Singhal, Tara Chand.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 30, 2020

2019004259 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/997,560 01/17/2016 Tara Chand Singhal 11195.309F 5874
103550 7590 10/30/2020
Tara Chand Singhal
P.O. Box 5075
Torrance, CA 90510
EXAMINER
GEROLEO, FRANCIS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2485
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chand@internetpromise.com
singhal@att.net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte TARA CHAND SINGHAL
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Appeal 2019-004259
Application 14/997,560
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–17, all of the pending claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the named inventor, Tara Chand Singhal, prosecuting the patent
application pro se, as the real party-in-interest. Appeal Br. 4, 44.
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SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to a
camera system for use in a mobile handheld computing and
communication device with a front side with a display screen
and a back side has two separate and independent cameras
positioned on the back side of the device, wherein the cameras
have a physical separation between them of substantially the
same separation as between the eyes on a human face and,
wherein the camera system creates a 3D-Like image of an
object for storage and for viewing on a display screen.
Abstract.
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
(Disputed Limitations Emphasized and Bracketing Added)
1. An apparatus for a camera system for use in a mobile
handheld wireless device that is one of a smart phone and a
tablet computer, with a front side with a display screen and a
back side, comprising:
(a) the apparatus is a mobile handheld wireless communication
and computing device with a processor, a memory and an
operating system and with a depth not exceeding half an inch,
the [1] mobile handheld device has a camera system with two
separate and independent cameras positioned on a back side of
the mobile handheld device, wherein the cameras have a
physical separation between them of substantially a same
separation that is between eyes on a human face;
(b) the cameras, each camera with a body, a lens and a charge
coupled device (CCD) image sensor, simultaneously capture
two separate images of an object or a scene and [2] a camera
logic operating in the processor and the memory of the mobile
handheld device merges the two separate images to create a
single three dimension (3D-[Like]) image for storage and for
viewing on the display screen;
(c) the camera logic takes data from individual pixels from the
left image and the right image and merges the images by
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positioning individual pixels of the right image, to the right of
the individual pixels of the left image in proximity, creating a
pixel pair, wherein the pixel pair is visually perceived by a
human as a single pixel with richer visual details then a pixel
from ether of the two separate images.
THE EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS AND CITED REFERENCES
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 7–9, and 12–14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) as indefinite. Final Act. 2.
The Examiner also rejects claims 1–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over the combined teachings of GSMArena team, This summer, in
3D: LG Optimus 3D review, available at https://www.gsmarena.com/
lg_optimus_3d-review-622.php (July 22, 2011; last accessed Oct. 19, 2020)
(“GSMArena”) and Kuroki (US 2005/0175257 A1; published Aug. 11,
2005). Final Act. 3–10.
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
Claim 1 recites [2] “a camera logic [that] merges the two separate
images to create a single three dimension (3D-[Like]) image for storage and
for viewing on the display screen.” In rejecting claim 1 as indefinite, the
Examiner finds that, even in light of the Specification’s teachings, “the term
‘3d-like image’ is not clearly understood [and] does not provide a clear
definition of what is a ‘like’ [sic] and the term’s meaning is subject to
different interpretations and scope.” Final Act. 2 (citing Spec., 3:8–11, 3:24–
25); Ans. 12–13. Appellant contends the Examiner errs because “what is
termed here as [a] 3D-Like image is . . . a stereoscopic image.” Appeal
Br. 12; Reply Br. 7–8.
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The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is whether “those
skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in
light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
Definiteness problems often arise when words of degree are
used in a claim. That some claim language may not be precise,
however, does not automatically render a claim invalid. When a
word of degree is used the [factfinder] must determine whether
the patent’s specification provides some standard for measuring
that degree. The [factfinder] must decide, that is, whether one
of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is claimed
when the claim is read in light of the specification.
Seattle Box Co. v. Indust. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial court’s determination that an expert would
know the limitations of the claims because the specification clearly sets forth
a standard for measuring the degree used in the claim language).
Here, the Specification discloses that a “3D-Like image is . . . a
stereoscopic image.” Spec., 3:8–9. Such stereoscopic images were known in
the art at the time of the invention, as was their merger (e.g., through
combining left and right images as juxtaposed images or in alternating
between left and right images in a checkboard pattern). E.g., Husak et al.
(US 10,136,118 B2; issued Nov. 20, 2018), Abstract; Routhier et al. (US
2005/0117637 A1; published June 2, 2005) ¶ 16; Kuroki ¶ 81, Figs. 2A–C.
The Specification further discloses that a 3D-Like image is “a stereoscopic
image as seen by the two eyes on a human face.” Id. at 3:24–25. This
disclosure provides a standard for measuring the claimed term of degree.
Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also Kuroki ¶ 140 (showing that it was known that 65 mm is the
approximate distance between human eyes). Thus, an artisan of ordinary
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skill would have understood the claimed 3D-Like image to be a stereoscopic
image formed by separate images as seen by the two eyes on a human face
that have been merged into a single image. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the
level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior
art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not
shown’”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755
F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Therefore, recitation [2]—including the
“3D-Like” limitation—is definite.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
rejection of claim 1, or of claims 2–4, 7–9, and 12–14, which the Examiner
similarly rejects.
Obviousness
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious, the Examiner relies on GSMArena’s
disclosure of a phone with a front facing camera and dual cameras on the
back to teach that a “mobile handheld device [that] has a camera system with
two separate and independent cameras positioned on a back side of the
mobile handheld device, wherein the cameras have a physical separation
between them.” Final Act. 3 (citing GSMArena 1–2). The Examiner
acknowledges that GSMArena “fails to particularly disclose the physical
separation between them of substantially a same separation that is between
[the] eyes on a human face.” Id. at 4. Thus, the Examiner relies on Kuroki’s
disclosure of front-facing cameras, separated approximately 65mm apart, to
suggest modifying GSMArena’s dual cameras on the back side to “have a
physical separation between them of substantially a same separation that is
between eyes on a human face.” Id. at 5 (citing Kuroki ¶ 140). The
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Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to combine GSMArena
and Kuroki in the manner of claim 1, including recitation [1], “in order to
realize conversation in a natural eye-to-eye matching state with a
conversation partner.” Final Act. 5; Ans. 14 (citing Kuroki Abstract, ¶ 21).
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “the two camera
lenses on the backside of the LG Optimus 3D are positioned a very small
distance away from each other” (Appeal Br. 17) and because the Examiner
relies on impermissible hindsight reasoning in concluding that Kuroki
suggests separating the cameras on the back of the LG Optimus 3D to be
substantially the same as the separation between eyes on a human face (id. at
18; Reply Br. 12–13).
We agree with Appellant the Examiner does not show that disputed
recitation [1] would have been obvious over the combined teachings of
GSMArena and Kuroki, but for reliance on impermissible hindsight.
Specifically, the Examiner’s conclusion that Kuroki would have made it
obvious to modify GSMArena to increase the distance between the cameras
on the back of the LG Optimus 3D “to realize conversation in a natural eye-
to-eye matching state with a conversation partner” (Final Act. 5) lacks a
rational underpinning.
In both Kuroki and GSMArena, conversations where the partners can
see one another make use of at least one camera on the front of the phone.
That is, GSMArena has a “[f]ront facing camera with video calls”
(GSMArena 2) while Kuroki teaches placing left and right cameras on the
same side as a screen (i.e., the front of a device) (Kuroki ¶ 140, Fig. 1).
Increasing the separation of the dual cameras on the back of the
LG Optimus 3D would not have effected “conversation in a natural eye-to-
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eye matching state,” as the Examiner posits (Final Act. 5), because neither
GSMArena nor Kuroki teaches or suggests turning the camera around to the
back side—the side without a screen—when engaged in a video call. Kuroki,
in particular, uses two cameras on either side of a screen to “provide the
eye-to-eye matching effect comparable to that obtained by positioning one
camera at the center of the imaginary screen.” Kuroki ¶ 141.
Although Kuroki details experiments conducted with an imaginary
screen (id. ¶ 140), the Examiner fails to show that Kuroki teaches or
suggests placing two cameras on the side of a device that does not have a
screen (i.e., the back side of the device) at a distance of substantially the
same separation that is between the eyes on a human face for purposes of
enabling conversation in a natural eye-to-eye matching state. Therefore, the
Examiner fails to show that recitation [1] would have been obvious in light
of the combined teachings and suggestions of GSMArena and Kuroki.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of claim 1, or of claims 2–17, which contain similar recitations.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 7–9,
12–14
112(b) Indefiniteness 1–4, 7–9,
12–14
1–17 103 GSMArena, Kuroki 1–17
Overall
Outcome
1–17
REVERSED