Splunk, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2020

2019002279 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/011,392 01/29/2016 R. David Carasso SP0021.04US.C3/269936 3695
128058 7590 10/01/2020
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
(Splunk Inc.)
2555 GRAND BLVD
KANSAS CITY, MO 64108
EXAMINER
ELLIS, MATTHEW J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2165
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentofficecorrespondence@splunk.com
shbdocketing@shb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte R. DAVID CARASSO, MICAH JAMES DELFINO, and
JOHNVEY HWANG
Appeal 2019-002279
Application 15/011,392
Technology Center 2100
Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–6, 8–16, 18–26, 28–30, and 34, which constitute
all claims pending in the application. Claims 7, 17, 27, and 31–33 have been
canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Splunk Inc.
Appeal Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND
The Claimed Invention
The invention relates to data presentation management, and “more
particularly . . . providing real time display of statistics and data field values
based for selected extraction rules.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claims 1, 11, and 21 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
invention and the subject matter of the appeal, and reads as follows:
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
accessing a set of events in a field-searchable data store,
each event including a portion of raw machine data that reflects
activity in an information technology environment and is
produced by a component of the information technology
environment, each event associated with a timestamp extracted
from the portion of raw machine data associated with the event
and having a plurality of fields with corresponding field values;
applying an extraction rule to extract field values for a
particular field in association with the set of events, including
the portion of raw machine data, accessed in the field-
searchable data store;
based on the extracted field values for the particular field,
determining one or more unique field values from the extracted
field values for the particular field in the plurality of events;
for each unique field value, determining a statistic
associated with each of the one or more unique field values in a
subset of the one or more unique field values based on the
determining of the one or more unique field values for the
particular field in the plurality of events, wherein the statistic
indicates a number of events having the unique field value
extracted in association with the particular field;
causing display of the subset of the one or more unique
field values;
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causing display of information related to the statistic
associated with the displayed unique field value among the
subset of the one or more unique field values;
wherein the method is performed by one or more
computing devices.
Appeal Br. 38–39 (Claims App.) (emphases added).
References
The references relied upon by the Examiner are:
Name Reference Date
Ivanov et al. (“Ivanov”) US 2007/0198565 Al Aug. 23, 2007
Ward et al. (“Ward”) US 2010/0275128 Al Oct. 28, 2010
Subrahmanyam et al.
(“Subrahmanyam”)
US 2011/0066585 Al Mar. 17, 2011
Hsieh et al. (“Hsieh”) US 2011/0246528 Al Oct. 6, 2011

The Rejections on Appeal
Claim 1 stands provisionally rejected on the grounds of nonstatutory
double patenting, as being unpatentable over claim 7 of copending
Application 15/582,669, and claim 1 of copending Applications 15/582,668,
15/582,667, 14/816038 and 14/816036. Final Act. 4.
Claims 1–6, 8–16, 18–26, 28–30, and 34 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 17–21.2

2 Portions of the Final Action and the Briefs refer to claims “1–30” as being
rejected, but this appears to be a typographical error because the only
pending claims are 1–6, 8–16, 18–26, 28–30, and 34. Appeal Br. 38–45
(Claims App.).
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Claims 1, 3–8, 11, 13–18, 21, and 23–28 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hsieh and Ward. Final Act. 21–
26.
Claims 2, 12, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Hsieh, Ward, and Subrahmanyam. Final Act. 26–28.
Claims 9, 10, 19, 20, 29, and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Hsieh, Ward, and Ivanov. Final Act. 28–29.
DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellant could have
made but did not make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On the record before us, Appellant’s arguments do not
persuade us of error. To the extent consistent with our discussion below, we
adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejection from
which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer. We provide the
following for highlighting and emphasis.
Nonstatutory Double Patenting Rejection
Appellant does not address the Examiner’s provisional rejection of
claim 1 on the ground of double patenting. Final Act. 4; Ans. 3. We,
therefore, summarily sustain that rejection.
Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner determined that claim 1 is directed merely to
“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results,” which
constitutes an abstract idea. Final Act. 17–18; Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank lnt’l,
573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (describing two-step framework “for
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distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts”). Further, the Examiner found that additional elements of claim 1
are “recited at a high level of generality” and involve only “conventional”
computer functions and, therefore, do not amount to significantly more than
the abstract idea. Final Act. 17–18. Accordingly, the Examiner concluded
that claim 1 constitutes ineligible subject matter.
Appellant argues that claim 1 is “directed to an improvement in
computer-related technology (e.g. applying effective extraction rules via
effective data presentation management)” through unique “statistics.”
Appeal Br. 10–14; Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant argues that claim 1 recites
“novel” features to facilitate “analysis of extracted values (e.g., via the
statistic indicating number of events having the unique field value extracted
in association with the particular field)” in order to enable “effective
extraction rules utilization.” Reply Br. 2–3.
Pursuant to the USPTO’s “Revised Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance,” which synthesizes case law and provides agency instruction on
the application of § 101, we must look to whether a claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes)
(“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (“Step 2A, Prong
Two”).
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See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance 84
Fed. Reg. 50, 54–55 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (collectively “Step 2B”).
We begin our review with Step 2A, Prong One of the Guidance, as
applied to Appellant’s claim 1.3
As the Examiner determined, claim 1 is directed to a “method
performed on one or more computing devices,” including the steps of
“accessing” data reflecting an “activity” and having a “timestamp,” applying
a “rule” to extract values, “determining” values and “statistics,” and causing
“display” of “values” and “information.” Final Act. 17–18; Appeal Br. 38–
39. Each of the foregoing steps simply recites collecting, analyzing, or
displaying information according to rules, which is a mental process (or,
alternatively, a mathematical concept to the extent the “rules” apply a
mathematical formula). See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d

3 The Guidance refers to “Step One” as determining whether the claimed
subject matter falls within the four statutory categories identified by
35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
This step is not at issue in this case.
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1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “collecting information, analyzing
it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” are “a
familiar class of claims ‘directed to’ a patent ineligible concept”). The fact
that the collection and analysis is performed on a general purpose computer
does not make the claim patent-eligible. See id.
Thus, upon review of claim 1, we agree with the Examiner’s
determination that the foregoing steps individually, and in combination,
recite one or more of the categories deemed abstract under the Guidance.
We next proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance. Under this
step, if the claim “as a whole” integrates the abstract idea into a “practical
application,” it is patent eligible. Appellant argues that claim 1 is directed to
improving technology, and specifically, improves “computer related
technology” by “applying effective extraction rules via effective data
presentation management.” Reply Br. 5.
Improving the functioning of a computing device or system can reflect
integration of an idea into a “practical application.” Guidance Section III;
see also DDR, 773 F.3d 1245; Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant, however, does
not explain, and we do not discern, any improvement in technology from the
claimed invention. Cf. Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350 (“harness[ing a] technical
feature of network technology in a filtering system” to customize content
filtering); DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claims at issue
here specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a
desired result––a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence
of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.”) (emphasis
added). The claims in Bascom and DDR, for example, were “necessarily
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rooted in computer technology” in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks, see, e.g., DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257,
but Appellant’s claim 1 recites instructions to obtain (extract) and display
data, without reciting any particular technical application. Further, claim 1
uses a computer in its ordinary capacity, and does not recite any specific
improvement to the way computers operate. Appeal Br. 38–39; Spec. ¶¶ 31,
32, 37, 39. Cf. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1330–33, 1336.
Appellant also does not direct us to any evidence that claim 1 recites
any unconventional rules, transforms or reduces an element to a different
state or thing, or otherwise integrates the idea into a practical application.
Finally, under Step 2B of the Guidance, we must look to whether the
claims include any “additional limitation that is not well-understood, routine
[or] conventional.” The “question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Mortg. Grader, Inc. v.
First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of
fact).
Claim 1 recites “an extraction rule” that operates to “determine”
various values and statistics, and “display” data. See supra. According to
the Specification, the steps of claim 1 are performed using general purpose,
conventional computing devices and program instructions. Spec. ¶¶ 31, 32,
37, 39. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that simply using standard,
generic computer elements to implement the foregoing managing of
resources is well understood, routine, and conventional, and is not a
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meaningful limitation that amounts to significantly more than an abstract
idea. Ans. 6. Further, although Appellant asserts that claim 1 includes
“novel” or unconventional elements, Appellant provides no evidence or
persuasive argument to rebut any of the Examiner’s foregoing findings.
Reply Br. 2–4. For example, Appellant does not address the Examiner’s
finding that the Specification describes only generic, standard computing
elements implementing the steps in claim 1.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1
merely uses computer elements in the implementation of an abstract idea,
which does not equate to providing a technical solution to a technical
problem. Ans. 4–6.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of error. We also are
not persuaded of error regarding the remaining claims, which are not argued
separately. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s subject matter-eligibility
rejection of all pending claims.
Rejections Under Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests “applying an extraction rule to extract field values” for a particular
field in association with the set of events “accessed in the field-searchable
data store,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 28–30. Specifically, Appellant
asserts that the Examiner relies on Hsieh, but in Hsieh, “events” are not
accessed in a field-searchable data store until after a regular expression is
applied. Id. Appellant also argues that Hsieh fails to teach “unique field
values are determined from such extracted field values for the particular
field in the events,” as Hsieh only “generally discusses a feature extractor
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that can ‘scan raw data and pull out structured data (e.g., numbers).’” Id. at
30 (quoting Hsieh ¶ 139). We, however, are not persuaded of error.
As the Examiner finds, Hsieh teaches that a regular expression can be
used to “scan raw data and pull out structured data.” Hsieh ¶ 139; Ans. 6–7.
This teaching corresponds to the “raw machine data accessed in a field-
searchable data store,” because “field-searchable” means (according to
Appellant’s Specification) that a regular expression can extract specific
portions of the data. See Spec. ¶¶ 25, 27 (describing “data field extraction
rule” as applied to identify and extract field values from data, and may
include regular expressions). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred in finding Hsieh teaches or suggests the “applying an
extraction rule” limitation of claim 1.
Regarding the “unique field values” recited in claim 1, the Examiner
finds, and we agree, that Hsieh teaches displaying a “histogram” of the
frequency of certain words in a data stream. Hsieh ¶ 119; Ans. 7.
Appellant’s Specification similarly describes the claimed “unique data
fields” as counting the number of times a specific term (e.g., “Bob,”
“Ralph,” and “John”) appears in a paragraph. Spec. ¶ 88. We, therefore, are
not persuaded of error.
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of error as to claim 1, as well as
claims 3–8, 11, 13–18, 21, and 23–28 (all of which were not argued
separately).
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 9, 10, 19,
20, 29, and 30 for the same reasons as claim 1, and that the additional
citation of Ivanov does not cure the deficiencies. For the same reasons as
discussed above, however, we are unpersuaded of error.
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Appellant also argues the rejection of claims 2, 12, and 22 separately
(as a group) from claim 1. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on
Ward’s teaching of a “topic of interest” does not satisfy “a selection of a
particular unique field value among a subset of unique field values that have
been displayed,” as recited in claim 2 (and substantively repeated in claims
12 and 22). Appeal Br. 33–34; Reply Br. 10. Appellant asserts that the
Examiner switched from relying on Subrahmanyam (in the Final Action) to
relying on Ward (in the Answer) as teaching the disputed limitation. Reply
Br. 10. Again, however, we are not persuaded of error.
The Examiner relies on a combination of Subrahmanyam with Ward,
together modifying Hsieh for teaching the disputed limitation. The
Examiner finds:
Ward teaches in paragraph [0103], that a topic of interest
can be selected, wherein this is equivalent to selecting a unique
field value among a subset of unique field values that have been
displayed. Also, in paragraph [0133], Ward teaches that a
summary dashboard can include a topic summary for selected
topics of interest, wherein this is equivalent to determining a set
of events which include the selected field values.
Subrahmanyam goes into detail about selection of a value,
wherein this is closer to the language of field value as recited in
the claims. However, Ward teaches selection of a displayed
value and determining the events which contain the value.
Paragraph [0106] of the specification describes a user selects an
extracted value and the event records with the extracted value
may be displayed. Based on a reasonable interpretation in view
of the specification, Hsieh as modified teaches the claimed
limitation.
Ans. 9.
Appellant’s arguments are directed to Subrahmanyam (in the Opening
Brief) and Ward (in the Reply Brief) individually, rather than addressing the
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Examiner’s combination of references and identifying error therein.
Because “one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
references,” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981), we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the obviousness rejections of 1–
6, 8–16, 18–26, and 28–30.
SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1 N/A Nonstatutory
Double Patenting
1
1–30 101 Eligibility 1–6, 8–16,
18–26, 28–
30, 34

1, 3–8, 11,
13–18, 21,
23–28
103 Hsieh, Ward 1, 3–8, 11,
13–18, 21,
23–28

2, 12, 22 103 Hsieh, Ward,
Subrahmanyam
2, 12, 22
9, 10, 19,
20, 29, 30
103 Hsieh, Ward,
Ivanov
9, 10, 19,
20, 29, 30

Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–16,
18–26, 28–
30, 34

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting all pending claims, i.e.,
claims 1–6, 8–16, 18–26, 28–30, and 34.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED