Sherwin-Williams Company, The

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 1321 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

THE SHERWIN-WII.LIAMS COMPANY
The Sherwin-Williams Company and Local 1961,
Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades.
Cases 10-CA-15355 and 10-CA-15741
March 30, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On October 7, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
William N. Cates issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief and the Charging
Party filed an answering brief to Respondent's ex-
ceptions.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. 2
We have modified the Administrative Law
Judge's proposed notice to conform with his rec-
ommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, The Sherwin-
Williams Company, Morrow, Georgia, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tions set forth in the said recommended Order,
except that the attached notice is substituted for
that of the Administrative Law Judge.
[ Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
2 Respondent's reliance on NLR.B. v Cone Mills Corporation, 373
F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1967), to support its contention that benefits were las-
fully withheld is misplaced. Here, upon expiration of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement between Respondent and the Charging Party, Re-
spondent immediately announced to the Charging Part) that it had decid-
ed to discontinue the disability benefits which had been provided for in
the expired agreement Respondent gave no notice to the Charging Party
of the impending change; nor did it provide any opportunity for bargain-
ing. Neither Cone Mills nor any other precedent stands for the proposi-
tion that an employer with an outstanding bargaining obligation can uni-
laterally alter or change an existing benefit, which is regarded as a man-
datory subject of bargaining without prior notice or bargaining See
Curley Printing Company. Printing Industries of Nashville. Inc.. and Print-
ing Industries of America. Inc, 169 NL.RB 251. 257 (196).
260 NLRB No. 185
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR REI ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT withhold disability benefits
payable to each of the five employees named
in the complaint in this proceeding throughout
the period October 25, 1979, to January 4,
1980, or otherwise discriminate against em-
ployees, because of any union activity by any
of our employees, including strikes.
WE WILI. NOT unilaterally change wages,
hours, working conditions, and other terms
and conditions of employment of our employ-
ees by refusing to pay our employees accrued
holiday benefits.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE wiL.L make our employees whole for
the loss of any disability benefits they suffered
as a result of our unlawful conduct, with inter-
est.
WE WILt. make Roy Odum whole for any
loss of holiday pay he suffered during the
period October 25, 1979, to January 4, 1980,
with interest.
WE WILI., upon request, bargain in good
faith with Local 1961, Brotherhood of Painters
and Allied Trades, concerning any proposed
change in the wages, hours, working condi-
tions, and terms and conditions of employment
of our employees in the following collective-
bargaining unit:
All production maintenance and raw materi-
al warehouse employees, and janitors at Re-
spondent's Morrow, Georgia, plant but ex-
cluding office clerical employees and the
plant clerical, finished product warehouse
employees, laboratory assistants, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
THE SHERWIN-WII.I.IAMS COMPANY
1321
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge: These
cases were heard before me on July 15, 1980, at Atlanta,
Georgia. Pursuant to a charge and an amended charge
filed on January II and February 25, 1980, respectively,
in Case 10-CA-15355 by Local 1961, Brotherhood of
Painters and Allied Trades, hereinafter Union or Charg-
ing Party, a complaint was issued on February 25, 1980,
against The Sherwin-Williams Company, hereinafter Re-
spondent or Employer, alleging that on or about October
25, 1979, Respondent unlawfully withheld disability
benefits payable to certain names employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. An amendment to
complaint in Case 10-CA-15355 issued June 4, 1980, in
which one of the previously named employees alleged to
have had disability benefit payments withheld was de-
leted. Further, pursuant to a charge filed by the Union
on April 18, 1980, in Case 10-CA-15741, a complaint,
order consolidating cases, and notice of hearing was
issued on June 4, 1980, against Respondent alleging that
on or about January 6, 1980, Respondent, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, unilaterally eliminated
pay for certain specified holidays which allegedly had
accrued pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement
between the Union and Respondent, and further alleges
that Respondent unlawfully withheld accrued holiday
pay from a specifically named employee on or about Jan-
uary 6, 1980, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act. On June 10, 1980, an errata was issued to the
amendment to complaint in Case 10-CA-15355 reinstat-
ing the name of the individual previously eliminated by
the amendment to complaint. Answers to the complaints
were duly filed by Respondent in which it denied having
violated the Act.
All parties appeared at the hearing and were afforded
full opportunity to present oral and written evidence,
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Upon the
entire record, together with careful observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses and consideration of briefs
filed by counsel for the General Counsel, Charging
Party, and Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is an Ohio corporation with an office,
plant, and place of business located at Morrow, Georgia,
where it is engaged in the manufacture of paint. During
the 12-month period preceding issuance of the original
complaint, Respondent sold and shipped products valued
in excess of $50,000 from its Morrow, Georgia, location
directly to points located outside the State of Georgia.
The complaints allege, Respondent admits, and I find
that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaints allege, the answers admit, and I find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALL.EGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent and Union have been parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement at least since 1967.' The con-
tract in effect at all times material to these cases expired
by its terms on October 25, 1979, following a request of
the Union to open the agreement for negotiations. The
Union and Respondent were unable to arrive at a new
agreement on or before October 25, 1979. The Union
called a strike at Respondent's Morrow, Georgia, plant
that commenced at 12:01 a.m., October 25, 1979. The
strike continued until January 4, 1980. There is no con-
tention that the strike was other than an economic strike.
The Teamsters Union did not strike Respondent as such,
but notified Respondent that it would honor, and did in
fact honor, the Union's picket line. The collective-bar-
gaining agreement that expired on October 25, 1979,
contained in article XV thereof a disability benefit plan.
The disability benefit plan as set forth in the contract be-
tween the parties was actually a summary of a disability
benefit plan which was a separate document. The provi-
sions of the disability benefit plan called for benefits to
be paid to disabled employees based upon the length in
complete years of service an employee had worked for
Respondent. Additionally, the collective-bargaining
agreement listed certain days as agreed upon holidays
which included: Thanksgiving Day; the day after
Thanksgiving; December 24; Christmas Day; December
31; and New Year's Day.
B. Alleged Withholding of Disability Benefits
The complaint in Case 10-CA-15355 with its amend-
ment and errata alleges that Respondent withheld disabil-
ity benefits payable to its employees Ann Roberts, Alton
Lyon, Dorothy Johnson, Marvin Grissom, and Charles
Tumlin. The complaint further alleges that the named
employees were entitled to the disability benefits under
the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint fur-
ther alleges that the named employees did not participate
in the strike that commenced at Respondent's plant on
October 25, 1979. The complaint alleges that the with-
The certified appropriate unit consists of:
All production maintenance and raw material warehouse employees,
and janitors at Respondent's Morrow, Georgia, plant but excluding
office clerical employees and the plant clerical, finished product
warehouse employees, laboratory assistants, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act
The Union and General Teamsters Local Union Noi 528, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America. were jointly certified by the Board on October
5. 1967, following a Board-conducted election on September 27, 1967
Therefore, the contract between Respondent and the Union is a contract
between Respondent and both unions The Painters Union (referred to in
this Decision as Union) represents the production employees while the
Teamsters represent the raw materials, warehouse, finished goods ware.
house, and associated products warehouse employees
1322
THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY
holding of the disability benefits from the named employ-
ees whose disability had commenced before the strike
and whose disability continued after the strike constitut-
ed a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
It is undisputed that the day the strike commenced,
five employees, namely: Ann Roberts, Alton Lyon,
Dorothy (Owens) Johnson, Marvin Grissom, and Charles
Tumlin, were disabled for one reason or another and as
such were unavailable for work. Each of the employees
were at least on October 24, 1979, the last day before the
strike and the expiration of the collective-bargaining
agreement, receiving disability benefits from Respondent.
Respondent's nationwide labor relations official,
Edward Skinner, acknowledged that he told representa-
tives of the Union at a meeting which took place on Oc-
tober 25, 1979, between Respondent and the Union that
the disability benefits of the disability plan would cease
being effective that date. Local 1961 business representa-
tive, Charles W. Cook, Jr., testified, and I credit his testi-
mony, that he protested to Respondent the termination
of the disability benefits. Disability benefits were in fact
discontinued by Respondent, effective October 25, 1979.
Skinner testified that Respondent had never paid disabil-
ity benefits to employees who were on any type of dis-
ability prior to a strike where the disability continued
into the advent of a strike. Skinner acknowledged that
discontinuance of the disability benefits was not dis-
cussed with the Union in negotiations prior to the termi-
nation of those benefits at the commencement of the
strike on October 25, 1979. Further, Respondent ac-
knowledged that it was unaware whether any of the
named employees who were on disability at the com-
mencement of the strike had demonstrated any public
support for the strike. Each of the disabled employees
were instructed by Chief Shop Steward Western
Howard, Jr.,2 not to participate in the strike, not to walk
the picket line, or do anything to participate in the strike.
It is undisputed that Howard attempted to file with Re-
spondent Personnel Director Faye Menhart a grievance
on November 5, 1979, protesting the discontinuation of
the disability benefits. The grievance was not accepted
by Respondent with the stated reason by Respondent
that there was no contract on which to base the griev-
ance.
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act by terminating disability benefits to its named
employees who were physically unable to work on and
after October 25, 1979, because other employees actively
employed at Respondent's facility went out on strike.
Respondent terminated the disability benefits immediate-
ly upon the commencement of the strike and at a time
when it had no knowledge as to whether the disabled
employees ratified or actively supported the strike and
further at a time when the union representative was pro-
testing the termination of those benefits by Respondent.
The termination of those benefits was unlawfully intend-
ed to coerce and restrain protected union activity with
respect to the strike, by imposing a sanction against cer-
tain unit employees if others in the unit engaged in strike
activity. E. L. Wiegand Division, Emerson Electric Co.,
2 Howard impressed me as a truthful witness and I credit his testimony
246 NLRB 1143 (1979). I reject Respondent's argument
that because the collective-bargaining agreement had ex-
pired, it was privileged to discontinue disability pay-
ments to employees who were disabled at and after the
time of the strike and expiration of the contract between
the parties.3 I further reject Respondent's contention that
the named employees could not reasonably have expect-
ed to work but for their disability, solely because of a
strike by other employees who worked in the area of the
plant where they would have worked.
Having found it was an unfair labor practice for Re-
spondent to have discontinued disability payments on the
first day of the strike, the individual employees must be
made whole for what they lost throughout the time
period starting October 25, 1979, and ending on the date
which each individual employee became well enough to
return to work, if in fact the employee recovered suffi-
ciently during the 10-week strike to return to work. In-
quiry into the question of how long an individual re-
mained on disability, and therefore how much the indi-
vidual is due, is a matter developed primarily at the com-
pliance stage of Board proceedings. However, evidence
was developed in this regard with respect to when cer-
tain of the employees named in the complaint were suffi-
ciently well to return to work and whether any of the
named employees enmeshed themselves in the ongoing
strike activity to such an extent as to terminate their
right to continued disability benefits.
Employee Ann Roberts testified, and I credit her testi-
mony, that she worked for Respondent as a paint filler
on the quart paintline labeling and packing quarts of
paint into boxes and then assisted the other employees in
stacking those boxes on pallets. Roberts had been on a
nonjob related disability for about a month prior to the
strike. This disability continued throughout the strike.
Robert was released without restrictions and returned to
work on January 7, 1980. Roberts was released for light
duty in early December 1979. Roberts indicated the re-
strictions were no lifting, bending, or stooping. Roberts'
uncontradicted testimony indicated her job required lift-
ing, bending, and stooping. The uncontradicted testimo-
ny of Roberts, Union Representative Cooper, and Chief
Steward Howard established that Respondent allowed
disabled employees with restrictions to light duty to
return to work if the injury or disability was job related,
but required an unrestricted and unconditional release
before allowing a disabled employee to return to work
following a nonjob related disability. I therefore con-
clude that Roberts' release to light duty did not termi-
nate her right to disability benefits as Respondent's prac-
tice was to require an unconditional release from a
nonjob related disability. Roberts at no time enmeshed
herself in the ongoing strike in any manner to terminate
her right to disability benefits. I therefore conclude that
7 An employer may not unilaterally terminate mandator) 8(d) subjects
of bargaining at the expiration of a contract without first giving notice to
and negotiating with the Union Harold W Hinson. d/b/a Hen House
larket .o. 3 s .NI..R B, 428 F 2d 133 (8th Cir 1970) Disability plans
are mandatory 8(d) subjects of bargaining M.cDonnell Douglau Corpora-
tion, 224 Nl.RH 881 (197t)
1323
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Roberts was entitled to disability payments from October
25, 1979, until January 7, 1980.
Employee Alton Lyon testified, and I credit his testi-
mony, that he sustained a back injury while lifting 50-
pound bags at Respondent's plant on October 12, 1979.
Lyon was released to return to work on November 7,
1979. Lyon gave his medical release papers to Respond-
ent's personnel manager who told him she would see him
after the strike. Lyon did not say at the time that he
wanted to go back to work, and Respondent's personnel
manager did not ask Lyon if he wanted to return to
work. Lyon did not return to work at the time of his re-
lease because of the strike. Lyon did nothing between
October 25 and November 7, 1979, to indicate his sup-
port for the strike. In fact, Lyon crossed the picket line
every other day during that time period in connection
with the physical therapy treatments he was receiving
for his injuries. I conclude that Lyon was entitled to dis-
ability payments from October 25 until November 7,
1979.
Employee Dorothy Johnson testified, and I credit her
testimony, that she had a nonjob related disability com-
mencing October 1, 1979, and she was not released to
return to work until November 27, 1979. Johnson did
nothing during that period to indicate her support of the
strike except to attend union meetings where she was
told that disabled employees were to have no part in the
strike. Johnson took no part in the strike. Johnson indi-
cated she made no effort to return to work after her re-
lease on November 27, 1979, until the termination of the
strike. I conclude that Johnson was entitled to disability
benefits from October 25, 1979 (she was paid disability
benefits prior to October 25, 1979), until November 27,
1979.
Employee Marvin Grissom, on the date of the hearing
of this case, was hospitalized and unable to testify. The
parties stipulated that Grissom was on a nonjob related
disability as of October 25, 1979. The parties further stip-
ulated that Grissom received disability payments from
October 18, 1979, until October 25, 1979. Additionally,
the parties stipulated that Grissom was unconditionally
released to return to his normal work duties on Novem-
ber 11, 1979. There is no evidence to indicate that Gris-
som enmeshed himself in any way in the ongoing strike
during the period October 25 to November 11, 1979. I
therefore conclude that Grissom was entitled to disability
benefits from October 25 to November 11, 1979.
Employee Charles Tumlin testified he was on light
duty disability as of October 25, 1979. Tumlin received
disability payments until October 25, 1979, for his nonjob
related injury. Tumlin testified he was told there was no
light duty available for him. The parties stipulated that
the disability certificate on file with Respondent indicat-
ed that Tumlin was unconditionally released to return to
work as of November 8, 1979. Tumlin joined the strike
the week of Thanksgiving 1979. I conclude that Tumlin
was entitled to disability benefits from October 25 to No-
vember 8, 1979.
C. Alleged Unilateral Elimination of Certain Holidays
and Withholding of Accrued Holiday Pay
The General Counsel alleges that since on or about
January 6, 1980, Respondent has discriminated against its
employee Roy Odum by withholding from him accrued
holiday pay, which had accrued pursuant to a then re-
cently expired collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent and the Union. Further, the General Counsel
alleges that the holiday pay was withheld because em-
ployees of Respondent, other than Odum and certain
specifically named fellow employees, engaged in activi-
ties on behalf of the Union by concertedly ceasing work
and engaging in a strike. The General Counsel contends
that the action by Respondent of withholding accrued
holiday pay from employee Odum, whom the General
Counsel alleges did not participate in the strike, consti-
tutes a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It
is also alleged that this conduct constitutes a unilateral
change in Respondent's existing holiday policy in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
In support of these allegations, the General Counsel
called employee Paul Odum as a witness. Odum has been
an employee of Respondent since 1972. I credit the un-
contradicted testimony of Odum. In April 1979, Odum
sustained a job-related injury to the cartilage in his knee
twice requiring surgery and as a result was absent from
work for an extended period of time. At the commence-
ment of the strike, Odum's disability benefits were ex-
hausted, but he was still disabled from returning to work.
Odum testified that, while disabled prior to the strike, he
received pay for any regular holiday that came due.4
However, after the advent of the strike and at a time
while Odum was still disabled, Respondent ceased to pay
Odum for regular holidays as set forth in the collective-
bargaining agreement between the parties. Approximate-
ly a week after Thanksgiving 1979, Odum, while at the
plant to pick up a workmen's compensation payment,
asked Respondent's plant nurse why he had not received
the Thanksgiving holiday payment. Odum testified the
nurse inquired of Respondent's payroll department and
then informed Odum it was because of the strike. Odum
testified he did not participate in the strike in any
manner.
Contrary to Respondent's contention that the discon-
tinuance of the holiday pay was raised at the October 25,
1979, bargaining session on the morning after the con-
tract expired and the strike commenced, I find there is
no evidence in this record to support that contention.
The first evidence that the Union had notice that the
holiday pay had been discontinued for any disabled em-
ployee was after the fact, through the affected employee
involved. There is no evidence that the Union was af-
forded an opportunity to negotiate the subject matter
prior to Respondent making the unilateral change. Re-
spondent's contention that the contract had expired and
its "obligation ceased" with respect to holiday pay for
'The contract which expired on October 25, 1979, provided
Where an employee who is otherwise eligible for holiday pay and is
absent due to an industrial accident, he shall receive holiday pay.
[G C lxh 2. p 15, Sec. 18]
1324
THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY
employees injured on the job is without merit. (See fn. 3
of this Decision.)
I find Respondent's withholding accrued holiday pay s
from its employee Roy Odum in the circumstances of
this case as outlined above violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act. See Wallace Mletal Products, Inc., 244
NLRB 41 (1979). I further find that the conduct of Re-
spondent as set forth above constitutes a unilateral
change in wages and working conditions in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
IV. [ritli I:1-iCT OF 1 t INI AIR I ABOR PR X( 11(CS
UPON C()OM11 :R I
The activities of Respondent set out in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
the Respondent described in section I, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
CONC LUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by withholding payment of disability benefits to the
employees named in the complaint herein from October
25, 1979, through January 4, 1980.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by withholding accrued holiday pay from its em-
ployee Roy Odum during the period October 25, 1979,
until January 4, 1980, as specified in the then controlling
collective-bargaining agreement.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by unilaterally changing employee benefits by elimi-
nating pay for the holidays alleged in the complaint
which had accrued as specified in the then controlling
collective-bargaining agreement.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Ac-
cordingly, Respondent is ordered to pay disability bene-
fits due to the employees named in the complaint with
interest to be computed as outlined below. The period
for which such reimbursement must be made is from Oc-
tober 25, 1979, until January 4, 1980. The disabled time
I The complaint alleges the holidays pursuant to the collective-bargain-
ing agreement as being: Thanksgiving Day. Christmas Eve, Christmas
Day, New Year's Eve, and New Year's Day. A reading of the contract
provisions in question shows one additional holiday during that period to
be the day after Thanksgiving I therefore conclude this holiday should
have been included also
period for each employee is set forth in the body of this
Decision.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (I) of the Act by withholding accrued vacation pay
from its employee Roy Odum, I shall order Respondent
to reimburse Odum for the holiday pay due him for the
period from October 25, 1979, until January 4, 1980,
backpay to be computed with interest as prescribed in F
iW: Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Flor-
ida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977); see, general-
ly, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 1
shall also order that Respondent, upon request, bargain
with the Union concerning any proposed changes in em-
ployees' holiday benefits.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 6
The Respondent, The Sherwin-Williams Company,
Morrow, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Withholding payment of disability benefits from
employees for the purpose of coercing them or other em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights to engage in pro-
tected concerted activities, including strike.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
unilaterally and discriminatorily changing employee holi-
day pay for the period specified in the section of this De-
cision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action deemed neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole the employees listed in the complaint
by paying to each what disability benefits were due them
during the period October 25, 1979, until January 4,
1980, with interest pursuant to present Board law.
(b) Reimburse its employee Roy Odum and make him
whole for any loss of holiday pay in the manner and for
the period specified in the section of this Decision enti-
tled "The Remedy."
(c) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union concerning any proposed changes in the
wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms and
conditions of employment of Respondent's employees
represented by the Union.
(d) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, all records necessary to analyze the
amount due in the effectuation of this remedial order.
(e) Post at its Morrow, Georgia, plant copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings. conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
: In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Continued
1 325
1326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for places, including all places where notices to employees
Region 10, after being duly signed by an authorized rep- are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
resentative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respond- by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
ent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained defaced, or covered by any other material.
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."