Shuster, Gary Stephen.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 9, 2020

14580040 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/580,040 12/22/2014 Gary Stephen Shuster 67073.05336 9878
112918 7590 04/09/2020
Coleman & Horowitt, LLP
499 W. Shaw Ave., Ste. 116
Fresno, CA 93704
EXAMINER
GARG, YOGESH C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocketing@ch-law.com
nalshikhaiti@ch-law.com
sflynn@ch-law.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GARY STEPHEN SHUSTER
____________

Appeal 2019-004474
Application 14/580,040
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 32 and 34–51, which constitute all of the claims
pending in this application. Claims 1–31 and 33 have been cancelled.
Br. 15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest Gary Stephen
Shuster. Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to “methods and
systems for facilitating resupply orders for a consumable commodity,
including methods and systems using a stand-alone electronic device
incorporated into retail product packaging.” Spec. 1.2
Claim 32, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
32. A method comprising:
associating, in a memory of a computer server, a scheme
identifier to an automated ordering scheme identifying a
commodity, a quantity of the commodity, and a physical
shipping address for a user account identified by an account
identifier;
receiving a transmission from a client device coupled to a
code provision device, the transmission including digital
information encoding the scheme identifier and an account
identifier, wherein the code provision device with the scheme
identifier is supplied with the commodity to the physical address;
and
automatically placing a purchase order according to the
automated ordering scheme, in response to receiving the
transmission.

2 We refer to the Specification filed Dec. 22, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action mailed Apr. 30, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief filed Dec. 3, 2018
(“Br.”); and Examiner’s Answer mailed Jan. 8, 2019 (“Ans.”).
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REJECTION3
Claims 32 and 34–51 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 10.4

ANALYSIS
A. Section 101
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4

3 In addition to the rejection recited below, the Examiner rejected 39–41 and
45–50 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph and claims 32, 34–42, and 44–
51 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Final Act. 4–7. Those
rejections were withdrawn in the Answer. Ans. 3.
4 The Examiner’s statement of the rejection includes claim 33, which has
been canceled. See Final Act. 10. We find this to be a harmless
typographical error.
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing

5 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
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human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).6
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

C. Our Analysis
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to “the abstract
idea of placing orders for commodity for a user based on received

6 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2),
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
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information related to the commodity and a user of the commodity.” Final
Act. 10. Specifically, the Examiner concludes that the claimed invention is
directed to the “concept of facilitating of placing orders for resupply orders
based on received information related to order [and] is abstract similar to
‘Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity,’ related to ‘Fundamental
Economic Practices.’” Id. at 11 (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see Ans. 4, 8.
Appellant argues that the claims “do not seek to cover the creation of
a contractual relationship.” Br. 6. Appellant also argues that the claimed
invention is “more than a mere migration of a fundamental economic
practice from pencil and paper to computer.” Id. at 7.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred.
Representative claim 32—with emphasis added—is reproduced
below:
32. A method comprising:
associating, in a memory of a computer server, a scheme
identifier to an automated ordering scheme identifying a
commodity, a quantity of the commodity, and a physical shipping
address for a user account identified by an account identifier;
receiving a transmission from a client device coupled to a
code provision device, the transmission including digital
information encoding the scheme identifier and an account
identifier, wherein the code provision device with the scheme
identifier is supplied with the commodity to the physical address;
and
automatically placing a purchase order according to the
automated ordering scheme, in response to receiving the
transmission.
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Claim 42 similarly recites an “apparatus comprising a processor and a
memory coupled to the processor, wherein the memory holds program
instructions, that when executed by the processor, causes the apparatus to
perform” the method steps of claim 32. Claim 51 similarly recites an
“apparatus comprising means for” performing the method steps of claim 32.
As relevant here, the 2019 Revised Guidance explains that
“organizing human activity” includes “commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations;
advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations).”
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The emphasized limitations above are each directed to marketing or
sales activities or behaviors (placing a purchase order according to an
ordering scheme). Specifically, the claim limitations identified above are
directed to (i) associating an identifier with an ordering scheme to identify a
commodity to be ordered, the quantity of the commodity to be ordered, and
the shipping address for commodity to the recipient user (i.e., “associating
. . . a scheme identifier to an automated ordering scheme identifying a
commodity, a quantity of the commodity, and a physical shipping address
for a user account identified by an account identifier”); (ii) receiving a
transmission from a recipient user’s client device with information about the
ordering scheme and the recipient user (i.e., “receiving a transmission from a
client device coupled to a code provision device, the transmission including
digital information encoding the scheme identifier and an account
identifier”); (iii) placing an order according to the ordering scheme (i.e.,
“placing a purchase order according to the automated ordering scheme, in
response to receiving the transmission”); and (iv) receiving the commodity
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ordered at the location of a code provision device that is coupled to the
recipient user’s client device (i.e., “wherein the code provision device with
the scheme identifier is supplied with the commodity to the physical
address”). Each of these steps, both individually and as a combination, are
directed to sales activities based on user preferences and user needs.
Accordingly, we conclude that claims 32, 42, and 51 recite a method
of sales activities or behaviors, which is an example of organizing human
activity as identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance, and thus an abstract
idea.
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether claim 32 is “directed to” the identified
abstract ideas, we next consider whether claim 32 recites additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the
reasons set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in claim 32 that integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Appellant argues that, “[r]ather than a free-floating abstract idea that
people should be able to reorder commodities, the claims describe a device
. . . whereby packaging for a commodity includes a mechanism that
determines when a commodity should be reordered, and triggers the
reordering.” Br. 4–5. According to Appellant, the “claims do not simply
‘call on a ‘computing device’ with basic functionality’ to do what a person
can do routinely.” Id. at 8. Specifically, Appellant argues that the claimed
invention describes performing “automated reorder . . . when a commodity
supply drops below a certain level, utilizing specialized hardware (a code
provision device).” Id.
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We are not persuaded. The Examiner properly concludes that the
claims are “directed to the functions of a computer server and not to a client
device.” Ans. 11. Appellant’s arguments are based on the use of alleged
specialized hardware (i.e., “code provision device”) that integrates the
judicial exception (i.e., sales activities and behaviors) into a practical
application. However, claim 32 merely recites interacting with a code
provision device, but does not specifically limit the code provision device.
For instance, claim 32 recites “receiving a transmission from a client
device coupled to a code provision device, the transmission including digital
information encoding the scheme identifier and an account identifier,
wherein the code provision device with the scheme identifier is supplied with
the commodity to the physical address.” Independent claim 42, similarly,
recites an apparatus that performs “receiving a transmission from a client
device couple to the code provision device, the transmission including digital
information encoding the scheme identifier and an account identifier,
wherein the code provision device with the scheme identifier is supplied with
the commodity to the physical address.” Independent claim 51 recites an
apparatus comprising “means for receiving a transmission from a client
device coupled to a code provision device, the transmission including digital
information encoding the scheme identifier and an account identifier,
wherein the code provision device with the scheme identifier is supplied with
the commodity to the physical address.” Contrary to Appellant’s argument
that the claims require “utilizing specialized hardware (a code provision
device)” that is part of the packaging for a commodity and determines when
to reorder a commodity, each of the independent claims requires the code
provision device merely be (i) coupled to the client device; and (ii) in the
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location where the commodity is sent. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments are
not commensurate with the scope of the claims.
Furthermore, claim 32 does not constitute an improvement to
computer technology; rather, it merely improves the abstract idea of sales
activities for ordering commodities when needed. For example, as
Appellant argues, the claim provides “trigger[ing] an automated reorder
performed utilizing specialized hardware when the commodity supply drops
to a certain level.” Br. 7. However, as discussed above, the claim does not
recite the use of any specialized hardware. Additionally, the result of
triggering the reorder of a commodity when the supply drops to a certain
level merely improves the sales activities associated with sale of
commodities. No improvements are made to the technology used in the sale
of commodities.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
determination that claims 32, 42, and 51 are directed to an abstract idea, and
we find the claimed additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application.
USPTO Step 2B
Turning to step 2B of the USPTO Guidance, we look to whether
claim 32 (a) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner concludes that the claimed additional limitations use
“computers . . . recited at a high level of generality” and “general purpose
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computers/generic computing devices . . . for implementing basic computer
functions and non-significant steps.” Final Act. 13; see Ans. 5, 9, 11–12.
Appellant argues that the “claims do not simply ‘call on a ‘computing
device’ with basic functionality’ to do what a person can do routinely.”
Br. 8. Specifically, Appellant argues that the claimed invention utilizes
“specialized hardware (a code provision device).” Id.
As discussed above, Appellant’s arguments that the claims recite a
“code provision device” as “specialized hardware” are not commensurate
with the scope of the claims. Instead, the “code provision device” in the
claims is merely (i) coupled to the client device; and (ii) in the location
where the commodity is sent. Otherwise, the claimed computer components
comprise “a memory of a computer server” and “a client device.”
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the claimed computer components (i.e., “a computer server”
and “a client device”)—whether considered individually or as an ordered
combination—perform anything other than well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions, such as collecting data (i.e., collecting data such as
an ordering scheme identifying a commodity, quantity of the commodity,
and physical shipping address), transmitting data (i.e., receiving a
transmission from a client device), and manipulating data (i.e., associating
the ordering scheme with an identifier, and determining to place the
purchase order). See Ans. 11–15 (concluding the ordered combination of
elements does not provide an inventive concept). Those types of generic
computer components performing generic computer functions—both
individually and in combination—have been found to be well understood,
routine, and conventional. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
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830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the claims, understood in
light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf,
conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering,
sending, and presenting the desired information”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and
sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not
even arguably inventive”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d
607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (server that receives data, extracts classification
information from the received data, and stores the digital images insufficient
to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing,
sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (use of Internet to verify credit-card transaction does not add enough
to abstract idea of verifying the transaction); see also MPEP § 2106.05(d)
(“Courts have held computer‐implemented processes not to be significantly
more than an abstract idea (and thus ineligible) where the claim as a whole
amounts to nothing more than generic computer functions merely used to
implement an abstract idea, such as an idea that could be done by a human
analog (i.e., by hand or by merely thinking.”)). Similarly, for the reasons set
forth in the Answer—which we adopt as our own—“the computing devices
limitations are simply a field of use that is an attempt to limit the abstract
idea to a particular technological environment.” Ans. 12; see Final Act.14.
Appellant further argues that the “claimed solutions amount to an
inventive concept for integrating the digital and non-digital worlds, and thus,
do not preempt every application of an automated ordering scheme.” Br. 9.
Appellant compares the claimed invention to that of DDR Holdings. Id.
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(citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.Com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2014)).
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that certain claims
satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two because “the claimed solution
amount[ed] to an inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-
centric problem,” i.e., a challenge unique to the Internet. DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1257–59; see Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “[i]n DDR Holdings, we held that
claims ‘directed to systems and methods of generating a composite web page
that combines certain visual elements of a “host” website with content of a
third-party merchant’ contained the requisite inventive concept”). The
Federal Circuit explained that the patent-eligible claims specified “how
interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result . . .
that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily
triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258.
The court reasoned that those claims recited a technological solution
“necessarily rooted in computer technology” that addressed a “problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” Id. at 1257.
According to the Federal Circuit, “DDR Holdings does not apply
when . . . the asserted claims do not ‘attempt to solve a challenge particular
to the Internet.’” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
873 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d
at 613). Unlike the patent-eligible claims in DDR Holdings, the claims here
do not attempt to solve a challenge particular to the Internet. See Br. 15–17;
Ans. 11. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that “the computing devices
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limitations are simply a field of use that is an attempt to limit the abstract
idea to a particular technological environment.” Final Act. 14.
Moreover, while preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its
absence does not establish patent eligibility. See FairWarning IP, LLC v.
Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering
a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and
made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Conclusion on Section 101 Rejection
Accordingly, we sustain the § 101 rejection of claim 32 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, as well as independent claims 42
and 51 with commensurate limitations, argued for similar reasons to
claim 32. See Br. 10–11.
Dependent Claims
I. Dependent Claim 43
We also sustain the § 101 rejection of dependent claim 43 because
Appellant does not argue eligibility separately for it. See Br. 13; 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
II. Dependent Claims 34–41 and 44–50
Claims 34–41 depend directly or indirectly from claim 32; and
claims 44–50 depend directly or indirectly from claim 42. Br. 15–17.
Appellant asserts that claims 34–38 and 44–47 recite tangible items (i.e.,
“images and cameras,” “optical code object,” “optical codes and labels,”
“labels, packaging for commodities and predetermined amounts of
commodities,” and “digital code”), and “narrow[] the way in which the
digital information/scheme identifier is encoded.” Br. 11–12. Appellant
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further asserts that claims 39–41 and 48–50 recite tangible items (i.e.,
“package configurations,” “a change,” and “wireless radio medium and
client device”), and add “additional step[s] (or program instruction[s]).”
Br. 13.
Appellant’s assertions do not persuade us of Examiner error because
the dependent claims merely narrow the abstract idea recited in each
independent claim (i.e., by reciting an “optical code” or “optical code
object” or “label,” by “narrow[ing] the way in which the digital information
. . . is encoded,” and by adding an “additional step (or program
instruction)”). Dependent claims that merely narrow an abstract idea “add
nothing outside the abstract realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Adding “a degree of particularity” does
not save a claim from abstraction. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons,
Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that “a claim is not
patent eligible merely because it applies an abstract idea in a narrow way”).
Additionally, the dependent claims employ generic computer-system
components similar to the independent claims to perform generic computer
functions—i.e., collecting, manipulating, and displaying data—such as a
wireless radio medium, client device, or camera. Br. 15–17; see Final
Act. 12–14, 15; Ans. 11–17. As with the independent claims, we conclude
that the combination of limitations in each dependent claim does not supply
an “inventive concept” that renders the claim “significantly more” than an
abstract idea.
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For the reasons discussed above, dependent claims 34–41 and 44–50
fail to satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step one and step two. Hence, we
sustain the § 101 rejection of these dependent claims.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 32 and 34–51.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
32, 34–
51
101 Eligibility 32, 34–51

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED