SPRINGSHOT, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 2, 2021

2021002062 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/797,313 03/12/2013 Douglas Paul KREUZKAMP 697432000100 1068
25224 7590 07/02/2021
MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
707 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES, CA 90017
EXAMINER
BOYCE, ANDRE D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
EOfficeLA@mofo.com
PatentDocket@mofo.com
pair_mofo@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DOUGLAS PAUL KREUZKAMP, and
ERIC PAUL PHELAN
____________

Appeal 2021-002062
Application 13/797,313
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–31. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Appellant appeared for oral hearing on June 10, 2021. The record includes a
transcript of the oral hearing.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies Springshot, Inc. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates generally to workforce
management and, more specifically, to systems and processes for managing
and tracking human resources and their tasks.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 17, 22, and 27 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim
1, reproduced below with emphasis and bracketed notations added, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method for managing
worker profiles and worker tasks, the method comprising:
at an electronic device:
[(a)] identifying an event;
[(b)] determining a type of the event;
[(c)] responsive to identifying the event:
[(1)] selecting a subset of a plurality of workers based on
a worker profile of each worker of the plurality of workers, the
subset of the plurality of workers including a first worker and a
second worker;
[(2)] automatically generating, via a processor, a project
associated with the event based on the type of the event,
wherein the project comprises a set of tasks associated with the
project;
[(3)] assigning a first subset of the set of tasks to the first
worker based on a worker profile of the first worker and a
worker profile of the second worker; and
[(4)] assigning a second subset of the set of tasks to the
second worker based on the worker profile of the first worker
and the worker profile of the second worker;
[(d)] automatically scheduling the first subset of the set of tasks
to be performed by the first worker before the second worker starts
performing the second subset of the set of tasks, wherein the
scheduling is based on a first location information associated with the
first subset of the set of tasks and a second location information
associated with the second subset of the set of tasks;
[(e)] transmitting, over a wireless network, the first subset of
the set of tasks to a first mobile device associated with the first
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worker and the second subset of the set of tasks to a second mobile
device associated with the second worker;
at the first mobile device:
[(f)] receiving the first subset of the set of tasks;
[(g)] determining that one or more tasks of the first subset of
the set of tasks are complete; and
[(h)] transmitting a first notification that the one or more tasks
of the first subset of the set of tasks are complete, wherein the first
notification that the one or more tasks of the first subset of the set of
tasks are complete includes one or more parameters indicating the
manner in which the one or more tasks of the first subset of the set of
tasks were completed;
at the electronic device:
[(i)] receiving, from the first mobile device, the first
notification that the one or more tasks of the first subset of the set of
tasks are complete;
[(j)] based on the first notification, directing, via the second
mobile device, the second worker to begin the second subset of the set
of tasks;
at the second mobile device:
[(k)] receiving the second subset of the set of tasks and the
direction to begin the second subset of the set of tasks;
[(l)] in response to receiving the direction to begin the second
subset of the set of tasks, providing, to the second worker, an
instruction for beginning the second subset of the set of tasks;
[(m)] determining that one or more tasks of the second subset of
the set of tasks are complete; and
[(n)] transmitting a second notification that the one or more
tasks of the second subset of the set of tasks are complete, wherein the
second notification that the one or more tasks of the second subset of
the set of tasks are complete includes one or more parameters
indicating the manner in which the one or more tasks of the second
subset of the set of tasks were completed; and
at the electronic device:
[(o)] receiving the second notification that the one or more
tasks of the second subset of the set of tasks are complete;
[(p)] accessing a first cumulative experience score associated
with the worker profile of the first worker from a database, wherein
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the first cumulative experience score is indicative of a cumulative
amount of work experience of the first worker over a particular time;
[(q)] updating the first cumulative experience score based on
the first notification that the one or more tasks of the first subset of the
set of tasks are complete and based on a predetermined number of
points associated with the one or more tasks of the first subset of the
set of tasks;
[(r)] storing the first updated cumulative experience score in the
database;
[(s)] accessing a second cumulative experience score
associated with the worker profile of the second worker from the
database, wherein the second cumulative experience score is
indicative of a cumulative amount of work experience of the second
worker over a particular time;
[(t)] updating the second cumulative experience score based on
the second notification that the one or more tasks of the second subset
of the set of tasks are complete and based on a predetermined number
of points associated with the one or more tasks of the second subset of
the set of tasks; and
[(u)] storing the second updated cumulative experience score in
the database.

Appeal Br. 47–49 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–13, 16–28, 30, and 31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Weyl (US 2009/0204470 A1, pub. Aug. 13, 2009),
Molander (US 2010/0257015 A1, pub. Oct. 7, 2010), and Van Pelt
(US 2013/0231969 A1, pub. Sept. 5, 2013). Final Act. 7–27.
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Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Weyl, Molander, Van Pelt, and Nielsen
(US 2009/0207019 A1, pub. Aug. 20, 2019). Final Act. 27–28.
Claims 29 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Weyl, Molander, Van Pelt, and Patel (US 2013/0275187 A1, pub. Oct. 17,
2013). Final Act. 28–30.

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1–30 as a group. Appeal Br. 16. We select
independent claim 1 as representative of this group. Claims 2–30, thus,
stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues
claim 31 separately.
Principles of Law
35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.” E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), and Alice, “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
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natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that
analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts,” such as an abstract idea. Id. According to
Supreme Court precedent, concepts determined to be abstract ideas include
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (id. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)).
If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as an
abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the
second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78).
This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
USPTO Guidance
We are also guided by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
guidance, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”) and the October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019 Update”), which
were incorporated into the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
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§§ 2104–06, Rev. 10.2019 (“MPEP”) in June 2020. “The guidance sets out
agency policy with respect to the USPTO’s interpretation of the subject
matter eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of decisions by
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51.
However, the “guidance . . . does not create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable by any party against the USPTO” and
“[r]ejections will continue to be based upon the substantive law.” Id.
Under the Guidance, the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework is a
two-prong inquiry. MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A). “Prong One asks does the
claim recite an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon?” MPEP
§ 2106.04(II)(A)(1). When determining whether a claim recites an abstract
idea, the guidance defines enumerated groupings of abstract ideas, distilled
from precedent. MPEP § 2106.04(a); see also id. § 2106.04(a)(2) (defining
abstract idea groupings); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. If the claim recites a
judicial exception, then the claim requires further analysis at Prong Two.
MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(1). “Prong Two asks does the claim recite
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application?” MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(2); see also id. § 2106.04(d). Only if
a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to
whether the additional elements, individually or in combination, provide an
inventive concept. See MPEP §§ 2106(III), 2106.05.
“An inventive concept ‘cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law
of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.’” Id. § 2106.05(I)
(quoting Genetic Techs. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). Among the considerations in determining whether the additional
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elements, individually or in combination, amount to significantly more than
the exception itself, we look to whether they add a specific limitation beyond
the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in
the field or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(II).
Rejection
The Examiner determined that the claims recite “managing worker
profiles and worker tasks.” Final Act. 2. The Examiner determined that this
concept involves “managing interactions between people,” which is a
subgrouping of the “certain methods of organizing human activity” grouping
of abstract ideas. Id. at 4–5. The Examiner also determined that the claims
do not recite additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application or that amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea. Id. at 6.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2A)
Turning to step one of the Mayo/Alice framework, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner oversimplified the
claim language, did not consider the specifics of the recited steps, or
otherwise erred in determining that representative claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea. Appeal Br. 19–29; Reply Br. 2–7. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks
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whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it
is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that the claims
focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or
a technical field.
The Specification is titled “WORKFORCE PRODUCTIVITY
TOOL.” The Specification describes that Mobile Resource Management
(MRM) tools were developed to dispatch work orders and track employees
via smartphones. Spec. ¶ 2. MRM tools offer companies better insight into
daily operations and can reduce overhead costs. However, development of
these tools has stagnated. Id. Current MRM tools typically run on older
operating systems and outdated hardware. Id. ¶ 3. They present instruction
in English-only text, alienating workers who are only partially literate or
who speak English as a second language. Id. The tools are unidirectional,
sharing little, if anything, with workers, so that the users see little benefit
from inputting data into the tool. Id. Current MRM tools also lack
functional breadth and adaptability, as they are typically narrowly-tailored
applications for collecting specific data for specific tasks. Id. ¶ 4. The
inventors of the claimed invention seek to “engag[e] and motivat[e] human
resources, improv[e] worker productivity, and better manag[e] and track[]
tasks.” Id. ¶ 5.
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a computer-
implemented method for managing worker profiles and worker tasks. The
method involves interactions with a first worker and a second worker. The
method begins by scheduling tasks to the first worker and second worker in
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response to an event. This portion of the method involves: “identifying an
event” (limitation (a)); “determining a type of the event” (limitation (b));
“responsive to identifying the event,” assigning tasks to the first and second
workers, i.e.,
selecting a subset of a plurality of workers based on a
worker profile of each worker of the plurality of workers, the
subset of the plurality of workers including a first worker and a
second worker;
automatically generating . . . a project associated with the
event based on the type of the event, wherein the project
comprises a set of tasks associated with the project;
assigning a first subset of the set of tasks to the first
worker based on a worker profile of the first worker and a
worker profile of the second worker; and
assigning a second subset of the set of tasks to the second
worker based on the worker profile of the first worker and the
worker profile of the second worker;
(limitations (c)(1)–(c)(4)); scheduling the first and second subsets of tasks,
i.e.,
automatically scheduling the first subset of the set of
tasks to be performed by the first worker before the second
worker starts performing the second subset of the set of tasks,
wherein the scheduling is based on a first location information
associated with the first subset of the set of tasks and a second
location information associated with the second subset of the
set of tasks[,]
(limitation (d)); and transmitting the tasks to the worker, i.e., “transmitting
. . . the first subset of the set of tasks to . . . the first worker and the second
subset of the set of tasks to . . . the second worker” (limitation (e)).
Next, the first worker receives the first subset of tasks and indicates
when one or more tasks of the first subset are complete, i.e., “receiving the
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first subset of the set of tasks” (limitation (f)); “determining that one or more
tasks of the first subset of the set of tasks are complete” (limitation (g)); and
transmitting a first notification that the one or more tasks
of the first subset of the set of tasks are complete, wherein the
first notification that the one or more tasks of the first subset of
the set of tasks are complete includes one or more parameters
indicating the manner in which the one or more tasks of the first
subset of the set of tasks were completed[,]
(limitation (h)).
In response to receiving the first notification, the method instructs the
second worker to begin the second subset of tasks, i.e., “receiving . . . the
first notification that the one or more tasks of the first subset of the set of
tasks are complete” (limitation (i)); and “based on the first notification,
directing . . . the second worker to begin the second subset of the set of
tasks” (limitation (j)).
The second worker indicates when one or more tasks of the second
subset are complete after receiving the instruction to begin, i.e., “receiving
the second subset of the set of the tasks and the direction to begin the second
subset of the set of tasks” (limitation (k)); “in response to receiving the
direction to begin the second subset of the set of tasks, providing, to the
second worker, an instruction for beginning the second subset of the set of
tasks” (limitation (l)); “determining that one or more tasks of the second
subset of the set of tasks are complete” (limitation (m)); and
transmitting a second notification that the one or more
tasks of the second subset of the set of tasks are complete,
wherein the second notification that the one or more tasks of the
second subset of the set of tasks are complete includes one or
more parameters indicating the manner in which the one or
more tasks of the second subset of the set of tasks were
completed[,]
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(limitation (n)).
In response to receiving the second notification, the method updates a
cumulative experience score associated with each of the workers.
Specifically, the method performs the following steps: “receiving the
second notification that the one or more tasks of the second subset of the set
of tasks are complete” (limitation (o)); “accessing a first cumulative
experience score associated with the worker profile of the first worker . . .,
wherein the first cumulative experience score is indicative of a cumulative
amount of work experience of the first worker over a particular time”
(limitation (p));
updating the first cumulative experience score based on
the first notification that the one or more tasks of the first subset
of the set of tasks are complete and based on a predetermined
number of points associated with the one or more tasks of the
first subset of the set of tasks;
(limitation (q)); “storing the first updated cumulative experience score . . .”
(limitation (r)); “accessing a second cumulative experience score associated
with the worker profile of the second worker . . ., wherein the second
cumulative experience score is indicative of a cumulative amount of work
experience of the second worker over a particular time” (limitation (s));
updating the second cumulative experience score based on the
second notification that the one or more tasks of the second subset of
the set of tasks are complete and based on a predetermined number of
points associated with the one or more tasks of the second subset of
the set of tasks;
(limitation (t)); and “storing the second updated cumulative experience score
. . .” (limitation (u)).
When given their broadest reasonable interpretation, limitations (a)
through (u) recite a method for managing worker tasks and worker profiles.
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This concept pertains to “managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people,” including “following rules or instructions,”
which is a subgrouping of the “certain methods of organizing human
activity” grouping of abstract ideas. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that limitations (a) through (u) of
claim 1 recite at least a certain method of organizing human activity, i.e., an
abstract idea. See Final Act. 2–5; see also Ans. 7–9.
Beyond the abstract idea, claim 1 recites the following additional
elements: an electric device for performing limitations (a) through (e), (i),
(j), and (o) through (u), a first mobile device for performing limitations (f)
through (h), a second mobile device for performing limitations (k) through
(n), a processor, a database, and a wireless network.2 The Examiner found,
and we agree, that these elements are recited at a high-level of generality and
amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a
generic computer component. Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that the invention improves existing MRM software
by improving breadth, compatibility, and adaptability. Appeal Br. 23,
27–28; see also Reply Br. 3–4. According to Appellant, claim 1 recites
“specifics of a distributed architecture involving multiple devices” and
“specific rule-based algorithms comprising an ordered combination of
steps.” Reply Br. 3. The “rule-based steps distributed among three devices
. . . result[ ] in real-time assignment, monitoring, and management of the
tasks and the workers.” Id.; see also id. at 4 (arguing that claim 1 provides a

2 In the reproduction of claim 1 above, italicized text indicates claim
limitations reciting the abstract idea; whereas, bolded text indicates
additional elements beyond the abstract idea.
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“specific distribution of steps amongst the centralized electronic device and
the mobile devices”). Yet, the centralized electronic device is a generic
computer component that manages the personal behavior and/or interactions
of the workers associated with the first and second mobile devices, also
generic computer components. That the rules are distributed among the
three devices requires the three devices to communicate over a network. But
communicating over a network is itself an abstract idea. See ChargePoint,
Inc. v. SemaConnect Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 766 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (“communicating requests to a remote server and receiving
communications from that server, i.e., communication over a network” is an
abstract idea). In our view, the improvement identified by Appellant
amounts to applying the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment (e.g., a first mobile device, a second mobile device, an
electronic device).
For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded that claim 1 is analogous to
the claims at issue in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 23–24. Appellant asserts that it
is the specific rules recited in claim 1, not the use of a computer per se, that
improves the performance of the management system. Id. at 23. However,
we see no parallel between Appellant’s claim 1 and the claims at issue in
McRO.
In McRO, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allow
computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial
expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced
by human animators. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313. The court determined that
the representative claim, when considered as a whole, was directed to a
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technological improvement over existing, manual 3-D animation techniques
and used limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an
improved technological result in conventional industry practice. Id. at 1316;
see also id. at 1314 (determining that the representative claim is “focused on
a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”). Here, Appellant
does not persuade us that claim 1 recites a technological improvement
analogous to McRO’s improvement in 3-D animation techniques, or that
claim 1 recites more than an improvement in wholly abstract ideas using
computers as tools.
We also find no parallel between claim 1 and the patent-eligible
claim 1 in Example 42 of the USPTO’s “Subject Matter Eligibility
Examples: Abstract Ideas,” available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/101_examples_37to42_20190107.pdf (hereinafter
“Eligibility Examples”). Appeal Br. 26–27; Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant
argues that Example 42 illustrates that the “actual steps” of a method claim
are to be examined to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application. Appeal Br. 26. However, the
Examiner considered the additional elements individually and as an ordered
combination and determined that they were insufficient to integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application. See Final Act. 2–7, 30–36; see also
Ans. 7 (“looking at the additional elements individually and in combination,
does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application using the
considerations set forth in the [Guidance] (Step 2A Prong Two)”). We agree
with the Examiner.
To the extent Appellant argues that claim 1 is analogous to claim 1 of
Example 42, we disagree. Claim 1 of Example 42 was deemed patent
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eligible because it provided a specific improvement over prior systems by
allowing remote users to share information in real time in a standardized
format regardless of the format in which the information was originally
input. See Eligibility Examples 18–19. Hypothetical claim 1, thus,
addressed technological difficulties related to incompatible computer
formats, disparate geographic locations, and the untimely sharing of
information. See id. at 17. Appellant does not persuasively argue that a
comparable improvement is present here.
To the extent Appellant maintains that claim 1 is patent eligible
because there is no preemption (Appeal Br. 28), preemption is not the sole
test for patent eligibility. “[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Beyond the abstract idea of a certain method of organizing human
activity, Appellant’s claim 1 recites a “communicable coupling,” “at least
one computing device,” a “user interface,” “an input interface,” “at least one
processor,” and a “graphical user interface component” at a high level of
generality, i.e., as generic components. Appellant’s Specification further
illustrates that the claimed invention is implemented using generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See Spec. ¶¶ 84–91.
We find no indication in the Specification that the operations recited in
claim 1 require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive
computer components, i.e., a particular machine, invoke any allegedly
inventive programming, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
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functions. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.”).
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more
than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited
abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1
includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an
“inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements amount to
“significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. MPEP § 2106.05(I).
We agree with the Examiner that it does not.
Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to consider the actual steps
recited in claim 1 when evaluating whether the additional elements integrate
the abstract idea into a practical application. Reply Br. 7–8; see also Appeal
Br. 29–33. However, the Examiner considered the additional elements
individually and as an ordered combination and determined that they were
insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See
Final Act. 2–7, 30–36; see also Ans. 7 (explaining that “the rejection sets
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forth an explanation of why the additional elements, taken individually and
in combination, do not result in the claim, as a whole, amounting to
significantly more than the exception (Step 2B)”).
The MPEP instructs Examiners at Step 2B to
[r]e-evaluate any additional element or combination of elements
that was considered to be insignificant extra-solution activity
per MPEP § 2106.05 (g), because if such re-evaluation finds
that the element is unconventional or otherwise more than what
is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field,
this finding may indicate that the additional element is no
longer considered to be insignificant[.]”
MPEP § 2106.05(II). Appellant points to this instruction and argues that the
Examiner needs to consider whether the recited method steps are well-
understood, routine or conventional activity. See Appeal Br. 29–31.
However, here, each of limitations (a) through (u), as recited in claim 1,
belongs to the abstract idea. That is, at Step 2A, Prong Two, none of the
claimed method steps was characterized as an additional element that added
no more than insignificant extra-solution activity to the abstract idea and,
thus, that failed to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See
MPEP 2106.05(g).
Appellant similarly argues that claim 1 recites steps that are not
disclosed by prior art systems. Appeal Br. 30–31. However, neither a
finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness determination automatically leads
to the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent eligible. Although
the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an
“inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-
obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or combination of elements
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
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significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18 (citation omitted). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or
even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591. A novel and non-obvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89
(1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject
matter.”).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection is improper in light of
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), because the
Examiner has not provided any facts showing that all of the claimed steps
were well-understood, routine, or conventional in the prior art at the time the
patent application was filed. See Appeal Br. 31–32 (arguing that the
Examiner shows with reference to Appellant’s Specification that the
computer components were known, but not the claimed steps themselves).
However, these steps are part of the abstract idea itself; they are not
additional elements to be considered in determining whether claim 1
includes additional elements or a combination of elements sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Under step two of the Mayo/Alice framework, the elements of each
claim are considered both individually and “as an ordered combination” to
determine whether the additional elements, i.e., the elements other than the
abstract idea itself, “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible
application. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted). In other words,
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the inventive concept under step two of the Mayo/Alice test cannot be the
abstract idea itself:
It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot be the
abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the
numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible
because the only alleged “inventive concept” is the abstract idea.
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed
invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply
the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than
that ineligible concept.”).
The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only additional
elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea are generic computer
components for implementing the abstract idea. Final Act. 4–5. The
Specification supports the Examiner’s finding that the additional elements
(i.e., “communicable coupling,” “at least one computing device,” a “user
interface,” “an input interface,” “at least one processor,” “graphical user
interface component”) are generic computer components. See Spec.
¶¶ 86–91. Appellant does not show how any additional element alone or in
combination amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the abstract
idea itself. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290.
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and claims 2–30,
which fall with claim 1.
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Appellant additionally asserts that the rejection of dependent claim 31
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be withdrawn because of the additional specific
limitations recited therein. Appeal Br. 25, 31; Reply Br. 4. Claim 31 further
recites that in response to an input indicating completion of a task of the first
subset, a determination is made on the first mobile device whether the input
is received before an expected completion time. If not, a transmission is sent
to the electronic device that the task of the first subset is complete.
However, if the input is received before the expected completion time, then
the first mobile device indicates that the task is not able to be reported as
completed.
Appellant asserts that these limitations do not “monopolize the entire
field of worker management” (Appeal Br. 25; see also Reply Br. 4) and are
not disclosed by prior art systems (Appeal Br. 31). Yet, the limitations
recited in claim 31 further narrow the abstract idea itself, i.e., a certain
method for organizing human activity. And, a narrow and novel abstract
idea is, nonetheless, an abstract idea. Appellant does not present any
persuasive argument that claim 31 is not directed to the same abstract idea as
claim 1, or that claim 31 recites any additional limitations beyond the
abstract idea, that when considered individually and in combination,
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Obviousness
Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2–13, 16, 28, 30, and 31
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 1 because Weyl and Molander do not teach or
suggest at least
automatically scheduling the first subset of the set of
tasks to be performed by the first worker before the second
worker starts performing the second subset of the set of tasks,
wherein the scheduling is based on a first location information
associated with the first subset of the set of tasks and a second
location information associated with the second subset of the
set of tasks[,]
as recited in claim 1, limitation (d). Appeal Br. 36–41. This limitation
requires ordering the subsets of tasks to be performed based on their location
information. The Specification explains that location information associated
with the tasks is used to “improv[e] project efficiency by coordinating and
ordering tasks to optimize team performance.” Spec. ¶ 46. Tasks may be
scheduled to distribute workers throughout a worksite to “minimize
interference and improve effectiveness.” Id. For an exemplary project
involving cleaning an aircraft, workers are scheduled to clean upper surfaces
of a plane before lower surfaces. See id. In this way, if crumbs on upper
surfaces fall to the floor while cleaning upper surfaces, then they are
removed during cleaning of the lower surfaces. Id.
In rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner relies on
a combination of Weyl and Molander for teaching the argued limitation.
Final Act. 10–11 (citing Weyl ¶¶ 195, 197), 15–16 (citing Molander
¶¶ 55–56). Weyl relates to coordinating jobs or tasks among a plurality of
job owners and workers online. Weyl ¶ 3. A work management server
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searches for workers based on the location of the workers to find qualified
workers whose location matches a location associated with a selected task.
Id. ¶ 194, Fig. 13B. The work manager confirms a location of the worker
and computes a distance to the worker from the location associated with the
task. Id. ¶ 195. The system then filters and selects workers based on the
location of the worker. Id. In another embodiment, a worker searches tasks
based on location information. Id. ¶ 197. The work management server
receives the worker’s location from the worker’s mobile phone, and filters
tasks within a certain radius of the worker’s location for selection by the
worker. Id. ¶ 197, Fig. 13C.
The Examiner finds that assigning a worker based on a worker’s
location, as taught by Weyl, teaches that scheduling is based on a first
location information associated with the first subset of the set of tasks and a
second location information associated with the second subset of the set of
tasks, as required by limitation (d). Final Act. 10–11 (citing Weyl ¶¶ 195,
197). However, scheduling a worker based on the worker’s location in
relation to a task, as taught by Weyl, does not teach scheduling the order of
tasks to be performed (i.e., “a first subset of the set of tasks to be performed
before . . . [starting to perform] the second subset of the set of tasks”) based
on the location of the tasks (i.e., “a first location information associated with
the first subset of the set of tasks and a second location information
associated with the second subset of the set of tasks”).
Molander relates to systems for scheduling and managing resources
and tasks. Molander ¶ 2. Molander teaches that a task within a series of
tasks can be dependent on a prior task being completed before it can be
performed. Id. ¶ 55. Once tasks are assigned, alerts can be sent to a mobile
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device of the field service person or a responsible work group. Id. ¶ 56.
Real-time updates also allow other users of the work management system
(e.g., dispatcher, field service personnel, customer service representatives,
and managers) to know the real-time status of the series of tasks. Id.
The Examiner finds that Wyle does not teach “automatically
scheduling the first subset of the set of tasks to be performed by the first
worker before the second worker starts performing the second subset of the
tasks” and relies on Molander’s disclosure of dependent tasks for this aspect
of the claim language, as recited in limitation (d). Final Act. 15–16 (citing
Molander ¶¶ 55–56). Yet, although Molander teaches scheduling a task to
be dependent on another being completed before it can be performed,
Molander, like Wyle, fails to teach or suggest scheduling the order of tasks
to be performed (i.e., “a first subset of the set of tasks to be performed
before . . . [starting to perform] the second subset of the set of tasks”) based
on the location of the tasks (i.e., “a first location information associated with
the first subset of the set of tasks and a second location information
associated with the second subset of the set of tasks”), as required by
claim 1, limitation (d).
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–13, 16, 28, 30, and 31 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable.
Independent Claims 17, 22, and 27, and Dependent Claims 18–21 and
23–26
Independent claims 17, 22, and 27 recite language similar to
independent claim 1. The Examiner relies on the same findings and
rationale to reject claims 17, 22, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) that we
found erroneous with respect to the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 103(a). Therefore, we do not sustain the rejections of independent
claims 17, 22, and 27, and dependent claims 18–21 and 23–26 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons set forth above with respect to
independent claim 1.
Dependent Claims 14, 15, and 29
The Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 14, 15, and 29 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 do not cure the deficiency with respect to the rejection of
independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we do not sustain
the rejections of dependent claims 14, 15, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
for the same reasons set forth above with respect to independent claim 1.

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CONCLUSION

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–31 101 Eligibility 1–31
1–13, 16–
28, 30, 31
103(a) Weyl, Molander,
Van Pelt
1–13, 16–
28, 30, 31
14, 15 103(a) Weyl, Molander,
Van Pelt, Nielsen
14, 15
29 103(a) Weyl, Molander,
Van Pelt, Patel
29
Overall
Outcome
1–31
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(l).
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED