Sherrell M. Garth, Complainant,v.R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 17, 2003
01a23960 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 17, 2003)

01a23960

09-17-2003

Sherrell M. Garth, Complainant, v. R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Sherrell M. Garth v. Department of the Army

01A23960

September 17, 2003

.

Sherrell M. Garth,

Complainant,

v.

R.L. Brownlee,

Acting Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23960

Agency No. BXJDCL-99-05J0020

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the agency's

final decision dated June 6, 2002, which dismissed her complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq.

Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor on March 29, 1999, seeking to

pursue a class complaint on behalf of black employees at the agency's

Family Services Division, concerning six discrimination claims.

When counseling was not successful, complainant, as class agent, filed a

formal complaint, which the agency transferred to an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ) for a decision on the issue of class certification.

On February 27, 2001, the AJ issued a decision denying class certification

due to failure to satisfy the applicable regulatory requirements, and

ordered the agency to process complainant's individual discrimination

complaint. On March 21, 2001, the agency issued a final decision

notifying complainant that the class complaint would be accepted

and processed as an individual complaint. However, in a decision on

December 10, 2001, the agency amended its March 21, 2001 determination,

and instead notified complainant that the complaint would be sent to a

certain EEO office to ascertain whether or not to accept the individual

complaint for processing.

In her individual complaint, complainant claims discrimination on the

bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) as follows:

Complainant and four co-workers were terminated or forced to resign

under duress;

Management solicited false statements from co-workers for the purpose

of supporting its decision to terminate complainant;

Management impeded the settlement of complainant's prior complaint;

Management failed to investigate alleged discriminatory practices;

Management engaged in discriminatory hiring practices; and

The servicing EEO Officer refused to process a class complaint brought

to his attention by complainant in June 1998.

In its June 6, 2002 final decision that is the subject of the instant

appeal, the agency first dismissed the entire complaint on the grounds of

untimely EEO Counselor contact. Specifically, the agency found that all

of the identified discriminatory incidents occurred during complainant's

employment, which terminated in June 1998, such that her EEO Counselor

contact on March 29, 1999, was beyond the 45-day period. The agency

also found that complainant had constructive knowledge of the time limit

because of prior EEO activity. Alternatively, the agency dismissed the

entire complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that none of the

alleged incidents resulted in a present tangible harm to complainant.

Next, in addressing the claims individually, the agency dismissed claim

2 on the grounds that it was identical to a claim raised in a prior EEO

complaint. Specifically, the agency found that complainant previously

filed an EEO complaint on August 18, 1998, claiming discriminatory

termination, and that in support of this claim, she specifically contended

that the agency solicited negative and false accusations about her.

The agency further determined that this prior complaint had been the

subject of an agency final decision finding no discrimination, as

well as a decision by the Commission in Garth v. Department of Army,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A01854 (January 17, 2001).

Regarding claim 6, the agency dismissed this claim on the grounds of

mootness, based on findings that complainant was terminated in June 1998,

and that her class complaint was ultimately processed by the agency.

Based on these findings, the agency furthered determined that even

if it were true that an EEO Counselor refused to process it for her,

there is no reasonable expectation that such a violation would recur,

and that interim events eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.

On appeal, in pertinent part, complainant argues that the complaint should

not be dismissed as untimely, given that complainant originally contacted

an EEO Counselor on June 8, 1998, mere days after her termination.

Complainant also argues that dismissal on the grounds of failure to state

a claim is improper, because her termination resulted in lost wages,

being stranded in Germany, other economic losses, and emotional distress.

Additionally, complainant avers that claim 5 goes to the heart of Title

VII, and avers that claims 3 and 4, at this stage, must be accepted

as true for complainant to be able to invoke Title VII protections.

Regarding the dismissal of claim 2, complainant argues that because this

matter was not fully addressed on the merits in the previous complaint,

it cannot be dismissed. Complainant concedes that the agency properly

adjudicated claim 6 as moot.<1>

In response, the agency disputes complainant's appeal contentions, and

elaborates on the findings set forth in its final decision, requesting

that the Commission affirm its dismissal. In reply, complainant charges

that the agency fragmented her claim, and processed it in a piecemeal

fashion, robbing her of an opportunity to have her termination claim

fully and fairly adjudicated on the merits.

Analysis and Findings

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)

day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation

is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,

but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have

become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that she was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that she did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence she was prevented

by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

Review of Commission records confirm that complainant contacted an EEO

Counselor on June 8, 1998, and again on October 7, 1998, which resulted

in the filing of two formal complaints alleging unlawful employment

termination, as well as certain acts of reprisal. As reflected

above, these two complaints (agency Complaint Nos. BXJDFO-98-101870

and BXJDFO-98-101910) were fully adjudicated by the agency, and the

Commission dismissed the appeal because of a late filing. See Garth,

supra. Subsequently, complainant again initiated EEO Counselor contact on

March 29, 2001, for the purpose of initiating a class action complaint,

again raising her own June 1998 termination, as well as other incidents,

all which occurred prior to her termination.

Based on these findings, we conclude that the agency properly dismissed

the entire complaint on the grounds of untimely EEO Counselor contact.

Specifically, we that the record confirms that all incidents in question

clearly occurred on or before the date of complainant's termination,

and so beyond the 45-day limitation period with respect to complainant's

EEO Counselor contact on March 29, 1999.

Finally, while we concur with the agency's determination that multiple

other grounds for dismissal of the complaint and/or individual claims are

applicable, given the above determination, we do not address them herein.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the agency's dismissal of

the captioned complaint on the grounds of untimely EEO Counselor contact.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 17, 2003

__________________

Date

1Because the parties do not dispute that

the dismissal of claim 6 was improper, we shall not further address

it herein.