0120131347
06-14-2013
Shirley A. Phillips, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.
Shirley A. Phillips,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Capital Metro Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120131347
Hearing No. 430-2012-00222X
Agency No. 1K-231-0013-12
DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's November 15, 2013 final action concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
BACKGROUND
During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Casual Mail Handler at the Agency's Richmond Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) in Sandston, Virginia.
On February 10, 2012, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint. Therein, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when:
on November 26, 2011, she was terminated from the Postal Service.
The record reflects that Casual employees are used as a limited term supplemental work force and are not covered under a collective bargaining agreement, and could be separated from their positions with the Postal Service at any time. The record further reflects that Complainant's daughter was also working at the Richmond P&DC as a casual employee.
Following the investigation of the instant formal complaint, Complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On January 7, 2013, the AJ issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency.
In her decision, the AJ found no discrimination. The AJ found that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination. The AJ further found that even assuming Complainant established a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which Complainant failed to show were a pretext.
The AJ noted that that on November 13, 2011, Complainant's daughter did not report to work as scheduled. The AJ further noted that the Acting Supervisor asked Complainant the reason her daughter was not at work and Complainant replied that her daughter was absent. The Acting Supervisor stated that she told Complainant that she had not approved her daughter's absence and that her daughter needed to call her. The AJ noted that Complainant's daughter called the Acting Supervisor, claiming that the Acting Supervisor had verbally approved her absence from work. The Acting Supervisor denied that she had approved the absence.
The Acting Supervisor further stated that on November 14, 2011, she approached Complainant's daughter "to inquire about her absence on Sunday. [Complainant's daughter] became very loud, rude and had a hostile body motion as we discussed her being absent without permission. [Complainant], approached in a loud and rude voice stating, 'you're not going to fire my daughter. I'm not going to stand for this shit.' I felt threaten by the way she approach me so I instructed [Complainant] to report back to AFSM#2 if she wanted her job."
The Acting Supervisor stated that following the incident, she went to the Plant Manager because Complainant's behavior "was loud, rude and she used profanity on the workroom floor in front of employees. This type of behavior is not and w[i]ll not be tolerated." The AJ noted that the Acting Supervisor complained to the Plant Manager about having to supervise Complainant and her daughter. The Acting Supervisor told the Plant Manager that she did not want to supervise if she had to tolerate such behavior from casual employees.
The Plant Manager stated that he was the deciding official to terminate Complainant from Agency employment for being insubordinate and disrespectful. Specifically, the Plant Manager stated that on November 14, 2011, Complainant "was reportedly disrespectful to her supervisor, rude, disruptive, threatening, and otherwise exhibited unacceptable conduct on the workroom floor. Management does not have the ability to discipline casual employees via letters of warnings or suspensions. Termination was deemed the only appropriate recourse." The record reflects that Complainant's daughter was also terminated from Agency employment during the relevant period.
The Plant Manager further stated that the Acting Supervisor approached him "very distraught stating that she didn't want to supervise anymore if management tolerated abusive, disrespectful, and disruptive conduct from casual employees. [Acting Supervisor] described the incident stated that [Complainant] was rude, intimidating and yelled and cursed at her on the workroom floor over a dispute regarding her daughter's attendance."
The Plant Manager stated that Complainant was in violation of Section 665.16 "Behavior and Personal Habits" of the Employee and Labor Relations Manual. Moreover, he Plant Manager stated that Complainant's race and sex were not factors in his determination to terminate her from Agency employment. Section 665.16 states "employees are expected to conduct themselves during and outside of working hours in a manner that reflects favorably upon the Postal Service."
Complainant, on appeal, argues that the AJ erred in issuing a summary judgment because there are material facts at issue. For instance, Complainant argues that she was discriminated against "because I was working in the position of a casual employee without the rights provided the other employees. Because I have been denied the due process of a hearing I have been unable to show cause for my discrimination. I believe that I was the victim of a conspiracy and a show of power by the Postal Service."
The instant appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Complainant has not provided any persuasive arguments regarding the propriety of the AJ's finding of no discrimination by summary judgment. Complainant has not identified any material facts in dispute which require resolution through a hearing. The AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts established during the investigation, and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Complainant did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decisions made here were motivated by discriminatory animus toward Complainant's race or sex.
Based on our careful review of the record and consideration of all arguments presented on appeal, the Agency's final action implementing the AJ's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 14, 2013
__________________
Date
2
0120131347
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
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