01993211
04-04-2002
Sherry Watts, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Sherry Watts v. U.S. Postal Service
01993211
04-04-02
.
Sherry Watts,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01993211
Agency No. 1F-921-1071-95, 1F-921-0021-97, 1F-921-0031-98
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final agency
decision (FAD) dismissing her EEO complaints<1> of unlawful employment
discrimination.
The record discloses that, on August 21, 1998, complainant and the agency
entered into a settlement agreement regarding the three above-mentioned
complaints. On October 23, 1998, the agency, without referring to its
August 1998 settlement agreement with complainant, issued a FAD finding
no discrimination regarding two of the above-mentioned complaints.
Complainant filed an appeal of the FAD several months later, in which
she alleged that the agency failed to comply with their August 1998
settlement agreement.
The Commission finds that the agency erred in issuing a FAD in this matter
and that the matter at issue herein is the complainant's allegation of
noncompliance by the agency. As ordered in a preliminary Commission
decision dated January 24, 2002, the agency supplemented the record
with evidence regarding its compliance with the August 1998 settlement
agreement. The agency, in a letter dated February 20, 2002 covering its
supplemental evidence, indicated that it did not breach the settlement
agreement with complainant. Complainant did not respond to the agency's
supplemental evidence within the allotted time frame. Now that the
Commission has received sufficient information to make a reasoned
determination, we will process complainant's appeal as appropriate.
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
[Manager] agrees to reinstate to [complainant] any sick leave actually
used for stress-related absences. To determine the correct # of hours,
[manager] agrees to get a printout of how much sick leave has been
used for stress-related absences since July 1995. [Complainant] agrees
to provide [manager] with information she has to assist him in that
determination. [Manager and complainant] agree to meet to confirm the
correct number of hours on or before Friday, September 4, 1998.
[Manager and complainant] agree that her leave without pay (LWOP)
will be adjusted to sick leave, from the sick leave that is reinstated.
The expectation is that holidays during the LWOP period will be reimbursed
at holiday rate.
In a letter dated February 24, 1999, complainant alleged that the agency
was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that the agency
specifically implement its terms. Specifically, complainant alleged
that the agency failed to (1) adjust her LWOP to sick leave from the
sick leave reinstated, (2) reimburse her for LWOP that exceeded the
amount of sick leave that was reinstated, (3) meet with complainant to
discuss the appropriate number of sick leave hours to reinstate, (4)
reimburse her for the annual leave and all of the LWOP that she used
once her sick leave was exhausted, and (5) reimburse her for the night
shift differentials she lost.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, complainant compiled data which indicated that
she used a total of 641.16 hours of sick leave, 106.73 hours of annual
leave, 859.53 hours of LWOP, and earned 80 hours of holiday pay between
1995 and 1998. The agency compensated complainant for 641 hours of
sick leave, which was the LWOP that was adjusted to sick leave, and
80 hours of holiday pay. The calculation was based on complainant's
current hourly rate, $18.19, rather than the applicable hourly rates
for 1995 through 1998, which were less than $18.19. On March 12, 1999,
the agency issued complainant a check for $13,115.00 less deductions.
The agency stated that its records were consistent with complainant's data
that she used 614.16 hours of stress-related sick leave. The agency did
not compensate complainant for annual leave used as stress-related leave
or for LWOP that exceeded the amount of sick leave that was reinstated
because such reimbursements were not provided for in the settlement
agreement. Finally, the agency did not include night shift differentials
in its calculation because, based on the Employee Labor Manual 434.2,
said differentials were for all work performed, paid training or travel
time between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. and were not applied to the use of
sick leave.
It is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's determination
in this matter that no breach occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
__04-04-02________________
Date
1The FAD addresses complaint numbers
1F-921-1071-95 and 1F-921-0021-97 only. Complaint number 1F-921-0031-98
is mentioned in complainant's appellate brief and several other documents
of record.