Sidney Rosenberg, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 29, 2005
01a55011 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 29, 2005)

01a55011

11-29-2005

Sidney Rosenberg, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Sidney Rosenberg v. United States Postal Service

01A55011

November 29, 2005

.

Sidney Rosenberg,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A55011

Agency No. 4A-110-0167-04

DECISION

Complainant filed an EEO complaint in which he claimed that the agency

discriminated against him on the basis of his religion (Jewish) when

his bid position was abolished, effective October 2, 2004. Complainant

claimed that the agency subjected him to disparate treatment and failed

to accommodate his religious beliefs.

The record reveals that complainant, a Sales and Service Associate, PS-5,

had worked at the Kingsway Finance Station in Brooklyn, New York for over

five years and had held his bid with Saturdays off since January 2000.

The agency stated that pursuant to a Function 4 Audit, complainant's

bid was abolished because complainant was needed to work on Saturdays.

On September 27, 2004, complainant notified his supervisor of his need of

an accommodation for his religious observance of the Sabbath on Saturdays.

Complainant's supervisor stated that he could not approve complainant's

request due to the needs of the agency.<1>

The complaint was accepted for investigation. Subsequent to the

completion of the agency investigation, the agency notified complainant

of his right to request either a hearing and decision by an EEOC

Administrative Judge or an immediate final action by the agency.

Complainant requested a final action. The agency therefore issued a

final action dated June 15, 2005, finding that no discrimination occurred.

The agency determined that complainant failed to set forth a prima facie

case of disparate treatment religion discrimination. The agency noted

that two other employees also had their bids abolished, and that the

only one whose bid was not abolished was one who did not have Saturdays

and Sundays as days off. The agency further determined with regard to

any alleged failure to accommodate complainant's religious beliefs that

other positions were available to complainant throughout Brooklyn, which

would have accommodated his Sabbath requirements and for which he did not

elect to bid. The agency stated that six employees, with less seniority

than complainant, received such positions as a result of a voluntary bid.

The agency noted that complainant stated that he would like to remain

in his current station and have Saturday off. According to the agency,

access to the agency's bidding procedure is a form of accommodation,

and complainant's failure to take advantage of it establishes that

discrimination did not occur.

On appeal, complainant contends that the Manager, EEO Compliance &

Appeals, advised him to have a final action issued by the agency rather

than pursue a hearing. Complainant maintains that the agency can

accommodate his request to have Saturdays off since it does not pose an

undue hardship. Complainant states that a Union official advised him

not to bid for another position.

In response, the agency asserts that the Manager, EEO Compliance &

Appeals, denies that he advised complainant to request that a final action

be issued rather than pursue a hearing. The agency further notes that

it is not responsible for the advice of the non�management official who

advised complainant against bidding for other positions. The agency

states that there were seven bids with Saturday and Sunday rest days

where complainant would have been senior to all of the successful bidders.

The agency argues that it is apparent that complainant wanted to observe

the Sabbath without moving from his current work facility. The agency

maintains that it is under no obligation to employ complainant in the

station of his choice, as long as it is willing to provide a reasonable

accommodation. The agency asserts that the seven cited bid positions,

all of which were awarded to less senior employees, and which would

have been awarded to complainant had he bid, demonstrate such reasonable

accommodation.

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case claiming

discrimination is a three-step process as set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), and its progeny.

For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step

normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,

need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,

the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions

were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department

of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990).

Initially, we find that complainant has not submitted sufficiently

persuasive evidence to support his contention that the Manager, EEO

Compliance & Appeals, advised him to forego a hearing and have a final

action issued. For purposes of analysis, we will assume, arguendo, that

complainant has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment

discrimination on the basis of religion. Next, the Commission finds

that the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its action.

The agency stated that complainant's bid position was abolished pursuant

to a Function 4 Audit that dictated staffing at the Kingsway facility

be realigned due to operational needs. Complainant's supervisor stated

that the Function 4 Audit estimated the need for a certain amount of

positions in the unit. According to complainant's supervisor, he was

asked to give information to the workforce realignment team about what

would be best for the tours of duty for positions and what would make

the most sense regarding days off for the positions. We find that the

agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision

to abolish complainant's bid position.

We find that complainant has not established that the agency's

operational needs were a pretext intended to hide its discriminatory

intent. Complainant has made no showing that the implementation of the

Function 4 Audit was intended to discriminate against him on the basis

of his religion. We observe that all three level five Sales Associates,

including complainant, had their positions abolished. The only Sales and

Service Associate whose position was not abolished did not have Saturday

and Sunday as his days off, and is Jewish. We find that complainant has

not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's stated

reasons for abolishing his bid position were pretext intended to mask

discriminatory intent.

Under Title VII, employers are required to accommodate the religious

practices of their employees unless a requested accommodation is shown

to impose an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(b)(1). The traditional

framework for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on

religious accommodation requires complainant to demonstrate that: (1) he

has a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with

his employment; (2) he informed the agency of this belief and conflict,

and; (3) the agency nevertheless enforced its requirement against him.

Baum v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01A05985 (March

21, 2002) (citations omitted).

�A refusal to accommodate is justified only when an employer . . . can

demonstrate that an undue hardship would in fact result from each

available alternative method of accommodation.� 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(c).

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(d), alternatives for accommodating an

employee's religious practices include, but are not limited to, voluntary

substitutes and swaps, flexible scheduling, and lateral transfers and job

changes. In order to show undue hardship, an employer must demonstrate

that an accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost. Baum,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A05985 (citation omitted).

Initially, we find that complainant has established a prima facie case

regarding a denial of religious accommodation. There is evidence

to support the position that complainant has a bona fide religious

belief that he should observe the Sabbath. Complainant informed

his supervisor of this belief on September 27, 2004, prior to his

bid position being abolished and the loss of his Saturday day off.

The record reveals that complainant was afforded several opportunities

to bid on positions in Brooklyn that did not require work on Saturdays.

Complainant would have had a seniority advantage over at least six

successful applicants for such positions. Nevertheless, complainant

chose not to pursue these positions. An agency is not required to

provide the specific accommodation preferred by a complainant and need

only provide an effective accommodation. See Gaytko v. Broadcasting Board

of Governors, International Broadcasting Bureau, EEOC Appeal No. 01A03297

(Sept. 16, 1997) (citations omitted). We find that the agency provided

complainant with an effective accommodation of his religious beliefs when

complainant was provided with the option to bid for positions that would

have permitted him to avoid working on Saturdays. See id. (finding,

in part, that an agency offer that complainant could seek a midnight

shift without Saturday work was an effective accommodation).

The Commission AFFIRMS the agency's decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 29, 2005

__________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1Complainant's current bid is at the Kingsway Finance Station with

Thursday and Sunday off.