) was contacted by
the police and ordered to remove it. The General Counsel
contends that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by these actions as they interfered with the Section 7
rights of the employees to post picket signs protesting the
labor dispute and in support of the striking employees. The
General Counsel contends that notwithstanding the alleged il-
legality of the placement of the picket signs on public prop-
erty of the utility company and the city, that the actions of
Proetz interfered with the Section 7 rights of the employees.
The General Counsel further contends that his fears were un-
founded and unreasonable as the signs do not purport to be
sponsored by the Respondent. The Respondent, on the other
hand, contends that the placement of the signs on a traffic
light and utility pole was illegal and Proetz had a right to
remove them and telephone the police in order to ensure that
they were removed. The Respondent argues further that the
actions of Proetz were not motivated by any unlawful pur-
pose or intent which intent it contends is an essential element
of the violations.
Analysis
I credit the versions testified to by Foreman and Fehrman
concerning this matter that the incident occurred over only
a 1-day period. Under either version, however, the removal
and causing of the removal of the picket signs by Respond-
ent’s owner, Proetz, was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Whatever his subjective intent was in doing so, Re-
spondent’s conduct impermissibly interfered with the Section
7 rights of the employees to place picket signs in support of
the strike. Although the utility company or the city or its po-
lice may have had just cause to remove the signs, the Re-
spondent did not. Muncy Corp., 211 NLRB 263, 272 (1974).
D. The Withdrawal of Recognition and the Refusal
to Bargain
Both David Sparks and Richard Sigmund testified that
they initiated the circulation of the petition to decertify the
Union on May 20. Sparks testified he was motivated by his
fear that he would be terminated once the strike was over al-
though no one had told him this. Both Sparks and Richard
Sigmund testified they were also motivated by the conduct
of Ray Fehrman2—who verbally abused Sparks on numerous
occasions by calling him such names as ‘‘scab,’’
‘‘motherfucker,’’ asshole, prick, and the like and who be-
rated Sparks to Sparks’ fiancee on an occasion when she vis-
ited Sparks at the store. Richard Sigmund also testified that
Fehrman always seemed to be in the immediate vicinity smil-
ing or making comments when a variety of incidents oc-
curred concerning the employees’ automobiles, such as the
tires being deflated and an automobile being scratched, al-
though he acknowledged he did not actually see Fehrman do
any of these things. Sparks testified he learned of the process
of filing a decertification petition from a friend who worked
at another company where a decertification petition drive had
caused the decertification of a union. The petition was pre-
pared by Sparks and Richard Sigmund who typed it up in
Respondent’s office using Respondent’s records to obtain the
names of the employees. Sigmund testified he has access to
the office and did not ask for permission to do so. The May
20 petition was signed by Sparks, Christopher Buehre, Carol
721ST. LOUIS AUTO PARTS CO.
3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
Sigmund, Donald Bushdiecker, and David Millinger and was
filed with Region 14 of the Board by Sparks on May 21.
Richard Sigmund did not sign the petition as he feared it
might not be appropriate for him to do so because of his re-
lationship to his mother Carla O’Brien who is corporate vice
president and to his grandfather Richard Proetz who is presi-
dent and owner of Respondent. O’Brien owns 1 share of
stock whereas Proetz owns 16,000 to 17,000 shares of stock
and is the majority shareholder.
On July 13, Sparks and Sigmund prepared an addendum
to the May 20 petition and secured the additional signatures
of Richard Sigmund, Richard Tash, and Glenn Curtis. Sig-
mund testified that on further consideration he signed the ad-
dendum because he was an employee and held no special
status which should prevent him from doing so. A copy of
this addendum was given to O’Brien, on July 13, who had
been previously given a copy of the May 20 petition. On the
basis of these two documents, Respondent withdrew recogni-
tion and canceled a meeting with the Union scheduled for
that night and has since refused to bargain with the Union.
Analysis
I find that Respondent did not violate the Act by its with-
drawal of recognition from and refusal to bargain with the
Union. I credit the testimony of Sparks and Richard Sigmund
that the petition to decertify the Union was initiated by
Sparks with assistance from Sigmund. Although Sigmund is
the son of minority shareholder Carla O’Brien and the grand-
son of majority shareholder Richard Proetz, there was no evi-
dence that he received special treatment or had any special
status as on employee or held any supervisory position or
confidential position. Moreover, he is independent and does
not reside in the same household as his mother. Rather, the
evidence was that he was employed as a rank-and-file em-
ployee. The sole evidence presented that might tend to sup-
port special status was Sigmund’s use of the employees’ files
in the office in order to obtain information for the prepara-
tion of the petition. However, Sigmund testified that neither
O’Brien nor Proetz was aware of this use of this information
and he had not asked permission to do so. I find that this
evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that Sig-
mund was accorded special status. I note also the unrebutted
testimony of O’Brien that when the Union met with the em-
ployees for a vote on the contract and ultimately a strike
vote, that they met in the Respondent’s office without the
presence of management representatives which is indicative
of a rather liberal right of access accorded employees to the
office. As I have recommended the dismissal of the unit
packing allegation, I find that there was no evidence of any
effort to pack the unit in order to remove the Union as col-
lective-bargaining representative. With the exception of the
isolated instances of the unlawful interrogation of Sparks
during his interview and the removal of the picket signs by
Proetz, there were no other unfair labor practices committed
as I have recommended the dismissal of the unit packing al-
legation. Thus although I have found two instances of viola-
tions of the Act in this case, I find that they were isolated
events and that they did not contribute in any manner to the
circulation of the petition. Under these circumstances, I shall
recommend the dismissal of this allegation also.
I find that in this case the Respondent had a reasonable
doubt of the Union’s majority based on the petition and the
addendum thereto which was thus based on objective consid-
erations and that the unfair labor practices found herein were
not of such a character as to either affect the Union’s status,
cause employee disaffection, or improperly affect the bar-
gaining relationship, itself. Guerdon Industries, 218 NLRB
658, 661 (1975); see also Sullivan Industries v. NLRB, 957
F.2d 890, 897–899. (D.C. Cir. 1992).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Slapco, Inc., d/b/a St. Louis Auto Parts Co. is an em-
ployer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Automotive, Petroleum and Allied Industries Employees
Union, Local 618 affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its
interrogation of then applicant for employment David Sparks
concerning his union sympathies and whether he would be
willing to cross a picket line in the event that Respondent’s
employees went on strike.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by re-
moving union picket signs in support of its employees strike
and causing them to be removed from public property.
5. Respondent did not engage in unlawful hiring of em-
ployees in order to pack the unit to remove the Union as ex-
clusive collective-bargaining agent of its employees.
6. Respondent did not violate the Act by its withdrawal of
recognition and refusal to bargain with the Union based on
petitions gathered indicating a lack of support for the Union
by a majority of its employees.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices, as found herein in
conjunction with the status of the employer as found above,
constitute unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act, it
shall be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action, including the posting of an appro-
priate notice designed to effectuate the policies and purposes
of the Act and the mailing of a copy thereof to each of the
striking employees at their home address.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, Slapco, Inc., d/b/a St. Louis Auto Parts
Co., St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating job applicants concerning their union
sympathies and whether they will cross a picket line to work
in case of a strike by Respondent’s employees.
(b) Removing or causing to be removed union picket signs
of its striking employees placed on public property.
722 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its place of business at St. Louis, Missouri, the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix’’4 and mail a copy of
said notice to each of the employees who went on strike in
May 1993. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. A copy of the notice shall be mailed to each
of the striking employees at their home address.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
The complaint is otherwise dismissed with respect to all
other alleged violations not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY THE ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid and protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate applicants for employment con-
cerning their union sympathies or whether they will cross a
picket line and work in the event of a strike by our employ-
ees.
WE WILL NOT remove or cause to be removed union pick-
et signs in support of a strike by our employees which are
placed on public property.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL mail a copy of this notice to each of our em-
ployees who went on strike in May 1993 at their home ad-
dresses.
Our employees have the right to join and support Auto-
motive, Petroleum and Allied Industries Employees Union,
Local 618 affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL–CIO or to refrain from doing so.
SLAPCO, INC., D/B/A ST. LOUIS AUTO PARTS CO.