Squaw Valley Develop-ment Company

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 23, 2006

No. 76511145re (T.T.A.B. May. 23, 2006)

Mailed:
May 23, 2006

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Squaw Valley Development Company
________

Serial Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
_______

Virginia R. Richard, Lana C. Marina, and Matthew A. Pater
of Winston & Strawn LLP for Squaw Valley Development
Company.

Michael Baird, Senior Examining Attorney, Law Office 116
(M. L. Hershkowitz, Managing Attorney).

NOTICE OF CORRECTION

By the Board:
On May 18, 2006, the Board mailed a final decision in
connection with this appeal.
Page 52 of the decision incorrectly states that the
request for reconsideration is granted to the extent that
the refusal to register under Section 2(a) is affirmed for
both applications in International Classes 24 and 35, rather
than in International Classes 25 and 35. In view thereof,
page 52 of the decision is hereby corrected to indicate that
the request for reconsideration is granted to the extent
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
ii
that the refusal to register under Section 2(a) is affirmed
for both applications in International Classes 25 and 35.
A corrected copy of the Board’s final decision is
attached.
Applicant's time for filing an appeal or commencing a
civil action regarding the Board’s decision will run from
the mailing date of this notice of correction. See
Trademark Rule 2.145(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. §2.145(d)(1).
-o0o-

Mailed:
May 23, 2006

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Squaw Valley Development Company
________

Serial Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
_______

Virginia R. Richard, Lana C. Marina, and Matthew A. Pater
of Winston & Strawn LLP for Squaw Valley Development
Company.

Michael Baird, Senior Examining Attorney, Law Office 116
(M. L. Hershkowitz, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Seeherman,1 Quinn and Zervas, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Request for Reconsideration

A. Background

On October 25, 2005, the examining attorney, citing In
re Ferrero S.p.A., 24 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1992), requested
reconsideration of the Board’s September 26, 2005 decision

1 Judge Seeherman has been substituted for Judge Chapman, who
participated in the Board’s September 26, 2005 decision and who
has since retired from government service.
THIS OPINION IS
CITABLE AS
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
2
in connection with this appeal. Squaw Valley Development
Company (“applicant”) filed a response on
November 14, 2005.
Our September 26, 2005 decision reversed the trademark
examining attorney's refusal to register the marks SQUAW
and SQUAW ONE2 (both in standard character form) on the
Principal Register, both for the following goods and
services:
“men's, women's and children's clothing and
accessories, namely, jackets, sweatshirts,
sweaters, shirts, pants, bathrobes, t-shirts,
gloves, head bands, vests, hats” in International
Class 25;

“skis, ski poles, ski bindings, ski tuning kits
comprised of waxes and adjustment tools, ski
equipment, namely, power cords” in International
Class 28; and

“retail store services in the field of sporting
goods and equipment, apparel for men, women and
children, footwear, headgear and related goods
and services” in International Class 35.

The examining attorney had refused registration of the
marks which are the subject of both applications under
Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), on
the grounds that each mark “consists of or comprises matter

2 Application Serial Nos. 76511144 for SQUAW and 76511145 for
SQUAW ONE were both filed May 2, 2003. In both applications,
applicant claims first use and first use in commerce in 1949 for
the goods in International Class 25 and the services in
International Class 35, and first use and first use in commerce
in 1968 for the goods in International Class 28.
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
3
which may disparage American Indians or bring them into
contempt or disrepute.” Brief at p. 2.3
The Applicant
As stated in our September 26, 2005 decision,
applicant maintains that it is the “world famous resort,
the home of the 1960 Winter Olympic Games” located in
California; owner of the www.squaw.com Internet domain
name; and owner of the following registrations (which are
of record herein):
Registration No. 670261 for the mark SQUAW VALLEY
for “women's, men's, girls', and boys' jackets,
pants, and sweaters”; and

Registration No. 1628589 for SQUAW VALLEY USA
for, inter alia, “hotel, restaurant and lounge
services; providing recreational facilities for
and instructions in skiing, golf, tennis,
swimming, operating a ski lift, aerobics and
other forms of exercise; real estate management;
and bus and transportation services.”

Applicant also maintains that “the primary significance of
Applicant's mark SQUAW, as used in connection with
Applicant's goods and services, is a shorthand reference to
Applicant's world famous resort, SQUAW VALLEY,” and the
primary significance of SQUAW ONE is the name of one of

3 Because applicant filed appeal briefs in both the SQUAW and
SQUAW ONE applications, unless otherwise indicated, citations to
applicant's brief are to applicant's brief filed in the SQUAW
application.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
4
applicant's ski lifts. Brief at p. 6; SQUAW ONE brief at
p. 6.
The Board’s September 26, 2005 Decision
The Board, in its September 26, 2005 decision,
reversed the examining attorney’s refusal to register each
mark for each International Class of goods and services.
The Board applied the two-part test set forth in Harjo v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1705, 1740 - 1741 (TTAB 1999)
(“Harjo I”), rev’d on other grounds, 284 F. Supp.2d 96, 68
USPQ2d 1225 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded, 415 F.3d 44, 75 USPQ2d
1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and later followed in Order Sons of
Italy in America v. The Memphis Mafia, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1364
(TTAB 1999), to determine whether the marks which are the
subject of this appeal are disparaging under Section 2(a):
(1) what is the likely meaning of the matter in
question, taking into account not only dictionary
definitions, but also the relationship of the
matter to the other elements in the mark, the
nature of the goods or services, and the manner
in which the mark is used in the marketplace in
connection with the goods or services; and

(2) if that meaning is found to refer to
identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or
national symbols, whether that meaning may be
disparaging to a substantial composite of the
referenced group.

The District Court in Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.
Supp.2d 96, 68 USPQ2d 1225 (D.D.C. 2003) (“Harjo II”),
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
5
remanded, 415 F.3d 44, 75 USPQ2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
found “no error” in this test for disparagement.
Under the first part of the test, the Board found that
the meaning of SQUAW and SQUAW ONE, when used in connection
with applicant's International Class 28 skiing-related
goods, is applicant’s Squaw Valley ski resort, and, when
used in connection with the International Class 25 goods
and the International Class 35 services, is “not applicant
or its ski resort, but rather … the dictionary definition
of SQUAW, i.e., an American Indian woman or wife.”
Decision at pp. 19 - 20. In view of the Board’s finding
regarding the International Class 25 goods and
International Class 35 services, the Board went on to
consider whether this meaning may be disparaging to a
substantial composite of Native Americans under the second
part of the two-part Harjo I test. The Board found as
follows:
[T]here is no evidence in the record that a
substantial composite of Native Americans find
applicant’s use of its marks on its identified
goods and services disparaging. The statements
attributed to Native Americans and Native
American groups do not address applicant's mark
as used on its goods and services. Further, the
fact that several states have taken the drastic
step of renaming geographic sites to names which
do not include the term “squaw” does not compel
the conclusion that applicant's marks as used on
applicant's goods and services are disparaging to
a substantial composite of Native Americans.
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
6
Both Harjo I and Harjo II require evidence that a
substantial composite of the referenced group
considers the use of the mark in connection with
the relevant goods or services to be disparaging.
Harjo I at 1747; and Harjo II at 1252 (“However,
the ultimate legal inquiry is whether the six
trademarks at issue may disparage Native
Americans when used in connection with Pro-
Football's services …. The ultimate legal
inquiry is not whether the term ‘redskin(s)’ is a
pejorative term for Native Americans.”)

The evidence submitted by the examining attorney
does not establish whether a substantial
composite of Native Americans finds applicant's
use of SQUAW in its marks on applicant's
identified goods and services to be disparaging.
The ultimate legal inquiry here is not whether
Native Americans find “squaw” a pejorative term
for Native American women. Decision at pp. 29-
30. (Emphasis in the original decision.)

Thus, the Board reversed the refusal to register SQUAW and
SQUAW ONE under Section 2(a) in each of the three
International Classes.
B. Request for Reconsideration
The purpose of a request for reconsideration is to
point out errors made by the Board in reaching its
decision, based on the evidence of record and the
prevailing authorities. It is not merely to allow either
the applicant or the examining attorney to reargue the
case. See TBMP §1219.01 (2d ed. rev. 2004), citing TBMP §§
543 and 544.
In the request for reconsideration, the examining
attorney maintains that the Board erred in arriving at its
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
7
September 26, 2005 decision. The examining attorney makes
the following three points in the request:
1. With respect to the goods and services in
International Classes 25 and 35, the examining
attorney asserts that the Board misapplied the
second part of the Harjo I test in requiring
evidence that the goods and services be considered
in finding the term is disparaging;

2. The examining attorney asserts that the Board
incorrectly applied an inter partes standard of
evidence to this ex parte appeal; and

3. With respect to the goods in International Class 28,
the examining attorney asserts that the Board did
not correctly analyze the evidence relating to the
first part of the Harjo I test.

Because these arguments are directed to errors of law and
are not entirely re-argument, we consider the substance of
the request for reconsideration.
1. With respect to the goods and services in
International Classes 25 and 35, the examining
attorney asserts that the Board misapplied the second
part of the Harjo I test in requiring evidence that
the goods and services be considered in finding the
term is disparaging.

The examining attorney maintains that the Board
“misapplied” the second prong of the Harjo I test in
finding that the examining attorney had not established
that a substantial composite of Native Americans find
disparaging applicant's use of SQUAW in its marks on the
identified International Class 25 goods and International
Class 35 services. The examining attorney states:
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
8
Nowhere in the second part of the test are goods
and services mentioned. The relationship of the
meaning of the term to the goods and services and
the context of the marketplace is only referred
to in the first part of the test. Because, as
the Board found, the matter at issue had no other
meaning for the relevant goods and services than
as a reference to Native American women and a
substantial composite of the targeted group finds
the term to be disparaging, the test for
determining disparagement was met. The Board
should have so decided. Instead, the Board
appears to have required a three prong test,
i.e., requiring that the examining attorney show
that the term has no other meaning in the context
of the goods and services and in the market place
but that of a term that targets a particular
group (part one of the Harjo I test); that the
examining attorney prove that the targeted group
finds the term disparaging (part two of the Harjo
I test) and then, as a third requirement, that
the examining attorney must establish that the
targeted group finds the use on Applicant's
specific goods and services to be disparaging.
(Request for reconsideration at unnumbered p. 5.)

The examining attorney characterizes the Board’s
decision as requiring evidence of “actual disparaging use”
and maintains that requiring “actual disparaging use” on
applicant's goods and services is “misplaced”;4 that “a
substantial composite of Native Americans believe the term
to [be] disparaging in any context”; that the “very

4 We did not state in our opinion that there must be evidence of
“actual disparaging use.” We stated, “[b]oth Harjo I and Harjo
II require evidence that a substantial composite of the reference
group considers the use of the mark in connection with the
relevant goods or services to be disparaging”; and that “there is
no evidence in the record that a substantial composite of Native
Americans finds applicant's use of its marks on its identified
goods and services disparaging.” Decision at pp. 29 - 30.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
9
existence of the term is disparaging”; and that
disparagement “may be inferred … from evidence regarding
the acceptability of the language or imagery used.”
Request for reconsideration at unnumbered pp. 10 – 12.
The examining attorney also argues that if examining
attorneys are required to show that the “targeted group”
finds the use on applicant's specific goods and services to
be disparaging, this requirement would eviscerate Section
2(a) as a basis for refusal of registration:
Clearly, a decision that requires the examining
attorney to prove that a substantial composite of
the … targeted group is disparaged when a
derogatory term is used on specific goods or
services would mean that the examining operation
would be unable to apply Section 2(a), a result
that Congress could not have contemplated. Given
the resources of the Office, an examining
attorney is highly unlikely to prove that a
targeted group is offended by use of a mark on
particular goods and services which may or may
not be in use, or if in use, may not be in use
for a substantial period of time or be in use in
an area where the targeted group may reside. As
written, the decision of the Board would seem to
indicate that if there is no proof that the
targeted group knows about the use of the
purported mark so as to be offended, any mark may
be registered. (Request for reconsideration at
unmarked p. 7. Emphasis in original.)

Applicant maintains that the examining attorney is
“wrong” in contending that the Harjo I test does not
require a showing that the marks at issue are disparaging
to a substantial composite of the referenced group if used
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
10
in connection with the goods and services set forth in the
applications. As support, applicant cites various passages
from the Board’s decision in Harjo I and from the District
Court’s opinion in Harjo II, maintaining that the District
Court “repeatedly faulted the Board for finding
disparagement in the absence of evidence that a substantial
composite of the referenced group found the mark
disparaging in connection with the identified goods and
services.” Response to request for reconsideration at p.
3. (Emphasis in original.) Further, applicant
characterizes the examining attorney’s arguments as asking
that the Board “adopt a ‘new’ test pursuant to which
disparagement would be determined in a vacuum without
reference to the goods or services involved or the
perceptions of the referenced group with respect to those
goods or services.” Id. at p. 4.
It has been long established that in the context of a
Section 2(a) ex parte refusal regarding scandalousness,
consideration must be given to the identified goods or
services. See In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 37
USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1938) (“Of course, the word 'Madonna'
is not per se scandalous. We do not understand that
appellant contends that a mark must be scandalous per se to
come within the prohibition of the statute. … It is
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
11
therefore obvious that, in determining whether a mark
‘consists of or comprises … scandalous matter,’
consideration ordinarily must be given to the goods upon
which the mark is used.”); and In re McGinley, 660 F.2d
481, 211 USPQ 668, 673 (CCPA 1981) (“In determining whether
appellant's mark may be refused registration as scandalous,
the mark must be considered in the context of the
marketplace as applied to only the goods or services
described in the application for registration.”).
The Board, too, has stated that the relevant goods or
services must be considered under Section 2(a). In Harjo
I, the Board cited In re Riverbank Canning Co., supra, and
stated, “[a]s with most trademark issues, including
scandalousness, the question of disparagement must be
considered in relation to the goods or services identified
by the mark in the context of the marketplace.” Harjo I,
50 USPQ2d at 1738. Harjo I involved claims by several
Native American plaintiffs that certain registrations of
the Washington Redskins professional football team for,
inter alia, marks containing or consisting of the term
REDSKINS were scandalous and disparaging to Native
Americans. The Board agreed with the plaintiffs that
several of the marks were disparaging, stating that
“petitioners have clearly established, by at least a
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
12
preponderance of the evidence, that, as of the dates the
challenged registrations issued, the word ‘redskin(s),’ as
it appears in respondent's marks in those registrations and
as used in connection with the identified services, may
disparage Native Americans, as perceived by a substantial
composite of Native Americans.” Id. at 1743.
Thereafter, Pro-Football, Inc. – the defendant in the
Board proceeding - commenced an action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia, seeking review of the
Board’s decision. The District Court in Harjo II concluded
“that the TTAB correctly stated the test for disparagement
and neither of the parties specifically dispute[d] this
approach.” Harjo II, 68 USPQ2d at 1247-1248.
Additionally, the District Court emphasized that, under the
second part of the Harjo I test, the question of
disparagement had to be considered in the context of the
involved goods or services. The District Court went on to
state:
To reach its conclusion that the trademarks may
disparage Native Americans, the TTAB essentially
determined that because the word “redskin(s)” may
be viewed by Native Americans as derogatory when
used as a reference for Native Americans, the
trademarks are disparaging because they use that
word. The result of this analysis is that there
is very little discussion of the use of the mark
in connection with Pro-Football's product or
services. … [I]n this case the TTAB did very
little analysis of how the use of the trademarks
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
13
in connection with Pro-Football's services
disparages Native Americans. The Board was
content with stating that because it found the
name to be pejorative, the marks must be
disparaging. Id. at 1254. (Emphasis in
original).

In commenting on the evidence considered by the Board
in connection with its evaluation of the second part of the
Harjo I test, the Court made clear that the goods and
services must be taken into account in making a
determination of whether a mark is disparaging, noting, in
connection with survey evidence, that “the survey is not
directly dispositive of the legal question before the TTAB
because it … did not test the participants’ view of the
term ‘redskin(s)’ in the context of Pro-Football’s
services ….” Harjo II, 68 USPQ2d at 1249. Similarly, with
respect to the historical evidence before the Board, the
Court said that “the ultimate legal inquiry is whether the
six trademarks at issue may disparage Native Americans when
used in connection with Pro-Football's services and during
the relevant time frame. The ultimate legal inquiry is not
whether the term ‘redskin(s)’ is a pejorative term for
Native Americans.” Id. at 1252.5 The District Court also

5 The Board quoted this statement in arriving at its
September 26, 2005 decision. According to the examining
attorney, “the Board utilized this quote to support its
conclusion out of context and in an inapposite manner,” because
the Board omitted the wording “during the relevant time frame” in
its quotation. The examining attorney argues:
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
14
commented generally on the factual findings made by the
Board, stating, “[n]one of the findings of fact made by the
TTAB tend to prove or disprove that the marks at issue ‘may
disparage’ Native Americans, during the relevant time
frame, especially when used in the context of Pro-
Football’s entertainment services.” Id. at 1249.
It is clear from the foregoing that the second part of
the test for disparagement requires consideration of
whether the term would be considered disparaging as the
term is used in connection with the identified goods or
services. Hence, we reject the examining attorney’s
contention that the Board did not apply the proper test in
our September 26, 2005 decision and/or has applied “a three
prong test.”

The missing terminology … is especially important
because the Harjo case involved a cancellation
proceeding and the issue before the Board and the
Court was whether there was substantial evidence to
show that the mark in question had a meaning in
relation to Pro-Football services that was disparaging
to Native Americans as of 1967 and not at the time of
the cancellation proceeding. Request for
reconsideration at unnumbered p. 6.

This argument has no bearing on, and does not dictate a different
result in, this appeal. Of course, the relevant time frame here
is the present, since this proceeding is an ex parte appeal, not
a cancellation proceeding, when the issue date of the
registration would be the relevant time period.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
15
2. The examining attorney asserts that the Board
should apply different standards of proof in ex parte
and inter partes proceedings.

As a second argument in favor of reconsideration, the
examining attorney submits that there is a different
standard of proof in an ex parte proceeding such as this
one and an inter partes cancellation proceeding such as
Harjo I. The examining attorney maintains that “[t]he
Board has consistently found that, in order to support a
refusal to register, the examining attorney need only make
a prima facie case”; that “the evidentiary burden then
shifts to Applicant to rebut the examining attorney’s
finding”; and that “[i]n this case, the examining attorney
has … made a substantial prima facie case.” Request for
reconsideration at unnumbered pp. 8 – 9.
Applicant, in response, maintains that “[t]he
Examining Attorney failed to offer any evidence whatsoever
concerning the views of the referenced group with respect
to use of the applied-for marks in connection with the
goods and services identified in the Application.”
Response at p. 4.
Of course, the examining attorney has the burden of
proving that a trademark falls within a prohibition of
Section 2(a). See In re Standard Elektrik Lorenz
Aktiengesellschaft, 371 F.2d 870, 152 USPQ 563, 566 (CCPA
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
16
1967). See also In re Wilcher Corp., 40 USPQ2d 1929, 1934
(TTAB 1996) (evidence of record established prima facie
that the mark would be offensive under Section 2(a) to the
conscience or moral feelings of a substantial composite of
the general public).
Once the USPTO sets forth a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with
evidence to rebut the prima facie case with “competent
evidence.” See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009,
1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re R. M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d
1482, 222 USPQ 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Teledyne
Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 986, 217 USPQ 9, 11 (Fed. Cir.
1982).
The Federal Circuit, our primary reviewing court, has
commented on the evidentiary burden of the examining
attorney and the limited ability of the examining attorney
to gather evidence in support of a refusal. In In re Budge
Mfg., Inc., 857 F.2d 773, 8 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
the Federal Circuit considered whether LOVEE LAMB is
deceptive when used for “automobile seat covers.” The
Federal Circuit stated:
In ex parte prosecution, the burden is initially
on the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to put
forth sufficient evidence that the mark for which
registration is sought meets the … criteria of
unregistrability. Mindful that the PTO has
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
17
limited facilities for acquiring evidence--it
cannot, for example, be expected to conduct a
survey of the marketplace or obtain consumer
affidavits -- we conclude that the evidence of
record here is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of deceptiveness. Id. at 1260-1261.

Similarly, in In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d
764, 226 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the Federal Circuit
considered whether the use of “Durango” for tobacco was
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive under
Section 2(e)(2) [currently, Section 2(e)(3)]. The
applicant argued that the USPTO failed to make a prima
facie case that there was a goods/place association between
tobacco and the geographic name “Durango” because the USPTO
produced no evidence that the public would actually make
the asserted association. The Federal Circuit disagreed
that the USPTO, as part of its prima facie case, must
establish an actual goods/place association, reasoning that
the examining attorney “does not have means” to undertake
the research, such as a marketing survey, necessary to
prove that the public would actually make the goods/place
association asserted. The Federal Circuit consequently
required the USPTO only to establish “a reasonable
predicate for its conclusion that the public would be
likely to make the particular goods/place association on
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
18
which it relies,” and not that the public would actually
make the asserted association. Id. at 868.
Also, in In re Pacer Technology, 338 F.3d 1348, 67
USPQ2d 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a case involving the
configuration of a container cap for adhesives and bonding
agents, the Federal Circuit found that to establish a prima
facie case of no inherent distinctiveness (which rested on
whether the public in the relevant market would view the
applicant’s cap as a source-identifier), the USPTO was not
required to show that other caps were actually being
advertised, sold or used in the relevant market, but that
evidence of the existence of other design patents for
container caps was sufficient. The Federal Circuit
acknowledged that it was “mindful of the reality that the
PTO is an agency of limited resources” and stated that “we
look only for substantial evidence, or more than a
scintilla of evidence, in support of the PTO’s prima facie
case.” Id. at 1632. See also In re The Boulevard
Entertainment, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 67 USPQ2d 1475, 1478
(Fed. Cir. 2003), where the Federal Circuit, in the context
of an ex parte Section 2(a) case, stated that “although
other evidence, such as consumer surveys, would no doubt be
instructive,” the USPTO’s finding that a mark comprises or
consists of scandalous matter pursuant to Section 2(a) “is
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
19
not legally insufficient because of the absence of such
evidence.”
In our September 26, 2005 decision, we found that
“there is no evidence in the record that a substantial
composite of Native Americans find applicant's use of its
marks on its identified goods and services disparaging.”
Decision at p. 29. We did not consider whether the
evidence that was of record was sufficient to satisfy the
examining attorney’s burden of showing that a substantial
composite of Native Americans find applicant's use of SQUAW
in its marks on applicant's identified goods and services
to be disparaging under the standard of proof approved by
the Federal Circuit in ex parte cases. In other words,
even though there was no direct evidence that a substantial
composite of Native Americans find applicant's use of SQUAW
in its marks on the identified goods and services to be
disparaging, we did not consider whether the examining
attorney met the Office’s burden under the second prong of
the Harjo I test by extrapolating from the evidence of
record that a substantial composite of Native Americans
find applicant's use of SQUAW in its marks on the
identified goods and services to be disparaging. Thus, we
now reconsider – applying the appropriate standard of proof
for an ex parte case - whether the evidence of record
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
20
submitted by the examining attorney is sufficient to
establish prima facie that a substantial composite of
Native Americans find applicant's use of its marks in
connection with its goods and services disparaging and, if
so, whether applicant has rebutted the examining attorney’s
prima facie case. Because the examining attorney’s
arguments regarding the standard of proof are only directed
to the Board’s conclusions regarding applicant’s goods and
services in International Classes 25 and 35, we reconsider
our decision in this respect in connection with these
classes of the application.
a. Did the examining attorney establish a prima
facie case of disparagement with respect to
applicant’s International Class 25 and 35 goods
and services?

As stated above, our September 26, 2005 decision
resolved the first prong of the Harjo I test regarding the
meaning of SQUAW and SQUAW ONE in the Office’s favor in
connection with the International Class 25 goods and
International Class 35 services, namely, that in these
marks, SQUAW conveys the dictionary definition of SQUAW as
an American Indian woman or wife. The Board arrived at its
conclusion despite the higher evidentiary burden we placed
on the Office when we rendered that decision. Because the
examining attorney has met the Office’s burden under the
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
21
higher evidentiary standard, the examining attorney has a
priori met the Office’s burden under the standard we have
now articulated. We hence do not revisit our findings with
respect to the first prong of the Harjo I test.
The evidence submitted by the examining attorney which
is relevant to our consideration of the second prong of the
Harjo I test, i.e., whether the meaning of SQUAW and SQUAW
ONE is disparaging to a substantial composite of Native
Americans, includes the following:6
1. Excerpted stories retrieved from the Nexis
database with statements from American Indian groups and
individual American Indians regarding the offensiveness of
the term “squaw,” e.g.:

Indian Country Today, January 28, 2004
The term [squaw] is degrading and racist," said
Fort Mojave Chairperson Nora McDowell, among
Arizona Indian leaders speaking on Indian Nations
and Tribes Legislative Day. McDowell refused
even to say the word in her address to the state
legislature. "I'm not going to say it because it
is offensive to us as Native American women,"
said McDowell, president of the Intertribal
Council of Arizona. … "Damaging and offensive,"
is how [Hopi Indian Chairman Wayne Taylor, Jr.]
described the word "squaw" … Rep. Jack Jackson
Jr., D-Window Rock, described the bill he has
presented, H.B. 2500, which prohibits places in
Arizona from being named "Squaw" ….

6 The examining attorney relied on this evidence in contending
that the meaning of “squaw” is a Native American woman under the
first part of the Harjo I test. As further discussed below, the
examining attorney considers the evidence of record as
establishing that Native Americans consider “squaw” disparaging
in any context and thus the Office need not provide specific
evidence that Native Americans consider “squaw” disparaging with
respect to applicant's mark as used in connection with the
applied-for goods and services.
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
22

The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 2, 2003
BYLINE: Tim Giago; Giago, an Oglala Lakota
[Indian, writes] … [I]t doesn't matter what the
word "squaw" means. It is how the word
transformed its meaning from the early settler
days. Any white man married to or living with an
Indian woman was known as a "Squawman." When
white men went looking for sex they went "squaw
hunting." If any white person living in Phoenix
or any other part of the United States wants to
know if the word "squaw" is offensive to Indian
women there is one sure way to find out. The
next time you see several Indian women gathered
together just walk up to them and call them
squaws. If you get away without having one hair
on your head mussed up, you may consider yourself
fortunate. It does not matter whether all of the
white people in Phoenix believe "Squaw Peak" is
an OK name. If just one Indian woman finds it
offensive then that alone is reason enough to
change the name.

The Lewiston Morning Tribune, February 11, 2003
Four [of the] 93 Idaho place names with the word
"squaw" in their names were officially changed
last December by the U.S. Board of Geographic
Names … Proponents of the name change have tried
for the last two years to remove squaw, which
many Indians consider offensive, from the names
of geographic features around the state. "It is
never appropriate to use the word ‘squaw,’ said
Julian Matthews, 44, a Nez Perce tribal member …
Squaw should be dropped from names for no other
reason than that it is offensive to Indian women,
he said ….

The Houston Chronicle, November 5, 2001
Most offensive to Indians is the use of the term
"squaw" in mascot or place names, Hook said.
Most modern American Indian groups now consider
"squaw" an obscene reference to a woman's body
part, Hook said. "It has always been a term of
derision for Indian women," he said. In the past
few years there has been a national movement
among Indian leaders to have "squaw" purged from
place names. The National Congress of American
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
23
Indians asked the U.S. Board on Geographical
Names to have that term forbidden in use for
place names across the country.

The Omaha World Herald, January 28, 2001
That position [that the name "Squaw" is not
offensive] ignores Indians' feelings about the
word, said Leonard Bruguier, a Yankton Sioux
[Indian] and the director of the Institute of
American Indian Studies at the University of
South Dakota in Vermillion. As he grew up in
Yankton, S.D., "the people I knew were seasonal
workers, hard workers," Bruguier said. "They'd
get drunk and you'd hear this, and it has a very
negative connotation." Linguists dispute the
origin of "squaw," although it clearly is
offensive today, said Bruguier … Some of those
urging the abolition of "squaw" link it to a
Mohawk word for a woman's private parts, retired
UCLA linguistics professor William Bright wrote
last fall in [the journal] Names.

The Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1998
The word "squaw" is a highly offensive Algonquin
word. … To use the word squaw today is not only a
grave insult to Native American women, it is an
insult to the dignity of every woman. [Letter
from HASHI-HANTA, American Indian Movement,
Sells, Ariz.]

The Saint Paul Pioneer Press, April 6, 1997
The word "squaw," long the stuff of TV westerns
and American vernacular, is offensive to some
American Indians, and a national activist group
is launching a campaign to remove it from more
than 100 places throughout California - including
the most famous of all: Squaw Valley. These
activists, leaders of the American Indian
Movement, say the word is the white man's
pejorative slang for "vagina," and they consider
it among "the worst of the worst." The group's
crusade has met with success in Minnesota, where
it persuaded the Legislature to pass a law
decreeing that 19 place names containing the word
squaw be changed ….

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
24
The Washington Post, September 20, 1993
[Senator Ben Nighthorse] Campbell said the word
Redskins is one of four terms most offensive to
Native Americans, the others being buck, squaw
and savage. … Campbell, a member of the Northern
Cheyenne tribe ….

2. Excerpted stories retrieved from the Nexis
database which report that Native Americans find the term
“squaw” offensive, including:

The Rocky Mountain News, June 1, 2004
Army Spc. Lori Piestewa, a Hopi from Arizona, was
the first U.S. servicewoman killed in the Iraq
war. … An Arizona mountain, Squaw Peak - a name
offensive to Indian people - was renamed in her
honor ….

The Tampa Tribune, May 19, 2004
The word "squaw" is as offensive to Indians as
the "n-word" is to blacks. It is so offensive
and repugnant that it's been banned from
geographical names in Minnesota and Arizona, and
a bill passed in Florida aims to ban it as
well ….

The Chicago Tribune, April 18, 2003
In renaming Squaw Peak, Napolitano also sought to
remove a name Indians find
offensive ….

The Los Angeles Times, April 13, 2003
The mountain is known as Squaw Peak, a name that
many American Indians find offensive and have
been trying to change ….

The Fresno Bee, June 30, 2003
Squaw Leap, a name that has long grated on
American Indians, has passed into Central
California history - at least, as far as the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management is concerned. The
agency this month renamed 6,700-acre Squaw Leap
Management Area. … It is now the San Joachin
River Gorge. … American Indians … for decades
have considered the name an insult. … Land
Management officials said the word "squaw" has
come under increasing fire across the country.
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
25
The word … carries disparaging and vulgar
meanings ….

3. Portions of state statutes retrieved from
www.lexis.com, www.stateline.com, and
www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us.com showing legislation enacted
in five states that rename geographic sites having the term
“squaw” or ban the term “squaw” from place names in public
places:

South Dakota Codified Laws §1-19C-4 (2003)
Offensive place names in South Dakota by county
are replaced as follows: … Squaw Lake[changed to]
Serenity Lake … Squaw Flat [changed to] Hat Creek
Flat … Squaw Creek [in Jones County changed to]
Pitan Creek … Squaw Creek [in Lawrence County
changed to] Cleopatra Creek … Squaw Hill [changed
to] Six Mile Hill … Squaw Lake [in Marshall
County changed to] Six Mile Lake … Squaw Creek
[in Moody County changed to] Jack Moore Creek ….

Montana Code Annotated §2-15-149 (2003)
Naming of sites and geographic features
replacement of word "squaw" -- advisory group.
(1) The coordinator of Indian Affairs shall
appoint an advisory group [to develop] names to
replace present site or geographic names that
contain the word "squaw". (2) Each agency of
state government that owns or manages public land
in the state shall identify any features or
places under its jurisdiction that contain the
word "squaw" and inform the advisory group . . .
[and shall ensure that] whenever the agency
updates a map or replaces a sign, interpretive
marker, or any other marker because of wear or
vandalism, the word "squaw" is removed and
replaced with the name chosen by the advisory
group.

Oregon Revised Statutes §271.600 (2003)
271.600 Prohibition on use of term "squaw."
… (2) Except as required by federal law, a public
body may not use the term "squaw" in the name of
a public property.

Maine Revised Statutes 1 M.R.S. §1101 (2003)
§1101. Definitions
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
26
1. OFFENSIVE NAME. "Offensive name" means a name
of a place that includes:
A. The designation "nigger" or "squaw" as a
separate word or as part of a word; or
B. The designation "squa" as a separate word.

Minnesota Session Laws Chapter 53-S.F. No. 574
(1995)
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA:
Section 1. … On or before July 31, 1996, the
commissioner of natural resources shall change
each name of a geographic feature in the state
that contains the word "squaw" to another name
that does not contain this word. … Signed by the
governor April 18, 1995 ….

4. A concurrent resolution passed by the Oklahoma
legislature calling for the renaming of geographic place
names in Oklahoma containing the term “squaw”:

Concurrent Resolution No. 94 (Oklahoma
Legislature, May 2000)
WHEREAS, the word "squaw" is offensive to Native
Americans, and a national movement exists to
remove this offensive word from all geographic
names. … NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED …. THAT
the word "squaw" be removed from all geographic
names used in Oklahoma.
www2.Isb.state.ok.us

Also in evidence is a concurrent resolution considered by
the Idaho legislature which addresses the “goal of the
eventual renaming of all geographical place names in the
state to eliminate the use of the word ‘squaw,’” stating
“Native Americans and many citizens of the state find the
term ‘squaw’ objectionable and offensive to Native
Americans.” House Concurrent Resolution No. 42, 2d Sess.
2002), located by the examining attorney at
www3.state.id.us.

5. Two dictionary definitions and one encyclopedia
entry for “squaw” submitted by the examining attorney with
Office actions issued in the involved applications.7

7 Applicant, with its responses to the examining attorney’s first
Office actions, submitted the following definition of “squaw”
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
27

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (online version)
1. Offensive. A Native American woman, especially a
wife.
2. A woman or wife.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online version)
1. often offensive: an American Indian woman
2. usually disparaging: WOMAN, WIFE.

Encyclopedia of North American Indians, Houghton
Mifflin (College Division) (online version)
The literal meaning of the word squaw is obscure,
and its connotations have changed over time. Its
origins are found among the northeastern tribes.
In Massachusetts, squd referred to a younger
woman. In Narragansett, sunksquaw meant "queen"
or "lady." Despite these Algonquian-language
origins, however, nonnatives applied the term to
native women throughout North America. Over time
it took on derogatory connotations as travelers
referred to native women as squaw drudges and
often used the term in opposition to Indian
princess. Nonnatives often referred to women
leaders as squaw sachems and nonnative men who
married native women as squaw men. By the
twentieth century the word squaw had developed
multiple derogatory associations that had no
connection with the word's original meaning.

In light of this evidence, the examining attorney
argues as follows:
The manner in which the applicant uses its SQUAW
mark on the identified goods and services does
not alter the fact that American Indians are

taken from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Merriam
Webster, Inc. (1993): “1a: an American Indian woman – compare
SANNUP b: FEMALE, WOMAN, WIFE – usu. used disparagingly.”
(Capitalization in the original.) Definition 1a does not include
a usage designation directly after the definition. However, the
other dictionary definitions and other evidence of record
indicating the offensiveness of the term outweighs the lack of a
usage designation directly after definition 1a.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
28
referred to, identified or implicated in some
recognizable manner by the term “SQUAW.” As in
Harjo, where the term “Redskins” was found to
refer to Native Americans and to retain its
meaning when considered in connection with the
registrant’s services, … the term “SQUAW” refers
to an identifiable group – American Indians –
and retains its meaning when considered in
connection with the applicant's goods and
services. Brief at p. 14. (Emphasis in the
original brief.)

Applicant has challenged the examining attorney’s
evidence, maintaining that the evidence relied on by the
examining attorney comprises excerpts from newspaper
stories regarding legislation in a few states and
localities banning use of the term “squaw” in geographical
place names; and that this “limited evidence” does not
relate in any way to use of the term SQUAW in connection
with applicant's “skiing-related goods and services
identified in the Application.” Reply at p. 13.
Specifically, applicant argues as follows:
There are more than 1,000 geographical features
in the United States in thirty-six (36) states
which have “squaw” in their names.
(Stateline.org, April 26, 2000). Only seven (7)
states have enacted legislation concerning use of
the term “squaw” in geographical names. This
legislation, however, is limited to geographical
feature names and does not apply to business
names and in some instances names of towns or
villages. (See e.g., press release issued by the
Oregon Legislature’s Democratic Leadership
Office, May 31, 2001, noting that the bill does
not infringe on an individual’s right to name his
property whatever he wants; The New York Times,
February 21, 2002, article which states that
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
29
Maine law requiring name change for geographical
places containing the term “squaw” does not apply
to businesses; Stateline.org April 26, 2000,
article which states that Minnesota law applies
only to geographic features, not to town names).
The Examining Attorney provides no evidence that
there is any consensus among the 2.4 million
Native Americans regarding the meaning of the
term “squaw”. Reply at p. 5.

Additionally, applicant argues that “[t]he Examining
Attorney offers only personal opinions of groups with
political agendas and the legislation created under
pressure to those agendas to support [the] refusal.” Reply
at p. 13. Applicant states:
The limited legislation referred to by the
Examining Attorney appears to reflect the agenda
of two activist groups, the American Indian
Movement and the National Congress of American
Indians. The majority of quotes cited by the
Examining Attorney in support of her position
that the term “squaw” is disparaging comes from
either members of these political groups or
legislators who have adopted the positions
espoused by these groups. In order to promote
their agenda, these political groups have
attempted to cast the term “squaw” in the worst
possible light by claiming that it refers to
female genitalia. This inflammatory definition
has been rejected by linguists in the very
articles relied upon [by] the Examining Attorney.
Reply at pp. 5 - 6.

We find that the evidence made of record by the
examining attorney is sufficient to establish prima facie
that applicant's marks disparage a substantial composite of
Native Americans when used in the context of applicant's
goods and services. The record includes statements from
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
30
Native Americans that the term is “damaging and offensive,”
“the worst of the worst,” an “insult” and “obscene.” The
record also demonstrates that the opinions of Native
Americans regarding the term are not limited to particular
contexts. Certainly, as a term considered “damaging and
offensive,” “the worst of the worst,” an “insult” and
“obscene,” the term “squaw” is encompassed within the
definition of “disparage.” (See definition of “disparage”
in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged
ed. 1993), of which we take judicial notice: “to speak
slighting of: run down: DEPRECIATE.”)8 Additionally, the
record includes a statement from Senator Ben Campbell, a
Native American United States Senator, that the term is
“one of four terms most offensive to Native Americans.”
The Washington Post, September 1993. We add that even if,
as applicant maintains, the statements in the record
attributed to Native Americans are those of Native American
activists and of legislators who share the views of such
activists, we do not discount such statements. Applicant
would have us assume that the views of Native American
activists and sympathetic legislators do not represent the

8 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions.
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports
Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594, 596 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372,
217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
31
views of a substantial composite of Native Americans.
Applicant provides no basis for concluding that their views
would not be shared by a substantial composite of Native
Americans. Further, in light of the ex parte nature of
this case and the Federal Circuit’s recognition of the
limited resources of examining attorneys, we do not
discount the probative value of such evidence.
The record also shows that various states have taken
the drastic and symbolic step of renaming geographic places
containing the term “squaw” or banning the term “squaw”
from geographic place names within the state. Of note is
Maine Revised Statutes 1 M.R.S. §1101 (2003), which
characterizes “squaw” as “offensive,” and includes the term
“nigger” in the same statutory section, deeming each as an
“offensive name.” Also, Concurrent Resolution No. 94 of
the Oklahoma Legislature (May 2000) describes the term
“squaw” as “offensive to Native Americans,” without
limitation to a particular context.
Applicant's challenges to the legislative evidence on
the basis that there are only a limited number of statutes
that address “squaw” and that such statutes only address
geographical place names and not the names of towns or
villages, or the names of businesses, are not well taken.
Even if “there are more than 1,000 geographical features in
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
32
the United States” which have “squaw” in their names, and
only seven out of thirty-six states have enacted
legislation that applies to “geographical feature names”
with “squaw,” the fact that seven states have addressed the
issue of names with “squaw” in them is significant. We
cannot conclude from the absence of similar legislation to
date in other states that those states consider the term to
be inoffensive. Also, the statutory sections submitted by
the examining attorney indicate that these seven states
have enacted such statutes on the basis that the term is
“offensive.” As noted above, the Maine legislature has
addressed the names of places containing “squaw” in the
same statutory section as “nigger.” See Maine Revised
Statutes 1 M.R.S. §1101 (2003). Additionally, that the
legislation does not address the names of businesses and is
not applicable to towns and villages does not detract from
the fact that the term is viewed as offensive.
The record also contains evidence of Native American
opposition to the term “squaw” as used in “Squaw Valley,”
which is the geographic location of applicant, part of
applicant's trade name, and part of the trademark of
applicant's claimed Registration Nos. 670261 (SQUAW VALLEY)
and 1628589 (SQUAW VALLEY USA). See excerpted story from
the April 6, 1997 edition of The Saint Paul Pioneer Press,
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
33
stating that “[t]he word ‘squaw,’ … is offensive to some
American Indians, and a national activist group is
launching a campaign to remove it from more than 100 places
throughout California - including the most famous of all:
Squaw Valley.”
We conclude that the evidence offered by the examining
attorney reflects that a substantial composite of Native
Americans would consider the term SQUAW, when its meaning
is a Native American woman or wife, to be disparaging
regardless of context, including in connection with
applicant's identified goods and services in International
Classes 25 and 35. The evidence shows that this term, when
it means a Native American woman or wife, is generally
offensive to Native Americans, no matter what the goods or
services with which the mark is used. Given the lesser
evidentiary standard that is required of the USPTO in the
ex parte context, it would be ludicrous to require an
examining attorney to find statements from individuals in
the relevant group stating that the term is offensive with
respect to the specific goods and services in the
application. Members of the affected group are not likely
to make public statements regarding their feelings about
the use of SQUAW with respect to specific goods or
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
34
services.9 Rather, we can infer from the evidence about the
generally offensive nature of the term when meaning a
Native American woman or wife that the term is offensive no
matter with what goods or services it is used.
Thus, after reconsidering applicant’s and the
examining attorney’s arguments, as well as the evidence
before us, in light of the standard of proof required in an
ex parte proceeding, we are persuaded that the examining
attorney has met the Office’s burden of establishing prima
facie that a substantial composite of Native Americans
finds the use of “squaw” in connection with applicant's
identified goods and services in International Classes 25
and 35 to be disparaging.
Because we have found both that the meaning of
“squaw,” as used in applicant’s marks for its goods and
services in International Classes 25 and 35, is a Native
American woman or wife, and that there is sufficient
evidence of record for us to conclude that a substantial
composite of Native Americans would find applicant's marks
for such goods and services disparaging, we find that the

9 For example, it is unlikely that a tribal governing body would
issue a statement that it found the use of SQUAW for “paperclips”
to be offensive; there would be no reason that such
pronouncements with respect to the use of the term for individual
goods or services would be made.
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
35
examining attorney has made out a prima facie case of
disparagement under Section 2(a).
b. Did applicant rebut the examining attorney’s
evidence that, under the second prong of the
Harjo I test, the mark is disparaging as used in
connection with the goods and services in
International Classes 25 and 35?

In view of our decision on reconsideration that the
examining attorney has met the requirements of the second
prong of the Harjo I test for disparagement, and therefore
has established a prima facie case, we must consider
whether applicant has rebutted the examining attorney’s
showing, and specifically whether applicant has rebutted
the showing on the second prong of the test. In doing so,
we have considered applicant’s arguments in both its appeal
brief and its response to the request for reconsideration.
Applicant contended, in its brief on appeal, that:
The mark SQUAW as used by Applicant for goods and
services closely associated with its famous
resort does not refer to identifiable persons.
Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the
second prong of the test for determining whether
the matter is disparaging. Brief at p. 8.

We disagree. As stated above, the examining attorney has
made out a prima facie case that applicant's marks are
associated with identifiable persons, i.e., Native
Americans, and, in our original decision we found in favor
of the Office with respect to the first prong of the Harjo
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
36
I test. Applicant’s unsupported statement that its marks
do not refer to identifiable persons is not sufficient to
rebut the evidence submitted by the examining attorney that
the word SQUAW in applicant’s marks, used in connection
with the identified goods and services in International
Classes 25 and 35, would have the meaning of a Native
American woman or wife.
Applicant, in its reply brief, has again challenged
the contention in the examining attorney’s appeal brief
that American Indians are “the relevant group of
identifiable persons referred to, identified or implicated
in some recognizable manner by the term ‘SQUAW’….” Brief
at p. 14. Although this argument uses a phrase from the
second prong of the Harjo I test (identifiable persons),
the argument actually goes to the first prong, i.e., what
is the “likely meaning” of the mark as used in connection
with the relevant goods and services since, if the mark
does not have the “likely meaning” of a Native American
woman or wife, Native Americans would not be the
“identifiable persons” of the second prong. As we have
noted, in our original opinion we found that the Office had
met its burden of establishing that the meaning of SQUAW
and SQUAW ONE for the goods and services identified in
International Classes 25 and 35 was a Native American woman
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
37
or wife and, as we have stated in this decision, applicant
has not rebutted this.
We note applicant’s argument that its “mark is not
used in connection with any other term or design element
that would create an association with American Indians or
any other identifiable person(s),” which was advanced by
applicant to distinguish the present situation from those
in other cases which had previously been cited by the
examining attorney, namely, Harjo I; In re Hines, 31 USPQ2d
1685 (TTAB 1994), vacated on other grounds, 32 USPQ2d 1376
(TTAB 1994); Doughboy Industries, Inc. v. The Reese
Chemical Company, 88 USPQ 227 (Pat. Off. 1951); and In re
Anti-Communist World Freedom Congress, Inc., 161 USPQ 304
(TTAB 1969). According to applicant, in these cases the
marks at issue, which the Board found to be disparaging,
“all included design or logo elements which reinforced the
connection with the referenced persons or symbol the
applied-for marks were found to disparage.” In contrast,
applicant submits that its marks “do not use any design or
logo elements which alludes to Native Americans.” Reply
brief at p. 14. It appears to us that this argument, too,
goes to the first prong of the Harjo I test, namely, the
“likely meaning” of the term in the mark. We agree that
applicant’s marks do not contain any design or logo
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
38
elements, but are for word marks in standard character
form. However, we are aware of no requirement in Section
2(a) or the case law interpreting Section 2(a) that to be
found disparaging a mark must include design or logo
elements which reinforce the connection with the referenced
persons or symbol. In fact, in In re Reemtsma
Cigarettenfabriken G.m.b.H., 122 USPQ 339 (TTAB 1959),
involving the mark SENUSSI for “cigarettes,” the Board’s
decision does not refer to a design component in the
applied-for mark, yet the Board found the mark to be
disparaging to a Moslem sect whose tenets forbid the use of
cigarettes.10
Applicant also maintains that the manner in which its
mark is used does not create an association with American
Indians, pointing to its specimens. Again, it appears to
us that this argument goes to the “likely meaning” of the
mark, the first prong of the Harjo I test, rather than to
whether applicant has rebutted the examining attorney’s

10 Applicant discussed Reemtsma in its reply brief at p. 15, and
argued that it is inapposite because “Applicant's mark SQUAW is
not the name of a religious sect or order and this case is
plainly not applicable to the present facts.” We are not
persuaded that the case is inapposite to the present case simply
because “SQUAW is not the name of a religious sect or order.”
There are various ways in which terms can be used so as to
disparage individuals or groups. Precedential case law is not
inapposite merely because the nature of the disparagement in one
case is different from another case.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
39
showing that Native Americans would find the mark
disparaging as used for the identified goods and services,
which is the second element of the test. We agree with
applicant’s contention that “Applicant's mark is not used
in connection with any other term or design element that
would create an association with American Indians or any
other identifiable person(s).”11
However, while use of Native American indicia in
applicant’s specimens would strengthen the association
between the marks and the meaning of “squaw” as a Native
American woman or wife, the lack of such indicia does not
mean that there would be no such association. Even without
other Native American indicia, consumers would understand
applicant's marks for its identified International Class 25
and 35 goods and services to refer to a Native American
woman or wife.

11 Applicant's specimens for the goods in International Class 25
are a photograph of (i) a knitted headband with SQUAW written in
large letters between two stylized snowflakes on the headband
itself, and (ii) a plain long-sleeved collarless shirt with SQUAW
ONE written in large letters on the front of the shirt. As for
the International Class 35 specimens, the specimen for the SQUAW
application depicts a store sign with SQUAW superimposed on a
circular background having a stylized “S” or a “double S,” with
one “S” adjacent to the other; and the specimen for the SQUAW ONE
application depicts SQUAW ONE on a store sign over the front door
of the store, with “accessories” also written on the sign.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
40
With respect to the second prong of the Harjo I test,
applicant, in its opposition to the request for
reconsideration, has attacked the examining attorney’s
evidence. Specifically, applicant asserts, “the Examining
Attorney has offered no evidence that a substantial
composite of the referenced group believes applicant's use
of that mark in connection with the identified goods and
services is disparaging.” Reply brief at p. 13.
Contrary to applicant's contention, the evidence of
record is sufficient for us to find (a) what a substantial
composite of Native Americans believes; and (b) that
applicant's use of the marks in connection with the
identified goods and services is disparaging. As already
mentioned above, in this ex parte proceeding the amount of
evidence needed for the Office to make a prima facie case
does not necessarily rise to the level of what is required
in an inter partes proceeding because of the Federal
Circuit’s recognition that the Office has limited
resources. The numerous quotations from Native Americans
in the excerpted portions of Nexis articles set forth
herein, and the fact that several states have taken the
drastic step of changing the names of geographic sites
containing the word “squaw,” is sufficient for us to
conclude that the sentiments regarding this term are not
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
41
limited to a minor portion of the Native American
population, but rather reflect the views of a substantial
composite of Native Americans.12
Further, the evidence is sufficient for us to conclude
that applicant's use of the marks in connection with the
identified goods and services is disparaging. The evidence
shows that “squaw” is a term that Native Americans consider
to be an offensive reference to Native American women and
this term maintains its offensive meaning in most contexts,
including when used in connection with applicant's
identified goods and services in International Classes 25
and 35.
Thus, applicant's arguments directed against the
examining attorney’s evidence are not well taken.
Applicant has not submitted any evidence which suggests
that Native Americans do not view “squaw” as a non-
disparaging term for its Class 25 and 35 goods and
services.
Accordingly, we conclude that applicant has not
rebutted either prong of the Harjo I test, and therefore we
find that applicant has not rebutted the examining

12 A substantial composite is not necessarily a majority. See In
re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 31 USPQ2d 1923, 1925
(Fed. Cir. 1994), quoting from McGinley, 211 USPQ at 763.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
42
attorney’s prima facie case of disparagement under Section
2(a).
3. With respect to the goods in Class 28, the
examining attorney asserts that the Board did not
correctly analyze the evidence relating to the first
part of the Harjo I test.

In our September 26, 2005 decision, the Board found
that the meaning of SQUAW in applicant’s marks, as used in
connection with its identified skis and ski equipment in
International Class 28, is applicant’s Squaw Valley ski
resort in California. The Board therefore held that the
marks were not disparaging under the first part of the
Harjo I test, i.e., the “likely meaning” of the matter in
question was not a Native American woman or wife.
The examining attorney has argued in the request for
reconsideration that the Board’s finding as to the meaning
of the marks with respect to the International Class 28
goods is erroneous; and that “[t]he Board based [its]
finding on evidence of the fame of the resort for winter
sports and use of the mark[s] on skis on which the word
SQUAW was closely accompanied by the wording ‘Squaw Valley
USA.’” Request for reconsideration at unnumbered p. 12.
It is the examining attorney’s position that this finding
was incorrect because applicant is not limited to using the
marks in close approximation to the wording “Squaw Valley
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
43
USA” and because applicant’s skis and goods related to
skiing could be sold in a ski shop not associated with
applicant, where the consumer would not necessarily
perceive the meaning of the term as the resort. Id. at pp.
12 – 13.
Applicant, in response to the examining attorney’s
arguments for reconsideration, maintains at p. 5 that the
examining attorney has no basis for the requested
reconsideration “other than an unsupported assertion that
Applicant has not sustained its burden of proving that
consumers would perceive use of the applied-for marks on
the Class 28 goods as referring to Applicant as opposed to
the dictionary meaning of the term”; and that the examining
attorney “has presented no new evidence, no manifest error
of fact or manifest error of law” with respect to the
determination regarding the goods in International Class
28.
In the appeal, applicant argued that “Applicant uses
the mark SQUAW in connection with ski equipment, clothing
and retail sporting goods store services as a shorthand
reference to SQUAW VALLEY”; that the “specimens of use
submitted with the application demonstrate that Applicant's
mark is not used in connection with any other term or
design element that would create an association with
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
44
American Indians or any other identifiable person(s)”; and
that the evidence submitted by applicant shows (i) that
applicant's marks have “secondary meaning” identifying
applicant's “world famous resort, SQUAW VALLEY, the home of
the 1960 Winter Olympic Games, and the skiing-related goods
and services identified in the Application”; and (ii) that
the meaning of SQUAW ONE is “the world famous SQUAW VALLEY
resort and the world famous ski lift named SQUAW ONE at
that resort.” Brief at pp. 6 – 7; reply at pp. 3 and 12.
Applicant submitted numerous articles from the Nexis
database in which applicant is referred to as “Squaw” and
one of applicant's chair lifts is referred to as “Squaw
One.” The following are excerpts from representative
articles showing such use of the term “squaw”:
Reno Gazette-Journal, November 2, 2004
“… Squaw job fair this Sunday
Find a job working at Squaw Valley USA during the
upcoming ski season at the fair ….”

The Seattle Times, November 23, 2003
Squaw Valley: The most noticeable change at
Squaw is the opening of Phase II of the new base
village ….

St Louis Post-Dispatch, November 9, 2003
Squaw Valley will be opening phase II of its
expanded base village. … For those chained to
their laptops, Squaw now provides wireless
Internet access from nearly anywhere on the
mountain.

Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
45
The San Francisco Chronicle, October 26, 2003
-- Squaw Valley: Phase II of the Village at
Squaw Valley is finished. “You can finally come
here and not see a construction zone,” said
Squaw’s Katja Dahl.

The Miami Herald, October 12, 2003
Squaw Valley boasts 33 lifts, including North
America’s only Funitel and a huge cable car, that
access six peaks, 4,000 acres and 2,850 vertical
feet of terrain. Take a twirl on Squaw’s on-
mountain skating rink located at High Camp (8,200
feet).

Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO), March 27, 2003
Pearson stays with friends in South Lake, a 3½-
hour drive from San Francisco, nearly every
weekend in the winter. He snowboards at Heavenly
and other Tahoe resorts like Squaw and Kirkwood.

The New York Times, February 23, 2003
TAHOE PACKAGE – Seventy-one motels, hotels and
vacation-home resorts in the North Lake Tahoe
area have nightly rates from $79 a person Sunday
to Thursday, $99 weekends for the rest of ski
season. This includes lift tickets at ski
resorts like Squaw and Alpine Meadows. There is
a two-night minimum; holidays are excluded.

Charlotte Observer, February 16, 2003
The first thing to know about Squaw Valley USA,
the California ski resort five miles west of Lake
Tahoe, is that nearly 20 years ago a movie was
filmed here that has become a cult classic. …
Thing is, a lot of the people who came to Squaw
to make that movie never left.

A substantial number of the articles submitted by applicant
in which “Squaw” is mentioned also include the term “Squaw
Valley.” It is clear that “Squaw” per se as used in those
articles is a shorthand reference to “Squaw Valley.”
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
46
Additionally, applicant has submitted two articles
from United States newspapers in which the term “Squaw One”
appears in reference to applicant's “Squaw One” ski lift.13
The first article appeared in The Washington Post on
November 7, 1999 and states in relevant part:
Squaw, which spread out in front of our home’s
hillside deck, owns the reputation of old-school
macho. Home of the 1960 Winter Olympics and
known for its challenging slopes …. And an hour
after hitting the Squaw One Express lift, and
winding up on something steep and icy, I knew
why.

The second article appeared in Deseret News (Salt Lake
City) on January 20, 2002, stating in relevant part:

13 Applicant submitted eleven articles in support of its
contention that “the likely meaning of the mark SQUAW ONE … is
that of the world famous SQUAW VALLEY resort and the world famous
ski lift named SQUAW ONE at that resort.” SQUAW ONE brief at
p. 6. Two of these articles refer to “Squaw One Accessories,”
which is a clothing outlet and not applicant's ski lift. (One of
applicant's specimens of use in the SQUAW ONE application is a
photograph of a storefront with a sign having “Squaw One
Accessories” written on the sign.) Also, another two of these
articles appeared in foreign publications, i.e., The Toronto Sun
and The Toronto Star. Because there is no evidence that The
Toronto Sun or The Toronto Star were distributed in the United
States or that the stories therein had any exposure to
prospective consumers in the United States, these two articles
have limited evidentiary value. See In re Men's International
Professional Tennis Council, 1 USPQ2d 1917, 1918 (TTAB 1986).
Additionally, five of the eleven articles are from wire service
reports. Wire service articles generally have limited
evidentiary value because we cannot determine whether or to what
extent they have been broadcast or otherwise distributed so as to
reach appreciable members of the relevant public. In re Cell
Therapeutics Inc., 67 USPQ2d 1795, 1798 (TTAB 2003). However,
one of the wire service articles appeared in The Deseret News
(listed above), and we have given it weight at least insofar as
this publication is concerned.
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
47
Squaw One, then the world’s largest double
chairlift, was wiped out by an avalanche the
first year it ran. And the second. And the
third.

Applicant has also made the following of record:
(a) printouts from its www.squaw.com website referring to
SQUAW and SQUAW ONE in connection with “Applicant's world
famous resort”; (b) search results for “squaw” on the Yahoo
and Google Internet search engines “in which the majority
of the results returned refer to Applicant's SQUAW VALLEY
resort”; and (c) a printout from “the online Encyclopedia
Britannica website in which a search for the term ‘Squaw’
retrieved the following listing for Applicant's SQUAW
VALLEY resort”:
Squaw Valley
World-famous winter sports area in Placer County,
eastern California, U.S., just northwest of Lake
Tahoe. The focus of a state recreation area, it
was the site of the 1960 Winter Olympics ….

Applicant also references the specimens of use in both
applications as showing use by applicant of SQUAW and SQUAW
ONE. Reply at p. 4; SQUAW ONE reply at p. 4.
As we stated in our September 26, 2005 opinion, the
record shows that SQUAW VALLEY is well known in connection
with the sport of skiing. Squaw Valley was the site of the
1960 Winter Olympics; Encyclopedia Britannica has an entry
for “Squaw Valley” and identifies Squaw Valley as “world-
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
48
famous”; Squaw Valley is mentioned in numerous newspaper
articles in newspapers from all over the United States;
and, according to the November 7, 1999 Washington Post
article noted above, Squaw Valley is known for its
challenging ski slopes. Further, the articles from the
Nexis database submitted by applicant indicate that “Squaw”
is used as a shortened form of “Squaw Valley.” In view
thereof, the examining attorney’s contention that applicant
is not “legally limited to using the mark in close
approximation with the wording ‘Squaw Valley USA,’” as
appears on one of the specimens of use for applicant's
International Class 28 goods, while true, is of no
consequence - the wording “Squaw Valley USA” on skiing
related goods is not necessary to create an association of
SQUAW with applicant; rather, the term SQUAW, when used
with skiing related goods, would be perceived as a
reference to the Squaw Valley ski resort.
The examining attorney also points out that there are
no trade channel limitations in the identifications of
goods and that “consumer[s] seeing those goods being sold
in a ski shop not associated with Applicant would not
necessarily perceive the meaning as the resort.” Request
for reconsideration at unnumbered p. 13. However, in view
of the evidence of record, and particularly because many of
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
49
the articles referring to “Squaw” are from locations in the
United States distant from applicant's resort, we cannot
accept the implication in the examining attorney’s argument
that an association with applicant would only be created if
the skis and skiing-related goods were sold in stores
associated with applicant.
The Board has, in analyzing refusals under Section
2(a), considered the meaning of a term as reflected by the
goods on which the mark is used. In In re In Over Our
Heads, Inc., 16 USQP2d 1653 (TTAB 1990), the Board reversed
a refusal to register the mark MOONIES (and design) for a
doll which dropped its pants when a collapsible bulb was
squeezed, thus exposing its buttocks. The examining
attorney took the position that “the mark comprised
scandalous matter which disparaged The Unification Church
founded by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon.” Id. at 1653.
However, the Board found that the term MOONIES had more
than one meaning, and that the meaning of MOONIES, when
used on the subject goods – dolls - would most likely be
perceived as indicating that the doll "moons," and would
not be perceived as referencing members of The Unification
Church.
Accordingly, we reiterate our finding that, when SQUAW
is considered in connection with applicant's “skis, ski
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
50
poles, ski bindings, ski tuning kits comprised of waxes and
adjustment tools, ski equipment, namely, power cords,”
i.e., items which are directly connected with skiing, it is
the Squaw Valley ski resort meaning of SQUAW, rather than
the meaning of a Native American woman or wife, that will
come to the minds of consumers. The same meaning will
attach to SQUAW ONE, used for such goods, not because
applicant has established that SQUAW ONE is well known (in
view of the limited evidence regarding SQUAW ONE), but
because of the prominence of the term SQUAW in the mark.
Because applicant has rebutted the examining
attorney’s showing regarding the “likely meaning” of the
marks for the International Class 28 goods, it is not
necessary for us to consider whether applicant has rebutted
the second part of the Harjo I test, and the refusal to
register the marks in Class 28 must be reversed. The
examining attorney’s request for reconsideration of our
decision regarding the International Class 28 goods is
denied.
Publication of the Mark
As a final point, we address applicant's contention
that “[d]oubts on the issue of whether a mark is
disparaging are resolved in favor of the applicant,” citing
to In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 31 USPQ2d
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
51
1923, 1928 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and In re In Over Our Heads,
Inc., 16 USQP2d at 1654-55, and its contention that “[b]oth
the Federal Circuit and Board have previously supported the
practice of passing a mark for publication and allowing any
person(s) that finds such mark scandalous or disparaging
the opportunity to oppose registration.” Response at pp.
5-6. While it is true that the Board has on previous
occasions resolved doubt as to whether a term was
disparaging or scandalous in favor of publication, the key
point is that the Board has done so when there has been
doubt. In this case, upon reconsidering our previous
decision and the evidence of record in light of the degree
of evidence required for the Office to meet its burden to
make a prima facie showing, we have no doubt that under
Section 2(a), as interpreted by the Board and the courts,
the term is disparaging with respect to the identified
goods in International Class 25 and the identified services
in International Class 35.
Thus, the examining attorney’s request for
reconsideration is granted to the extent that the Section
2(a) refusal is affirmed for the application in
International Classes 25 and 35.14

14 In his request for reconsideration, the examining attorney
included a footnote suggesting that applicant’s marks might also
Ser. Nos. 76511144 and 76511145
52
DECISION: The examining attorney’s request for
reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. It
is granted to the extent that the refusal to register under
Section 2(a) is affirmed for both applications in
International Classes 25 and 35, and it is denied to the
extent that the refusal to register under Section 2(a)
remains reversed for both applications in International
Class 28.

be considered scandalous under Section 2(a), and indicated that
the Board had the authority to remand the application so that the
examining attorney could consider whether a refusal might be made
on this ground, also. If an application comes before the Board
on appeal, and it appears to the Board that there may be a ground
for refusal that was not previously considered by the examining
attorney, the Board may, pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.142(f),
remand the application to the examining attorney to consider
whether such a refusal should be made. However, the Board will
exercise its power to sua sponte remand an application only prior
to the issuance of a final decision and not, as here, when a
decision has been issued and the Board is considering a request
for reconsideration. Indeed, once a final decision issues, the
Board no longer has the authority to order such a remand. See
Trademark Rule 2.142(g) (“An application which has been
considered and decided on appeal will not be reopened except for
the entry of a disclaimer under §6 of the Act of 1946 or upon
order of the Director, but a petition to the Director to reopen
an application will be considered only upon a showing of
sufficient cause for consideration of any matter not already
adjudicated.”).